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Abstract 
Wilson, Ashley Peter, 'Hermeneutics and Moral Imagination: The 
Implications of Gadamer's Truth and Method for Christian Ethics' (Ph.D. 
thesis: Durham University, Durham, 2007). 
This study considers the implications for Christian ethics of the work of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer (in particular, his hermeneutics as presented in Truth and Method). The 
adequacy of moral deliberation based on autonomous moral reasoning to complex 
dynamic situations is challenged, as is the Enlightenment conception of abstract, 
universal rationality. Two major theses are proposed. First, that ethics (including 
Christian ethics) should adopt a stance that is properly hermeneutical: taking proper 
account of ethics' embeddedness in history and tradition; and abandoning hope of a 
universal or objective standpoint from which to make ethical judgements. Second, that 
human beings are fundamentally imaginative moral beings: imagination is central to 
ethics because it is central to language and reason. 
Legalism and utilitarianism are critiqued as examples of the dependence of ethics on 
notions of absolute truth and universal method. Gadamer's Truth and Method is 
considered, highlighting areas of relevance to ethics. In response to Gadamer's 
observations on the centrality of language to hermeneutics, the work of Mark Johnson 
in cognitive science is explored in detail. The centrality of imagination to moral 
reasoning and to conscience is noted; and parallels are drawn between conscience and 
taste. It is proposed that a proper emphasis on the metaphorical nature of moral 
language, together with a notion of reason (and of moral deliberation) that is essentially 
imaginative, accord better with the phenomenology of ethical deliberation than the 
traditional accounts and also allow for more flexible responses. 
The implications of Gadamer's hermeneutics and Johnson's moral imagination for 
Christian ethics are explored in relation to creation, incarnation, revelation and 
inspiration. The study concludes that a properly hermeneutical Christian ethics would 
allow a greater role for the imagination in moral deliberation and provide a system 
which is flexible, creative, and humane, and which properly reflects the goodness and 
beauty of God. 
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IV 
ln this thesis I will explore the implications for Christian ethics of the 'vvork of Hans-
Georg Gadamer (in particular, his hermeneutics as presented in Truth and Methoi). I 
hope to demonstrate that thorough and explicit attention to the hermeneutical 
dimensions of ethical thought can yield important insights into our ethical 
understanding and moral reasoning. In so doing, I hope to contribute to the continuing 
contemporary discussions of the problems of modern ethical systems by challenging 
some of their assumptions and suggesting an alternative emphasis and approach. 
Gadamer's hermeneutics seem to be simply assumed by many authors (for example 
Alasdair Macintyre in After Virrue 2) but it is rare to find any explicit reference made to 
his work or any rigorous examination of the implications of hermeneutics for ethics. 
Although hermeneutical principles have found their way into American philosophy, 
Gadamer's work does not seem to have been well known in America until 
comparatively recently. This appropriation of hermeneutics at second hand may explain 
some apparent aporias in much modern ethical writing. Gadamer himself suggests that 
his work may have been marginalised because of the 'technological animosity to 
history', the rise of analytic philosophy, the Anglo-American theory of science, and the 
fresh impetus of the social sciences towards statistical and formal methods, in the latter 
half of the twentieth century. 3 
Ll Albstractnon 
Ethical decisions affect some of the most important and value-laden areas of our lives 
and our relationships with others; yet we are denied any affective dimension to our 
deliberations by many contemporary ethical theories. Ethics is to be an objective, quasi-
scientific, discipline: all subjective considerations (feelings, emotion, imagination), all 
agent-relative deliberations, and all context-relative features are to be excluded. This 
Tiv/. 
Alasdair Macintyre. After Virtue: A Stud)' in Mora! The01y (London: Duckwo11h, 2nd eel, 1985). 
Hans-Georg Gaclamer, 'A fterworcl' [ 1989], in T!v/, 551-79, at 551. 
t1ies in the face of our everyday moral experience. Instinct and common sense tell us 
that our lives and interrelationships with others are complex and dynamic: it feels 
inappropriate to deny our feelings and passions in relation to decisions about our lives 
and relationships when they are often the things that motivate us most strongly. 
Passions and emotions 1natter. We regularly find ourselves in situations vvhere we feel 
that a perfectly good rule should not be applied 'on this occasion' or where there seems 
to be simply no good alternative. Ethics is about concrete choices; it can feel very 
artificial or heartless to consider moral deliberation in the 'abstract' 
I suggest that the abstraction of moral principles (whether rules, rights, duties, 
consequences or whatever) from the context of action, and from human experience and 
emotion, constitutes a serious defect in any system of moral thought. Many modern 
ethical theories have attempted to describe rules that apply in all cases, or a procedure 
for determining the 'right' action or the 'right' choice in any given situation. However, 
in their attempts to turn ethics into a rational scientific discipline such theories have 
abstracted the ethical decision making process into an objective and dissociated method. 
However, ethicists have long been aware of the need to take proper account of the 
context of ethical problems. John Dewey and James Tufts, observed (in 1908): 
Of one thing we may be sure. If inquiries are to have any substantial basis, if 
they are not to be wholly up in the air, the theorist must take his departure from 
the problems which men actually meet in their own conduct. l-Ie may define and 
refine these; he may divide and systematize; he may abstract the problems from 
their concrete contexts in individual lives; he may classify them when he has 
detached them; but if he gets away from them he is talking about something 
which his own brain has invented, not about moral realities.4 
Some degree of abstraction may be required in our ethical thinking, but only as a tool of 
analysis. When faced with a deeply contextual ethical choice with a range of morally 
relevant factors and a network of relationships one has to begin somewhere, and 
abstracting certain features of the situation for consideration may be indispensable. 
However, it is crucial to remember that such abstraction is a means and not an encl. The 
results of ethical ret1ection on such abstracted features must surely be weighed against 
other possible approaches and feel back into the context to inform an ethical judgement. 
No single approach, based on the abstraction of particular features, can hope to provide 
a judgement that is properly relevant even to the situation under consideration let alone 
4 Quoted in Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics (London: S.C.M., 1966), 159. 
2 
to other, or all, similar situations. In my opinion, much ethics since the Enlightenment 
has been characterised by progressively increasing abstraction and has signally failed 
adequately to address 'the problems which men actually meet in their own conduct'. 5 In 
order to achieve their aim of universal (or even just wider) applicability ethical systems 
can only be very general in their prescriptions or proscriptions. As the systems become 
more general, they are of less and less direct practical use. They also lose their purchase 
on moral agents, becoming less and less able to motivate ethical decisions. Where are 
the strong sources of moral 'something-or-other' that will allow us to draw the kinds of 
ethical conclusions that carry enough moral weight to inspire people to live 
accordingly? My sense is that intellectual (rational) suasion is not enough, and that 
affective and aesthetic suasion are needed, which suggests that ethics will need to find 
its roots in affectivity and aesthetics, as well as reasonableness. Much contemporary 
ethics has focussed on the last of these three (with a particular notion of 
'reasonableness'), with the result that frequently we are unable to explain to ourselves 
why we think some kinds of acts are morally valuable and others morally objectionable. 
1.2 Modernity and rationality 
There are many ways of reading the Enlightenment but arguably one dimension of it is 
not so much the simple triumph of reason, but the completion of the process of 
dissociating the reason from the will and the passions, such that they can be contraposed 
in the way that David Hume does (reason as the slave of the passions). R. A. Shiner 
suggests that: 
The bulk of moral epistemology in the history of philosophy has been dominated 
by the model of the essential separation of Reason and Sentiment as possible 
sources of moral judgement ... We are not going to make any further progress 
(in meta-ethical theory) until we give up the Great Divide between Reason and 
Sentiment. 6 
5 The term 'Enlightenment' is increasingly contested: concerns have been expressed that different 
countries experienced different 'Enlightenments'; different commentators would date the 
Enlightenment differently and would include different authors as representative figures. I am using the 
term with its commonly accepted meaning: the intellectual movement beginning in England in the 
seventeenth century with Locke and the deists and developing in France and Germany in the 
eighteenth century. The term is roughly equivalent to 'the Age of Reason'. See M. J. Inwood, 
'Enlightenment', in Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 236-37. 
6 R. A. Shiner, 'Butler's Theory of Moral Judgement', in S. C. Brown (ed.), Philosophers of the 
Enlightenment (Brighton: Harvester, 1979), 199-225. 
3 
The standard account of modernity sees it ansmg with the seventeenth century 
insistence on rationality, together with a rejection of tradition and superstition: this 
scientific and philosophical revolution was instigated by Galileo and Descartes and 
produced a world of physical theory and technical practice. Stephen Toulmin suggests 
that, in fact, the roots of modernity go back rather earlier, to the Renaissance humanists: 
e.g. Erasmus and Rabelais in the fifteenth century, Montaigne and Shakespeare in the 
sixteenth. 7 Descartes' philosophy was a response to Montaigne' s restatement of 
classical scepticism: 'unless some one thing is found of which we can be completely 
certain, we can be certain about nothing'. 8 Montaigne believed that such a thing could 
not in fact be found, and that we simply cannot attain to certainty. Descartes found 
certainty in his cogito (the certainty of existence offered by mental experience). 
Modernity, Toulmin suggests, 
had two distinct starting points, a humanistic one grounded in classical literature 
and a scientific one rooted in 171h-century natural philosophy.9 
However a great deal of humanist insight was lost in the seventeenth century. With the 
Enlightenment, reason became the supreme authority. The basic presupposition of 
Enlightenment rationalism is that we can, by the exercise of our reason alone, discover 
everything there is to know about the world and ourselves, including religion and ethics. 
The Enlightenment emphasis was on 'scientific method', on validation, and on the 
search for 'univocity'. Reason is the sole arbiter; human beings are no longer to be 
subject to any external authority. Cartesian dualism was to become the 'chief girder in 
[the] framework of Modernity': 10 natural phenomena were increasingly explained in 
mechanical terms and rationality came to be seen as the distinguishing feature of human 
beings. However, human beings were characterised as mixed creatures: part intellectual 
in their exercise of reason, part carnal in their susceptibility to emotion. Human beings 
must strive to control unruly passions by the exercise of a decontextualised rationality. 
Toulmin suggests four ways in which philosophy after Descartes set aside humanist 
concerns in relation to practical knowledge. 11 First, the move from the oral to the 
written: validity of arguments came to depend on the analysis of chains of written 
7 Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (New York: Free Press, 1990), 22-
28. 
8 
-F'rolll'rViontaigne's ApoTogy o/R,aimonciSebond. Quoted in Toulmin, Cosm~polfs,-42. 
9 Toulmin, Cosmopolis, 43. 
10 Toulmin, Cosmopolis, I 08. 
11 Toulmin, Cosmopolis, 30-35. 
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statements (logic) rather than on the persuasiveness of public utterances (rhetoric). 
Second, the move from the particular to the universal: the abstraction of absolute and 
universal principles (like statute law) rather than the consideration of particular cases 
(case law). Third, the similar move from the local to the general: the demands of 
rationality require a focus on abstract ideas and unifying principles 'behind' concrete 
examples of cultural diversity. Fourth, the move from the timely to the timeless: 
transient human affairs are ignored, the focus is on timeless principles that hold good 
always and everywhere. I suggest that these approaches have been followed in ethics as 
well as in philosophy more generally, and that they are responsible for the propensity 
for abstraction in much modern ethics and so for ethics' increasing failure to motivate 
agents in complex moral situations: 
The seduction of High Modernity lay in its abstract neatness and theoretical 
simplicity: both of these features blinded the successors of Descartes to the 
unavoidable complexities of concrete human experience. 12 
Moral philosophy is only ever conducted by real people embedded in real historical 
cultures and traditions. As Mcintyre puts it: 
There was the-morality-of-fourth-century-Athens, there were the-moralities-of-
thirteenth-century-Western-Europe, there are numerous such moralities, but 
where ever was or is morality as such? 13 
For Kant, the answer to this was that all rational beings are required in virtue of their 
reason to act on maxims that are universalisable. Hence the necessity that ethics be 
universal. However, Hegel and Gadamer, among others, would argue that no such 
universal principles exist: reason itself has a history and all principles are specific to 
particular cultures in particular times and places. 14 Kant's principles, which he assumed 
to be universal, 
turned out to be the principles and presuppositions of one highly specific 
morality, a secularised version of Protestantism which furnished modem liberal 
individualism with one of its founding charters. Thus the claim to universality 
foundered ... For what the progress of analytic philosophy has succeeded in 
establishing is that there are no grounds for belief in universal necessary 
principles - outside purely formal enquiries - except relative to some set of 
assumptions. Cartesian first principles, Kantian a priori truths and even the 
ghosts of these notions that haunted empiricism for so long have all been 
expelled from philosophy. 15 
12 Toul~in, Cosmopolis, 201. 
13 Macintyre, After Virtue, 266. 
14 See also Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988). 
15 Macintyre, After Virtue, 266-67. 
5 
However, the ghosts of Kantian universalism linger in many other disciplines including, 
I suggest, in ethics. 
Albert Jansen and Stephen Toulmin are critical of the dominant assumption that moral 
reasoning must be formal and demonstrative or else not 'rational' at all. 16 They observe 
that demonstrative reasoning, which leads to knowledge as episteme, operates within a 
system of concepts. In other words, it is an abstract undertaking: relation to real life is 
suspended, and the focus is on internal consistency. Following Aristotle, they suggest 
that moral arguments cannot legitimately be abstracted in this way and that therefore 
moral knowledge is a matter not of theoretical knowledge, or episteme, but of practical 
wisdom, or phronesis. I will argue that there is much to gain from this emphasis on 
moral knowledge as phronesis (Chapter Four), and from a recovery of humanist 
concerns with practical wisdom. Ethics needs to recover rhetoric (Chapter Six); and, 
following Gadamer, it must recognise the inescapably situated nature (particular, local 
and timely) of all ethical reflection (Chapter Four). 17 
1.3 Kant's ethics and its separation from aesthetics 
Whilst Kant was convinced of the importance of reason he was also concerned to 
delineate the limits of reason. For Kant it is impossible to know anything 'in itself, 
rather we can only know how things appear to be: precisely because we can only know 
them through our minds and our reason. We are simply unable to move to an objective 
standpoint outside of space and time. Reason and language can only apply within our 
world. He was, then, a transitional figure between the Enlightenment and later 
philosophers such as Hegel and Gadamer. 
Kant is often characterised as continuing the separation between reason and emotion. 
However, Mary Midgley disagrees: 
The view that our feelings don't concern morality, that we have no duties about 
them, that it does not matter how we feel so long as we act correctly, is often 
attributed to Kant ... this is a mistake. 18 
16 Albert R-. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin; ·The Abuse ofCasuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), 326. 
17 See Toulmin, Cosmopolis, 186. 
18 Mary Midgley, 'The Objection to Systematic Humbug', in Heart and Mind: The Varieties of Moral 
Experience (Brighton: Harvester, 1981 ), 76-102, at 76. 
6 
She suggests that Kant's problems arise because he is opposing people (moral sense 
theorists such as Francis Hutcheson) who exalted feeling 'absurdly' in ethical 
judgement. Consequently he stresses the inferiority of feeling and argues that morality 
is conditional on the presence of a good will. What Kant is emphasising is the 
responsible self as a whole. The clash between will and feeling is to some extent 
artificial: 
we may perhaps do better to say, in the end, that [feeling] has a different kind of 
value, both kinds being necessary to the whole and not in competition. But we 
must certainly also say that these two kinds of value are intelligibly related. 19 
Midgley's defends Kant against the charge of saying that our feelings do not concern 
morality. She shows that Kant may have been misunderstood, and that his insights could 
have been developed in other ways. However, much modem ethics, including 'Kantian 
ethics' perpetuates the separation with which Kant himself is unfairly charged. I will 
argue (Chapter Five) that, if Midgley is correct, Kant's position is to be preferred: will 
and emotions are both essential components of moral deliberation. 
Kant's Critique of Judgement can be seen as offering a mediating course between the 
opposing approaches of rationalism and empiricism. Both mental concepts and sense 
experience are needed: they are brought into relation with one another through the work 
of the imagination. However, for Kant, humankind is still primarily rational. Michael 
Inwood notes that 
in the first edition of his Critique of Pure Reason Kant broached the possibility 
that our faculties of sensibility and understanding are both rooted in imagination; 
in the second edition he abandoned this idea and reinstated the primacy of 
reason. Heidegger preferred the possibility rejected by Kant, that man is an 
imaginative being rather than a primarily rational being. 20 
Together with Mark Johnson,21 I will argue that humans are primarily imaginative 
beings: indeed imagination is actually a central component of reason (Chapter Five). 
Kant does make a rigid distinction between ethics and aesthetics. In relation to aesthetic 
judgments, he argues against both pure subjectivism and any strong version of 
objectivism: principles of taste are neither merely empirical expressions of preference 
nor determinate a priori laws. We cannot make an aesthetic judgement without personal 
experience of an object and there are no necessary and sufficient criteria by which we 
19 Midgley, 'The Objection to Systematic Humbug', 90. 
20 Michael Inwood, Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 107. 
21 MI. 
7 
can define a beautiful object in advance. Judgements of taste are not cognitive 
judgements,22 and yet they expect universal agreement. For Kant this means that 
aesthetic judgements must be 'disinterested': the justification for the claim to 
universality depends upon the inability to 'discover, underlying this liking, any private 
conditions' .23 The insistence on disinterest means that such judgements cannot rely on 
agreeable sensations or on concepts of the good. The judgement of the beautiful is 
content with mere contemplation. Aesthetic judgements proceed without reference to a 
priori concepts: they are 'reflective' rather than 'determinative': they do not involve 
bringing particulars under universals. 
In relation to ethics Kant is sharply critical of: 
those accustomed to purvey, in accordance with the public taste, a mixture of 
the empirical and the rational . . . the empirical part should be scrupulously 
separated from the rational part. 24 
moral law is about a priori reason, not about practical rules or empirical principles: 
we cannot do morality a worse service than by seeking to derive it from 
examples25 
Empirical principles are always unfitted to serve as a ground for moral laws. The 
universality with which these laws should hold for all rational beings without 
exception - the unconditioned practical necessity which they thus impose - falls 
away if their basis is taken from the special constitution of human nature or from 
the accidental circumstances in which it is placed.26 
For Kant, moral judgement is determinative and therefore of a different kind from 
aesthetic judgement. Gadamer concludes, crucially, that this distinction (on the basis of 
which Kant excludes all considerations of aesthetics or feeling from moral deliberation) 
is not absolute' :27 the types of judgement and knowledge that Kant so rigidly separated 
are in fact substantially similar, differing in degree rather than kind. Similar arguments 
have been advanced by Marcia Muelder Eaton and Richard W Miller.28 I will argue, 
22 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement [ 1790], trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1987), §I. 
23 Kant, Critique of Judgement, §6. 
24 Immanuel Kant, 'Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals' [1785], in H. J. Paton (ed.), The Moral 
Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H J Paton (London: Hutchinson, 1948), 
iii. Page references are to the second edition of Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, which appear 
as marginal notes in this edition. 
25 Kant, 'Groundwork', 29. 
26 
- Kant, 'Groundwork', 90.-
27 TM, 39. 
28 Marcia Muelder Eaton, 'Integrating the Aesthetic and the Moral', Philosophical Studies 67 ( 1992), 
219-40; Marcia Muelder Eaton, 'Aesthetics: The Mother of Ethics?' The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 55 (1997), 355-64; Richard W. Miller, 'Three Versions of Objectivity: Aesthetic, Moral and 
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with Gadamer, that Kant was wrong to make this rigid distinction between ethics and 
aesthetics; and that ethics may have much to learn from our experience of aesthetic 
judgements (Chapter Three and Chapter Four). I will argue that Kant is right to identify 
a central role for the imagination in aesthetic judgement but that this role should be 
extended to moral judgment as well; indeed, that it is basic to all understanding 
(Chapter 6). I will also argue that ethics is an a posteriori enterprise and that moral laws 
can only take their basis from the 'special constitution of human nature or from the 
accidental circumstances in which it is placed'. This will involve losing their claim to 
universality but it is the only way to retain their relevance and intelligibility (Chapter 
Four and Chapter Five). Our moral knowledge is inescapably bound to our situation. 
1.4 Joseph Fletcher and Alasdair Macintyre 
A crisis in Protestant Christian ethics was precipitated by Joseph Fletcher's Situation 
Ethics, published in 1966?9 It is debatable, however, whether Christian ethics has really 
ever dealt adequately with the challenges which Fletcher presented. Stanley Hauerwas 
observed (in 1974): 
The situation ethics debate seems to be slowly coming to an end. This may not 
be due to the fact that the issue has been settled, but as so often happens in 
intellectual disputes the adversaries simply become bored and begin to turn 
their interests elsewhere. 30 
Hauerwas wished to reopen the debate because he believed that: first, 'there was 
something essentially right about the main thrust of [Fletcher's] view'; and 
second, 'a restatement of the problems in terms of the nature of moral notions 
gives an important insight into the proper business of theological ethics' .31 I 
would argue that he was right on both counts. I intend to return to both ideas in the 
course ofthis thesis: to address the first in relation to Gadamer's hermeneutics and 
the second in relation to the work of Mark Johnson. 
Scientific', in Jerrold Levinson ( ed.), Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection (Cambridge: 
C~fl1br_id~~ Un_iversit)' Press, 199~), 26-58. 
29 Fletcher, Situation Ethics. 
30 Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection (Notre Dame IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981 ), II. 
31 Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue, 11-12. 
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Fletcher outlines three approaches to making moral decisions. 32 First legalism: 
with this approach one enters into every decision-making situation encumbered 
with a whole apparatus of prefabricated rules and regulations. Not just the spirit 
but the letter of the law reigns. Its principles, codified in rules, are not merely 
guidelines or maxims to illuminate the situation; they are directives to be 
followed. Solutions are preset, and you can 'look them up' in a book- a Bible or 
a confessor's manual. 
Second, antinomianism: 
Over against legalism, as a sort of polar opposite, we can put antinomianism. 
This is the approach with which one enters into the decision-making situation 
armed with no principles or maxims whatsoever, to say nothing of rules. In 
every 'existential moment' or 'unique' situation, it declares, one must rely upon 
the situation of itself, there and then, to provide its ethical solution. 
Third, situationism: 
A third approach, in between legalism and antinomian unprincipledness, is 
situation ethics. (To jump from one polarity to the other would be only to go 
from the frying pan to the fire.) The situationist enters into every decision-
making situation fully armed with the ethical maxims of his community and its 
heritage, and he treats them with respect as illuminators of his problems. Just the 
same he is prepared in any situation to compromise them or set them aside in the 
situation if love seems better served by doing so. 
Critiques of Fletcher's approach in Situation Ethics actually often represent him as 
advocating a form of antinomianism whilst, in fact, he is sharply critical of such 
unprincipled responses. Indeed, in Situation Ethics itself, he is already aware of this 
potential error: 
There has indeed been a 'misplaced debate' about situation ethics, because so 
many have too quickly taken it to be antinomian.33 
Fletcher is often criticised and dismissed for allowing no respect for ethical principles 
and exclusively emphasising the situation. However, he does allow maxims a role in 
ethical decision making. The point he is making is that while such maxims may hold 
true generally they are not to be seen as ultimately decisive: we must be prepared to 
compromise them if the situation demands. He refers to this as 'principled relativism' 34 
and allows rules a role only as illuminators and not as directors of ethical decision-
making. He suggests that the classical rule of moral theology requires us to obey laws 
and principles as the principal elements of morality but, as far as possible, to temper our 
behaviour with love and reason. Fletcher, on the other hand, suggests that in fact love is 
32 Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 17-31. 
33 Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 34. 
34 Fletcher, Situation Ethics., 43-46. 
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the principal consideration, and law should have only a subservient place.35 Fletcher's 
situation ethics have been rightly criticised for their dependence upon the rather vague, 
general and subjective principle of agape. The formal content of situation ethics in 
terms of actual moral guidance is notoriously lacking: how are we to know what love 
requires in complex social situations? Whilst this criticism may be valid it is not alone 
sufficient to undermine Fletcher's basic point that consideration must be given to the 
particularity of specific situations as well as to general maxims. His emphasis on 
situations, on the radical particularity of ethical decisions, is in accord with the non-
abstractness of our decision-making experiences. This emphasis changes the balance 
between considerations of norm and context in ethical decision-making. However it 
does perpetuate the distinction (and indeed the tension) between norm and context. I 
will argue that we need to see norm and context as features of moral deliberation which, 
rather than competing, mutually inform one another: neither trumps the other. 
Situationists ask very seriously if there are ever enough cases enough alike to 
validate a law or to support anything more than a cautious generalization.36 
Hauerwas is critical of Fletcher's tendency to oversimplify the factors of the moral life: 
reducing them to a balance between situation and principles: 
Equally important for our reflection are the issues ofthe nature of the moral self, 
the conception of Christian existence, and the nature of moral authority, all of 
which receive little attention from the point of view of situation ethics.37 
He also suggests that Fletcher fails to account for the significance and variety of moral 
principles that exist. The danger in all of this is that Fletcher's valid insights about the 
complexity of moral decision making can be dismissed. The debate peters out not 
because the issues have been settled but because enough of a smokescreen has been 
created that people turn their attentions elsewhere. Inaccurate characterisations of 
Fletcher's position, together with justified criticisms of Situation Ethics, have allowed 
other authors to sideline or ignore his important challenges regarding the situation of 
moral decision making and the more or less universal human experience that in certain 
circumstances we would wish to say that certain moral rules should be broken. In my 
view Fletcher's insights represented an important corrective to the oversimplifying and 
abstracting tendencies of much ethical theory. The drive for abstraction and simplicity 
in conventional ethics means that it simply fails to address the complexity of the moral 
35 Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 31. 
36 Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 32. 
37 Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue, 12. 
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life. What is required is an account of moral rationality which takes proper account of 
the situatedness (tradition, culture, situation and agent) of moral deliberation and that 
can accommodate different perspectives without descending into total relativism. I will 
argue that Gadamer's hermeneutics provide just such an opportunity (Chapter Three and 
Chapter Four). 
In After Virtue Macintyre argues that the shrillness and interminability of modem moral 
debate is the result of a catastrophe in the history of ethics.38 What we possess today are 
simply fragments of older traditions. Our moral notions have been abstracted from the 
contexts that made them intelligible. This situation has been compounded by 
emotivism: the argument that all evaluative judgements are nothing but expressions of 
personal preference.39 Consequently, we are using moral language that we cannot fully 
comprehend in debates that can never be rationally settled. Macintyre also observes that 
the modem moral self has become an autonomous individual, detached from all social 
particularity.40 He argues that like other human enterprises, ethics should be shaped by 
our language, culture and history. Macintyre identifies the catastrophe that is 
responsible for the fragmentation of our ethical thinking as the Enlightenment Project: 
the search for a purely rational justification of morality with no regard for any human 
telos. The big mistake was to reject the Aristotelian model of morality. Macintyre 
makes a sustained case for the recovery of this model of morality using the key concepts 
of virtue, practice, narrative and tradition. 41 The most important point is that ethics is 
essentially a communal practice. Stephen Fowl and Gregory Jones argue that Scripture 
is primarily addressed to communities rather than to individuals and that ethics must be 
considered in relation to tradition: 
[B]ecause there is no way to talk about moral decisions apart from people's 
contexts, convictions and commitments, a preoccupation with decisions made by 
isolated individuals distorts our conception of ethics in general and the relation 
of Scripture to Christian Ethics in particular. An adequate conception of ethics 
requires attention to issues of character and the formation of character in and 
through socially-embodied traditions.42 
38 Macintyre, After Virtue, 1-5. 
39 Macintyre, After Virtue, 6-23. 
40 Macintyre, After Virtue, 32. 
41 There is not space here for a thorough and detailed consideration of Macintyre's arguments. For 
further discussion see NanceyMurphy~ Brad-J. Kallenberg and Mark Thiessen- Nation (eds:), Virtues·· 
and Practices in the Christian Tradition: Christian Ethics after Macintyre (Harrisburg: Trinity Press 
International, 1997). 
42 Stephen E. Fowl and L. Gregory Jones, Reading in Communion: Scripture and Ethics in Christian 
Life(Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 1991), 9. 
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Macintyre sees the Enlightenment Project as a blind-alley in ethical theory, leading 
almost inevitably to emotivism and Nietzschean nihilism. The Enlightenment has 
mistakenly excluded from ethics all social considerations (virtues and practices) and all 
historical considerations (narrative and tradition). Macintyre's considerations of 
language, culture and history together with his understanding of tradition represent a 
deeply Gadamerian insight about the hermeneutic nature of human understanding. 
Whilst we might agree with Macintyre's characterisation of the state of contemporary 
ethics and with his emphasis on tradition it is not clear why we should choose one 
tradition over all the rest: is it not possible to recognise the ontogeny of our differing 
ethical notions and yet seek to find means of encouraging conversations and 
reconciliation between traditions? If we are to choose one, why should we choose the 
Aristotelian model? Would it not be better to accept that no tradition has a monopoly of 
ethical truth and that we need to take the best insights of all of them? I will argue that 
we should do precisely that (Chapter Five). 
1.5 Starting points 
Having been a conservative evangelical for many years, my own Christian ethics was 
nurtured within a legalist framework. However, this framework proved to be 
insufficiently flexible and compassionate when faced with real-life cases (I worked as a 
volunteer with people affected by HIV and Aids). I needed to find an alternative 
approach: perhaps this research should be seen as a form of 'therapy'. 
Consider the following scenario: 
A man is standing on a bridge over a river in full spate, just upstream from a 
high waterfall. His three children are walking on the riverbank with his wife 
when the youngest falls into the river a couple of hundred yards upstream from 
the bridge and is swept away. The man sees what has happened. There are no 
onlookers, there is little time and, although the man can probably reach the 
child, the chances of a successful rescue are slim. What would you do in that 
man's situation? 
There are many ways of approaching this dilemma, based on rules, consequences, 
duties, and so on. Most people conclude that the consequences for the family of the 
man's death_ i!'l_ an at!e111pt~~ rescue aretoo great; the man shot!ld_stay_pu~. However, 
one person faced with this dilemma offered the response that they would jump in 'so 
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that their child did not have to die alone' .43 It seems unlikely that any of the traditional 
approaches to moral decision-making would reach this conclusion and yet, to me at 
least, it seems to be a praiseworthy and somehow 'fitting' response. Can motivation 
alone make an action right? Can a desire to act out of love and concern for another 
outweigh all other moral factors? How could this decision be justified? Is 'fittingness' 
sufficient justification? Traditional accounts of moral deliberation struggle to answer 
questions such as these, though they are clearly weighty and important matters. Perhaps 
there is more to ethical deliberation than our traditional theories allow? 
This study has been prompted by a series of feelings or hunches. First: the hunch that 
abstraction and reduction in ethical theories is in danger of rendering them irrelevant to 
the complex dynamic situations in which we live out our moral lives; that morality 
conceived as a system of laws or a single universal method is simply too narrow and too 
unimaginative to capture most of what goes on in our moral experience. Second: the 
hunch that the Enlightenment's dissociation of reason from the will and the passions 
was a mistake and that post-Kantian rationalist ethics may have led to the impasse in 
ethics noted by Macintyre in After Virtue. Third: the hunch that, in ethics, intellectual 
(rational) suasion is not enough and that affective and aesthetic suasion are also needed. 
Ethics will need to find new roots in affectivity, aesthetics, reasonableness and rhetoric: 
notions such as fittingness, flexibility, balance and mitigation will be crucial. Fourth: 
Johnson's thesis that human beings are fundamentally imaginative moral animals. Fifth: 
the hunch that Fletcher got something significantly right in Situation Ethics: in terms of 
his diagnosis of the problem if not his prescription for a solution. Sixth: the hunch that 
Gadamer's hermeneutics, with its denial of absolute truth and criticism of scientific 
method, may have something to offer to our understanding of 'understanding' in ethics. 
Relatively little has been written directly on the relevance of Gadamer's work for ethics: 
I have found Matthew Foster's book Gadamer and Practical Philosophy: The 
Hermeneutics of Moral Confidence and five Ph.D. theses.44 Of these, the most relevant 
43 I am grateful to the Revd Dr Joseph Cassisy for this example. 
44 Matthew R. Foster, Gadamer and Practical Philosophy: The Hermeneutics of Moral Confidence 
(Atlanta GA: Scholars, 1991); Rog~r_A, Badpam, 'The Inwlications ofGadamer's.Hermeneutics for 
Contemporary Christhin -Ethics' (Ph: D. thesis: Drew University, New Jersey, 1997); Eric W Bain-
Selbo, 'Understanding Others Morally: Philosophical Hermeneutics and Comparative Religious 
Ethics' (Ph.D. thesis: The University of Chicago, Chicago, 1997); Susan-Judith G Hoffmann, 'The 
Ethical Dimension in Gadamer's Hermeneutics' (Ph.D. thesis: University of Guelph, Guelph, 1992); 
Michael J Kelly, 'On the Possibility of Philosophical Ethics: A Hermeneutic Response' (Ph.D. thesis: 
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to this study is Roger Badham's thesis 'The Implications of Gadamer's Hermeneutics for 
Contemporary Christian Ethics'. Badham does not offer any detailed exegesis of Truth 
and Method though he does explore Gadamer's concepts of sensus communis, historical 
consciousness and phronesis. Badham develops his insights in very different directions 
from mine, drawing on work by Don Cupitt, Lawrence Kohlberg, H.Richard Niebuhr, 
and James Gustafson. There is no reference to moral imagination. Susan-Judith 
Hoffman does elaborate a 'hermeneutic ethics' arguing that Gadamer's hermeneutic 
circle can be brought to bear on ethical principles and that such an approach constitutes 
a promising alternative to the autonomous moral reasoning of the Enlightenment. Joy 
Ross also explores the possibility of an ethics rooted in Gadamer's hermeneutics, noting 
the situatedness of our moral understanding together with its essential linguisticality. 
She develops her approach in relation to the Aristotelian conception of phronesis. 
Neither Hoffman nor Ross explores Gadamer's hermeneutics in relation to Christian 
ethics, or in relation to imagination. Eric Bain-Selbo appropriates the philosophical 
hermeneutics of Gadamer in the service of comparative religion, again focussing on the 
concept of phronesis. He develops his arguments in relation to openness to other 
traditions; here, religious traditions. Matthew Foster and Michael Kelly both approach 
Gadamer in a search for confidence in relation to philosophical ethics. Both argue that 
the contemporary lack of confidence is unwarranted and that Gadamer' hermeneutics 
can provide such confidence. However, this confidence is justified on very different 
grounds from the traditional arguments and without any 'foundation' in the 
transcendental sense. Kelly suggests a dialectical method of ethical reflection based on 
Gadamer's notion of effective history. Foster argues that hermeneutics must include 
techne (as part of human history and tradition): dialogue with neighbours involves 
reaching out from one's areas of competency. Although Gadamer is steadfastly opposed 
to 'method' Foster argues that a consideration of 'techniques' and 'rules' can be subsumed 
under the hermeneutic enterprise. My work does share common ground with all of these 
authors. However, the distinctive features of my approach are the engagement with 
legalism and utilitarianism; the thorough exegesis of Truth and Method; the engagement 
with the work of Mark Johnson; the exploration of the significance of moral 
imagination; and the specific relation to Christian ethics. 
Boston University, Boston, 1986); Joy C Ross, 'Gadamer and Hermeneutic Ethics: On the Possibility 
of Moral Understanding in a Modern World' (Ph.D. thesis: The Pennsylvania State University, 
Philadelphia, 1994 ). 
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1.6 Outline of study 
I propose two major theses. First, that ethics (including Christian ethics) should adopt a 
stance that is properly hermeneutical: taking proper account of ethics' embeddedness in 
history and tradition, abandoning hope of a universal or objective standpoint from 
which to make ethical judgements. Second, following Johnson, that human beings are 
fundamentally imaginative moral beings: imagination is central to ethics because it is 
central to language and reason. 
In Chapter Two I will challenge two approaches to ethics, legalism and utilitarianism, 
which represent contemporary ethics' dependence on notions of absolute truth and 
universal method. I will argue that they share significant common ground, including 
certain assumptions based on Enlightenment modes of thought. 
Chapter Three will consist of a thorough exegesis of Gadamer's Truth and Method 
(guided by a concern to uncover its relevance to ethics) as the basis for a thought-
experiment concerning the relationship between ethics and hermeneutics. 
In Chapter Four I will evaluate this thought-experiment by exploring the implications 
for ethics discovered in Chapter Three and relating them to my critique of legalism and 
utilitarianism from Chapter Two. I will also consider criticisms and developments of 
Gadamer's hermeneutics. 
In Chapter Five I will consider the central role of moral language together with the 
importance of metaphor and concept-formation. I will outline important connections 
with the work of Mark Johnson in cognitive science: especially in relation to metaphor, 
concept-formation and imagination. In particular I will outline his conception of reason 
and contrast it with the Enlightenment notion of abstract and universal rationality. I will 
also explore the role of imagination in ethical deliberation; the imaginative character of 
conscience; and some parallels between taste and conscience; concluding with a 
suggested model for the work of moral theorists. 
In Chapter Six I will explore further Mark Johnson's notion of moral imagination and 
its possible relevance for Christian ethics. I will set out a critical realist approach to 
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truth and briefly consider the importance of the imagination in aesthetics and revelation. 
I will attempt to correlate the doctrines of creation and incarnation with a hermeneutical 
approach to ethics that incorporates moral imagination. I will explore improvisation as a 
model for Christian ethics; and consider the importance of inspiration and the 
communal dimensions of ethics. The chapter concludes with a consideration of two 
practical consequences: the recovery of rhetoric; and the adoption of casuistry. 
In Chapter Seven I will review the arguments to that point and consider a hermeneutical 
approach to 'experience' before reflecting, as an example, on the current debate in the 
Anglican Communion about homosexuality. I will then draw some final conclusions. 
17 
Chapter Two 
Moral Truth and Moral Method: a Critique of Legalism and 
Utilitarianism 
Gadamer argues against the possibility of absolute truth (timeless and unchanging truth 
that can be known with complete certainty) and suggests that 'scientific method' is 
simply inappropriate in the human sciences (including ethics). In my critique of 
contemporary ethics I wish to challenge two 'mentalities': two approaches to ethics 
which represent contemporary ethics' dependence on notions of absolute truth and 
universal method and which share some characteristic assumptions and philosophical 
foundations. The first is 'legalism'; the appeal to moral absolutes and the assumption of 
a universal moral reality based on a particular conception of universal human reason. I 
will take as a paradigm example the work of John Finnis 1 (section 2.1). The second is 
utilitarianism with its claims to the universal application of a 'scientific method' 
(section 2.2). At first sight these two approaches may appear to be quite distinct, each 
often regarding the other as characterising the wrong approach to ethics: however, I will 
argue that they have a significant amount in common, including certain assumptions 
based on Enlightenment modes of thought. In each case I will set out a brief overview 
of the approach to ethics and then explore criticisms from the perspective of my own 
concerns about abstraction and the importance of context. 
2.1 John Finnis on moral absolutes 
2.1.1 The New Natural Law Theory 
The 'New Natural Law Theory' has been developed by John Finnis and Germain Grisez 
(founders of the Finnis-Grisez 'school'). It includes an account of the basic human 
goods; a theory for deriving moral norms from those goods; an account of 'practical 
reasonableness'; and a theory of 'exceptionless moral norms' or 'moral absolutes'. It is, 
as Rufus Black observes, 'a sophisticated and supple moral theory' .2 The theory 
1 
_ See-e.g.-John Finnis,-Natural Law and-Natural-Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, -1980); John Finnis, 
Fundamentals of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983); MA. 
2 Rufus Black, 'Introduction: The New Natural Law Theory', in Nigel Biggar and Rufus Black (eds.), 
The Revival of Natural Law: Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses to the Finnis-Grisez 
School (Aidershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2000), 1-28, at I. 
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attempts to make good the failings of previous, negative, natural law theories and to 
construct an account of human fulfilment and flourishing. 
One important foundation for the new theory is a distinction between theoretical reason 
seen as pursuing 'knowledge about aspects of reality' and practical reason, the function 
of which is seen as 'bringing realities into being'. 3 By means of this distinction they 
hope to avoid the charge of committing the naturalistic fallacy of scholastic natural law, 
that is the logically illicit derivation of an 'ought' from an 'is': 
from a set of theoretical premises, one cannot derive any practical truth, since 
sound reasoning does not introduce what is not in the premises. And the 
relationship of principles to conclusions is a logical one among propositions. 
Therefore, the ultimate principles of morality cannot be theoretical truths of 
metaphysical and/or philosophical anthropology.4 
They suggest that scholastic natural law prescribes as moral those actions that conform 
to, and are derived from, 'human nature'. The Finnis-Grisez school argue that their list 
of basic human goods 'corresponds' to different dimensions of human nature but is not 
'derived from' them. 5 
Grisez identifies (correctly, I suggest) three major failings of classical moral theology 
founded on scholastic natural law. First: 
Classical moral theology tends to reduce Christian moral life to a means of 
gaining heaven and avoiding hell. 6 
Laudably, the new natural law theory seeks to elucidate the intrinsic relationship 
between human nature and human fulfilment in our earthly life. Second, Grisez 
criticises classical moral theology for its 'static character'. 7 He argues that human nature 
does not change but that new possibilities for action are constantly appearing. Grisez is 
right to criticise classical moral theology for adopting a static model: human lives are 
composed of complex dynamic processes as a fortiori are the developing 'lives' of 
communities and traditions. Grisez is surely right in seeking to reinterpret the structure 
of natural law in an attempt to respond flexibly to new possibilities. Even if human 
nature is relatively static our understanding and appreciation of it can develop quite 
3 Black, 'New Natural Law', 4. 
4 Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle and John Finnis, 'Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends', 
American Journal of Jurisprudence 32 ( 1987), 99-151, I 02. 
s- Bilick,-'NewNaturai-Law',-7. --
6 Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, vol. I: Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: Franciscan 
Herald, 1983), 106. 
7 Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, I 06. 
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rapidly. Third, Grisez criticises classical moral theology for its legalism, for being 'too 
much concerned with laws and too little concerned with persons'. 8 This criticism echoes 
my own concerns about abstraction, as we shall see, and Grisez is again to be 
commended for his attempts to conceptualise human fulfilment and flourishing. 
The Finnis-Grisez school attempts to identify the basic human goods or objectives by 
enquiring into the reasons for our actions. They pursue the chain of reasons until they 
claim they have identified reasons which require no further reasons to justify them. 
These 'ultimate reasons for doing things' are what they label as 'basic human goods' 9: 
The General Categories of Basic 
Human Goods 
Substantive goods (goods in which 
people can participate without 
deliberately pursuing them) 
1. life itself- its maintenance and 
transmission - health and safety 
2. knowledge and aesthetic experience 
3. some degree of excellence in work 
and play 
Reflexive goods (goods pursued through 
choice) 
Dimensions of Human Nature to 
Which these Goods Correspond 
Human beings ... 
as animate ... organic substances 
as rational beings capable ofknowing and 
experiencing reality 
as simultaneously rational and animal 
4. harmony between and among as agents through deliberation and choice 
individuals and groups of persons -
living at peace with others, 
neighbourliness, friendship 
5. harmony between the different 
dimensions within the self, including 
one's feelings, emotions, judgements 
and choices 
6. harmony between the dimensions 
within the self and a person's acts: 
harmony among one's judgements, 
choices and performances - peace of 
conscience and consistency between 
one's self and its expression 
7. harmony with some more-than-
human source of meaning and value 
8 Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, I 06. 
9 This table is taken from Black, 'New Natural Law', 6-7. and draws on Grisez, Boyle and Finnis, 
'Practical Principles', 107-8. 
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These basic goods correspond to different dimensions of human nature: hence our 
natural inclinations provide important information as we attempt to identify the goods. 
Taken together these goods constitute human fulfilment. The Finnis-Grisez school 
argues that everyone should rationally arrive at this same list of human goods because 
the list corresponds to our human nature. On Black's analysis, they do accept that the 
basic human goods are always culturally embodied but cultural variation is limited to 
variations of expression within this same list of basic human goods: different ranking of 
the various goods or different forms of their expression. 10 New Natural Law thus 
provides a basis for explaining and affirming moral diversity. It characterises the basic 
human goods as incommensurable, non-hierarchical, and self-evident. The claim of self-
evidence is not a claim that everyone will actually recognise a specific list of goods; but 
rather that once a person has understood what is meant by a particular good, in the light 
of the sort of reflection necessary to identify it, they will recognise it as a basic 
. .fi fi . II JUSti 1catory reason or actiOn. 
Having identified this list of goods New Natural Law theory characterises morality as 
being completely practically reasonable in the making of decisions about how to 
pursue human fulfilment. 12 
Amongst the requirements of this basic principle are that we should 'avoid the distortion 
of human decisions by feelings and emotions' .13 Morality is purely a matter of reason. 
Having identified human beings as having different dimensions of the self (feelings, 
emotions, judgements and choices), rather than seek to accommodate all of these 
dimensions in moral considerations they limit morality simply to choices guided by 
judgement in the face of potential distortion by feelings and emotions. 
New Natural Law theory envisages these basic principles being embodied in moral 
norms. Positive norms point people towards human fulfilment, they instantiate one or 
more basic human goods, and are often in need of development in a particular context. 
They are not obligatory as it will often be reasonable to pursue any one of a number of 
such norms at any one time. Negative norms 
10
- Black;-'New Natural Law', 9-10. 
11 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 64-65. 
12 Black, 'New Natural Law', 15. 
13 Black, 'New Natural Law', 15. 
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emerge when a generic proposal for action does violate some requirement of 
practical reason ... unreasonably thwarting human fulfilment. 14 
Perhaps the most important requirement of practical reason in the emergence of 
negative norms is that one should never choose directly against a basic human good. 
The matter of intentional choice in this requirement is important and harmful side-
effects of an action may sometimes be justified by a consideration of the principle of 
double effect. In New Natural Law theory simply acting in accord with a basic human 
good does not necessarily render an action moral. 15 However, deliberately acting against 
one of the basic human goods does render the action immoral. Such negative moral 
norms are considered by the Finnis-Grisez school to be 'exceptionless'. 
I have some serious concerns about the implied status of the whole system of New 
Natural Law theory. It is not presented in any provisional way; as a suggested way 
forward or as a contribution to ethical debate. Rather it is presented as the only right 
ethical theory, alterations or revisions are not entertained, and the system (at least in 
Finnis's hands) remains more or less unchanged since first proposed. However, the 
more general aspects of the theory need not detain us any longer; what I wish to 
challenge is this characterisation of exceptionless moral norms, particularly as set out in 
Finnis's book Moral Absolutes. 16 
2.1.2 Moral absolutes: exceptionless moral norms 
Moral Absolutes is predominantly a contribution to an intra-Catholic debate: Finnis's 
main target is proportionalism. The book addresses the question of whether there are 
such things as exceptionless moral norms and 
attempts no more than an overview of [this] much debated and most important 
question of faith and morals, and an outline of some grounds for thinking it 
reasonable to propose and accept a definite answer. 17 
14 Black, 'New Natural Law', 20. 
15 Grisez, Boyle and Finnis, 'Practical Principles', 123-25. 
16 See also Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights; John Finnis, Aquinas : Moral, Political, and Legal 
Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus. 
17 MA, foreword. 
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Finnis begins by acknowledging the challenge to 'the very possibility of tme moral 
absolutes' .18 While he accepts that exceptionless moral norms are few, and not 
fundamental, he nonetheless sees them as strategic: 
the moral n01ms whose tmth is now contested are decisively important for 
conscience, conduct, and civilization. And their intrinsic relationship to the 
foundations of morality and faith is such that to deny them is to overlook, 
ignore, or challenge those foundations. 19 
Finnis sets up the issue by quoting Pope John Paul II: 
The whole tradition of the Church has lived and lives on the conviction [that] 
there exist acts which, per se, and in themselves, independently of 
circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object. 
There are moral norms that have a precise content which is immutable and 
unconditioned ... for example, the norm ... which forbids the direct killing of an 
. 20 Innocent person. 
Finnis is here claiming no more than that such norms are exceptionless: for him that is 
the definition, in this context, of 'absolute'. To avert the charge that such moral 
absolutes are merely tautologous (e.g. 'murder is wrong') Finnis argues that the 
prohibited acts can be specified without relying on prior moral judgement (e.g. the kind 
of judgement implied by the choice of the word 'murder' in the above example). 
Finnis's position, then, is identical to that of the magisterium of the Roman Catholic 
Church. Timothy Chappell raises the concern that elements of the New Natural Law 
theory are far from self-evident and that they could have been generated 'ad hoc to give 
certain conclusions in applied ethics', 21 regarding, for example contraception and 
abortion. He suggests that Grisez moves too quickly from 'self-evident first principles' 
to claims about what must never be done (choosing to destroy, damage or impede any 
intelligible human good). 
In a move which seems to weaken his case, Finnis accepts that for some moral absolutes 
the particular act is specified with reference to circumstances (the circumstance of 
marriage for example). This surely implies that the moral absolute proscribing adultery 
can only hold in societies where marriage is deemed a human good (as it is by the 
Catholic Church). In other societies the moral 'absolute' would either not apply or else 
be meaningless. The prohibition of adultery seems once more to be a prior conviction. 
Is MA, I. 
19 MA, I. 
20 MA, 2. He is quoting Reconciliatio et Paenitentia ( 1984), ellipsis original to Finnis. 
21 Timothy Chappell, 'Natural Law Revived: Natural Law Theory and Contemporary Moral Philosophy', 
in Biggar and Black, The Revival of Natural Law, 29-52, at 32. 
23 
Finnis begins part way along the process of considering circumstances and then argues 
that from that point on a norm is 'absolute': 
Once one has precisely formulated the type, one can say that the norm which 
identifies each chosen act of that type as wrong is true and applicable to every 
such choice, whatever the (further) circumstances.22 
Finnis separates his moral absolutes from another 'exceptionless' case: that of the 
settled judgement of conscience which deems an act right 'in all the circumstances'. He 
argues that such judgements may indeed be exceptionless but only in situations where 
all the circumstances are the same. In the case of moral absolutes on the other hand one 
need only identify certain circumstances for all other circumstances to become 
irrelevant: 
The moral absolutes of Christian tradition ... are proposed as valid, true and 
applicable even in circumstances which are neither foreseen nor even implicitly 
identified in the norm, but which despite their relevance and moral importance 
(ifthey arose) would not deflect the norm's applicability.23 
It is hard to see how Finnis can describe such circumstances as 'relevant': his definition 
of the moral absolute renders them precisely 'irrelevant' even though they may have 
moral importance in other situations (where a moral absolute does not apply). 
Oliver O'Donovan characterises Finnis's position: 
There are some closely specified moral propositions which are not susceptible of 
being revised in the light of further moral experience. 24 
Finnis asserts that the Christian faith affirms specific moral absolutes and turns for 
examples to the Decalogue and to Christ's teaching on adultery.25 He sees the Ten 
Commandments as a 'manifestation of God's sovereignty in ... creation' ?6 Finnis's 
reliance on the 'plain assertions' of Jesus requires a confident exegesis of the passage in 
question (Matthew 19.4-9). The passage though is not simply and unequivocally about 
adultery; rather it addresses a situation (post-divorce) in which the couple are, in legal 
terms, no longer married. Finnis acknowledges that the situation requires 'interpretation 
and elaboration, since there are questions about who is indeed married' .27 Is Jesus here 
22 MA, 3. 
23 MA, 5. 
24 Oliver O'Donovan, 'John Finnis on Moral Absolutes', in Biggar and Black, The Revival of Natural 
Law, 111-30, at 113. 
25 MA, 6-9. 
26 MA, 7. 
27 MA, 8. 
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speaking about adultery directly or is he, rather, emphasising the good of marriage and 
addressing the issue of lack of commitment on the man's part (divorcing a wife merely 
to take another is as much adultery as engaging in sex with another while still married)? 
Taken at face value, the verse hardly appears to be establishing a moral absolute about 
adultery (though this of course may have been a 'given' in the culture of the time). 
However, Finnis does not seem able to accept any development in our understanding of 
biblical prescriptions or of human nature: revelation is fixed and final. Implicit here is a 
particular conception of reason: as universal and unchanging. 
Finnis argues that human fulfilment is the fulfilment of individuals in community 
(Kingdom) and that the Decalogue is to be understood as 'the implication of the 
supreme principles': to love God and neighbour, and to seek first the Kingdom of God. 
We can readily accept this but it is simply a non sequitur to argue that they must 
therefore be moral absolutes. 
Finnis addresses a criticism, made by Garth Hallett, that to adhere to moral absolutes is 
to 'honor rules above values' .28 He argues that the value is already included in the rule 
and that by keeping it one is honouring the value of the person whose good would 
otherwise be infringed. (At this point, his argument is remarkably close to that of rule 
utilitarianism in which rules are justified by whether keeping them tends, on the whole, 
to promote utility.) Finnis rejects out of hand any notion of 'balancing' goods to be 
achieved by observing or by ignoring the rule. He simply asserts that in observing the 
rule one does not dishonour or ignore the goods 'which one supposes could be secured 
by violating the moral absolute':29 they simply have no place in the considerations of 
moral judgement in the face of a moral absolute. His argument against the felt necessity 
of violating moral absolutes on occasion is that we should simply trust divine 
providence. His argument for moral absolutes seems to be largely that they are 'God-
given', in natural law (by reason) or in Scripture (by revelation), and that we should 
simply accept them. However, this again implies a conception of universal reason and 
an understanding of revelation which, though all revelation comes through human 
beings situated in history and tradition and bound by language and culture, admits no 
change or development in our understanding and interpretation. 
28 Garth Hallett, Christian Moral Reasoning (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 
120. 
29 MA, II. 
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Finnis argues that the denial of the possibility of moral absolutes is a 'post-Christian 
phenomenon'. By this he means that it is a feature of Enlightenment thought, especially 
that of 'such men as Bentham and Marx' by whom 
the Kingdom was transformed into the inner-worldly realm of justice, 
prosperity, fraternity and freedom, to be constructed by enlightened human 
planning and providence.30 
Finnis rightly argues that the Enlightenment relies on technical reasoning in moral 
deliberation and is critical of proportional ism for this reason. 31 He uses the term 
synonymously with consequentialism: 
. . . their characteristic moral principle and method: Pursue the course which 
promises, in itself, and in its consequences, a net greater proportion of ~ood 
states of affairs, or ... a net lesser proportion of bad, overall, in the long run. 2 
Proportionalism represents a sustained challenge to Finnis's conception of moral 
absolutes. 
2.1.3 The denial of absolutes: proportionalism 
Finnis identifies two major factors behind the denial of absolutes by Catholic moral 
theologians; first, the general atmosphere of secular dissent from the church's moral 
teaching and, second, the question of contraception and a desire to approve it. He argues 
against proportionalism by an alleged reductio ad absurdum. Relying on the assertion 
that 'divine providence involves the permission of evil only so that out of it God may 
draw a somehow greater good', he suggests that in any decision requiring moral 
judgement proportionalism implies that one can simply 'do whatever you feel like' safe 
in the knowledge that God will only allow what makes for the greatest good in the long 
run.
33 This is not an accurate summary of proportionalist thought; rather, it describes a 
situation in which human beings have no responsibility for moral judgement (the 
opposite of the proportionalist view). Finnis is suggesting that proportionalism 
30 MA, 12-13. 
31 For further criticism of proportionalism see Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (London: Catholic 
Truth Society, 1993). For examples of proportionalist thought see Bruno SchUller, Wholly Human: 
Essays on the Theory and Language of Morality, trans. Peter Heinegg (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 
1986). and Richard McCormick, 'Killing the Patient', in John Wilkins (ed.), Understanding Veritatis 
Splendor - the Encyclical Letter of Pope John Paul II on the Church's Moral Teaching (London: 
S.P.C.K., 1993), 14-20. 
32 MA, 14. 
33 MA, 15-16. 
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somehow denies the importance of free choice and of moral responsibility which the 
New Natural Law affirms. 34 
The cns1s in traditional Catholic ethics reached a head with the papal encyclical 
Humanae Vitae in 1968.35 Finnis defines the contraceptive act as a contra life choice, 
chosen separately from any decision to engage in intercourse and therefore separate 
from considerations of the moral features of the contracepted sexual act itself. 36 He 
blames a misunderstanding of this for much of the confusion surrounding contraception 
in Catholic moral theology. Again he insists that acts are specified by their intention 
(object), so that, for example, Natural Family Planning need not be adopted as a method 
of contraception but rather as a choice to avoid the bad side-effects of having a baby, 
without any choice to prevent conception. He also identifies the assumption that regular 
sexual satisfaction is a right (or even an obligation) within marriage as a cause of the 
pastoral pressures on the church to accept contraception. He is critical of much common 
moral teaching which presented the church's position as simply a series of laws rather 
than truths 'about the intrinsic relationship of certain types of act to true integral human 
fulfillment' .37 The basic problem was a failure to 'identify clearly and centrally the most 
relevant moral absolute violated by contraception' .38 Finnis considers various attempts 
to justify contraception (by e.g. Louis Janssens and Paul VI's commission). He argues 
that when such attempts failed attention turned to the very foundations of Catholic 
moral teaching. He observes that most Catholic ethicists who dissent on contraception 
also deny the possibility of moral absolutes.39 The focus of debate moved away from 
contraception to the philosophical debate about the very possibility of the moral 
absolutes which were seen as obstacles to the desired conclusion (except, of course, by 
Finnis who saw them as protecting the traditional position).40 
Finnis accuses Franz Scholz, John Dedek, Louis Janssens, and Richard McCormick of 
reading back proportionalist principles into scholasticism, especially Aquinas. Finnis is 
dismissive of such attempts, arguing that Aquinas was quite clear that there are a 
34 See Finn is, Fundamentals of Ethics, 136-38; Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, chapters 2 & 8. 
35 MA, 84-85. 
36 MA, 84-90. 
37 MA, 87. 
38 MA, 88. 
39 MA, 89-90. 
40 MA, 93. 
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minority of negative norms which hold semper et ad semper: always and everywhere, 
without exception. He is equally dismissive of suggestions from John Milhaven that 
modern people (humanity come of age) may have a dispensation from God to approach 
moral judgements in new ways; and of suggestions that 'modern moral problems are so 
complex that no revealed norm could truly settle them' .41 He notes, correctly, that just 
because the church does not have an immediate answer to every moral problem we 
cannot conclude that it has no answer to any. To be fair to Finnis, he readily admits that 
moral absolutes may be few in number, even though he considers that they are of 
strategic importance. 42 
Finnis deals with a number of philosophical objections to moral absolutes. First, Josef 
Fuchs suggests that the tradition of moral absolutes rests on the naturalistic fallacy. 
Finnis contends that Aquinas's practical principles are not deduced from facts but are 
simply self-evident and that acts are judged not on their physical characteristics but in 
terms of their object shaped by the agent's will and intention.43 Second, objections from 
Joseph Fuchs and James Walter that the tradition is based on a fallacious inference from 
God's creative will to his moral will. Finnis contends that moral absolutes are not 
justified by any appeal to God's will but to integral human fulfilment. 44 Third, the 
suggestion, by Janssens, that moral absolutes 'irrationally abstract some elements from 
the total reality of a human action' (as I have also argued). Finnis does not really 
address this criticism directly; rather; he points out again the impossibility of addressing 
all the elements: 
In reality, the injunction to consider all the goods and bads in the totality of the 
situation, when there is no rational criterion for processing all the information, 
cannot (for all its authors' good intentions) be other than an invitation to devise 
rationalizations for doing what one feels like.45 
This may be true unless, of course, such consideration is still a worthwhile ideal even if 
unattainable; unless there are criteria other than rational; unless emotivism (which 
seems to be a great fear of Finnis) can be controlled in other ways such as by reference 
to a communal dimension of deliberation or to a moral tradition. Again, the fact that 
proportionalism cannot achieve its ideal does not necessarily mean that the effort to 
41 MA, 92. 
42 MA, I. 
43 MA, 94. 
44 MA, 95. 
45 MA, 97. 
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consider all the goods and ills should not be made: unless one insists on a perfect and 
rational moral judgement, in the way that Finnis does, when the only option is to limit 
the factors under consideration. This, of course, is the same criticism that Finnis laid at 
the door of proportionalists who could similarly only achieve a terminus to their 
deliberations by limiting their considerations. As human beings we cannot escape our 
limitations but we should still set our sights high. Fourth, proportionalists such as Fuchs 
point to the criterion of 'proportionateness' used by the tradition in the development of 
the doctrine of double effect. Finnis contends that in this instance there is no weighing 
of net good or bad consequences; there is simply an injunction that one should do no 
more harm than is necessary, that the foreseen harm of an action should be 
proportionate to the desired end. 46 Whilst there may be no strict weighing of 
consequences here there is certainly a judgement about what is proportionate in the 
circumstances. Fifth, K.-H. Peschke argues that moral absolutes falsely absolutise 
criteria which should be subject to some higher principle such as reverence for God. 
Finnis contends that in the tradition moral absolutes are indeed subject to such 
principles (love of God and conformity to reason) and are already implications of such 
principles.47 Sixth, Franz Boeckle and McCormick argue that the moral absolutes 
'absolutise the human goods which they claim to protect' when such goods are premoral 
and conditioned: so that no norm protecting them can be absolute.48 Here Finnis repeats 
his definition of moral absolutes as claiming no more than to be exceptionless, on the 
grounds that such exceptions would be unreasonable. Finnis concludes that the appeal to 
reason against moral absolutes 
turns out, under the pressure of rational arguments to be an appeal not to reason 
but to some intuitive process which is 'beyond reduction to reasoning processes 
or analytic judgements' and which is therefore fittingly called by those who rely 
on it an 'instinct'. 49 
He suggests that 
the whole effort to develop a theoretical critique of the tradition's absolutes is a 
simple antecedent wish to approve some of the actions they exclude. 5° 
A similar antecedent wish (to exclude certain actions) may be part of the motivation for 
Finnis's assertion of the absolutes. We must ask whether 'instinct' is always to be 
46 MA, 97. 
47 MA, 99. 
48 MA, 99. 
49 MA, I 00, quoting McCormick. 
50 MA, 101, emphasis original. 
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discounted; and whether such instinct can provide a legitimate challenge to the moral 
absolutes. 
Finnis observes that all these objections represent instances of one particular kind of 
argument against the moral absolutes: that they all in one way or another seek to make 
ethics into a techne, a technique or method. Finnis argues, rightly in my view, that the 
possibilities of human fulfilment, even in the life of one individual are too open-ended 
for any technique to be appropriate. This criticism is particularly telling against 
consequentialism which explicitly seeks a scientific method and attempts to reduce 
ethical deliberation to an instrumental calculus. 
Finnis argues that proportionalism is 'incoherent with its own ambition to guide free 
choices'. 51 However it seems to me that his argument at this point is spurious, based on 
an inaccurate characterisation of proportionalism. Finnis notes that proponents of 
proportionalism argue that a comparison of options is possible because there is a 
common notion of 'value' in terms of which the various options can be assessed. Thus 
the option promising the greater good will have the highest aggregate value. Finnis then 
argues that, at this point, all other options fall away and there is no longer a real choice 
to be made; there are no longer any rationally appealing options, hence proportionalism 
is incoherent with its own aim of guiding rational choice. 52 This seems to say little more 
than that, after one has made a choice other options are to be discounted. Whatever 
'method' is applied, one option will ultimately be preferred and chosen; it is hardly fair 
to criticise a method for producing an answer. Finnis misses the point that it is at the 
beginning of the process that all the options seem rationally appealing (or at least need 
to be considered); the proportionalist method is aimed precisely at grounding the choice 
between such options when it is not clear at the outset which is best. Finnis claims that a 
coherent proportionalist position requires 
a rational judgement, made prior to moral judgement and choice, and 
concerning the intelligible goods in the options available for choice. 53 
What Finnis has failed to notice is that the proportionalist method simply conflates the 
moral and rational judgements: the right thing to do simply is the option that promises 
51 MA, 51. 
52 MA, 52. 
53 MA, 54, emphasis mine. 
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the greater good. The moral judgement is made in the process of the rational judgement 
and is not consequent upon it. 
In asserting the incommensurability of options, Finnis acknowledges that different 
instantiations of a particular good can be incommensurable since each is 'an aspect of 
some person's reality'; it is only 'states of affairs considered in abstraction from their 
origins, context, and consequences' that can be compared in value. 54 The moral calculus 
required by consequentialism is simply beyond us. Finnis is surely right in his assertion 
of incommensurability but it is interesting that he acknowledges the importance of the 
individual to the evaluation of good. He suggests that any option which infringes a basic 
human good can never be rationally chosen; any such preference can only be based on 
feelings. This seems simply to be an assertion that moral absolutes are always rational 
and that any denial of them must be the result of reason being overwhelmed by feelings. 
It seems that Finnis shares many assumptions with consequentialists about morally 
significant factors while refusing to accept their 'method' or to abandon his own 
attachment to moral absolutes. 
Finnis also criticises proportionalism for its effect on the character of the individual 
moral agent. A strict consequentialist, he suggests, would be prepared to 'do and 
become anything' if it would achieve an overall balance of greater good. 55 Finnis rightly 
observes that these effects on character are simply incommensurable with the other 
kinds of consequences of one's actions and that strict consequentialism ignores 'the 
soul-making significance of moral action'. 56 He argues that choices have a lasting effect 
on one's character57 and emphasises the reflexive nature of moral choices: the choices 
one makes have consequences for oneself and potentially for the world (Finnis cites Sir 
Thomas More's refusal to lie as an example).58 The incommensurability of diverse 
goods (as here with considerations of character) is perhaps the most frequent and the 
most telling criticism levelled at all forms of consequentialism. However, the fact that 
the strict method of consequentialism fails does not necessarily imply that consequences 
should never be considered. Incommensurability is a criticism of consequentialism in 
54 MA, 53. 
55 MA, 20. 
56 MA, 23. 
57 MA, 73. 
58 MA, 50. 
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terms of its own understanding of 'method': it is a non sequitur to suggest that because 
the method fails, the concerns are irrelevant. Whilst we might agree with Finnis' s 
criticisms of consequential ism at this point, to do so implies neither that a consideration 
of consequences is irrelevant to moral judgement nor that an appeal to moral absolutes 
is the only way to preserve the 'soul-making significance of moral action', the only way 
to give proper consideration to matters of character and virtue. 
2.1.4 The relevance of tradition, and the 'narrowing of horizons' 
Although he allows for development of character, Finnis does not seem able to accept 
any development in our understanding of biblical prescriptions or of revelation. Karl 
Rahner based his denial of exceptionless moral norms on the view that specific moral 
absolutes cannot be permanent because human nature itself is subject to change.59 
Against this, Finnis asserts (with Vatican II Gaudium et Spes) that there are certain 
fundamental and unchangeable realities which are founded in Christ (and which are 
presumably knowable in a perfect, permanent, 'absolute' way). He ignores the fact that 
our understanding of any such realities is inevitably conditioned by our history, 
tradition, culture and language: once more there is an appeal to absolute reason. 
Finnis is concerned to protect the 'foundations' of Christian tradition60 and will not 
allow any deviation even in conflict or borderline situations; but all our understanding, 
even Finnis's notions of foundations and Christian tradition, are conditioned by our 
historical and linguistic finitude. As Eberhard Schockenhoff observes: 
even the assessment of specific actions as intrinsically evil and morally 
reprehensible under all circumstances is itself subject to the historicity of our 
moral knowledge. 61 
Finnis accepts that 'historicity and social change do affect moral judgment' ,62 citing as 
examples changes in social and cultural entities (e.g. borrowing and lending); 
conceptual clarification; removal of 'emotional bias'; and the development of new (or 
59 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, 22 vols., vol. 14: Ecclesiology, Questions in the Church, The 
Church in the World, trans. David Bourke (London: Da0on, Longman and Todd,_ ~976), 14-16. 
60 MA, 14. 
61 Eberhard Schockenhoff, Natural Law and Human Dignity: Universal Ethics in an Historical World, 
trans. Brian McNeil (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 192. 
62 MA, 25-26. 
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apparently new) forms of behaviour. It is not clear why he refuses to allow that such 
changes could occur relating to the norms which he wishes to preserve as 'absolute': the 
impact of conceptual clarification and new behaviour regarding homosexual 
relationships would seem to be one possible example. Finnis continues to draw a 
distinction between identifying the rightness of an act and identifying the wrongness of 
an act. He accepts that: 
Everything in the New Testament, Augustine and Thomas (and much in Plato 
and Aristotle) tells you that judging the rightness of an action is no easy task but 
is the task of virtue, of discerning one's vocation and following it out with 
creativity, intelligence, fairness, humility and all the other needful dispositions. 
The moral absolutes now in dispute identify wrong actions, not right; they are 
negative norms (praecepta negativa) which hold good always and on every 
occasion (semper et ad semper). 63 
This description of positive moral judgement has much to commend it: it is not clear on 
what basis Finnis can justifiably exempt the negative norms from similar consideration. 
Finnis, quoting Grisez, argues that it is the negative norms excluding divorce and 
adultery that create the stability and 'space' needed for marital love to grow. Grisez 
acknowledges that 'the meaning of the good of marital love is not exhausted by 
anyone's present understanding of it'. 64 He argues against defining the good of marriage 
in positive terms since 'to say, once for all, what marital love is and must be, would be 
to mummify it' .65 Grisez is right to emphasise the need for a stable framework within 
which to operate. Freedom must operate within certain limits; the alternative is simply 
chaos. However, the framework need only be relatively stable rather than absolute: the 
sort of evolving framework offered by a tradition's moral understanding. 
Finnis speculates on several possible motives for denying the existence of moral 
absolutes but is particularly exercised by 
a loss of the sense that revelation was completed in the life, the words, and the 
deeds of Jesus, communicated to and handed on by the apostles as a gospel 
which is 'the source of all saving truth and all moral teaching' and 'includes 
everything which contributes to the holiness oflife ... of the people of God' .66 
One need not argue that revelation has continued or is 'progressive' (to use John Henry 
Newman's term) since the death and resurrection of Jesus to question the demand of 
63 MA, 27-28. 
64 MA, 28. 
65 MA, 28. 
66 MA, 30. He is quoting Vatican II, Dei Verbum paras 4,7 and 8, ellipsis original to Finnis 
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faith implied here; one need only point out that our understanding of any revelation, 
even if that revelation were complete, must be partial and developing.67 The revelation 
may indeed be the source of all moral teaching and include everything that contributes 
to holiness but why should we believe that we have already perfectly identified all that 
this entails? Finnis is afraid that letting go of moral absolutes implies relativism and 
undermines God's revelation: denying moral absolutes 
is to take a long step toward denying that God has revealed anything to a people, 
or ever constituted a people of God at all. 68 
Finnis considers the Decalogue in the Fathers69, observing that the commandments were 
seen as 'precepts of natural law': known by reason and given by God as intrinsic to 
human nature; guiding us towards human fulfilment. As such, their content is fixed. 
O'Donovan modifies this position by proposing that whilst moral absolutes are not 
subject to any 'antithetical development' they may be subject to complementary 
development; to new areas of application: 
Imagination never suffices to envisage all the possible implications of a 
principle we hold exceptionless; the discovery of such implications is part of 
what is involved in a serious attempt to apply principles to cases. 70 
This question of the scope of application is important and Finnis addresses a criticism, 
made by Bruno Schuller, that refusing to violate a moral absolute for the sake of the 
greater good 'thereby manifest[s] a lesser or narrower willingness to further human 
good'; 71 that following a moral absolute necessarily implies a 'narrowing of horizons': 
A principal proportionalist objection to the truth of specific moral absolutes is 
this: They irrationally abstract some elements from the total reality of a human 
action .... in adhering to a moral absolute one rejects an option as soon as one 
understands it as including an action of the type specified in the norm, and thus 
one narrows one's focus unreasonably. 72 
However, Finnis argues that to judge an action 'right' requires a consideration of all the 
circumstances but that an action may be judged wrong as soon as it is seen to violate a 
moral absolute. 73 However, he argues that this is not a narrowing of one's horizon since 
67 For a discussion see David Brown, Tradition and Imagination: Revelation and Change (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999). 
68 MA, 30. 
69 MA, 9. 
70 O'Donovan, 'John Fifinis on Moral Absolutes', 125. 
71 MA, 17, in footnote. 
72 MA, 15-20. 
73 Finnis accepts that moral absolutes are all negative (i.e. prohibitions). 
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[one] is not excused from doing everything morally possible to pursue the goods 
which could have been sought by violating the moral absolute ... the situation 
thus morally structured challenges the chooser to expand the horizons of 
possibility with creativity and zeal. 74 
Finnis argues that it is proportionalism that involves the inevitable narrowmg of 
horizons in order to render the judgement manageable (or at least seemingly so) by 
choosing which factors and consequences of an action are to be included in a moral 
judgement. Finnis is undoubtedly right to suggest that it is simply impossible for the 
proportionalists to consider every conceivable consequence, and that they must 
inevitably limit their horizon. Any such limiting of horizon, says Finnis, cannot be 
guided by any moral principles but only by 'feelings'. 75 However, the proportionalist 
criticism of moral absolutes that they 'irrationally abstract some elements from the 
totality of a human action' still has considerable force unless one believes that a 
'rational' approach must involve moral absolutes. Moral absolutes are undoubtedly 
abstractions; the only question is whether they are rationally justified; and indeed 
whether such justification has any moral grounds. Finnis is attempting to preserve moral 
judgement as a purely rational endeavour and to deny any role to feelings. This 
conception of reason and its opposition to feelings and desire is open to question.76 
Surely proportionalism can also be a challenge to expand the horizons of possibility 
with creativity and zeal: the only apparent difference between the two situations of 
moral judgement is that for the legalist certain types of act are simply excluded. The 
legalism of moral absolutes and the assessments of proportionalism both involve a 
narrowing of horizons. 
74 MA, 17. 
75 MA, 18. 
76 See e.g. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980); Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and 
Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Ml; Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The 
Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). See also Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican province (London: Bums, 
Oates & Washbourne, 2nd revised ed, 1920-25), Il-1.59. Aquinas argues that virtue and passion can 
co-exist provided passions are subordinate to reason. 
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2.1.5 The possibility of exceptions 
SchUller argues that it can be right, in certain circumstances, to violate any of the moral 
norms; Finnis disagrees. In a reflection on the tale of the Tyrant's Wife77 (where the 
moral issue is whether it would be right to seduce a tyrant's wife in order to overthrow 
the tyrant), Finnis addresses this question of whether acts prohibited by his moral 
absolutes could ever be right, concluding, of course, that they cannot. For Finnis, 
adultery, fornication, lying and murder are simply always wrong and this wrongness is 
not simply 'formal', i.e. it is not contained within the definition of the acts (as e.g. 
adultery is not defined as 'wrongful sex outside marriage' but simply as 'sex outside 
marriage' which is deemed wrongful by a separate judgement). 
Finnis here touches on the important issue of concept formation in relation to 'good' 
and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong'. For the legalist, it can never be right to do certain bad 
things (proscribed by moral absolutes). Once an action is identified as wrong it must not 
be chosen whatever one's feelings: it is better to suffer wrong than to do it.78 This is an 
exercise in avoiding evil. For the proportionalist, an act is identified as the right thing to 
do by virtue of its good (or less harmful) consequences: in tragic situations an action 
may be 'right' even though still 'bad'. This is an exercise in maximising the good. 
General moral intuition certainly suggests that actions usually conceived of as wrong 
may have to be done on certain occasions: either for a greater good or in tragic 
situations where there is no good option. The distinction need not be, as Finnis suggests, 
between whether such acts are good or bad but between whether they are right or wrong 
in the circumstances. For Finnis, the circumstances make no difference to a moral 
judgement in the face of a moral absolute. This, though, is to abstract an action from its 
context in the totality of human life. Can an action be adequately specified without 
reference to the context? Finnis argues that such acts are defined 'in terms of the acting 
person's object: what that person chooses'. However, that choice will always include a 
consideration of context: Finnis makes the point himself when he quotes (approvingly) 
Aquinas's suggestion that an act of marital intercourse and an act of adultery are 
different acts, that they 'relate to the human goods at stake in intercourse quite 
77 MA, 31-37. 
78 MA, 47. 
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differently'.79 This can surely only be maintained with reference to the context (of 
marriage, at least)? Even then, the act may not be adequately specified, e.g. in cases of 
marital rape. Context and motivation are important factors in moral judgement and 
specific moral absolutes do not leave any room for such considerations. Finnis himself 
declares that: 
To define an act for the purpose of moral evaluation, one should not look to the 
physical behaviour and causality precisely as such. Instead one should look to 
the proposal, combining envisaged end with selected means, which the acting 
person adopts (or may adopt) by choice, the proposal which any relevant 
behaviour will express and carry out. 80 
It seems that in the process of defining moral acts, moral absolutes have already 
'smuggled in' considerations of consequences (envisaged end). O'Donovan notes the 
importance of implicit considerations of context in certain moral norms. He argues that 
some norms which appear to be merely tautologous do in fact have specific force by 
virtue of 'an unspoken reserve of cultural understanding' (his example is 'Do your 
duty', addressed to a soldier).81 He suggests that some words in these moral norms 
involve an implicit reference to cultural commitments. In a similar manner, he suggests, 
some terms in Finnis's moral absolutes 'arise explicitly from institutions and 
conventions in society' (for example the institution of marriage). He argues that in both 
cases the norms 'affirm as valid a corpus of moral demands which is associated with a 
social role'. 82 
Finnis attempts to answer the objection that tradition has allowed killing for the sake of 
a greater good: in war and in capital punishment. He notes that Aquinas contended that 
capital punishment 'need involve no choice to destroy a human good ... but can be done 
with a different intentionality ... restoring the order of justice violated by the one who 
killed'. 83 He admits that Aquinas's explanation may be challenged (rightly so, for it is 
surely disingenuous in the extreme) but claims that Aquinas is intent on avoiding any 
'greater good' type of argument which might be labelled as proportionalist. 
79 MA, 38. See Aquinas, 'Summa Theologica', 1-2.18 and 1-2.1. 
80 MA, 40. 0 
81 O'Donovan, 'John Finnis on Moral Absolutes', 118. 
82 O'Donovan, 'John Finnis on Moral Absolutes', 119. 
83 MA, 55-57. Aquinas, 'Summa Theologica', 11-2.64. 
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Finnis' s defence of the moral absolutes includes the principle that evil cannot be chosen 
even for the sake of a greater good. 84 He repeats his criticism of proportional ism: that it 
can result in the absurd position of recommending that one 'try anything', even sin, 
because this provides the opportunity for the greater good of God's glory in redemption. 
He suggests that this form of antinomianism was rejected by Paul in Romans 3 and that 
he (Paul) was effectively arguing against a consequentialist approach which judged 
actions according to their effectiveness. Finnis sees this as anticipating his own critique 
of proportional ism: that it is inconsistent with divine providence. 85 He also attributes the 
principle (that one may never do wrong in order to prevent a greater wrong) to St 
Augustine who argues that though intention and purpose are significant in moral debate 
there are some things which are clearly always wrong and should never be chosen 
whatever the intention. 86 However, it is the consideration of intention which, for Finnis, 
is crucial when considering the unwanted consequences, or side-effects, of a moral 
choice. 
2.1.6 The principle of double effect 
Finnis emphasises the distinction between actions that are intended and actions that are 
merely side-effects of a choice.87 He asserts that certain types of intention (those 
prohibited by the specific moral absolutes) are 'incompatible with the love of God and 
with seeking the Kingdom' because they are simply incompatible with a concern for 
human good. 88 He goes on to consider the importance of intention in other moral 
judgements: this significance of intention is the basis for the doctrine of double effect. 
Actions are defined by their intention, and that intention includes not just the end of the 
action but also the means of attaining it; means are seen as intermediate ends. 
Behaviourally different acts may be morally identical because they share the same 
end,89 as may positive actions and omissions. However, other effects which are not 
directly related to the achievement of the end are simply side-effects and are not relevant 
in evaluating the morality of the choice or intention. They are categorised as pre-moral 
84 MA, 59. 
85 MA, 60-63. 
86 
· MA, 63·66. 
87 MA, 67. 
88 MA, 68. 
89 Finn is's example is contraception by barrier methods and by the contraceptive pill. 
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evils. One may have a moral responsibility for these side-effects but it is different from 
the responsibility one has for one's moral choices. Finnis argues that 
though they are caused by one's choice and action, they are not chosen, that is, 
are not intended, even if they are foreseen (even foreseen as certain). Rather, 
they are permitted, that is, (as I shall say), accepted.90 
Finnis does accept that one may have a great moral responsibility for foreseen 
consequences of a choice but insists that they are to be evaluated on a different basis 
from the choice itself. It is hard to see why one is not equally morally responsible for 
something one can foresee 'as certain' to result from one's choice as for that choice's 
'intended' consequences (though possible side-effects could be considered differently). 
Consequentialists might argue that a course of action resulting in the death of non-
combatants could be right in certain circumstances; Finnis might agree if the deaths 
were a side-effect: 
Killing non-combatants as a side effect, which one clearly foresees and thus 
accepts, of one's properly motivated military operations can be acceptable; but 
killing non-combatants, by the very same devices, as a means of demoralising 
enemy combatants ... is never to be intended, chosen, done.91 
In his moral deliberation, Finnis has taken account of context (war) and consequences 
(death of non-combatants), as well as intention, to conclude that the moral absolute 
prohibiting the taking of innocent life can be broken (though not intentionally). For 
Finnis, the moral absolute that evil may not be chosen for the sake of good is not the 
measure of one's responsibility for side-effects. They are measured instead by the 
principle of fairness and by 'other basic moral principles' .92 Finnis himself 
acknowledges the importance of other features of context when he outlines the 'basic 
moral principles' to which he refers: 
creativity and fidelity in making and carrying out commitments, a certain 
detachment from particular goals, and all the other virtues needed to bring 
feelings and actions into harmony with reason's grasp of the basic human 
goods.93 
He describes the prudent as mature people of practical wisdom, part of whose prudence 
is 
90 MA, 71. 
91 MA, 68. 
92 MA, 81. 
93 MA, 81. 
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precisely their firm integration of character around all the moral absolutes, their 
unwillingness even to deliberate about departing from one or other ofthem.94 
Why could prudence not involve the integration of character around 'important moral 
principles' (virtually exceptionless, perhaps, but not absolute)? Even for Finnis, context 
and consequences are important and a judgement has to be made about 'fairness' or 
'proportionateness' which is dependent upon context. The attempt to limit consideration 
of moral responsibility simply to one's intention seems impossible to attain. Chappell 
comments that 
in the explanation of actions, context is everything; but what the Grisez School 
offers is precisely an abstraction from any particular context.95 
It may be that consequentialism's goal is also unattainable and that moral judgement 
may need to consider more aspects of a situation than simply future consequences but 
legalism's abstractions seem equally unsatisfactory. Both are guilty of abstracting from 
the totality of the context of moral decision-making. 
Finnis addresses attempts by Richard McCormick, and by Hallett, to show that one may 
indeed intend human harm as a means to greater good.96 Their examples include lying 
to protect confessional secrets; corporal punishment; capital punishment; therapeutic 
amputation; self-defence; and distressing criticism. Finnis argues that in all cases the 
intention is not to cause harm but that the action can properly be framed in terms of a 
different intention. Once more he struggles with capital punishment arguing that it is 
possible to hold that 
just insofar as the action chosen immediately and of itself instantiates the good 
of retributive justice, the death of the one bein% punished is not being chosen as 
an end in itself or as a means to an ulterior end. 7 
However, he argues that justification of capital punishment for the purpose of 
deterrence would be questionable. The suggestion that 'the death of the one being 
punished is not being chosen' surely highlights the questionableness of legalism's 
abstraction of 'intention': a good deal of 'context' has here been introduced in the 
identification of an agent's intention. 
Just as interesting is the issue of therapeutic amputation. Finnis argues that 
94 MA, 83, emphasis original. 
95 Chappell, 'Natural Law Revived', 42. 
96 MA, 78. 
97 MA, 79-80. 
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therapeutic amputation (e.g. to prevent spread of cancer) is not doing harm but 
preventing the further harm that a limb already doomed would do to the health 
or life of the person. 98 
Once again, the context is relevant to the identification of intention in this example: the 
crucial phrase is 'already doomed'. In cases where it is clear that a limb can not be 
salvaged then Finnis's assertion holds true. However it is clear that amputation does 
involve harm when one considers other more difficult situations. What is the intention 
when therapeutic amputation is performed in a case where it is not certain that the limb 
is already doomed? What if there are possible alternatives that may save the limb? Just 
how early in the course of the disease can amputation be considered? Amputation of a 
limb in very early and localised cases of malignancy might prevent spread of the cancer, 
and that may be the intention of the surgeon, but that surely does not make it morally 
right? Again legalism's abstraction is unsuccessful: the subjective judgement of 
proportionateness must be based upon considerations of context and consequences. We 
have seen that Finnis characterises such judgement as an 'instinct' and 'beyond reason'. 
In my view, the model of an aesthetic judgement might be nearer the mark. 
2.1. 7 The aesthetic dissolution of the absolutes 
There is one further type of challenge to the moral absolutes (and it is similar to the 
approach I wish to commend). Finnis refers to it as the aesthetic dissolution of the 
absolutes.99 Finnis observes that such models of ethics are based on a particular reading 
of Aristotle on phronesis, and argues that they involve a ' ... reduction of ethics- not to 
a technique so much as to something like a creative fine art.' 100 
Finnis suggests that in any form of artistic creation the artist is not simply guided by 
some independent technique or by any goal external to the process: 'thus artistic 
creation outruns technique'. Instead, the artist is guided by a sense or intuition in 
response to the characteristics of their medium: the specific artistic creation is the only 
way for the artist to articulate this sense. 'There is an interaction between the process of 
creation and this imaginative "conception" or "intuition" or "anticipation" of the 
object'. The design may be radically altered during the process but never disappears. 
98 MA, 79. 
99 MA, 101. 
100 MA, 101-02. 
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The aesthetic evaluation of the creation involves considerations both of 'what the work 
is trying to say' and 'how the work is saying it'. The criteria for judgement cannot be 
wholly specified prior to, or independently of, the creation: 
Provided the composition has a kind of inner unity, clarity, integrity, it can have 
an aesthetic worth which can govern and reshape, rather than be governed by, 
pre-existing standards generalizing the features of previous aesthetic objects 
which by their own inner unity, clarity, integrity established for themselves their 
artistic worth. 
Finnis notes that some people 'conceive the moral life in a fashion analogous to this'. 
Moral norms interact with specific actions and are 'public distillations' of morally good 
action. There are no criteria which could allow the right to be identified in the abstract; 
rather, virtuous agents demonstrate excellence in a way analogous to a superior athlete. 
They propose that thinking about a situation which calls for something to be 
done 'is not the consideration of maxims and the placing of a case under a 
general rule'. They claim that moral principles and norms form no kind of 
system; none of them has its truth by being derivable from or otherwise related 
to the others; each has its truth 'by living off what [virtuous and vicious] agents 
d , 101 0. 
Perhaps moral principles and norms form no kind of rationalistic system but that does 
not necessarily mean that they are arbitrary, just as aesthetic judgement is not arbitrary. 
The suggestion that the 'virtuous agent' demonstrates 'the excellence' that is possible in 
human behaviour is entirely in accord with the tradition of the saints (exemplary lives 
honoured for what they can teach us) and with the moral example of Christ (which must 
surely constitute at least a part of the moral import of the gospel). Johnson suggests that 
moral education and growth do not consist primarily in the learning of moral 
rules. We learn by experience and example ... We are inspired by the lives of 
people ... who seem to us to be caring, sensitive, intelligent, courageous and 
wise. We get a sense of what we might become and how we might live by 
observing how they live and by trying to act as they would. 102 
Finnis rightly identifies one conclusion of the aesthetic model of ethics: that 'the 
wrongness of certain choices cannot be known in advance' .103 He suggests that on this 
model the right choice can only be determined in each situation: 
a field free from rational . . . criteria, that is, from applicable standards for 
identifying which choices are not right. 104 
101 MA, I 02-03, emphasis mine. Finn is attributes such views to e.g. Sokolowski and Conn. The 
quotations are from Robert Sokolowski, Mora/Action (Bloomington: Indiana UniversitiPres-s, 1982). 
102 Ml, 258. 
103 MA, I03. 
104 MA, I 04, emphasis original. 
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This is simply an unwarranted exaggeration: the aesthetic model is not free of rational 
criteria; rather, other criteria are considered alongside reason; and standards, though 
provisional and derived from community and tradition, are still operative. Finnis's 
characterisation may hold true for forms of antinomianism: consider Fletcher's 
definition; 
This is the approach with which one enters into the decision-making situation 
armed with no principles or maxims whatsoever, to say nothing of rules. In 
every 'existential moment' or 'unique' situation, it declares, one must rely upon 
the situation of itself, there and then, to provide its ethical solution. 105 
To suggest that because the system does not rely exclusively on deductive reasoning it 
is completely unprincipled is a non sequitur. Finnis insists on reason alone, and on a 
particular conception of reason, in moral judgement. Goran Bexell suggests that the 
Finnis-Grisez School represents a rationalistic, rather than simply a rational ethics: 
A rational ethic is based on rational considerations and is logically consistent; its 
opposite is an irrational ethic. That ethics ought to be rational few would contest. 
A rationalistic ethic, on the other hand, allows only the reason to determine 
moral theology, at the expense of other human spiritual capabilities and other 
ethical phenomena; it may well presuppose an Aristotelian view of human 
beings as specifically rational. In such a system, feelin~s, will, or intuition 
should not override reason, as they may in a rational ethic. 1 6 
For Finnis, it is 'the sway of feelings over reason [that] constitutes immorality by 
deflecting one to objectives not in line with integral human fulfillment' .107 The first 
principle of morality is that one ought to will only those possibilities whose willing is 
compatible with integral human fulfilment: Finnis describes this as the most abstract 
and generic moral absolute. 108 Finnis's conception of morality is thoroughly 
rationalistic: 
Nothing is unconditional (absolute) in moral thought save the demand of reason 
itself. 10~ 
This is a conception of reason as absolute and universal, and which has no room for 
feelings and desires. 
105 Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics (London: S.C.M., 1966), 22. 
106 Goran Bexell, 'Is Grisez's Moral Theology Rationalistic? Free Choice, the Human Condition, and 
- Christian Ethics', in Biggar ana Black, TheRevi'va(ofNaiural Law, 131-47, at f33, emphasis mine. 
107 MA, 45. 
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Finnis argues that the aesthetic model overlooks 'the profound difference between the 
open-ended goods of persons . . . and the material on which every fine art works'. He 
suggests that; 
In an art, features of a particular item of matter can make a significant difference 
to the artist's performance, a difference controlled by the artist's imagination 
and other non-intellectual sensitivities and acts. 110 
In this, Finnis simply begs the question. Why can similar considerations not be true of a 
moral agent? It is precisely the imagination (and other non-intellectual sensitivities and 
acts) whose place in ethics I wish to affirm. Although Finnis maintains his position 
regarding moral absolutes, he does say of positive norms: 
When the question is what should be done, the (affirmative) norms themselves, 
however specific, leave something, often much, to be settled by a conscience 
which now must be measured by the unintelligible particularity of one's own 
feelings, by an intuitional grip, by the 'discernment' which constitutes a 
particular prudence, about what is to be done. 111 
Quite so, and if one abandons the notion of moral absolutes then this becomes true of all 
situations of moral deliberation. Finnis argues that all the objections to moral absolutes 
which seek to make ethics a techne must fail because of the open-ended nature of 
human fulfilment. The result, he suggests, is that ultimately such approaches rely on 'an 
appeal to "instinct", "sense" or "intuition'" .112 Similarly he suggests that for the 
aesthetic model 'the upshot is, again, an appeal to "intuition"' .113 Finnis's final criticism 
of the aesthetic model is that it is basically an 'ad hoc proportionalism' .114 He suggests 
that to claim that the exceptional features of a situation warrant the violation of a norm 
is to claim that those features 'outweigh the "wrong-making" factors!': hence his charge 
of proportionalism. However, this argument is circular: it is only because Finnis has 
chosen to characterise the claim in terms of weighing factors that this conclusion 
follows. The aesthetic justification of such an exception need involve no such 
instrumental method. 
110 MA, 104. 
Ill MA, 104. 
112 MA, 101. 
113 MA, 102. 
114 MA, 105. 
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2.1.8 Are moral absolutes defensible? 
I wish to challenge the possibility of moral absolutes and the mentality that 
accompanies a legalist approach to ethics. I suggest it is simply not possible to specify 
moral norms with sufficient precision to make them universally applicable, i.e. 
exceptionless or absolute in Finnis's terms. However, such norms need not be 
abandoned completely, they can still be useful guides, suggesting what is usually (or, 
indeed, almost always) right. Finnis seems to assume that because such models deny 
moral absolutes they must necessarily abandon all norms completely. However this is 
not the case: consider Joseph Fletcher's definition of situationism: 
The situationist enters into every decision-making situation fully armed with the 
ethical maxims of his community and its heritage, and he treats them with 
respect as illuminators of his problems. Just the same he is prepared in any 
situation to compromise them or set them aside in the situation if love seems 
better served by doing so. 115 
We need not abandon the system of moral norms; merely reconsider its status. Richard 
B. Miller's description of rules seems to correspond better to the phenomenology of 
ethical decision-making: 
rules . . . do not track human conduct in the way that scientific laws track the 
behaviour of physical bodies: . . . precisely and comprehensively, without 
remainder. But moral rules provide neither of these forms of coverage. That is 
because the behaviour to which moral rules refer is the result of human freedom 
and is embedded in chance and contingency. Moreover, the coverage provided 
by moral rules is relatively indeterminate in part because the language of moral 
rules is open-textured, requiring interpretation and clarification in the process of 
connecting them to facts or cases. 116 
Likewise Henry Sidgwick: 
what is needed is a line of argument which on the one hand allows the validity, 
to a certain extent, of the maxims already accepted, and on the other hand shows 
them to be not absolutely valid, but needing to be controlled by some more 
comprehensive principle. 117 
The question is whether exceptions should be allowed to rules which both sides agree 
are generally valid: in other words, whether rules should be absolute. 
115 F-letcher, Situation -Ethi~s. 26. 
116 Richard B. Miller, 'Rules', in Gilbert Meilaender and William Werpehowski (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook ofTheological Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 220-36, at 220. 
117 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London: Macmillan, 4th ed, 1890), 417. 
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Many of Finnis's criticisms of proportionalism may be telling but to accept them does 
not imply that one must accept his account of moral judgement. While legalism appeals 
to universal moral reason and to absolute truth, consequentialism appeals to a quasi-
scientific method. Legalism and consequentialism may both embody Enlightenment 
tendencies and both may thereby be untenable as complete systems despite both 
identifying important moral principles. 
2.2 Utilitarianism 
2.2.1 Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill 
Classical utilitarianism was first formulated by Jeremy Bentham. 118 He built his system 
of ethical judgement on the idea of utility as the promotion of pleasure and avoidance of 
pain, drawing on ideas from Thomas Hobbes and David Hume. Bentham's is the first 
and paradigmatic statement of utilitarian ethics. The theory has been modified and 
adapted by later authors but, to a very large extent, all subsequent forms of 
utilitarianism and consequentialism represent attempts fully to come to terms with 
Bentham's legacy. Bentham outlines his method thus: 
To take an exact account then of the general tendency of any act, by which the 
interests of a community are affected, begin with any one person of those whose 
interests seem most immediately to be affected by it: and take an account, 
1. Of the value of each distinguishable pleasure which appears to be produced 
by it in the first instance. 
2. Of the value of each pain which appears to be produced by it in the first 
instance. 
3. Of the value of each pleasure which appears to be produced by it after the 
first. This constitutes the fecundity of the first pleasure and the impurity of the 
first pain. 
4. Of the value of each pain which appears to be produced by it after the first. 
This constitutes the fecundity of the first pain, and the impurity of the first 
pleasure. 
5. Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the 
pains on the other. The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure, will give the 
good tendency of the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of that 
individual person; if on the side of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole. 
6. Take an account of the number of persons whose interests appear to be 
concerned;- and repeat the above process with respect to each. Sum up the 
118 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation [ 1780] (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1876). 
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numbers expressive of the degrees of good tendency, which the act has, with 
respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is good upon the 
whole: do this again with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the 
tendency of it is good upon the whole: do this again with respect to each 
individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is bad upon the whole. Take the 
balance; which, if on the side of pleasure, will give the general good tendency 
of the act, with respect to the total number or community of individuals 
concerned; if on the side of pain, the general evil tendency, with respect to the 
same community. 119 
Bentham argues that his system allows the words ' ... ought, right and wrong and 
others of that stamp' to have objective meaning which they otherwise lack. If an 
action conforms to the principle of utility then it is one that ought to be done (or 
at least it is not one that ought not to be done), it is a right action. 12° For 
Bentham, utility is the only principle by which human beings should, and 
actually do, make moral decisions. 
The principle of utility recognizes this subjection [to pleasure and pain], 
and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to 
rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. 121 
Note that Bentham's language in outlining his method is mathematical ('exact', 
'value', 'numbers', 'sum up', 'balance' etc.). His approach is to attribute numerical 
values to the consequences of an act and to consider the resulting inequality sum. 
Utilitarianism thus represents an attempt to make ethics into a scientific discipline: 
The aim of ethics is to render scientific - i.e. true, and as far as possible 
systematic - the apparent cognitions that most men have of the rightness or 
reasonableness of conduct. 122 
It seeks to reduce complex ethical decision-making to a consideration of a single 
principle: utility. An ethical decision is supposed to be the result of the creation of an 
inequality sum of utility (and disutility) for each alternative course of action and a 
comparison of the results: the right action being the one which produces the greatest 
utility (or the least disutility). Johnson is critical of this kind of reductionism: 
Whereas Kantianism impoverishes reason by its excessive abstractionism, its 
chief Enlightenment rival, utilitarianism, does so by a corresponding 
reductionism. To put it crudely, utilitarianism reduces reason to economic, 
means-ends, technical rationality as the sole criterion for moral evaluation. 123 
119 Bentham, Morals and Legislation, 30-31. 
120 Bentham, Morals and Legislation, 3-4. -
121 Bentham, Morals and Legislation, 1-2. 
122 Sidgwick, Methods, 77, see also 422. 
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While Johnson here contrasts utilitarian reduction with Kantian abstraction, 
utilitarianism too performs its own versions of abstraction. In order to keep the 
'arithmetic' manageable, utilitarians must limit their consideration of possible 
consequences. This process, which requires some prior principle to guide the selection, 
inevitably means that some features of the context are disregarded. This may be the case 
for all ethical deliberation but utilitarians are under particular pressure to 'narrow their 
horizons' and, arguably, the system has an inbuilt tendency to prefer those features 
which can be easily 'measured' (in terms of utility). As Bernard Williams rightly 
observes, such limitation has the effect of giving measurable consequences an 
unreasonable prominence in the decision whilst dismissing those features of a situation 
which do not fit readily into the utilitarian scheme. 124 Utilitarianism is characterised by 
a distinctive method rather than distinctive results. For Williams the question is 
not 'do you agree with utilitarianism's answer?' but 'do you really accept 
utilitarianism's way of looking at the question?' 125 
Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism and as such is committed to the position 
that actions are to be judged solely by their consequences; and that institutions, laws and 
practices are similarly justified by reference to their consequences. Actions themselves 
do not have any intrinsic value. 
Roger Badham observes that such attempts to introduce scientific method into the 
human sciences are an attempt to turn phronesis into techne whereby techne falsely 
claims that its scientific methods produce all the knowledge necessary for a society: 
More specifically, in ethics the just society is produced by means of objective, 
universalisable ethical principles while the issue of virtuous character is denied 
real significance as unscientific, subjective and, therefore, untrustworthy. 126 
This universalistic frame of mind is typical of a scientific approach. It leaves no room 
for altruism and must assume that a moral method will produce similar results in similar 
circumstances. I want to suggest that such universalism is a chimera. 
Utilitarianism is an attempt to make ethics purely 'rational' (in Enlightenment terms) 
and to free it from the influence of passion and emotion as well as the 'unwarranted' 
claims of authority. J. J. C. Smart explicitly sets out to 
124 Bernard Williams, 'A Critique_of Utilitarianism', in J. J. C. _Smart and Bernard_ Willia111s _(e©~), 
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state a system of ethics which is free from traditional and theological 
associations. 127 
Sidgwick focuses on the methods or processes of ethics: 128 as a result, traditional 
narratives and symbols are cast off (or at least, this is attempted). I will argue, with 
Gadamer, that it is not, in fact, possible to cast them off: it is they that have the power to 
mediate meaning. I will also suggest that the attempt to produce a purely rational ethics 
is misguided and illegitimate: 
this is not an interpretation but a de-mythologisation which has determined a 
priori that symbols and myths have no value. 129 
For utilitarianism, the question of the 'good' or the 'useful', the criteria by which 
consequences are to be judged, has been contentious, and different versions of 
utilitarianism have offered different definitions. Bentham's initial answer was to equate 
usefulness with the ability to promote pleasure and avoid pain, based on his observation 
that this is the principle upon which most people do in fact act, even if they do not 
consciously think of it: 
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain 
and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to 
determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on 
the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. 130 
And he was thus able, famously, to assert that 'quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin 
is as good as poetry'. This must follow from Bentham's basic premise: 'goodness' here 
is simply defined in terms of quantity of pleasure. For Bentham, the interest of the 
community was simply to be determined by the sum ofthe interests of its members. 
Bentham wishes to exclude all judgements of approbation based on feeling. He is here 
attacking moral sense theorists and leaves no room for 'aesthetic' judgements or 
communal values in his single-minded pursuit of an 'extrinsic' principle on which to 
base ethical judgements. This constitutes a form of abstraction: removing ethical 
judgements from all influence of feeling. Again this is a reflection of his determination 
to establish moral judgements on rational and scientific foundations. Bentham is aware 
of the complexity of this task and sets out at great length the kinds of pleasures and 
127 J. J. C. Smart, 'An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics', in Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism, 3-
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pains and their measurement together with factors affecting human beings' sensibility to 
such pains and pleasures. 131 He is also aware of the unreasonable practical demands that 
such a system would make if applied to every moral decision: 
It is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to 
every moral judgment, or to every legislative or judicial operation. It may, 
however, be always kept in view: and as near as the process actually pursued on 
these occasions approaches to it, so near will such process approach to the 
character of an exact one. 132 
In order for this system to be even remotely manageable, Bentham must drastically 
restrict his definition of utility. He chooses a strict hedonistic principle: 
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves 
of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have 
to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in 
question. 133 
John Stuart Mill's essay on utilitarianism 134 is perhaps better known than Bentham's 
original work. Mill clarifies the principle of utility and explores its connections with 
other theories. He attempts to ground the theory in human nature and shows its 
compatibility with much ordinary moral reflection. However, he was unhappy with 
Bentham's definition of happiness and his adoption of a one-dimensional principle of 
pleasure. Mill held instead that there are higher and lower pleasures: 
better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates 
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. 135 
It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact that some 
kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be 
absurd that, while in estimating all other things quality is considered as well as 
quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity 
alone. 136 
However, this adds a further level of complexity to the utilitarian calculus: it is not clear 
how this 'quality' is to be estimated nor does it seem likely that everyone will desire the 
same pleasures in the same degree. The difficulties of defining and of adequately 
evaluating types of happiness are highlighted even further by Smart who considers the 
hypothetical case of a man fitted with electrodes, the self-stimulation of which produced 
131 Bentham, Morals and Legislation, chapters 3-6. 
132 Bentham, Morals and Legislation, 31. 
· 
133 Bentham; Morals· ana Legislation~ 2. 
134 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism [ 1861] (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, 2nd ed, 200 I). 
135 Mill, Utilitarianism, I 0. 
136 Mill, Utilitarianism, 8. 
50 
various kinds of pleasure. 137 The instinctive reaction is to suggest that man was made 
for 'higher things' although the strict hedonist would simply have to decide in terms of 
quantities of pleasure. 'Happiness' is in itself an evaluative concept. Whilst Mill admits 
that it is possible to learn to do without happiness and even, in the case of the hero or 
the martyr, to reject it, he does not believe that this negates the principle of utility. 
Rather, he argues, the hero or the martyr prizes the happiness of others more than his 
own individual happiness. Despite this, however, Mill insists on keeping rigidly 
separate the morality of the action, the worth of the agent and the agent's motive: 'the 
motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action' .138 This is another form of 
abstraction and raises the question of whether it is really legitimate to characterise two 
actions as (morally) identical when they are performed in different contexts, by different 
agents and for different motives. As Williams points out, the situation is even more 
complex when one allows for 'negative responsibility' (a notion he wishes to criticise): 
when judged in terms of consequences alone one is just as responsible for the things one 
allows or fails to prevent. 139 In consequentialist terms there is no moral difference 
between me bringing about a situation and someone else (whom I could have prevented) 
doing so. As Williams observes this 'represents ... the extreme of impartiality, and 
abstracts from the identity of the agent.' 140 
2.2.2 G. E. Moore's challenge to utilitarianism 
G. E. Moore is sharply critical of Mill (and of Sidgwick) arguing that pleasure is not the 
only criterion of the good and that Mill's comments on 'quality' of pleasures 141 actually 
imply that this must be the case. 142 Both Moore and Sidgwick argue that the 'good' is an 
unanalysable concept; utilitarianism's insistence that pleasure is the sole good can only 
be based on intuition and its claims rest simply on self-evidence. 143 Moore is happy to 
accept that pleasure may be good as an end but cannot accept that pleasure alone is 
good as an end. Moore criticises Mill for asserting that 'good' simply means 'desirable' 
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and that one can only identify the 'desirable' by identifying what is actually desired. 
Moore counters that: 
The desirable means simply what ought to be desired or deserves to be 
desired. 144 
Where Moore's criticism really bites is in his critique of Mill's comments on quality of 
pleasures. Moore rightly points out that there must be some other criteria of 'good' by 
which Mill can make the judgement that certain pleasures are better, or of higher 
quality, than others. The judgement, by Mill's own argument, cannot be based simply 
on quantity or intensity of pleasure; rather there must be some other way of identifying 
the higher pleasures. Mill is determined to cling to his utilitarian principles but the 
situation is becoming too complex for a simple inequality sum involving just one term 
(pleasure) to provide an ethical judgement of sufficient weight and flexibility. This is 
even without introducing the further complexities associated with concepts of justice 
and equitable distribution: should the utilitarian be aiming to increase total happiness or 
average happiness? Smart suggests that there are 
good utilitarian reasons for adopting the principle of fairness as an important, 
but not inviolable, rule ofthumb. 145 
Moore held that certain states of mind (learning, for example) had intrinsic value which 
was independent of any associated pleasure (or pain); 146 this is in contrast to Bentham 
and Mill who argued that their value was only as a means to attaining pleasure. Also, he 
argued that some things (truth, beauty, love and friendship, for example) were good 
independently of whether people actually desired them. I would agree with Moore that 
we intuitively value some things above others but I suggest it is meaningless to talk of 
value without any possibility of real application, without asking 'valuable for whom?'. 
Moore is critical of Sidgwick for suggesting that 
no one would consider it rational to aim at the production of beauty in external 
nature, apart from any possible contemplation of it by human beings. 147 
Moore does consider it rational: but I think the point that Sidgwick makes could be 
seen, in part at least, as the idea that the very definition of 'beauty' implies human (or 
possibly divine) contemplation. Moore asks us to consider two imaginary worlds: one 
beautiful and one ugly: 
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Well, even supposing them quite apart from any possible contemplation by 
human beings; still is it irrational to hold that it is better that the beautiful world 
should exist, than the one which is ugly? 148 
What Moore has failed to notice in this example is that he (or any other judge) 
contemplates such worlds in the very act of imagining them. Our imagination is a 
crucial component of our ethical deliberation: in utilitarianism, imagination is involved 
both in the envisaging of consequences and in the evaluation of happiness (for oneself 
and for others). As Williams observes: 
discussion about how one would think and feel about situations somewhat 
different from the actual (that is to say, situations to that extent imaginary) plays 
an important role in the discussion of the actual. 149 
Any attempt to consider beauty or pleasure without reference to a subject constitutes a 
further form of abstraction. I hope to argue that the same is true of 'goodness' and that 
all attempts to abstract ethical decisions from contexts and agents should be resisted. 
Sidgwick hints at something similar: 
nothing ... appears to possess this quality of goodness out of relation to human 
existence, or at least to some consciousness or feeling. 150 
the perception of goodness or virtue in actions would seem to be analogous to 
the perception of beauty in material things: which is normally accompanied with 
a specific pleasure which we call 'aesthetic'. 151 
However, he is careful to point out that goodness and beauty should not simply be 
equated: there can be good conduct which is not 'beautiful' and 'striking gifts and 
excellences' even in crime and wickedness. 152 
Moore himself is critical of the abstraction of pleasure (or consciousness of pleasure) as 
the only criterion for determining the 'good' and suggests that it is 'quite plain' that 
there are other more complicated states of mind which we think of as desirable. 
Therefore consciousness of pleasure cannot be the sole good; rather we must consider 
the 'principle of organic unities'. 153 It is not only the complexity of situations and 
consequences that militate against the method of utilitarianism; the complexity of 
human beings compounds the difficulties still further. I would suggest that ethical 
deliberation is far too complex for any single criterion or scientific method to do it full 
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justice. Williams is highly critical of utilitarianism because, he argues, it is simply 
incapable of making sense of the integrity of a moral agent as it makes only 'the most 
superficial sense of human desire and action' 154 and is unable to 'coherently describe 
the relations between a man's projects and his actions' .155 Consequential ism denies any 
intrinsic value to actions and yet the activities that one freely chooses are those in which 
one can see intrinsic value. Williams argues that the denial of intrinsic value to actions 
is in danger of completely undermining utilitarianism: why would anyone choose to be 
a utilitarian unless they could see intrinsic value in that particular form of moral 
deliberation?156 Equally, he suggests, it is absurd to require an agent to disregard his 
own projects in favour of the results of utility calculations which explicitly do allow for 
the projects of others. 157 Williams criticises Smart, and utilitarianism, for omitting any 
consideration of 'excellencies of character' which could help to define a 'good man' .158 
He also observes that in many important ways utilitarianism 'runs against the 
complexities of moral thought'. 159 This, I suggest is the inevitable result of the single-
minded scientific reductionism which is at the heart of utilitarianism's method. 
2.2.3 The big problem: incommensurability 
One step in that method, the summing of utilities, has given rise to most criticism of 
utilitarianism. The very possibility of such a step presupposes the commensurability of 
goods: 
the assumption is involved that all pleasures included in our calculation are 
capable of being compared quantitatively with one another and with all pains ... 
so that each may be at least roughly weighed in ideal scales against any other. 160 
Smart observes that the complexity is, in fact, even greater as one has to not only 
foresee possible consequences and compare likely pleasures but also to estimate their 
probabilities. 161 Commensurability is required, first, between different goods for the 
same person (intrapersonal) and, second, between different people in relation to the 
154 Williams, 'Critique', 82. 
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same good (interpersonal): the latter is particularly difficult to ascertain. In practice, 
what is often required is simultaneous intrapersonal and interpersonal comparisons -
good A for person X compared to good B for person Y. Robert Goodin argues that this 
is really only a problem for hedonistic Utilitarians: 'they are the ones asking us to get 
inside someone else's head' .162 Williams suggests that utilitarianism makes enormous 
demands on the availability of empirical information: information which is, in truth, 
'largely unavailable and shrouded in conceptual difficulty.' 163 He suggests that this is 
tolerated because consequentialism 
appeals to a frame of mind in which technical difficulty, even insuperable 
technical difficulty, is preferable to moral unclarity. 164 
This blind following of method (techne) is a feature of a scientific approach which is 
wholly committed to the pursuit of clarity, of a univocal 'right answer'. In the face of 
insuperable technical difficulty utilitarianism is regularly faced with situations where it 
can offer no justified (on its own terms) ethical guidance. Why should this be preferable 
to 'moral unclarity'? 
Goodin suggests that welfare utilitarianism can mitigate the difficulties of interpersonal 
utility comparisons by defining utility in terms of welfare interests: 
Whereas preferences, pleasures and pains are highly idiosyncratic, welfare 
interests are highly standardised. 165 
He argues that it is welfare utilitarianism that has given the 'broader notion of utility 
some practical content'. However, the more standardised a measure of utility becomes 
the more abstracted it must be, and therefore it is in danger of losing its relevance to real 
situations. Goodin is prepared to accept this for the sake of a simple, rational (scientific) 
system: 
there is considerable advantage in being able to say there is one common 
standard- utilitarianism- underlying arguments both for and against, and hence 
capable of adjudicating the conflict. Utilitarianism in that way provides some 
rational basis for making what all too often seem to be no more than arbitrary 
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However, he observes (without concern) that this is achieved by 'abstracting from 
people's actual wants to their more generalised welfare needs'. 167 This abstraction is 
further compounded by utilitarianism's commitment to treat individuals impartially: 
In the utilitarian formula, a utile is a utile is a utile. What we ought to do ... is 
independent of any consideration of who we are or of any special duties that 
might arise from that fact. 168 
Such abstraction isolates utilitarianism, and other forms of strict consequentialism, from 
considerations of tradition and character. 
2.2.4 The relevance of tradition and character 
Mill is happier than Bentham to allow tradition a role in moral judgement. As an answer 
to the objection that there is insufficient time, before every action, to fully assess the 
effects on general happiness, he says 
there has been ample time, namely, the whole past duration of the human 
species. During all that time mankind have been learning by experience the 
tendencies of actions. 169 
Mill is attempting to dispose together of two common criticisms of utilitarianism: that 
the gathering of the required information is impractical; and that utilitarianism does not 
take proper account of our moral precepts. For Mill, tradition and communally accepted 
moral precepts are only secondary rules; nothing more than the distillates of centuries of 
experience of the effects of actions on happiness; their status depends on the 
observation that following them generally tends to generate most happiness. Sidgwick 
observes: 
And in proportion as the apprehension of consequences becomes more 
comprehensive and exact, we may trace not only change in the moral code 
handed down from age to age, but progress in the direction of a closer 
approximation to a perfectly enlightened utilitarianism. 170 
Bentham seems to imply something similar but he seems more determined that each 
moral judgement should be approached afresh. Mill and Sidgwick allow the moralist to 
bring with him to the current question the accumulated wisdom of his tradition. In this 
they are closer to Fletcher's 'situationist' whilst Bentham is nearer to Fletcher's 
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'antinomian' .171 Sidgwick is of the opinion that utilitarianism cannot develop a moral 
code for humanity de novo, rather it must start within a received ethical tradition and 
then consider whether any changes to the tradition can be recommended. 172 In allowing 
'rules of thumb' one knows in advance that one will on occasion fail to correctly 
identify exceptional cases: as Williams puts it: ' [one is] licensing some tactical disutility 
in pursuit of strategic utility.' 173 
Mill was also uncomfortable with Bentham's reductionism and aware that utilitarianism 
could be seen as rendering men 'cold and unsympathising'; 174 he insisted that moralists 
should cultivate their sympathies as well as their moral feelings. 175 The same charge 
can, of course, be levelled at deontologists who can appear heartless when preferring 
'abstract conformity to a rule to the prevention of avoidable human suffering' .176 Mill 
also attempts to justify certain moral precepts (e.g. that it is wrong to lie) by considering 
the consequences for the character of the individual: 
It would often be expedient [in the short term] ... to tell a lie. But inasmuch as 
the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on the subject of veracity is one 
of the most useful ... things to which our conduct can be instrumental ... we feel 
that the violation [of the rule] ... would not be expedient. 177 
This does not seem consistent with his previous assertions about motivation. On the 
other hand, Sidgwick is concerned, in a discussion of moral sense or conscience, to give 
due place to 
the effect of sympathy [on] impulses that prompt to actions as well as with 
feelings that result from them. 178 
He suggests that the 'direct sympathetic echo' that one feels for the 'judgements and 
sentiments' of others, in their ethical conduct, is an important factor in sustaining one's 
own ethical deliberations. 179 
As Mill addresses further criticisms of utilitarianism it seems that he introduces further 
qualifications and moves further away from a simple utilitarian position. However he 
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still argues that all ethical theories are ultimately based on the single principle of utility 
even when this is not appreciated by their proponents. Music, health, and even virtue, he 
suggests, are desirable not as means to happiness but as part of happiness itself. The 
definition (and measurement) of happiness are becoming more and more complex as 
Mill attempts to make the utilitarian position more humane. Yet, Mill is determined to 
hold fast to utilitarian principles: 
If the opinion which I have now stated is psychologically true - if human nature 
is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a 
means of happiness ... [then] happiness is the sole end of human action, and the 
promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct. 180 
He suggests that all moralists resort to utilitarian principles in attempts to commend 
their own theories. Whilst I would accept that all ethical theories require a theory of the 
good, I think that Mill's mistake is to assume that this must always be defined, as he 
would argue, in terms of utility, even given the broader conception of utility which he 
outlines. Another interpretation might be that ethical theories are not all based on the 
principle of utility but that some utilitarians (like Mill) are prepared to admit the 
legitimacy of other principles (even if they attempt to justify them not on their own 
terms but in terms of the principle of utility). It seems that a strict utilitarian position is 
difficult to hold. It may be that no single ethical system can completely avoid the charge 
of heartlessness and that the best approach is to combine elements of more than one. 
Smart suggests that there may well be 
no ethical system which appeals to all people, or even to the same person in 
different moods. 181 
Heartlessness, it seems to me, may be the direct result of the forms of abstraction which 
we have already discussed. Could it be, once again, that what is required is a form of 
aesthetic judgement? 
2.2.5 Evaluation of the good: aesthetics? 
Goodin observes that all ethical theories reqmre a theory of 'the good', especially 
utilitarianism which must evaluate 'good consequences'. 182 However he suggests that 
while such a theory might be indispensable there is little agreement on its content and 
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source. He observes that most theories of the good appeal to broadly similar standards 
of goodness, in line with broadly Aristotelian principles which 
analyse excellence in terms of a rich complexity that has been somehow 
successfully integrated. 183 
He goes on to suggest that such broad agreement 'comes basically in the realm of 
aesthetics'. He argues that such 'aesthetic' agreement is inadequate to the task required 
of it by ethical theories because it amounts to 'promoting things that are good in 
themselves, without being good for anyone' whilst ethics is about social relations. I 
disagree with Goodin's evaluation of aesthetic agreement, assuming, as it does, a 
detached and purely subjective conception of aesthetics. Indeed I would suggest that 
this is exactly the sort of agreement we should be seeking in ethics. Goodin's 
dissatisfaction with such an approach is a manifestation of a 'scientific' approach which 
deeply mistrusts anything which cannot be validated by scientific method. 
Mill (and Moore) are surely right to want to qualify (or oppose) Bentham's basic 
position. However, in order to do so they must appeal to principles which are not 
contained within a strict utilitarian framework. How are we to categorise higher and 
lower pleasures? Which states of mind are to be granted 'intrinsic value'? Goodin 
suggests that such appeals are in danger of undermining their ethical theories: 
the further this distances itself from classic hedonic utilitarianism, and the closer 
it comes to embracing an aesthetic ideal ... the less credible this analysis is as an 
ethical theory. 184 
Perhaps Goodin is looking for the wrong sort of ethical theory? He certainly seems to 
require a particular sort of theory: he is committed to a 'rational' and 'scientific' theory, 
having already excluded any possibility of an aesthetic component. Mill and Moore, on 
the other hand, seem to turn instinctively to aesthetic considerations when faced with 
the cold reductionism of Bentham's utilitarian calculus. Whilst we may not wish to 
accept the notion of a moral sense or faculty, it may be that aesthetic considerations 
(balance, elegance, fittingness, appropriateness) can have a place in ethical judgement. 
Such considerations need imply neither arbitrariness nor simply personal preference. 
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2.2.6 The possibility of exceptions: casuistry 
In answer to the criticism of utilitarianism that it allows an individual to favour his own 
interests, Mill argues that many of the criticisms laid at the door of utilitarianism are no 
more than comments on the general 'infirmities of human nature'. All moral theories 
must accept as a fact the existence of conflicting considerations and the possibility of 
exceptions: at least ifthey are to be 'believed by sane persons'. 185 
There is no ethical creed which does not temper the rigidity of its laws by giving 
a certain latitude, under the moral responsibility of the agent, for 
accommodation to peculiar circumstances; and under evert creed, at the opening 
thus made, self-deception and dishonest casuistry get in. 18 
This is a crucial observation and the comments regarding self-deception and dishonest 
casuistry highlight those areas which Finnis and others are, presumably, attempting to 
avoid by means of their insistence on moral absolutes. However, Mill and Fletcher seem 
to imply that 'latitude' should not be seen so much as a concession in 'peculiar 
circumstances' but rather should be seen to operate in a great many more cases of moral 
judgement: allowing proper consideration of agents, motives, contexts, situations, 
tradition and rules. The difficulty which then arises is how to evaluate the judgements 
which are made; at this point Mill would no doubt argue for the reintroduction of the 
principle of utility, his 'common umpire' .187 I would argue instead that, at this point, 
there is a role for aesthetic criteria and communal judgement, matters to which we will 
return later. Bentham, Mill and Moore are all agreed that the rightness of an action is to 
be judged solely by consequences, states of affairs brought about by the action. 
Williams points to an inherent contradiction here. The essence of strict act-utilitarianism 
is a matter of 'asking oneself the correct question' (the question about consequences) at 
the moment of ethical deliberation. Ironically this makes it a matter of motivation: one 
must be motivated solely by a commitment to the consideration of consequences. 
Even though Mill and Moore attempt to rescue utilitarianism from Bentham's simple 
hedonistic calculus they do still hold to the necessity of some form of (more subtle, 
weighted, more discriminating) calculus. Their criticisms of utilitarianism stem from the 
effects of Bentham's thoroughgoing reductionism in applying a single principle and a 
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scientific method. Their own systems, while being less reductionist cannot escape this 
charge completely: their ethics is still a matter of 'measurement' and comparison. 
Indeed, it is in the pursuit of this basic conviction that utilitarianism and other forms of 
consequentialism lay themselves open to the classical criticisms and are guilty of 
varying degrees of abstraction. Utilitarians, perhaps especially Mill, may feel a certain 
unease about the practical results of a rigid application of a utilitarian calculus but 
nonetheless they are tied to this basic approach. For all the refinements and 
modifications, for all the introduction of external principles, and for all the attempts to 
make the system more humane, the various forms of utilitarianism (and 
consequentialism) can be reduced to an attempt to put measurable criteria into an 
inequality-sum for each alternative action. This inherent tension is, I suggest, a 
manifestation of the inadequacy and inappropriateness of scientific method in ethics. 
Similar considerations apply to other developments of utilitarianism such as those based 
on 'preference satisfaction' or on 'welfare'. The criteria, in themselves, may be worthy 
of consideration; the problems arise when they are co-opted into the service of 
utilitarian method. The problem lies in the fundamental structure of thought introduced 
by Bentham, from which subsequent Utilitarians are simply unable completely to 
escape. 
Despite the criticisms of utilitarianism in relation to individual morality, might it 
perhaps come into its own as a standard for judging public action? 
2.2.7 Public morality: a strength of utilitarianism? 
Utilitarianism may not be well suited to day-to-day decisions: properly applied the 
method is simply too time-consuming. 188 However it may be a useful tool on those 
occasions when we must deliberate and decide on a moral question, so that it could be 
the standard that public policy-makers are to use when making collective 
choices impinging on the community as a whole ... The right choice is the one 
which maximises utility summed impersonally across all those affected by an 
action. 189 
188 Rule utilitarianism claims to avoid this criticism but it too represents an abstraction from context and 
is arguably subject to the weaknesses of both utilitarianism and legalism. 
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This, certainly, seems to have been Bentham's view: he wrote an introduction to the 
principles of morals and legislation. However, even in public settings it is hard for 
utilitarianism to evade the criticisms levelled at Mill, Moore and others. 190 Williams 
suggests that many important questions in political philosophy, relating to political 
principles and to government, cannot be addressed by utilitarianism at all. 191 Although 
utilitarianism may seem well suited to questions of public policy it is likely that the 
method can be applied with most precision in certain limited and private cases. 192 In the 
absence of complete empirical information, utilitarianism can surely only provide a 
rough answer to a moral question. The sharpest criticisms of utilitarianism relate to 
incommensurability, inflexibility and inhumanity- all of which, I would argue, are the 
result of utilitarianism's search for objective scientific method. 
Consideration of the consequences of an action certainly seems to be an instinctive way 
of approaching an ethical question - it is often the way 'ordinary' people 'do ethics'. 
Certainly it is commonly the way they justify rules (and legislation). Sidgwick observes 
that 'Common Sense is unconsciously utilitarian' .193 I would not wish to argue that the 
insights of utilitarianism should have no place in ethical deliberation; pleasure and pain 
may be relevant criteria among others and consequences will need to be taken into 
account. However, as a complete system (which gives no quarter to alternatives) we 
must be aware of its severe limitations and recognise that, alone, it is simply unable to 
answer many ethical questions (even on its own terms) and that, as Johnson observes, it: 
narrows our reason so drastically that it excludes most of what is significant in 
our ordinary moral deliberations. 194 
2.3 Conclusions 
Neither the appeal to absolute truth and universal reason implicit in legalism nor the 
'scientific method' of consequentialism can hope to do justice to the full range of 
human moral consideration or to free us from the restrictions of our 'situation'. Rather 
we must enter the situation aware of our limitations and approach the moral judgement 
190 Williams outlines a number of criticisms of utilitarianism in matters of social choice. See Williams, 
'Critique', 140-41. 
191
- Williams, 'Critique', 149. 
192 Williams, 'Critique', 80. 
193 Sidgwick, Methods, 451. 
194 Ml, 120. 
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with creativity and zeal. As Charles Taylor argues, we must utilise not just a simple 
language of quantity but also a language of qualitative contrasts. 195 As we have seen, 
value cannot always be quantified. Williams suggests that instinctively we are, at least 
in part, not utilitarians because we are unable to treat our moral feelings as objects with 
only utilitarian value: 
our moral relation to the world is partly given by such feelings, and by a sense of 
what we can or cannot live with ... utilitarianism alienates one from one's moral 
feelings. 196 
Perhaps instinct, imagination and inspiration are important at precisely this point. Could 
it be that our moral responsibility before God is not settled by an appeal to absolute 
truth or to incontrovertible method, but rather that it is to be worked out in creative 
engagement with God, with our situation, and with our tradition? The norms that Finnis 
describes as absolute need not be abandoned but might be seen to be indeed the 'public 
distillations' of morally good action which Finnis condemns, 197 to be followed in most 
(perhaps almost all) cases but nonetheless seen as provisional and able to be violated in 
certain possible (rare) circumstances. Such norms would indeed function as negative 
'boundary markers' but are in no sense 'absolute' and are potentially susceptible to 
modification. We must always be conscious of our historical, linguistic and cultural 
situatedness: we can never eliminate it completely. Sidgwick observes that 
the detailed regulations which it is important to society to maintain depend so 
much upon habit and association of ideas, that they must vary to a great extent 
from age to age and from country to country. 198 
He also suggests that similar discrepancies will be found 'side by side in the morality of 
any one society at any given time' and that there will inevitably be imperfections in our 
own moral code. 199 Sidgwick is clear that humanity is inescapably 'situated' in a 
context and is not always and everywhere the same. As we will see, for Gadamer 
historical and cultural situatedness are essential to all our understanding. 
I suggest that all ethical approaches (we must here avoid the term 'methods'), including 
both legalism and consequentialism, are unable to determine every moral judgement 
with absolute certainty. Moral judgement deals in terms of likelihood and probability, 
and works with provisional norms and partial understandings of context and motivation. 
195 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 14-24. 
196
- Williams, 'Critique', I 03: 
197 MA, I 02: he attributes this view to Conn and Sokolowski. 
198 Sidgwick, Methods, 450. 
199 Sidgwick, Methods, 460. 
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There is, I suggest, in most cases an inevitable gap between our judgement and 
certainty; there is an unfathomable remainder at the end of our deliberations. Finnis will 
allow no such compromise on his position; while utilitarianism, though able to 
compromise, fears for the integrity of its method: too much compromise and the method 
will no longer be identifiably utilitarian. Williams, discussing rule-utilitarianism, 
comments: 
I think ... that forms of utilitarianism which help themselves too liberally to the 
resources of indirectness lose their utilitarian rationale and end up as vanishin~ly 
forms of utilitarianism at all. ... It is a question of the point of utilitarianism?0 
If the point of utilitarianism is to provide a complete ethical 'method' then it is probably 
true that indirect forms lose their rationale. However utilitarian considerations could 
perhaps become part of a broader system of ethical deliberation and so find a new 
'point'. 
Legalism and utilitarianism have a surprising amount in common: they both rigidly 
preserve the norm/context dichotomy; they are both based on Enlightenment notions of 
'reason' and 'rationality'; they both seek to exclude feeling and emotion from moral 
decision-making, because of a concern to satisfy the canons of rational validation and 
'objectivity'; they both abstract features of a decision from its total context; they both 
assert that there is only one right answer in a situation; and they both artificially restrict 
the range of morally relevant factors. 
We need to learn to bring different ethical models into conversation and to give up the 
impossible dream of a single method providing universal objective judgements. 
Whether such a conversation is possible has been addressed by Alasdair Maclntyre201 
(who argues that it is not and that we must choose one system from among the 
alternatives) and Jeffrey Stoue02 (who, on the other hand, believes that apparent 
disagreements signify a substantial level of basic agreement and that such conversations 
are indeed possible). I would agree with Stout, though a good deal of effort may be 
required to reach mutual understanding: conversations will have to address rules, 
preferences, happiness and consequences. There will be debate about whether we 
should be maximising good or preventing evil. There will also be questions of relative 
200 williams, icritiqwi', 8 f.· 
201 Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 2nd ed, 1985). 
202 Jeffrey Stout, Ethics after Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents (Cambridge: James 
Clarke & Co., 1988). 
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importance and deliberative priority, which will be different in relation to different 
agents. There will be judgements about which rules, and which consequences are 
relevant to a particular decision. Both legalism and utilitarianism are forms of 
abstraction which can leave them detached from real situations: both attempt to rule out 
ethical judgements based on feelings which can leave them detached from real people. 
Finnis's insistence on 'intention' as the defining feature of an action is important, 
locating, as it does, the object of moral judgement neither simply in the action 
(behaviourally described) nor simply in the agent. I wish to suggest that moral truth 
'emerges' (or, that goodness is located) in the interaction between agent and action 
within a historical, linguistic and cultural context; the inherited judgements of tradition 
and the exemplary lives of virtuous agents. There are possible parallels here with the 
notion of beauty - neither a feature of objects per se, nor entirely 'in the eye of the 
beholder' but, rather, located in the interaction of object and viewer within the context 
of tradition, culture and language; the creativity of artists; and the traditional 
judgements of previous critics. Words such as beauty, love and pleasure seem to me to 
be of a particular kind: they are words which inherently assume human experience; 
'beauty' only has meaning when referring to the interaction of an object and a thinking 
subject; 'pleasure' seems to be the same. The truth of such statements does not seem to 
be located either in the nature of the object, nor simply in the opinion of the subject, 
rather the sense of these statements relies upon, and 'truth' is located in, the interaction 
of object and subject. This is an important concept, with parallels to discussions of 
metaphor in linguistics, to which we will return in Chapter Five. 
Could it be that several approaches must somehow be combined; that the appropriate 
combinations may vary from one situation to another, especially between private cases 
and public cases; and that the adequacy of the resulting moral judgement must be 
assessed on 'aesthetic' criteria (fittingness, elegance) giving due regard to the qualities 
and characters of agents and the particularity of contexts? Sidgwick does not attempt a 
complete synthesis of the 
methods of right conduct, which are for the most part found more or less 
vaguely combined in the practical reasonings of ordinary men.2°3 
203 Sidgwick, Methods, 492. 
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However, he does discuss the mutual relations between egoism, intuitionism and 
utilitarianism.204 Smart considers the possibility of a 'compromise theory' which 
combines considerations of utilitarianism and deontology, citing Ross's theory of Prima 
Facie Duties as an example.205 He observes that such a 'balancing' may not be possible. 
This is self-evidently true but then the same charge can be levelled at Smart's own 
utilitarianism. The fact that something may not be achievable (or not perfectly 
achievable) does not mean that there is nothing at all to be gained, nor that the attempt 
should not be made. It may be that whilst utilitarianism alone and legalism alone cannot 
do justice to the dynamic complexity of human moral reasoning, utilitarian 
considerations, together with some notion of (non-absolute) moral norms can be 
combined, with other moral insights and language of qualitative distinctions, into a 
broader theory. This may be a long way from 'absolute truth' or 'scientific objectivity' 
but I will argue that it is true to the insights of Gadamer' s hermeneutics. 
We have considered many criticisms of moral absolutes and of utilitarianism. Their 
main failings seems to lie in a failure to appreciate (or a deliberate disregard for) the 
complexity, and significance for moral deliberation, of the context of our actions and 
choices (the twin failings of abstraction and reduction); and also in their reliance on 
Enlightenment reason. They also fail adequately to allow for the influence of history 
and tradition. It is the validity of such approaches which we are going to explore with 
Gadamer. 
204 Sidgwick, Methods, 492-505. 
205 Smart, 'Outline', 72-73. 
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Chapter Three 
Gadamer's Truth and Method: an 'Ethical' Exegesis 
In this chapter we will embark on an extended thought-experiment. Our principal 
question will be: if Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics can govern an interpretation 
of what ethics is, and how it works, and how it can be justified, then what would ethics 
look like? We will also need to ask whether such a hermeneutical ethics can provide 
satisfactory answers to the criticisms of legalism and utilitarianism which we identified 
in Chapter Two. As we read Truth and Method1 it will be instructive mentally to replace 
'text' with 'text-analogue' (e.g. another person or another tradition) and 'historical 
distance' with 'moral distance' (the gap in understanding between differing moral 
approaches). I have tried a number of ways to structure this material but ultimately felt 
that it was important to preserve the flow of Truth and Method so that we can trace the 
development of Gadamer's cumulative arguments. This chapter therefore follows the 
pattern of Truth and Method and adopts Gadamer's section headings. This exegesis is 
necessarily selective: prominence is given to those sections of Truth and Method that 
seem to me to have the most direct relevance to ethics, and those which are significant 
for the development of Gadamer's argument. I attempt to highlight the ethical 
implications of Gadamer's hermeneutics but they are not discussed at any length until 
Chapter Four. 
3.1 Truth and Method, Part One: Introduction 
'The question of truth as it emerges in the experience of art' 
In Truth and Method Hans-Georg Gadamer develops a theory of truth and 
understanding based on experience. For Gadamer, we are all inevitably historically and 
culturally situated: there can be no such thing as a purely 'objective' observer or 
interpreter: there simply is no standpoint outside history and culture from which such 
observations could be made. However Gadamer does not see this as a weakness, rather 
it is only because of our historical and cultural situatedness that we can have any hope 
. ofundetstaridirig anything". We~ musl be aware of the·limita1ions which ~o·ur oackgrounos 
I TM. 
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impose: real understanding arises from the fusion of the 'horizon' ofthe interpreter with 
the 'horizon' of the text. 
The basis of Gadamer' s argument in Truth and Method is a consideration of the 
experience of art. It is from aesthetics that Gadamer develops and extends his theory of 
understanding and truth. From a consideration of the truth of art Gadamer develops a 
theory which he generalises to the whole field of hermeneutics and to understanding in 
general. His purpose is to outline the features that are common to all modes of 
understanding.2 For our purposes, we will focus on the implications of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics for ethical understanding. 
In the first part of Truth and Method Gadamer is sharply critical of theories of 'aesthetic 
consciousness' which abstract the 'experience' of art from its connections with the real 
world of history, tradition and community. Gadamer's assessment of the truth of art and 
the contextual nature of the understanding of art force him to conclude that art must be 
understood like all other 'texts': 
Aesthetics has to be absorbed into hermeneutics. . .. hermeneutics must be so 
determined as a whole that it does justice to the experience of art. Understanding 
must be conceived as a part of the event in which meaning occurs, the event in 
which the meaning of all statements - those of art and all other kinds of tradition 
-is formed and actualised.3 
Gadamer's key insights are that historical and cultural situatedness though inevitable are 
actually essential to our understanding; that, in at least this respect, all forms of 
understanding are similar; and that it is impossible to abstract a pure aesthetic 
'experience' from a work of art without reducing its true being (many works of art, for 
example have religious or secular life-function and were never intended as giving solely 
aesthetic pleasure);4 understanding is part of an 'event of meaning'. For Gadamer, truth 
is not the exclusive preserve of science, or of scientific method. Works of art are not 
isolated from the world: not only interpretations of art but also the artworks themselves 
make claims to truth. I will suggest that our ethical interpretations and our experiences 
of the virtuous life, in ourselves and in others, can make similar claims to truth without 
the need to resort to 'scientific method'. 
2 TM, xxxi. 
3 TM, 164-65, emphasis original. 
TM,77. 
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Gadamer does not explicitly develop his insights in relation to ethics although he makes 
passing reference, particularly in relation to taste and he does consider ethics in his 
section The Hermeneutic Relevance of Aristotle.5 Despite this, Gadamer's assertion that 
all forms of knowledge are substantially similar will require, if he is correct, that ethics 
too must be 'absorbed into hermeneutics'. Gadamer characterises Immanuel Kant as 
asking the question: what are the conditions of our knowledge by virtue of which 
modem science is possible, and how far does it extend? Gadamer himself asks a similar 
philosophical question: how is understanding possible? Having sought an answer to this 
question we may then be able to ask: what are the conditions of moral understanding, by 
virtue of which ethics is possible, and how far does it extend? 
3.2 Truth and Method, Part One 1: Transcending the aesthetic 
dimension 
3.2.1 The significance of the humanist tradition for the human sciences 
Gadamer is strongly critical of philosophers who attempt to show that 'the inductive 
method, basic to all experimental science' is also the only method valid in the human 
sciences. 6 He suggests that 
one has not rightly grasped [the] nature [of the human sciences] if one measures 
them by the yardstick of a progressive knowledge of regularity. The experience 
of the sociohistorical world cannot be raised to a science by the inductive 
procedure of the natural sciences . . . historical research does not endeavour to 
grasp the concrete phenomenon as an instance of a universal rule. Its ideal is 
rather to understand the phenomenon itself in its unique and historical 
concreteness ... not to attain knowledge of a law - e.g. how men, peoples, and 
states evolve - but to understand how this man, this people, or this state is what 
it has become ... 7 
Gadamer is right to highlight the peculiarities of the human sciences: whilst they may in 
fact seek patterns, regularities and predictions, there is an inevitable lacuna in their 
knowledge because of their inability fully to allow for the character of the context or 
motivation of the human agents involved. In history, the ruthless application of 
scientific method can remove all the truly human elements and end up distancing the 
investigator from the 'real' history of what he is examining. Science makes assumptions 
5 TM, 312-24. 
6 TM,4. 
7 TM,4. 
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about the nature and possibility of understanding and gives it an independent validity: 
Gadamer suggests this is illegitimate. 
Gadamer argues that in the nineteenth century 'science' and 'knowledge', in all fields, 
were modelled on their paradigms in the natural sciences. 8 He suggests that this is 
inappropriate and that, in any case, the real heritage of the human sciences was the 
humanism of Herder. He suggests that the ideal of 'cultivating the human' (Bildung zum 
Menschen) was 
perhaps the greatest idea of the eighteenth century, and it is this concept which is 
the atmosphere breathed by the human sciences of the nineteenth century.9 
Gadamer offers an extended consideration of the 'guiding concepts of humanism': 
Bildung (culture), Sensus communis, Judgement, and Taste. He is keen to preserve the 
traditional humanist understandings of these terms and to retrieve them from their 
isolation in the field of aesthetics. 
(1) The humanist understanding of Bildung is as a process of self-formation, education 
or cultivation though subsequently it comes to refer to the result rather than the process. 
Gadamer sees it as 'the properly human way of developing one's natural talents and 
capacities' .10 Gadamer quotes (with approval) Wilhelm von Humboldt: 
when in our language we say Bildung, we mean something both higher and 
more inward [than Kultur], namely the disposition of mind which, from the 
knowledge and the feeling of the total intellectual and moral endeavour, flows 
harmoniously into sensibility and character. 11 
He also suggests that Bildung IS more than the exercise of one's own powers m 
developing character, rather: 
The rise of the word Bildung evokes the ancient mystical tradition according to 
which man carries in his soul the ima~e of God, after whom he is fashioned, and 
which man must cultivate in himself. 1 
8 See the discussion of Mill in TM, 3-4. 
9 TM,-9.-
10 TM, 10. 
II TM, 10-11. 
12 TM, 11. 
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This notion of being and becoming, of developing and presenting what already latently 
exists will become an important and recurring theme for Gadamer, especially as he turns 
to consider 'play' and the ontology of art. 13 Gadamer's understanding of Bildung seems 
to incorporate both aesthetic sensibility and moral character. Aesthetic consciousness, 
though present in all, must be developed 14 as must conscience. Gadamer suggests that 
such a developed consciousness has much of the character of a sense: 
this consciousness accords well with the immediacy of the senses - i.e. it knows 
how to make sure distinctions and evaluations in the individual case without 
being able to give its reasons. Thus someone who has an aesthetic sense knows 
how to distinguish between the beautiful and the ugly ... and whoever has a 
historical sense knows what is possible for an age and what is not, and has a 
sense of the otherness of the past in relation to the present. 15 
For Gadamer aesthetic consciousness consists in a 'trained receptivity to 'otherness" 
and 'keeping oneself open ... to other more universal points of view'. 16 Science makes 
exclusive claims to be able to discover 'truth' but Gadamer suggests that there is 
another source of truth located in the concept of Bildung. For Gadamer, philosophy, art 
and history are modes of experience in which a truth is communicated that cannot be 
verified by the methodological means proper to science. 17 Gadamer seems to be 
suggesting that there is a 'real world' beyond the scope of science which must be 
accessed and appropriated by means of our 'experience' (his prime example is the 
aesthetic experience). 
(2) Gadamer, with G. B. Vico, understands sensus communis to mean 'not only that 
general faculty in all men but the sense that founds community' .18 There are implicit 
criticisms here of Kant's understanding of the conditions of knowledge and of Rene 
Descartes' reliance on the individual thinking subject. Gadamer suggests that the sensus 
communis mediates unique positive knowledge and that the 'possibilities of rational 
proof and instruction do not fully exhaust the sphere of knowledge' .19 He suggests that 
we have somewhat lost sight of this ancient tradition in our commitment to the modem 
concept of method. Noting the reductionism and 'impoverishment' of the human 
13 TM, 101-34. 
14 TM, 17. 
15 TM, 17. 
16 TM, 17 .. 
17 TM, xxii. 
18 TM, 21. 
19 TM, 23. 
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sciences which have resulted he suggests that we should 'laboriously make our way 
back into this tradition' .20 Gadamer invokes Aristotle's distinction between practical 
and theoretical knowledge (phronesis and episteme). Practical knowledge is a different 
kind of knowledge which is 'directed towards the concrete situation' and so must grasp 
an infinite variety of circumstances.21 For Aristotle, the grasp and moral control of a 
situation require a 'direction of the will'. Phronesis is not simply a capacity but also a 
'determination of moral being which cannot exist without the totality of the "ethical 
virtues"' .22 It is not simply about practical astuteness or mere cunning; it also 
presupposes a moral sense which allows assessments of what is right. Phronesis is a 
large part of the sensus communis and it interacts with the moral virtues so that they 
inform and develop each other. Morality and history are related to the sensus communis: 
ethical traditions develop within communities where there is a consensus regarding the 
issues and virtues that 'matter'. Gadamer suggests that the sensus communis is found in 
all people but formed by the community. For Gadamer, the will is not directed by 
abstract universal reason, rather it is related to an actual and specific community or 
group. Developing a sensus communis is an essential part of the life of any community. 
Gadamer suggests that the sensus communis is the sense of the common good: it is 
acquired through living in a community and is formed by the community's structures 
and values. This contextual and communal form of good sense (common sense) is a 
cure for the moon-sickness of metaphysics ... [and] also contains the basis of a 
moral philosophy which 'really does justice to the life of society.' 23 
(3) Gadamer suggests that judgement does not simply follow reason but is also a faculty 
like the senses: 
In fact the logical basis of judgement - subsuming a particular under a universal, 
recognising something as an example of a rule - cannot be demonstrated. Thus 
judgement requires a principle to guide its application. In order to follow this 
principle another faculty of judgement would be needed, as Kant shrewdly 
noted. So it cannot be taught in the abstract but only practiced from case to case, 
and is therefore an ability more like the senses.24 
For Kant and the German Enlightenment this entailed that judgement be considered one 
of the lower powers of the mind. Was this a valid criticism or has the emphasis on a 
20 TM, 24 . 
. 
21 
.. TM;2T. 
22 TM, 22. 
23 TM, 24. 
24 TM, 31. 
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particular conception of reason been responsible for the 'lost tradition' noted above and 
for the limitation and narrowing of the concepts of knowledge and understanding? For 
Kant, the sensus communis becomes narrowed to judgements of taste about what is 
beautiful (i.e. aesthetic taste) all else is to be based on reason. Did Kant go too far in 
excluding other judgements from the sensus communis and are those other judgements 
more like aesthetic judgements than Kant allowed? Gadamer certainly seems to be 
. 25 
suggestmg so. 
(4) Gadamer notes that the concept of taste was originally more moral than aesthetic 
until it was dramatically narrowed by Kant in his Critique of Judgement. Prior to this, 
taste had concerned the ideals of genuine humanity and character which could produce a 
good society. Taste was not simply private but always sought to be 'good taste', with an 
implied ability to stand back from ourselves and our personal preferences. The 
agreement of an ideal community gives taste its normative power. Gadamer again 
suggests that taste has the character of a sense and can produce judgements without 
necessarily being able to give reasons for those judgements. He observes that we are 
particularly sensitive to what is tasteless: 
Sureness of taste is ... safety from the tasteless. It is a remarkable thing that we 
are especially sensitive to the negative in the decisions taste renders. The 
corresponding positive is not properly speaking what is tasteful, but what does 
not offend taste. 26 
Gadamer concludes, crucially, that 'the distinction between determinant and reflective 
judgement, on which Kant bases his critique of judgement is not absolute' .27 Kant 
purified ethics from all aesthetics and feeling on the basis of this distinction. For 
Gadamer, the types of judgement and knowledge that Kant so rigidly separated are in 
fact substantially similar, differing in degree rather than kind. Gadamer, while allowing 
that aesthetic judgement is different from conceptual knowledge, does not allow that 
therefore truth claims may only be made in relation to the latter. 
The ethical implications of this section are based on Gadamer' s criticisms of scientific 
method in the human sciences; his recovery of humanist insights concerning Bildung, 
sensus communis, judgement and taste; and the notion of phronesis. 
25 TM, 30-34. 
26 TM, 36. 
27 TM, 39. 
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One feature of hermeneutical ethics will be the normative influence of the sensus 
communis on interpersonal relationships as part of community life, and, by extension, to 
relationships between communities. If every individual is always engaged in Bildung, in 
self-formation and cultivation, moral formation could be considered in a similar light. 
The idea that aesthetic consciousness has much of the character of a sense could perhaps 
be extended to 'moral sense' or conscience: thus someone who has moral sense can 
distinguish between the good and the evil, and has an instinct for moral judgement in 
other contexts and for other agents. This certainly seems to accord well with the popular 
notion of moral 'intuition' (that one instinctively knows when something is right) and 
the observation that similar moral 'problems' may require different solutions in 
different circumstances or for different people. This sense character of taste and the 
normative elements of the sensus communis will both have important consequences for 
ethics if a moral understanding of taste can be recovered. 
Both taste and judgement evaluate the object in relation to a whole in order to 
see ... whether it is 'fitting'. One must have a 'sense' for it - it cannot be 
demonstrated. 28 
If the distinction between determinant and reflective judgement can be overcome then 
this could provide a new basis for truth claims in relation to ethical statements, for a 
form of ethical realism. Morality (like philosophy, art and history) may be a mode of 
experience in which truth can be communicated. 
3.2.2 The subjectivization of aesthetics through the Kantian critique 
Gadamer is highly critical of the subjectivization of aesthetics in Kant and of the 
resulting abstraction of aesthetic experience. In his Critique of Judgement Kant 
investigates the foundations of taste. He addresses the tension (previously addressed by 
Hume29) of the apparently subjective, individual, nature of judgements of taste ('beauty 
is in the eye of the beholder', 'there's no disputing of taste') with the concept of good 
and bad taste (implying that some judgements are wrong) and the implied claim to 
universality ('this is beautiful' implies an agreement not required by 'I think this is 
28 TM, 38. 
29 David Hume, 'Of the Standard of Taste', [ 1757], in Carolyn Korsmeyer (ed.), Aesthetics: The Big 
Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 137-50. 
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beautiful'). Kant's aesthetics, grounded on unprincipled judgements of taste, 
acknowledges that there is no empirical universality of taste grounded in our common 
human nature, and accepts an a priori claim to universality. However, in the process, 
aesthetics becomes purely a matter of subjective feeling and is denied any significance 
as knowledge. 
The basis of Gadamer's critique of Kant is the nature of the 'aesthetic experience'. He 
argues that there are two meanings of 'experience' (Erlebnis): first, an event in which 
something is experienced and, second, the permanent residue of this event in the person 
having the experience. It is the latter that gives an experience its lasting importance: the 
experience establishes itself in memory with a lasting meaning, a meaning which cannot 
be exhausted by conceptual determination. This sort of experience is not abstracted, it is 
not isolated in time and divorced from its connections to the 'real world'. Gadamer goes 
on to argue that the aesthetic experience is not just one kind of experience among many 
but represents the essence of experience itself. If so, then ethical experiences will be of 
a similar nature. He is critical of the abstraction of the aesthetic experience in Kant, 
especially as many great works of art have a function in life (both secular and religious). 
He argues that Kant's abstraction alters, or reduces, the 'true being' of these works of 
art.Jo 
Gadamer is critical of the concept of aesthetic consciousness and cultivation (Bildung) 
as it has developed since Kant, especially in the work of Schiller where taste and 
judgement are relegated to secondary roles. Artistic production is now seen as an 
independent area for the operation of genius; taste in production is no longer required, 
merely in appreciation. Gadamer links the denial of truth in the aesthetic with its 
abstraction from its context into simple appearance. He argues that this concept of an 
abstracted aesthetic consciousness simply does not do justice to the true nature of 
aesthetic experience with its lasting significance for the observer. Gadamer also 
dismisses the idea that there can be universally valid judgements of aesthetic value from 
some objective standpoint outside history and culture: 
Even [a society's] artistic interests are not arbitrary or in principle universal, but 
what artists create and what the society values belong together in the unity of a 
style _of life_ and an ideal of taste. 31 
30 TM, 77. 
31 TM, 84-85. 
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All perception already involves understanding: what we 'see' depends upon our 
differentiation of the sensory inputs and our expectations of what we are likely to see. 
The notion of 'pure perception', in which we have removed all expectation and 
imagining, can only ever be an unattainable limiting case. Even the simple fact that we 
attempt to see or understand something implies that we expect there is something to be 
seen or understood and we will attempt to assimilate the sensory inputs to known 
categories and patterns, as optical illusions demonstrate. All understanding exists, and 
can only exist, as part ofthe 'hermeneutic continuity ofhuman existence'. 32 
The pantheon of art is not a timeless presence which offers itself to pure 
aesthetic consciousness but the assembled achievements of the human mind as it 
has realised itselfhistorically.33 
All of this must take place in a 'hermeneutic community'. To experience a work of art 
(or a virtuous life) is to share in the knowledge which it contains. The abstraction of the 
subjective aesthetic consciousness, which Gadamer criticises, destroys the continuity of 
the work. The existence of a work of art consists partly in its being experienced by an 
observer within a community and a tradition of understanding. Gadamer, then, is 
seeking to do justice to the truth of aesthetic experience and overcome the radical 
subjectivization of the aesthetic that began with Kant. Aesthetic experience is, he 
suggests, a mode of knowledge which conveys truth. 
The ethical implications of this section are based on Gadamer's critique of abstraction 
and the 'aesthetic consciousness'; the nature of experience; and the importance of 
judgement. Also if all understanding exists as part of the hermeneutic continuity of 
human existence then ethical knowledge and understanding too can only exist as part of 
a tradition of understanding; and the virtuous lives of the saints are also the assembled 
achievements of the human mind as it has realised itself historically. Recently there has 
been considerable interest in the overlap of aesthetics and ethics34 together with a 
reconsideration ofthe objectivity of moral knowledge35 and the nature ofmoral value.36 
32 TM, 96. 
33 TM, 97. 
34 Jerrold Levinson, 'Introduction: Aesthetics and Ethics', in Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Aesthetics and 
Ethics: Essays at the Intersection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1-25; Michael 
Tanner, 'Aesthetics and Ethics', in Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy- CD-
Rom Version /.I (London: Routledge, 1999); Marcia Muelder Eaton, 'Integrating the Aesthetic and 
the Moral', Philosophical Studies 67 (1992); 219-40; Marcia Muelder Eaton, 'Aesthetics: The Mother 
of Ethics?' The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 55 (1997), 355-64 
35 See Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J. L. Mackie (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1985); Sabina Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); 
Richard W. Miller, 'Three Versions of Objectivity: Aesthetic, Moral and Scientific', in Levinson (ed.), 
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3.2.3 Retrieving the question of artistic truth 
Gadamer argues that concepts of the aesthetic, such as imitation, appearance, and 
illusion, imply a relation to something from which aesthetics itself is different. He 
prefers the 'return to the aesthetic experience' of phenomenology and the assertion that 
there is truth in the experience itself: 
seeking to understand experiences presupposes that there is truth in them ... we 
can only do justice to art in the larger context of truth in the human sciences.37 
Gadamer is keen to retrieve an understanding of taste which restores its moral, 
communal and cognitive dimensions and restores it to a primary role in the production 
of art, not simply a subjective role in its appreciation. 
Gadamer is critical of the understanding of Bildung as it has developed since Kant 
because of its narrowing to include only aesthetic cultivation where aesthetic 
experiences are abstracted from their context in community and tradition. The 'work of 
art' and the 'aesthetic experience' depend upon a process of abstraction: everything in a 
work which is related to its context must be disregarded. Gadamer calls this process 
'aesthetic differentiation'. 38 He argues that the ontological definition of the aesthetic has 
shifted towards mere 'appearance' because of the hegemony of the natural sciences: the 
claim that only scientific method can lead to truth. For Gadamer, the phenomenology 
of aesthetic experience includes a recognition of truth: 
Is there to be no knowledge in art? Does not the experience of art contain a 
claim to truth which is certainly different from that of science, but just as 
certainly not inferior to it? And is not the task of aesthetics precisely to ground 
the fact that the experience (Erfahrung) of art is a mode of knowledge of a 
unique kind ... but still knowledge, i.e. conveying truth?39 
Aesthetic phenomena may reveal to us the limits of our understanding but there is no 
vantage point from which we could see these limits or set ourselves outside them. 
Aesthetics and Ethics, 26-58; Peter Railton, 'Moral Realism: Prospects and Problems', in Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral 
Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 49-81; Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays 
on Moral Realism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). Cf. J. L. Mackie, 'The Subjectivity of 
Values', in Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1988), 95-118. 
36 Peter Railton, 'Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism', in Levinson (ed.), 
Aesthetics and Ethics, 59-I 05. 
37 TM, 99. 
38 TM, 85. 
39 TM, 97-98. 
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For this reason we must adopt a standpoint in relation to art and the beautiful 
that does not pretend to immediacy but corresponds to the historical nature of 
the human condition.40 
For Gadamer, experience becomes the dominant concept in aesthetics: 
our concern is to view the experience of art in such a way that it is understood as 
experience. The experience of art should not be falsified by being turned into a 
possession of aesthetic culture, thus neutralising its special claim. We will see 
that this involves a far-reaching hermeneutical consequence, for all encounter 
with the language of art is an encounter with an unfinished event and is itself 
part of this event. 41 
The experience of art (or ethics) cannot present perfect truth in terms of final knowledge 
but it is not a discontinuous experience of aesthetic (or moral) consciousness; it is 
necessarily connected with the 'real world' of history, tradition and culture. Jean 
Grondin makes the important observation that Gadamer is not a postmodem thinker.42 
Postmodemism's rejection of method leads to the questioning of the whole idea of truth, 
the adequacy of consciousness, and reality itself. For postmodernists there can only ever 
be 'interpretations' or 'perspectives'. 
In Gadamer's view, the great misunderstanding of postmodemism lies here. It 
still follows Descartes in making knowledge and truth dependent on the idea of 
method.43 
Gadamer is critical of any suggestion that 'method' is the only way to truth and argues 
that all truth, including scientific truth, is inevitably context bound and perspectival. 
The ethical implications of this section are based on Gadamer's continued critique of 
abstraction and recovery of the moral dimensions of taste. Such a conception of taste 
may have parallels with our understanding of conscience in ethics. Gadamer's 
hermeneutics invites us to reconsider our notions of 'understanding' itself and of truth. 
40 TM, 97. 
41 TM, 99, emphasis original. 
42 Jean Grondin, The Philosophy of Gadamer, trans. Kathryn Plant (Chesham: Acumen Publishing, 
2003). 
43 Grondin, Philosophy ofGadamer, 3. 
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3.3 Truth and Method, Part One II: The ontology of the work of art and 
its hermeneutic significance 
3.3.1 Play as the clue to ontological explanation 
In considering the subjective and objective dimensions of art, Gadamer now makes a 
significant reversal: the subject of aesthetic experience is not the person who 
experiences it but the work itself. Gadamer adopts the word 'play' to describe the mode 
of existence of a work of art. Play is a common concept in aesthetics, especially in 
Kant's concept of the free play of imagination and understanding. This though is a 
subjective understanding of play which Gadamer rejects in favour of his definition in 
terms of ontology: 
When we speak of play in reference to the experience of art, this means neither 
the orientation nor even the state of mind of the creator or of those enjoying the 
work of art, nor the freedom of a subjectivity engaged in play, but the mode of 
being of the work of art itself.44 
Gadamer extrapolates from the linguistic use of the word 'play' (e.g. when used of light, 
parts of machinery or waves) to suggest that play is not necessarily about 'games' with 
'players'. Play he suggests exists without players but only reaches presentation through 
the players. Play is about movement and the mode of being of play is similar to the 
'mobile form of nature' .45 
This understanding of play might seem to be a little strained: it is hard to conceive of 
'play', in its usual sense, without players (or waves, or machinery) in at least some 
stages of its existence. Play may exist within a tradition and community of players and 
may be said to have an independent existence once created but for it to exist without any 
players seems implausible. However, Gadamer is not using the word in its usual sense. 
For him play is about self-presentation and movement, about a mode of being. Gadamer 
quotes Schlegel: 
All the sacred games of art are only remote imitations of the infinite play of the 
world, the eternally self-creating work of art.46 
Is the world self-creating? If art (and 'play') can have an existence independent of 
players then perhaps so, but to describe the ontology of nature as play seems to assume 
the role of God as player: creation is somehow God's self-presentation. For Christians 
44 TM, 101. 
45 TM, 105. 
46 TM, 105. 
79 
of course, this would be a reasonable assumption, and with it Gadamer's logic certainly 
follows. Many of Gadamer's insights at this point can be adopted without necessarily 
following his definition of 'play'. Gadamer's language of play seems to accord with the 
language of 'being' and 'becoming': art exists in itself but only comes to its true 
potential in the interaction with a viewer. For Gadamer, play is about interaction with 
others47 and about self-presentation, but 'all presentation is potentially a representation 
for someone': meaning exists in the event or interaction between the work and the 
audience. For Gadamer the main purpose of play is not to achieve a particular result or 
to solve a task, rather it is about 'ordering and shaping the movement of the game 
itself .48 He links play, self-presentation and ontology: 
Play is really limited to presenting itself. Thus its mode of being is self-
presentation. But self-presentation is a universal ontological characteristic of 
nature.49 
This seems circular as the assertion that self-presentation is an ontological characteristic 
of nature derives from Gadamer's assertion that play is the mode of being of nature. 
Gadamer suggests that once play is realised it can take on the character of a work or a 
'structure'. 50 In the same way people can be transformed by their encounter with art 
(and ethics). One can really only encounter a work of art when it is 'performed': 51 when 
transformation occurs. It is the interplay and movement in art, in 'play' and in 
'becoming' that brings about a change. Gadamer describes this as a 'transformation into 
the true'. 52 In being presented what already exists in play emerges (or becomes): 
What we experience in a work of art and what invites our attention is how true it 
is - i.e. to what extent one recognises something and oneself ... In recognition 
what we know emerges, as if illuminated, from all the contingent and variable 
circumstances that condition it. 53 
Having reiterated the inevitable imbedded nature of aesthetics, Gadamer repeats his 
criticism of aesthetic differentiation (abstraction) and aesthetic consciousness as an 
isolated phenomenon: 
47 TM, 106. 
48 TM, 107. 
~9 TM, 108. 
50 TM, 110. 
51 Even literature involves 'an internal reading'; and the plastic arts have a context in which they are 
encountered: both can thus plausibly be said to be 'performed'. 
52 TM, 112. 
53 TM, 114. 
80 
My thesis then is that the being of art cannot be defined as an object of aesthetic 
consciousness because, on the contrary, the aesthetic attitude is more than it 
knows of itself. It is part of the event of being that occurs in presentation, and 
belongs essentially to play as play. 54 
Through this process of presentation and transformation, truth is mediated. However, 
this truth cannot be separated from the medium: the work and the truth are inextricably 
linked to the form of presentation. 55 'Aesthetic being' depends on being presented. For 
Gadamer, this is a strength not a weakness. It is not a deficiency or some lack of 
autonomous meaning; rather it is part of its very essence. The spectator is an essential 
element. This gives the aesthetic (and ethical) an essential temporal dimension. 
Gadamer illustrates this by considering festivals. In the same way that a work of art is to 
be repeatedly presented, it is in the nature of a festival to be celebrated regularly. Each 
celebration will be different, if only because of changes in the surrounding events. So, 
part of the essence of a festival (and of art) is to be always different. Gadamer suggests 
that something which exists by always being something different is temporal in a much 
more radical sense than something that belongs only to history. So for example, 
'Christmas' is more temporal than 'Christmas 2001' and we are mistaken to attempt to 
identify a 'timeless essence' of Christmas. The essence of the festival (and of the work 
of art, and of the exemplary life) lies not in some objective essence 'outside' time; 
rather it lies in its inescapable temporality. 56 
Gadamer next considers the definition of tragedy in Aristotle's Poetics: a definition 
which expressly invokes the spectator's frame of mind. This presumes that the spectator 
can understand the language and the story of the play; only then can the encounter with 
tragedy become a self-encounter. There must be a community and tradition within 
which an event of meaning can occur. 
For the writer, free invention is always only one side of a mediation conditioned 
by values already given ... The writer's free invention is the presentation of a 
common truth that is binding on the writer also ... He himself stands in the same 
tradition as the public that he is addressing. 57 
The public who are addressed have a responsibility here too if this is to become a 
genuine self-encounter. It is not simply a responsibility to recreate the past but, rather, 
54 TM, 116. 
55 TM, 120. 
56 TM, 122-24. 
57 TM, 133. 
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to receive and apply the 'common truth' which it presents. Gadamer notes Hegel's 
assertion that 'the essential nature of the historical spirit consists not in the restoration 
of the past but in thoughtful mediation with contemporary life'. 58 
The ethical implications of this section are based on Gadamer' s notions of play and self-
presentation. Perhaps ethics is less about 'solving a task' and more about 'ordering 
movement'. Perhaps the nature (ontology) of ethics is similar to that of art: i.e. it cannot 
be abstracted because the being of ethics is part of the event of being that we see in 
people's lives and belongs to our self-presentation or becoming. The truth and meaning 
of ethical statements are located in an event of meaning occurring between people. It is 
therefore inevitably bound to its context and tradition. Just as readers must engage in 
thoughtful mediation between the past and contemporary life, so in ethics we should 
engage in thoughtful mediation between the 'text' (represented by a real text or another 
person) and ourselves to overcome not historical distance but moral distance. 
3.3.2 Aesthetic and hermeneutic consequences 
Gadamer's enqmry into aesthetics forms part of a larger enqmry into the human 
sciences and their claim to truth. Gadamer argues that their use of method, based on the 
natural sciences, is inappropriate. The obvious alternative is to suggest that truth in the 
human sciences should be understood on a similar model to that of aesthetics. 
Gadamer's concern is that the prevailing understanding of aesthetics consigns it to the 
periphery of society, labelling it as subjective experience, and denies it a role in 
mediating truth. Also, aesthetics detaches art from its situation: 
By detaching all art from its connections with life and the particular conditions 
of our approach to it, we frame it like a picture and hang it up. 59 
The experience of art is, for Gadamer, an experience of truth but one in which the 
viewer knows that he is always involved; truth is about participation in an 'event of 
meaning'. Historicism presupposes a distance between a work of art and the viewer, this 
distance disappears under Gadamer's notions of presentation and participation. We are 
not masters of our aesthetic experiences; they are about being (the being of the work of 
art and of the viewer) as much as about knowledge. We encounter truth as we 
58 TM, 169. 
59 TM, 135. 
82 
participate in the event. A work of art, understood in this sense, as an event of being, 
cannot properly be understood as an object of aesthetic consciousness. Gadamer 
characterises the mode of being of art in terms of presentation which includes play and 
picture, communion and representation. A work of art is an event of presentation:60 
it is really true that the divine becomes picturable only through the word and 
image. Thus the religious picture has an exemplary significance. In it we can see 
without any doubt that a picture is not a copy of a copied being, but is in 
ontological communion with what is copied. It is clear from this example that 
art, as a whole and in a universal sense, increases the picturability of being. 
Word and image are not mere imitative illustrations, but allow what they present 
to be for the first time fully what it is.61 
The abstraction of art into mere 'framed pictures' by the aesthetic consciousness cannot 
be primary for Gadamer; 'the picture contains an indissoluble connection with its 
world. ' 62 The work of art 'in itself proves to be a pure abstraction. Gadamer criticises 
the approach of the aesthetic consciousness to literary art in which it is only form, and 
not content, which matters, arguing that our understanding is not concerned with the 
formal achievement of a work of art but with what it says to us. 63 He is critical of the 
hermeneutics implicit in the human sciences because interpretation is no longer about 
truth. Rather it is about recreating the experience of the artist: by attempting to 
understand either the mind of the artist or the historical context. Gadamer argues that 
these variants of hermeneutics (the psychologising and the historicist) actually exclude 
hermeneutics from the realms of truth and knowledge without even realising it. 
Having reclaimed the 'truth' in art, Gadamer now has to reclaim truth for all of 
hermeneutics. He argues that his criticism of aesthetic consciousness has implications 
for the whole of hermeneutics: for our understanding of 'understanding'. Aesthetics 
must become part of hermeneutics and hermeneutics itself must become more 
comprehensive. 
Understanding must be conceived as part of the event of meaning which occurs, 
the event in which the meaning of all statements - those of art and all other 
kinds of tradition- is formed and actualized.64 
60 TM, 144. 
61 TM, 143. 
62 TM, 144. 
63 TM, 163. 
64 TM, 165. 
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Gadamer observes that historical consciousness is largely responsible for the centrality 
of hermeneutics in the human sciences (anything which is estranged from its original 
context requires interpretation). He goes on to argue that the prevailing form of 
hermeneutics, which he attributes primarily to Wilhelm Dilthey, is simply not adequate 
for the task because of its exclusion of questions of truth. Gadamer continues with art as 
an example of understanding and asks what the approach of hermeneutics should be in 
relation to it. He considers the approaches of Friedrich Schleiermacher and Hegel, 
characterising these as reconstruction and integration respectively. Consciousness of 
loss in relation to tradition motivates both, but they approach the hermeneutic task quite 
differently. Schleiermacher is wholly concerned with reconstructing the work as 
originally constituted. Hence his emphasis on reconstructing the 'world' to which the 
work belonged: establishing the situation, the intention of the author, performing in the 
original style. According to Schleiermacher historical enquiry opens the possibility of 
recovering what has been lost. Gadamer concedes the importance of such approaches 
but questions whether what we obtain is the 'real' meaning of the work and is sceptical 
of the suggestion that understanding involves a 'second creation' of the work. He argues 
that it is in fact impossible accurately to reconstruct the original context of a work of art. 
All our attempts at reconstruction can never reproduce an 'original' but only a 
derivative and cultural understanding. In any case, detaching a work of art from its 
contemporary context fixes its 'meaning' in the past. 
Similarly a hermeneutics that regarded understanding as reconstructing the 
original would be no more than handing on a dead meaning.65 
Gadamer prefers the approach of Hegel who accepts the futility of restoration and sees 
all 'historical' approaches as external activities while the authentic response is an 
internal one that involves the viewer in a thinking relation with the past: it is the self-
consciousness of spirit that comprehends the truth of art. 
The ethical implications of this section lie in Gadamer' s conclusion that we must 
undertake a critique not just of aesthetic consciousness but also of historical 
consciousness (as manifested in historicism) because we are concerned not with 
subjective experience, nor with reconstruction of the past but, rather, with 'the truth that 
manifests itself in art and history'. 66 This represents a further critique of abstraction and 
of the claims of scientific method to represent the only access to truth. 
65 TM, 167. 
66 TM, 169, emphasis mine. 
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3.4 Truth and Method, Part Two: Introduction. 
'The extension ofthe question of truth to understanding in the human sciences' 
In Part Two of Truth and Method Gadamer seeks to elucidate the universality of the 
hermeneutic problem. He is highly critical of the tendency to deny the finitude of 
human understanding and to simply assert that all we need is a better method or 
technique. His criticisms are largely directed at the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey, criticising the former's emphasis on reconstruction and the latter's reliance on 
method based on the model of the natural sciences. 
Gadamer' s basic contention is that Romanticism has relocated the aim of understanding 
from 'truth' (based on content) to 'meaning' (based on form and expression). Meaning 
becomes merely the expression of an era or individual rather than a truth: this parallels 
his arguments about aesthetic truth. Understanding no longer relates to the text's subject 
matter but simply to the text itself: what the author meant and expressed. Gadamer 
wishes to reclaim the truth of hermeneutical experience in the human sciences and to 
resist the hegemony of scientific method as the only guarantor of truth. 
3.5 Truth and Method, Part Two 1: Historical Preparation 
3.5.1 The questionableness of romantic hermeneutics and its application to 
the study of history 
Gadamer wishes to follow Hegel rather than Schleiermacher, suggesting that 
hermeneutics must take a new turn. He traces the historical development of 
hermeneutics along two paths: theological and philological. Considering the 
interpretation of scripture he observes that 'its literal meaning is not univocally 
intelligible in every place and at every moment' .67 He then introduces the concept of the 
hermeneutic circle: parts of a text are understood in the light of the whole and the whole 
is understood in the light of the parts. Historicism suggests that the context of world 
history is itself a whole, within which texts and other objects must find their meaning. 
Ultimately there arose the conception of 'a universal hermeneutics for which the special 
__ ~ ___ ~~~mpJariness_ of tradition- is -no -longer-a- presupposition-of the-hermeneutical-task'. 68-
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Gadamer characterises Schleiermacher as rejecting all Enlightenment ideas of a 
common human nature and so having to redefine our relationship with tradition: neither 
Scripture nor reason could provide a foundation for textual understanding. He sees 
Schleiermacher as attempting to isolate the procedure of understanding, trying to make 
it an independent method. 69 
For Gadamer what is to be understood when we try to grasp a text or speech is not just a 
thought, seen as pat1 of another's life or as an aesthetic creation, but rather a truth which 
involves both the author and the reader (or hearer or viewer). Gadamer criticises 
Schleiermacher's 'psychological' approach where what is to be understood is the mind 
of the author/speaker. Understanding is, for Schleiermacher, a reproduction of an 
original production: 
all speech and all texts are basically related to the art of understanding, 
hermeneutics, and this explains the connection between rhetoric (which is a part 
of aesthetics) and hermeneutics; every act of understanding is for 
Schleiermacher the inverse of an act of speech, the reconstruction of a 
construction. Thus hermeneutics is a kind of inversion of rhetoric and poetics. 70 
Schleiermacher applies the considerations of the hermeneutic circle to the psychology 
of the author: an individual thought can only be properly understood as part of a whole 
life. Schleiermacher considers that barriers to understanding can be removed by the 
reader overcoming their prejudices and 'identifying' with the author. But this act of 
putting oneself in the author's context is, for Schleiermacher, a precondition to the act 
of understanding and not an integral part of it. Schleiermacher's emphasis on 
psychology leads him to suggest that the task of understanding is to 'understand an 
author better than he understood himself.' Gadamer suggests that Schleiermacher is far 
too optimistic about our ability to overcome our prejudices and fully to identify with an 
author; and also that, even on the basis of Schleiermacher's own assessments, this 
identification cannot be separated from the act of understanding. 71 
Gadamer is sharply critical of this psychological 'turn' in hermeneutics: hermeneutics is 
no longer about the well-foundedness of truth and meaning but is now about the 
reconstruction of an unconscious process. Texts are purely expressive phenomena; 
69 TM, 185. 
70 TM, 189. 
71 TM, 192. 
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Schleiermacher detaches them from any dogmatic interest, and indeed from any claim 
to truth. 
This would clearly indicate the position of Schleiermacher and the romantics. In 
creating a universal hermeneutics they expel critique based on understanding the 
subject matter from the sphere of scholarly interpretation. 72 
Rather than this emphasis on 'reconstruction', Gadamer prefers the Hegelian concept of 
'integration': truth emerges as text and contemporary consciousness combine in a 
'fusion of horizons'. Just as the 'truth' of a work of art is only completed m a 
contemporary 'presentation', the truth of a text is only revealed in its interaction with 
contemporary understanding. We can only understand texts from the past, or others 
from different traditions, in the light of our own worldview, our own categories and, 
crucially, our own language. Grondin is critical of Gadamer for his rigid opposition to 
the psychological aim of understanding the mind of the author and for his criticisms of 
psychologism.73 However, Gadamer is emphasising the centrality of truth and not 
simply meaning or expression. Gadamer's later comments about openness to others and 
about dialogue provide the recognition of the reasons for another's position that 
Grondin urges. For Gadamer, hermeneutics is about more than meaning, authorial 
intention and expression; the rhetorical intention is always the expression of something. 
Schleiermacher was concerned with the exact interpretation of particular texts, and with 
how speech is to be understood. The historical school moved beyond Schleiermacher's 
hermeneutics in an attempt to understand universal history, the whole history of 
humankind. Particular texts served only as sources; as the parts from which the whole of 
universal history could be understood. This approach is best exemplified in the work of 
Dilthey. He applies the hermeneutical method to history itself; historical reality 
becomes a text which is to be understood. Gadamer suggests that Dilthey's approach 
represents a culmination or new formulation of earlier work by Herman Ranke and 
Johann Droysen. He criticises them for their attempts to defend the scientific nature of 
their discipline. He argues that once they have abandoned any conception of an a priori 
teleology (as found in Hegel) then 
there exists neither an end of history nor anything outside it. Hence the whole 
continuity of universal history can be understood only from historical tradition 
-i tself.-B ut- thi-fcis~,precisely-otlie=ctaim of~literaryfiennetreutrcs~naffiely~1nartne -
72 TM, 196. 
73 Grondin, Philosophy ofGadamer, 59. 
87 
meaning of a text can be understood from itself. Thus the foundation for the 
study of history is hermeneutics. 74 
The historical school urged the self-effacement of the historian: just as scientific 
observation should be independent of the observer, so should the observation of 
historical phenomena. But history is not at its end, and so is not a finite 'text', and the 
interpreters of history are embedded within it; there simply is no 'scientific' vantage 
point outside history. Alternatively, the historical school appeals to aesthetic categories 
by urging the kind of abstraction seen in the aesthetic consciousness (of which as we 
have seen Gadamer is fiercely critical). The historian is to consider events as 
expressions of an era and to contemplate them subjectively: the mode of aesthetic 
consciousness here provides the necessary self-effacement. Gadamer argues that here 
again the historical school fails to take adequate note of the facts that the historian is a 
part of history and that history is always a concern for us; there simply is no aesthetic 
vantage point outside history either. 
Ranke argues that no preconceived idea concerning the significance of history should 
prejudice historical research but, as Gadamer points out, 'the self-evident assumption of 
historical research is that history constitutes a unity'. 75 The questions of history only 
exist because 'History' is part of the tradition it seeks to explain. Gadamer is happy to 
recognise the historical thought of Droysen as 'more acute' than Ranke's but even here 
Gadamer concludes that the aim of historical research is to reconstruct the great text of 
history from the fragments of tradition; an approach which relies on aesthetic-
hermeneutic categories. 76 Droysen understood historical phenomena as the expressions 
of 'moral powers' which formed the 'actual reality of history'. 77 So the moral power of 
the individual becomes a historical power because it is the moral sphere that is lasting 
and powerful in history. Gadamer characterises Droysen' s understanding of this 
mediation: 
The mediate moral world moves in such a way that everyone participates in it, 
but in different ways. Some preserve existing conditions by continuing to do the 
customary thing, while others have new ideas and express them. The continuity 
of the historical process consists in this constant overcoming of what is, through 
criticism based on what ought to be. 78 
74 TM, 199. 
75 TM, 208. 
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The individual and the historian participate m the moral world but only from the 
limitations of given moral spheres (such as nationality, politics and religion). It is from 
the 'concrete conditions of his own historical existence' 79 that the individual tries to 
understand. Gadamer suggests that for Droysen history ultimately depends on 'the 
mystery of the person that is ultimately unfathomable by research'. 80 However this 
distance also represents a kind of 'proximity': the historian cannot isolate historical 
events for 'objective' investigation. Rather, because of the historian's familiarity with 
the moral world and the prior understanding of tradition the historian is 
integrated with his object in a way completely different from the way a natural 
scientist is bound to his. 'Hearsay' is here not bad evidence but the only 
evidence possible. 81 
There are very significant implications for ethics in Gadamer' concepts of the 
hermeneutic circle and the fusion of horizons, together with his continued critique of 
abstraction and his emphasis on the nature and communication of truth. 
3.5.2 Dilthey's entanglement in the aporias of historicism 
In Truth and Method Gadamer regularly returns to the philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey.82 
This is a significant and pivotal section in Gadamer's argument and here his differences 
with Dilthey, though implicit throughout, become explicit. Gadamer argues that Dilthey 
is tom between idealism and empiricism, between philosophy and experience. Dilthey is 
attempting 'to provide a philosophical foundation for the human sciences' and his task 
is 'to construct an epistemological basis between historical experience and the idealistic 
heritage of the historical school'. 83 The historical school needed a philosophical basis 
for historical knowledge similar to that which Kant had provided for the natural 
sciences. However, while Kant's achievement provided the justification for science's 
claims it did so only by clearly delineating the sphere within which such claims could 
79 TM, 215. 
80 TM,216. 
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be made: he had defined the conditions of possibility and a methodology. The problem 
for the historical school is one of epistemology: how can we know anything about 
history? Hegel's rational construction of world history had been rejected and historical 
knowledge limited to experience. Dilthey was keen to demonstrate that historical 
experience could become a science and his approach was to provide the human sciences 
with a methodology. This emphasis on method is the target of Gadamer's sustained 
attack. 
Dilthey concluded that he could not simply transpose Kant's work on scientific 
knowledge to questions of historical knowledge: 
The first condition of possibility of a science of history is that I myself am a 
historical being, that the person studying history is the person making history. 84 
Whilst Gadamer does not deny this he argues that this identification of the historical 
subject with historical object only serves to conceal the epistemological problem: how 
does an individual's experience come to constitute 'history' which is not experienced by 
any individual but rather by, for example, a community, generation or nation? Gadamer 
observes that this is a crucial step for Dilthey's epistemological project. The problem, 
which Dilthey recognised, is making the transition from a 'psychological to a 
hermeneutical grounding of the human sciences'. 85 
Dilthey hopes that 'historical consciousness', our awareness of the historicity of life, 
will provide a solution to the problem of historical knowledge. Our awareness allows us 
to shake off the effects of our historical situatedness and study history objectively. 
Gadamer argues that because we are such thoroughly historical beings there is no 
possibility of genuinely objective knowledge that transcends our historical condition 
and our prejudices. 86 For Gadamer 'historical consciousness' contains an internal 
contradiction. Dilthey attempted to 'legitimate the knowledge of what was historically 
conditioned as an achievement of objective science'. 87 A life could be understood 
through the hermeneutical approach to the whole and the parts. Whilst Dilthey accepted 
that an age should be understood on its own terms he believed that similar principles 
84 Quoted in TM, 222. 
85 TM, 224. 
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could be applied to increasingly large historical units resulting ultimately m an 
understanding of universal history. As Gadamer points out: 
Applying this schema presumes, of course, that one can overcome the fact that 
the historical observer is tied to time and place. 88 
Such overcoming is the claim of historical consciousness: the claim to a universal and 
objective understanding of history: 
fundamentally [Dilthey] regards this kind of understanding . . . as obtainable 
through scientific method. He explicitly justifies the human sciences' use of 
comparative methods by saying that their task is to overcome the accidental 
limits imposed by one's own range of experience and 'to rise to truths of greater 
universality'. 89 
Gadamer questions Dilthey's theory at precisely this point, observing that for true 
comparison both objects must be at the disposal of the subject, a condition which cannot 
be fulfilled by historical knowledge. 
Dilthey argues that philosophy and hermeneutics are grounded in life; individuality is 
not primary but arises out of lived experience. Any historical idea is 'limited by the 
course of its effect'. However, for Dilthey, the concept of 'objective spirit' is still 
central. Gadamer characterises Dilthey's understanding of the primary question: 
How is the power of the individual related to what exists beyond and prior to 
him: objective spirit?90 
Gadamer sees in this a failure to escape from the consequences of the idealist 
philosophy of Hegel.91 Dilthey has simply replaced absolute spirit with historical 
consciousness: the spirit knows itselfthrough historical phenomena: 
It is not in the speculative knowledge of the concept, but in historical 
consciousness that spirit's knowledge of itself is consummated.92 
Gadamer is once more critical of Dilthey in this identification of historical 
consciousness with a form of self-knowledge.93 Whilst a subject can undoubtedly adopt 
a reflexive attitude to his own historicity Gadamer argues that he can never discover the 
full extent of his determination by historical experience. We cannot identify all of our 
prejudices and we can never identify all of the historical influences that give rise to 
88 TM, 231. 
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them. For Gadamer historical consciousness is 'being more than knowledge' and, 'for a 
historical being, historicity itself is never resolved in self-knowledge' .94 
Gadamer goes on to criticise Dilthey for his Cartesian foundationalism and emphasis on 
scientific method. Dilthey, he argues, follows romantic hermeneutics in seeing the 
historical world as a text to be deciphered: 
Dilthey ultimately conceives inquiring into the historical past as deciphering and 
not as historical experience (Erfahrung).95 
From this starting point he 
succeeds in harmonizing the human sciences with the methodological criteria of 
the natural sciences. 
For Gadamer, this merely demonstrates the huge pressure exerted by the methodology 
of modem science which is, however, ultimately inadequate to the task of providing an 
epistemological grounding to the human sciences. We cannot interpret the 'hermeneutic 
manifestations of life from the categories of modem science' .96 Gadamer is determined 
to provide an account of the human sciences based on historical experience, and to find 
a different grounding for the truth they reveal.97 
The ethical significance of this section lies in Gadamer' s continued critique of scientific 
method in the human sciences and the inescapable historical situatedness of human 
beings. By analogy, 'the person studying ethics is the person making ethics': our moral 
lives have significance not just for ourselves but for our communities. However 
abstractly we try to conceive of ethics, we can never escape from the fact that we too are 
continually faced with situations that require moral deliberation. Even in reflection, we 
cannot overcome the limits of our own range of experience: moral deliberation can 
never satisfy the conditions for true comparison: one cannot truly 'get inside someone 
else's head'. We must provide a properly historical account of ethics and find for it a 
grounding other than the categories and methods of science. 
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3.5.3 Overcoming the epistemological problem through phenomenological 
research 
Gadamer's proposal for overcoming the epistemological problem is to tum to 
phenomenology and in particular the work of Martin Heidegger, though he begins with 
a consideration of the work of Edmund Husser! and Count Yorck.98 Grondin suggests 
that Gadamer is drawing heavily on the early work of Heidegger on the hermeneutics of 
facticity. However, since this work was at the time unpublished Gadamer has to build 
his argument on the basis of Being and Time together with a consideration of these other 
authors. This certainly seems to be a plausible explanation for the 'rather elliptical 
character' 99 of this section of Truth and Method. 
Gadamer borrows from Husser! the important concept of 'horizon': 
With this concept ... Husser! is obviously seeking to capture the way all limited 
intentionality of meaning merges into the fundamental continuity of the whole. 
A horizon is not a rigid boundary but something that moves with one and invites 
one to advance further. 100 
Here again we see the hermeneutic concept of the part and the whole, the 'part' being 
bounded by a 'horizon'. Husser! refers to an all-embracing world horizon as a 'world of 
life' (Lebenswelt) which Gadamer describes as 
the world in which we are immersed in the natural attitude that never becomes 
an object as such for us, but that represents the pregiven basis of all experience 
... It is clear that the life-world is always at the same time a communal world 
that involves being with other people as weli. 101 
This concept of 'horizon' will become central to Gadamer's hermeneutics. 
The return to 'things in themselves' in Husserl's phenomenology is the key to liberating 
philosophy from scientific methodology: though Gadamer argues that Husserl does not 
go far enough and that it is Heidegger who really achieves this. Husserl argues that 
'subjectivity' is not the opposite of 'objectivity' as this would imply an 'objective' 
concept of subjectivity. Instead he proposes 'correlation research': where the relation is 
primary and the poles, of 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity', are contained within this 
relation: 
98
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'The naivete of talk about "objectivity" which completely ignores experiencing, 
knowing subjectivity, subjectivity which performs real, concrete achievements, 
the naivete of the scientist concerned with nature, with the world in general, who 
is blind to the fact that all the truths that he acquires as objective, and the 
objective world itself that is the substratum in his formulas is his own life 
construct that has grown within him, is, of course, no lon~er possible, when life 
comes on the scene', writes Husserl with regard to Hume. 1 2 
For Gadamer this is what it really means for philosophy and hermeneutics to be 
grounded in life. 
Heidegger asserts the inescapable temporality of being and the impossibility of any 
ultimate foundation. Everything must be understood from the experience oftemporality: 
Thus it was clear that Heidegger's project of a fundamental ontology had to 
place the problem of history in the foreground. But it soon emerged that what 
constituted the significance of Heidegger's fundamental ontology was not that it 
was the solution to the problem of historicism, and certainly not a more original 
grounding of science, nor even, as with Husserl, philosophy's ultimate grounding 
of itself; rather, the whole idea of grounding itself underwent a total reversal. 103 
Being and objectivity can only be understood in terms of the temporality and historicity 
of Dasein: temporality is ontologically definitive of subjectivity. The 'knower' and the 
'known' both have the mode of being of 'historicity' .104 Heidegger's primary concern 
was the question of being, but his phenomenology and his analysis of Dasein's 
historicity meant that he was able to 'move beyond the complications on which 
Dilthey's and Husserl's investigations into the fundamental concepts of the human 
sciences had foundered.' 105 Understanding is the ontological basis of Dasein, it is 
Dasein's mode of being: the knowledge attained by the natural sciences and that 
attained by the human sciences are parts contained within this greater whole. This is the 
decisive moment for Gadamer. Understanding is not about method; rather, it is part of 
the 'being' of life itself. Because understanding is temporal it can only ever be 
provisional, we can never master a situation once and for all: 
Hermeneutics is not the title of a philosophical project that aspires to complete 
understanding, but the name of vigilance in thought which rests on its 
absence. 106 
For Gadamer, understanding is always an interaction between a historical subject and a 
historical object but it also arises out of history as an addition to a tradition: it is a 
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participative 'event' of meaning. Dasein always has a past as well as a future ('thrown-
ness' as well as 'projection') and always has the condition of finitude. To speak of 
certainty or of ultimate foundations represents a forgetfulness of temporality. 107 
In this section, Gadamer has cleared the ground: he argues that Heidegger's 
hermeneutics of facticity, with its concept of being, its radicalisation of history and its 
dispossession of human subjectivity, frees hermeneutics from the problems of 
epistemology inherent in Dilthey. In particular it avoids the use of Cartesian categories 
of modern science. There simply is no objective standpoint outside history from which 
to view the world or one's own being. Gadamer can now further develop his own 
hermeneutics. 
The ethical significance of this section lies in the concept of horizon and the 
characterisation of objectivity and subjectivity. Perhaps talk of subjectivity and 
objectivity in ethics constitutes a similar false dichotomy? Does ethical truth perhaps 
emerge m the interaction between subject and object (agent and context)? As 
historically situated beings, does our ethical 'horizon' constitute an inescapable 
'situation' for our ethical reflection? If, like aesthetics, ethics has to be absorbed into 
hermeneutics 108 then complete understanding in ethics will also be a vain hope, and 
vigilance to be preferred. 
3.6 Truth and Method, Part Two II: Elements of a theory of 
hermeneutic experience 
3.6.1 The elevation of the historicity of understanding to the status of a 
hermeneutic principle 
Gadamer moves on to consider how we are properly to acknowledge the historical 
dimension of all understanding. He begins by looking at Heidegger's accounts of the 
hermeneutic circle and of prejudices (the fore-structure of understanding). For 
Heidegger the hermeneutic circle is not vicious, rather it contains the positive possibility 
of the most primordial kind of knowing. 109 The circle is not to be avoided; rather, it 
107 TM, 262-64. 
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must be entered into in the right way: by becoming aware of our prejudices. Like a text, 
life can only be understood in the relationship between the whole and the parts. 
In any event of understanding we must 'remain open to the meaning of the other person 
or text', 110 we must be sensitive to the otherness of the person or text. We cannot do this 
by attempting to adopt a posture of objective neutrality (in any case our prejudices 
render such a posture unattainable); rather we should 'foreground' our prejudices to be 
aware of our bias. We must remain open to the possibility that our prejudices will be 
challenged and may be changed by the 'event of meaning' involved in understanding 
the other. Heidegger demonstrated that even our best efforts simply to read a text 'at 
face value' already involve a significant fore-structure of understanding. Gadamer 
suggests that 'the fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice against 
prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power' .111 In the Enlightenment, the word 
'prejudice' acquires its negative connotation rather than simply denoting a provisional 
judgement. For Enlightenment rationalism, all judgements must have an objective 
methodological justification: all other judgements are simply unfounded. This reflects 
the emphasis of science on Cartesian doubt: nothing is certain that can in any way be 
doubted until those doubts have been rigorously tested by an appropriate method. Myth 
must retreat in the face of reason. Gadamer observes that whilst romanticism reverses 
the Enlightenment's evaluation (favouring the 'mythical' and the 'old') it nonetheless 
perpetuates 'the abstract contrast between myth and reason' .112 He suggests that the 
romantic critique of the Enlightenment ends in historicism which seeks also to 
overcome all prejudice in its search for objective history. Gadamer comments that; 
The overcoming of all prejudices, this global demand of the Enlightenment, will 
itself prove to be a prejudice, and removing it opens the way to an appropriate 
understanding of the finitude which dominates not only our humanity but also 
our historical consciousness. 113 
Gadamer argues that being situated within a tradition is not an escapable limitation; 
rather we are completely and inevitably context-bound, including our reason. There is 
no such thing as absolute reason; rather our reason is constantly dependent upon the 
context in which it operates. 
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In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand 
ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a 
self-evident way in the family, society and state in which we live. The focus of 
subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a 
flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of an 
individual, far more than his judgements, constitute the historical reality of his 
b . 114 em g. 
For Gadamer, as for Heidegger, prejudices are a necessary condition of understanding. 
What appears to reason to be simply a limiting feature is actually a constitutive part of 
our historical reality. Gadamer asserts that there are legitimate prejudices which aid our 
understanding and others which give rise to misunderstanding. While he asserts that 
prejudices must finally be justified by reason115 he defers any consideration of how we 
are to recognise these legitimate prejudices. Some critics argue that Gadamer never 
satisfactorily addresses this particular issue. 116 He does say that we can never reliably 
differentiate our prejudices in advance; rather they are separated only in the process of 
understanding itself. 117 
Gadamer seeks to rehabilitate both authority and tradition, reversing their subordination 
to reason. 118 Whilst agreeing that authority, if allowed to displace individual judgement 
can be a source of illegitimate prejudices this does not 'preclude its being a source of 
truth'. 119 He argues that the human sciences are mistaken in their attempts to reduce 
their historicality simply to a matter of prejudices which must be overcome. There is a 
danger that in focussing on one kind of truth (verifiable by scientific method) other truth 
may be missed. There is no 'object of research' in the human sciences as in the natural 
sciences. We bring the questions of the present to bear upon tradition but can never 
attain to a 'perfect knowledge of history'. Gadamer suggests that the object of the 
natural sciences 'can be described idealiter as what would be known in the perfect 
knowledge of nature' whilst this can not be said of history; 120 though even science is 
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motivated by the concerns of the present and the current interests of scientists: it too is 
'carried along by the historical movement of life itself .121 
Gadamer concludes a discussion of 'the classical', in which he emphasises both its 
normative power and its historical contingency, by suggesting that while romanticism 
had attempted to free the interpreter from all historical conditions (by an appeal to 
universal human nature) hermeneutics had finally recognised the historical nature of 
events and of understanding itself: 
Understanding is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in 
an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are 
constantly mediated. This is what must be validated by hermeneutic theory, 
which is far too dominated by the idea of a procedure, a method. 122 
Gadamer next considers the implications for hermeneutics of being historical and 
belonging to a tradition; he considers the effect on understanding of 'temporal distance'. 
He begins by noting Schleiermacher's description of the hermeneutic circle in both 
'objective' and 'subjective' terms: texts belong in the context of a writer's work and of 
all literature but at the same time they belong in the context of a writer's creative life. 
Following Heidegger, Gadamer suggests that understanding is always determined by 
prejudices and that the hermeneutic circle can never completely disappear: 
The circle of whole and part is not dissolved in perfect understanding but, on the 
contrary, is most fully realized. The circle, then, is not formal in nature. It is 
neither subjective nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of 
the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The anticipation 
of meaning that governs our understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, 
but proceeds from the commonality that binds us to the tradition. But this 
commonality is constantly being formed in our relation to tradition. Tradition is 
not simply a permanent precondition; rather, we produce it ourselves inasmuch 
as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence further 
determine it ourselves. Thus the circle of understanding is not a 
'methodological' circle, but describes an element of the ontological structure of 
understanding. 123 
Gadamer observes that hermeneutics always assumes that an interpreter has an interest 
in the subject matter of a traditionary text and a connection to the tradition of which the 
text is also a part. However there is no guaranteed agreement; rather the work of 
hermeneutics is based on 'a polarity of familiarity and strangeness' .124 There are 
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tensions between these aspects and also between a text's temporal distance and its 
belonging to a tradition. 'The true locus of hermeneutics is this in-between' .125 
Hermeneutics must clarify the conditions for understanding to occur in this 'in-
between'. It is not possible to identify legitimate prejudices in advance but only in the 
process of understanding. In asking how this happens hermeneutics must 'foreground 
what has remained entirely peripheral in previous hermeneutics: temporal distance and 
its significance for understanding' .126 
Gadamer does not see temporal distance as simply negative; rather 'it is the supportive 
ground of the course of events in which the present is rooted' .127 Rather than being a 
limiting factor in understanding, temporal distance is, for Gadamer, the positive bearer 
of meaning; the settled wisdom of custom and tradition. He observes: 
Often temporal distance can solve the question of critique in hermeneutics, 
namely how to distinguish true prejudices, by which we understand, from the 
false ones, by which we misunderstand. 128 
Grondin suggests that here Gadamer has gone too far in establishing understanding on 
the culmination of tradition to such an extent. In particular he suggests that Gadamer's 
proposal leaves significant problems in relation to contemporary texts and also with the 
consolidation of mistaken interpretations by tradition. However, Gadamer comments 
further. 
I have softened the original text ('It is only temporal distance that can solve 
... '): it is distance, not only temporal distance, that makes this hermeneutic 
problem solvable. 129 
In relation to contemporary texts there will inevitably be different kinds of distance: 
different traditions, different contexts, and different prejudices will give rise to cultural 
distance and what I have referred to as 'moral distance'. Gadamer observes that 
suspension of prejudices logically implies a questioning stance: approaching a text in 
this way opens up possibilities and keeps them open. We do not simply suspend our 
own prejudices in order to accept the text or other person without question. We must put 
our own prejudices 'at risk' in the encounter being prepared for them to be modified or 
discarded as a result of the 'conversation' .130 
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Having considered the question of temporal distance, Gadamer now considers 'The 
principle of history of effect ( Wirkungsgeschichte)' which Grondin, rightly, considers to 
be the 'speculative summit of the work' and the principle which the rest of Truth and 
Method develops. 131 In any act of understanding we must recognise that we are already 
conditioned by history in, for example, our assessments of which lines of inquiry are 
worth following and which objects are considered worthy of study. Even when we 
believe we are approaching something from an objective and 'ahistorical' standpoint we 
cannot escape the effects of history. In this regard even science is conditioned by 
history. We must become aware of effective history: 
historically effected consciousness (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein) is an 
element in the act of understanding itself and ... is already effectual in finding 
the right questions to ask. 132 
To be conscious of being affected by history is what constitutes an awareness of our 
hermeneutical situation: the situation we find ourselves in with regard to a tradition we 
are trying to understand. 133 This is a situation which we can never fully grasp, simply 
because we are historical beings. These limitations of a situation constitute its 'horizon'; 
similarly, a traditionary text has a historical horizon. These horizons are never 'closed': 
individuals understand as part of a community and a tradition. Historically identified 
cultures also interact. Any suggestion of a closed horizon around a culture can only be 
an abstraction. Ultimately all our horizons and all historical horizons constitute the one 
great horizon of history in which human life exists. 134 We need to learn to look beyond 
what is close at hand so that we may see it in proportion. The horizon of the present is 
continually changing as we risk our prejudices and attempt to understand our own 
traditions: 
There is no more an isolated horizon of the present in itself than there are 
historical horizons which have to be acquired. Rather, understanding is always 
the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by themselves. 135 
The ethical implications of this section lie in Gadamer's emphasis on our historical 
situatedness; the nature of prejudice; the concept of temporal distance which might be 
extended to 'moral distance'; and the notion ofhistory of effect (or 'effective history'). I 
will argue in Chapter Four that we should think of ethical understanding too as 
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participating m an event of tradition and subject to the constraints of the same 
hermeneutic circle. Gadamer now turns to consider a central problem of hermeneutics: 
the question of application, which he suggests is to be found in all understanding. 
3.6.2 The recovery of the fundamental hermeneutic problem 
Gadamer agrees with romanticism that interpretation is not consequent upon 
understanding but is rather a constant component of all understanding. However, for the 
romantics, application was separate and distinct, following on from successful 
understanding/interpretation. Gadamer argues that this too is a false dichotomy: 
understanding any text always involves the context of the interpreter: 
Formerly it was considered obvious that the task of hermeneutics was to adapt 
the text's meaning to the concrete situation to which the text is speaking. 136 
What matters is what the text 'says' to a given interpreter in a given situation. All texts 
must be understood differently in different situations; application is always involved. 
For Gadamer, understanding, interpretation and application are all integral to the 
hermeneutical process. 
Gadamer also asserts the continuity of philological, legal and theological hermeneutics, 
arguing that it was the concept of historical consciousness in romanticism that resulted 
in philological hermeneutics coming to be seen as a distinct discipline. Gadamer wants 
to redefine a hermeneutics of the human sciences which is continuous with legal and 
theological hermeneutics: 
The meaning of a law that emerges in its normative application is fundamentally 
no different from the meaning reached in understanding a text. 137 
To give this account of application a philosophical basis, Gadamer turns to Aristotelian 
ethics. Aristotle, he suggests, freed ethics from metaphysics by locating it in human 
action (virtue is based on practice and 'ethos'): 
Human civilization differs essentially from nature in that it is not simply a place 
where capacities and powers work themselves out; man becomes what he is 
through what he does and how he behaves-i.e., he behaves in a certain way 
because of what he has become. Thus Aristotle sees ethos as differing from 
physis in being a sphere in which the laws of nature do not operate, yet not a 
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sphere of lawlessness but of human institutions and human modes of behaviour 
which are mutable, and like rules only to a limited degree. 138 
Gadamer then poses a very important question: whether it is possible to have a purely 
philosophical knowledge of the moral being of humankind, that is, knowledge that does 
not arise with experience. Gadamer, following Aristotle, suggests not: individuals 
encounter the good not in abstract propositions but in the concrete situations of 
everyday life. Moral decisions relate to actions in context: 
Thus, it is essential that philosophical ethics have the right approach, so that it 
does not usurp the place of moral consciousness and yet does not seek a purely 
theoretical and 'historical' knowledge either but, by outlining phenomena, helps 
moral consciousness to attain clarity concerning itself. 139 
Gadamer's stated purpose in returning to the ethics of Aristotle is to lend weight to his 
claims about the 'alienation of the interpreter from the interpreted by the objectifying 
methods of modem science'. 140 Gadamer now turns to a discussion of three forms of 
knowledge: theoretical knowledge (episteme), practical knowledge (techne) and moral 
knowledge (phronesis). 141 The last two, which guide action, include the task of 
application, which Gadamer has identified as the central task of hermeneutics. However 
the two are not the same: an individual's character is not accessible in the same way as a 
craftsman's material. The individual is always subject to the influences of tradition and 
community; and character is not always amenable to manipulation. 
From this, Gadamer concludes that philological and legal hermeneutics are, in fact, very 
similar. Jurists must distinguish between the original meaning of a law and its 
application to specific cases: its normative content is partially determined by how it is 
applied. 142 In fact, a law can have no meaning at all without the possibility of its being 
applied. Case law is simply an account of the historical effect of the law: understanding 
is the mediation between past and present; between statute law, case law and the case at 
hand. Application is not consequent upon a prior understanding; rather it is an integral 
part of all understanding. Legal hermeneutics is essentially the same as both 
philological and theological hermeneutics. This unity does not consist in historical or 
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scientific method but in the fact that they all find 'their true ground in historically 
effected consciousness' .143 This is the 'great conclusion of hermeneutics in the human 
sciences' .144 
The implications of this section concern the distinction between understanding and 
application in ethics. Gadamer might argue that moral hermeneutics is also like legal 
hermeneutics: moral knowledge can only be gained from experience in the exercise of 
phronesis and ethics has much to learn from the model of case-law. 
3.6.3 Analysis of historically effected consciousness 
Gadamer consistently appeals to Hegel in his efforts to overcome historicism. Hegel 
appreciated that understanding is not simply an attempt to reconstruct past meaning -
rather it inescapably involves contemporary application. Historically effected 
consciousness is not simply another form of 'objective' inquiry; as a consciousness of a 
particular text it is always already involved in the history of the work. The usual 
concept of consciousness, however, implies reflexivity, the ability to stand apart from 
the thing of which it is conscious. At this point, Gadamer is concerned to distance 
historically effected consciousness from Hegel's reflective philosophy. 
Romantic hermeneutics strives for perfect enlightenment: 'the complete limitlessness of 
our historical horizon .. . [and] the abolition of our finiteness in the infinity of 
knowledge ... ' 145 The problem for Gadamer is that the appeal to hermeneutic 
experience, like other appeals to immediacy, may itself be self-refuting if 'it is not in 
itself an immediate relation, but a reflexive activity'. 146 However, Gadamer's 
historically effected consciousness is never completely dissolved in reflection. Whilst 
this may give rise to charges of relativism, Gadamer, following Heidegger, is not 
unduly concerned. He argues that one can only speak of 'relativism' if one accepts the 
possibility of absolute knowledge: they are two sides of the same coin. For Gadamer, 
the division into absolute truth or relativism is a false dichotomy: Heidegger's 
hermeneutics of facticity demonstrate that all absolute foundations depend upon a denial 
143 Tly/, 340. 
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of our temporality. Hermeneutics does not seek absolute certainty. Historically effected 
consciousness makes no reflective claim to universal validity; rather, Gadamer sees it as 
part of the essence of hermeneutic experience, a condition of understanding. 
Gadamer argues against the understanding of experience in the natural sciences (and its 
parallel in the historico-critical method), suggesting that here its meaning has become 
severely restricted and that it simply ignores the 'inner historicity of experience': 147 
results must be verifiable and repeatable, hence their historicity is denied. In a 
discussion of Husser!' s attempts to address this problem, Gadamer comments that 
'language is already present in any acquisition of experience' 148 and that 'pure reason' 
is simply a fantasy as we are completely unable to free ourselves from the prejudices 
and predispositions of our language. Gadamer, however, sees this not as a negative 
constraint, rather 'language is a positive condition of, and guide to, experience itself .149 
Experience tends to work on the basis of inductive reasoning rather than logical 
deduction. There is a role here for memory (of previous experiences): universal 
concepts are acquired by learning. The universality of experience is not that implied in 
the scientific understanding of experience but that required by the historicality and 
linguisticality of all understanding. 
For Gadamer, experience is often a negative process. It is not simply about generating 
universal concepts: new experiences challenge our previous false generalisations. The 
structure of experience is ultimately dialectical. This negativity is seen in the 
development of 'wisdom': the 'experienced' person is radically undogmatic, open to 
new experiences and willing to learn. 
The dialectic of experience has its proper fulfilment not in definitive knowledge 
but in the openness to experience that is made possible by experience itself ... 
Experience in this sense belongs to the historical nature of man. 150 
We need to learn by experience the limitations of our understanding. The fundamental 
experience is that of our own historicity. Grondin observes that Aristotle placed 
'experience' (empeiria) at the 'mid-point between isolated perceptions and conceptual 
universality'. It is our experience that becomes our knowledge: 
. -
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The person who reaches experience from the height of great abstract principles 
is not a person of experience, nor very wise either. The empeiria does not enjoy 
less of a 'universality', which is neither that of a concept nor that of repeated 
observations. It is the universality of the finitude of experience and the 
experience of finitude itself. 151 
Openness to tradition is a characteristic of historically effected consciousness and this 
structure of openness in hermeneutics brings Gadamer back to the concept of the 
question. We must acknowledge the reality of experience and be conscious of what we 
do not know. A question has its own horizon: a set of presuppositions within which can 
be seen what still remains open. 152 In answering a question both positive and negative 
judgements are involved: establishing what is the case, but also excluding what is 
wrong. Gadamer argues that Aristotle accords priority to the question and concludes 
that this priority implies that 'method' must be inappropriate to knowledge as there is 
no foolproof method that can be learned for asking questions. The ability to identify 
what is questionable is born of experience and the question provides the conditions for a 
productive dialectic which can result in knowledge. 'The art of questioning ... is the art 
of conducting a real dialogue.' 153 For Gadamer, the model of 'conversation', 
establishing understanding through spoken language, characterises the task of 
hermeneutics in relation to written texts. Language and concepts here too communicate 
meaning as part of a 'conversation'. 
In his attempt to provide a 'logic of question and answer' Gadamer turns to R. G. 
Collingwood who argues that 'We can understand a text only when we understand the 
question to which it is an answer.' 154 We must assume that the answer is adequate to the 
question: we expect coherence. Gadamer describes this as the 'fore-conception of 
completeness' .155 If we can understand historical events 'only when we reconstruct the 
question to which the historical actions of the persons involved were the answer' 156 
perhaps we can only understand ethical 'events' when we reconstruct the question to 
which the ethical actions of the persons involved were the answer. Because of our 
historicity our horizons can only ever be temporary, our understanding moves within 
151 Grondin, Philosophy ofGadamer, 118. 
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our horizons while we are formed by history. Our understanding itself becomes an event 
within a tradition. A reconstructed question never stands within its original horizon; 
rather it becomes part of our horizon. This 'fusion of horizons' is part of genuine 
understanding: we 'regain the concepts of a historical past in such a way that they also 
include our own comprehension of them'. 157 
Gadamer argues that the logic of question and answer puts an end to talk about 
permanent 'problems'. The identity of any such problem is an 'empty abstraction': 
There is no such thing, in fact, as a point outside history from which the identity 
of a problem can be conceived within the vicissitudes of the history of attempts 
to solve it. 158 
'Problems' of this sort are detached from any 'motivated context of questioning' and 
become insoluble 'unasked' questions. 159 Are ethical 'problems' (the kind to which 
absolute laws might provide an answer) also empty abstractions, simply addressing 
unasked questions? It is the dialectic of question and answer that gives understanding 
the character of a 'conversation'. Historically effected consciousness renounces any 
claim to absolute knowledge and seeks understanding through a fusion of horizons. It is 
Gadamer' s 'directing idea' that 
the fusion of horizons that takes place in understanding is actually the 
achievement of language ... It is not that the understanding is subsequently put 
into words; rather, the way understanding occurs - whether in the case of a text 
or a dialogue with another person who raises an issue with us - is the coming-
into-language of the thing itself . . . Whereas up to now we have framed the 
constitutive significance of the question for the hermeneutical phenomenon in 
terms of conversation, we must now demonstrate the linguisticality of dialogue, 
which is the basis of the question, as an element of hermeneutics. 160 
Like application, language is not consequent upon understanding; rather it is a condition 
of understanding: the interlocutors must find a common language if the subject matter is 
to be understood. This sets the scene for Part Three. 
The ethical implications of this section concern Gadamer's description of the nature of 
experience; and his further critique of abstraction. Is what we have characterised as 
abstracted ethics also making 'an unfounded claim to universal validity'? Do the 
charges of 'relativism' made against, for example, situationism and proportionalism rely 
15LTM, 374. 
158 TM, 375. 
159 TM, 376. 
160 TM, 378, emphasis original. 
106 
on a similar belief in absolute knowledge? Gadamer also introduces the important 
notion of 'openness' and the discipline of question and answer. 
3.7 Truth and Method, Part Three: Introduction. 
'The ontological shift of hermeneutics guided by language' 
Gadamer's considerations of hermeneutics in terms of 'conversation' and the 'dialectic 
of question and answer' culminate in a consideration of the linguisticality of all 
understanding and the role of language in experience. In this Gadamer follows 
Heidegger's tum to language: a tum which, together with the work of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, was to become a major feature of twentieth-century philosophy, paving 
the way for the work of Jurgen Habermas, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Paul 
Ricoeur and Richard Rorty among others. Part Three of Truth and Method, then, has 
far-reaching implications and connections. It will not be possible in this thesis to follow 
up all these lines of criticism and development. However in Chapter Five, in dialogue 
with the work of Mark Johnson, we will consider the inescapable linguisticality of 
understanding, the metaphorical nature of language, and the processes of concept 
formation , which together have significant implications for our understanding of moral 
notions and moral deliberation. 
In Truth and Method Gadamer takes an 'ontological tum' 161 : 
an investigation of the Being of historical life comes out of a clarification of 
historical living in its fullness, i.e. the activity that it is. This activity, however, 
turns out to be linguistic, such that language shows itself to be the Being of 
historical life. 162 
For Gadamer language is the 'real medium of human being' .163 It is not consequential 
upon thought; it is not simply an instrument which we use to put 'reality' into linguistic 
form: 
Gadamer demystifies Heidegger's insight into language: human beings live 
within language as the air they breathe rather than as an instrument they deploy 
at will. They exist conversationally in relation to everything that is. 164 
161 TM, 381,438. 
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Language is the 'horizon of being' 165 and whilst we may lament the limitations of our 
language they are not something from which we can ever escape. Just as our historical 
situatedness is both a source of limitations for our understanding but also a condition of 
our understanding, so is our linguistic situatedness. For Gadamer understanding a text 
(or text-analogue) or event is not about the scientific grasp of an 'object'. Rather, it is a 
'conversation' in which the subject is always already involved; in which both parties 
'speak'; in which the subject's prejudices are put at risk; and which is to be seen as 
following a similar pattern to two people 'reaching an agreement' ( Verstandigung). 
3.8 Truth and Method, Part Three 
3.8.1 Language as the medium of hermeneutic experience 
Gadamer continues his consideration of language by exploring further his notion of 
'conversation', arguing that we 'become involved' in conversation rather than 
'conducting' it, that a conversation has a life of its own, and that truth can emerge from 
the interaction. The event of meaning which constitutes understanding is itself 
constituted linguistically. The text and the interpreter are always already embedded in 
language: for there to be any meaningful exchange or understanding there has to be a 
common language of discourse. 166 In genuine conversation we consider an 
interlocutor's contribution in terms of how it addresses us: what it has to say to us rather 
than what it says about them. Gadamer makes a crucial extension to his theory by 
arguing that understanding texts is best understood on the model of conversation, of two 
people 'coming to an understanding' .167 The subject matter is given expression in the 
interpreter's participation in a 'conversation' with the text. Language is not a tool to be 
used in the hermeneutical enterprise; rather, like interpretation and application, it is a 
constituent part of understanding itself. In the relationship between text and interpreter 
the subject matter is 'brought' into language: the horizon of the text and the horizon of 
164 Fred Lawrence, 'Gadamer, the Hermeneutic Revolution, and Theology', in Dostal (ed.), Cambridge 
Companion to Gadamer, 167-200, at 184. 
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the interpreter are fused. 168 'Language is the universal medium in which understanding 
occurs'. 169 
Tradition too is verbally constituted. What is handed down to us in myths, legends and 
stories, in oral and written traditions, is verbal in character. The bearer of tradition is a 
communal memory expressed in language. For Gadamer the approach to a 'text' is quite 
distinct from Schleiermacher's insistence on understanding the mind of the author. The 
truth which emerges in the conversation with the text does not depend on our ability to 
make this psychological connection: 
The horizon of understanding cannot be limited either by what the writer 
originally had in mind or by the horizon of the person to whom it was originally 
addressed. 170 
All such limitations are, according to Gadamer, simply abstractions from the whole 
history of the text and its history of interpretation. Rather we should ask 'What is the 
text's claim to truth in the face ofthis multifarious mixture of past and future?' 171 This 
is a further example of the dialectic of question and answer. 
Our language may not conform easily to that of a text. Gadamer points out the dangers 
of unthinkingly using our concepts to describe historical objects or events thereby 
effacing real differences with linguistic familiarity: 
Despite his scientific method, [the historian] behaves just like everyone else- as 
a child of his time who is unquestioningly dominated by the concepts and 
. d' fh' 172 preJU Ices o IS own age. 
When one becomes aware of one's prejudices and the historicality of one's concepts 
there are two options: to attempt to erase one's prejudices and to adopt the concepts of 
the text's era (to adopt an 'objective' standpoint); or to foreground one's prejudices and 
attempt to mediate between the concepts of the text and one's own. Gadamer is 
scathingly critical of the first option: 
To think historically always involves mediating between [the concepts of the 
past] and one's own thinking. To try to escape from one's own concepts in 
interpretation is not only impossible but manifestly absurd. To interpret means 
precisely to bring one's own preconceptions into play so that the text's meaning 
168 TM, 388. 
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can really be made to speak for us ... Every interpretation has to adapt itself to 
the hermeneutical situation to which it belongs. 173 
We are not always able to express what we feel and indeed Gadamer suggests that we 
can never say everything we would wish despite language's apparently limitless 
capacity for extension and innovation. Gadamer argues that being limited to a 
'situation' in this way does not necessarily mean that an interpretation's claim to truth 
must be only 'occasional' or 'subjective'. Instead he argues that the verbal nature of the 
interpretation, its expression in language, always implies the possibility of 
communicating with others and thereby generating a communal understanding. For 
Gadamer, thought and language, just like understanding and interpretation, are 
indissoluble. 
We can only think in a language ... we are always already encompassed by the 
language that is our own. 174 
Concepts are embedded within our language: so much so that we are usually completely 
unaware of them. However Gadamer suggests that they are not fixed but are constantly 
being revised in the light of experience and dialogue: 
the capacity to use familiar words is not based on an act of logical subsumption, 
through which a particular is placed under a universal concept. Let us remember, 
rather, that understanding always includes an element of application and thus 
produces an ongoing process of concept formation. 175 
Gadamer is sharply critical of the 'instrumentalist devaluation' of language in modern 
linguistics and philosophy. He compares this to the 'complete unconsciousness' of 
language in classical Greece (where there was no word for 'language') and suggests that 
this change in attitude has allowed 'language' to become an object of scientific study in 
which form can be totally separated from content. 176 He argues that this is an inadequate 
conception: 
The language that lives in speech - which comprehends all understanding, in-
cluding that of the interpreter of texts - is so much bound up with thinking and 
interpretation that we have too little left if we ignore the actual content of what 
languages hand down to us and try to consider language only as form. 177 
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Language then has a universal significance; everything intelligible that exists must be 
accessible to understanding and interpretation and this is achieved through the verbal 
forms of language. Hence Gadamer's famous slogan 'Being that can be understood is 
language' (Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache.) 178 
The ethical implication of this section is that language is not just the medium of 
hermeneutic experience but also the medium of ethical experience. We are inescapably 
situated within language, just as we are inescapably situated within history. 
3.8.2 The development of the concept of language in the history of Western 
thought 
Gadamer considers two theories of language. 179 He is critical of both the 
'conventionalist' theory (in which words are arbitrarily applied to objects with their 
only source of meaning in communal usage and convention) and the 'similarity' theory 
(in which there is conformity between a word and its object, words are 'fitting' or 
appropriate to the objects they describe). Gadamer argues that 'customary usage' sets 
limits to both theories: the meaning of words cannot be arbitrarily changed if 
communication is to be maintained, and it is hardly fair to criticise words for 
inaccurately representing objects when language is a feature of human beings not of 
objects. Gadamer suggests that both theories are guilty of too instrumentalist a 
conception of language, assuming that we can somehow know about objects 'before' 
using language to describe them. Gadamer therefore suggests that both theories 'start 
too late' .180 He is relentlessly critical of instrumentalist theories of language, arguing 
instead that both thought and experience are always already immersed completely in 
language and that 'truth' does not reside in words but in dialogue. Gadamer observes 
that using a 'technical term' involves fixing the meaning of a word by limiting its 
variability and semantic range, limiting it to one particular concept. However, this 
process happens continually in language and not just in relation to technical terms. The 
'death' of metaphors represents a communally agreed restriction of a word's meaning. 
Problems arise when we forget the heritage of our words and assume that they have 
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literal meanings, offering access to absolute truth. We cannot stand 'outside' language 
and understand things 'in themselves'; language goes 'all the way down'. Everything 
we do and everything we are conscious of is mediated by language. Language 
dominates our conceptual schemes and worldviews. There simply is no realm of 'pure' 
thought apart from language. 
Gadamer asserts 'the fundamental metaphorical nature' of language implied by the 
constant process of concept formation: 
However certainly speaking implies using pre-established words with general 
meanings, at the same time, a constant process of concept formation is going on, 
by means of which the life of a language develops. 181 
Here, reason works inductively from grasping resemblances rather than deductively 
from subsuming particulars under universals. Gadamer suggests that just as individual 
words only acquire meaning in discourse, so knowledge can only be achieved within a 
'relational structure' of ideas. These observations are further examples of the principle 
of the hermeneutic circle. 
Once more Gadamer is critical of the scientific ideal of 'logical proof: 
accepting the ideal of logical proof as a yardstick . . . has robbed the logical 
achievement of language of its legitimacy. That achievement is recognized only 
from the point of view of rhetoric and is understood there as the artistic device 
of metaphor. The logical ideal of the ordered arrangement of concepts takes 
precedence over the living metaphoricity of language, on which all natural 
concept formation depends. For only a grammar based on logic will distinguish 
between the proper and the metaphorical meaning of a word. What originally 
constituted the basis of the life of language and its logical productivity, the spon-
taneous and inventive seeking out of similarities by means of which it is possible 
to order things, is now marginalized and instrumentalized into a rhetorical figure 
called metaphor. 182 
Discursive multiplicity is conceptual as well as verbal. 'Natural concept formation that 
keeps pace with language . . . very often takes place as a result of accidents and 
relations.' 183 Univocity is an abstraction from these relationships of meaning. Such 
abstraction may be useful and even, in the extreme case of science, essential but it 
should be remembered that 
181 TM,429. 
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to regard the metaphorical use of a word as not its real sense is the prejudice of a 
theory of logic that is alien to language. 184 
The work of concept formation is a communal enterprise. 'Common usage' guides as 
well as limits the development of language. 
The ethical implications of this section concern the metaphorical nature of our moral 
language and the illegitimacy of its instrumental use; together with the process of 
concept formation involved in the development of our moral notions. 
3.8.3 Language as horizon of a hermeneutic ontology 
Richard Bernstein notes that Gadamer's project is ontological: 
Following Heidegger, Gadamer argues that the essential character of our being-
in-the-world is to be individuals who understand the happening of truth through 
language. 185 
Gadamer is seeking to keep his distance from 'the modem philosophy and science of 
language' which concentrates on the form of languages and studies different human 
languages comparatively. He contends that the conception of language as form, 
separated from content, is an abstraction which must be reversed: 
Verbal fom1 and traditionary content cannot be separated in the hermeneutic 
experience. If every language is a view of the world it is so not primarily 
because it is a particular type of language (in the way that linguists vtew 
language) but because of what is said or handed down in this language. 186 
For Gadamer, language is not simply 'one of man's possessions in the world' .187 Rather 
it is language itself that allows humankind to be aware of a 'world' at all. Humboldt 
maintained that as an individual grows into a linguistic community (as they learn the 
language) they are introduced to a shared perspective on the world. Gadamer concludes 
that 'language has no independent existence apart from the world that comes to 
language within it' .188 The communal dimension of language and its inherent 
orientation toward application are fundamentally constitutive of language rather than 
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occasional elements. 'Man's being in the world is primordially linguistic' .189 The 
suggestion here seems to be that for human beings all our experience of the world is 
mediated through language: language mediates the encounter between human being and 
world (or object, or 'other'). Truth does not exist in language but in the interaction 
which language mediates as the world is brought into being in language. Gadamer is 
critical of the Cartesian foundations of science arguing that the understanding of 
hermeneutical experience which he has outlined demands that 'we go beyond the idea 
of the object, and the objectivity of understanding, toward the idea that subject and 
object belong together' .190 Gadamer asserts that language 'has its true being only in 
dialogue, in coming to an understanding' .191 He argues that all human communities are 
in fact linguistic communities, in which language is formed and evolves. Just as we can 
increase our understanding by correlating ('fusing') perspectives (horizons) within 
language, so also we can increase our understanding by entering into other language-
worlds, other traditions. Our experiences are not exclusive but are fundamentally open 
to others. This wider dialogue can allow us to overcome some of the limitations of our 
own language-world. Our verbal nature and limitations are not barriers to understanding 
but are conditions of its possibility in the same way that our communal and historical 
situatedness are conditions of understanding as Brice Wachterhauser notes: 
The fact that knowledge is always dependent on historical, linguistic, and 
normative conditions, which constitute a relative standfoint, is not an inherent 
danger to knowledge, but a condition of its possibility. 19 
We must acknowledge that we are conditioned by language and history and that there 
simply is no 'objective', i.e. unconditioned', standpoint. Gadamer dismisses concerns 
about the suggestion that he himself is making an 'absolute' claim to truth here: 
In particular it is no objection to affirming that we are thus fundamentally 
conditioned to say that this affirmation is intended to be absolutely and 
unconditionally true, and therefore cannot be applied to itself without 
contradiction. The consciousness of being conditioned does not supersede our 
conditionedness. It is one of the prejudices of reflective philosophy that it 
understands matters that are not at all on the same logical level as standing in 
propositional relationships. Thus the reflective argument is out of place here. For 
we are not dealing with relationships between judgements which have to be kept 
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free from contradictions but with life relationships. Our verbal experience of the 
world has the capacity to embrace the most varied relationships of life. 193 
The limitations of our language imply that we can never fully express 'what we mean': 
all human speaking is finite. Again we encounter the hermeneutic circle; words can only 
be understood in terms of a whole language, and vice versa. Saying what one means is 
never simply positive: to say that an object 'is' something in particular always implies 
that it 'is not' something else. Words do not simply relate to objects but 'words in 
relation' refer to 'objects in relation'. Whatever has been said can always be said in 
another way. We can always understand things, and understand ourselves, differently. 
This 'speculative' 194 nature of language constitutes 'the hermeneutic promise of 
. 1. ' 195 umversa tty . 
The objectifying language of scientific method is an abstraction; a necessary abstraction 
for the purposes of science, but an abstraction nonetheless. The universal claims of 
scientific method represent an illegitimate attempt to expand the scientific notion of 
understanding, which in truth is only a particular part of the wider hermeneutical 
experience in the medium of language. The concepts of 'art' and 'history' are 'modes of 
understanding that emerge from the universal mode of hermeneutical being as forms of 
hermeneutic experience' .196 Should we now say the same for 'ethics'? In Chapter Four 
we will explore in more detail the implications for ethics of Gadarner's Truth and 
Method. 
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Chapter Four 
Significance and Criticism: the Ethical Implications of 
Gadamer's Truth and Method 
At the beginning of our explorations of Gadamer's Truth and Method we embarked on 
an extended thought-experiment: posing the question 'if Gadamer's hermeneutics can 
govern an interpretation of what ethics is, and how it works, and how it can be justified, 
then what would ethics look like?' It is now time to begin to evaluate this thought-
experiment. With this in mind, in this chapter I wish to explore the implications for 
ethics of Gadamer's hermeneutics as developed in Truth and Method and described in 
the previous chapter (section 4.1 ). My main contention in the light of Gadamer's work 
is that ethics must consciously adopt a stance that is thoroughly hermeneutical. We have 
seen how Gadamer has developed a sustained critique of the notion of universal truth 
and of the use of 'scientific method' in the human sciences. Thus Gadamer's 
hermeneutics will have serious implications for the concept of moral absolutes and for 
the method of utilitarianism, which would support my critique in Chapter Two: it is 
those implications which I hope to draw out in this chapter. I hope to demonstrate that 
Gadamer's hermeneutics can provide a sound philosophical approach to moral 
judgements, and that contextual moral truths can be properly asserted without recourse 
to scientific models of validation. Gadamer's Truth and Method has been criticised 
since its publication and I will consider some of these criticisms in order to assess their 
impact on my main thesis (section 4.2). I will also look briefly at some developments of 
Gadamer's work to see whether these might be applicable to ethics conceived as a 
hermeneutical endeavour (section 4.3). 
4.1 The significance of Gadamer's hermeneutics 
Gadamer concludes Truth and Method with this paragraph: 
Thus there is undoubtedly no understanding that is free of all prejudice, however 
much the will of our knowledge must be directed toward escaping their thrall. 
Throughout our investigation it has emerged that the certainty achieved by using 
scientific methods does not suffice to guarantee truth. This especially applies to 
the human sciences, but it does not mean that they are less scientific; on the 
contrary, it justifies the claim to special human significance that they have 
always made. The fact that in such knowledge the knower's own being comes 
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into play certainly shows the limits of method, but not of science. Rather, what 
the tool of method does not achieve must - and really can - be achieved by a 
discipline of questioning and inquiring, a discipline that guarantees truth. 1 
There is no special claim which would allow ethics immunity from these observations. 
If there is no understanding that is free from all prejudice and if scientific method is 
insufficient to guarantee truth then this applies as much to ethics as to any other form of 
human understanding. Gadamer's emphasis on our historical situatedness and the sheer 
impossibility of 'an objective standpoint' represents a significant challenge to 
Enlightenment emphases on universal reason and objectivity. Gadamer also challenges 
Kant's subjectivization of the aesthetic, arguing that aesthetic experience is also rooted 
in our historical situatedness. He argues that understanding and meaning operate at the 
level of practical concern and not merely theoretical observation. In fact, Gadamer's 
hermeneutics is a serious challenge to Kant's attempts to separate scientific, ethical, and 
aesthetic knowledge from each other. Gadamer argues that the problems of 
understanding and truth are similar in all areas: hermeneutics is a universal problem. 
The most serious challenges raised by Gadamer's hermeneutics are directed at ethical 
theories based on conceptions of absolute truth or universal method. Legalism and 
utilitarianism both attempt to understand human beings apart from their cultural and 
historical situatedness and to provide either universal norms or a universally applicable 
method. We have considered several criticisms of moral absolutes and of utilitarianism, 
and have suggested that their main failings seem to lie in a failure to appreciate the 
complexity, and the significance for moral deliberation, of the context of actions and 
choices (the twin failings of abstraction and reduction); and in their reliance on 
scientific truth and Enlightenment reason. Gadamer argues that all human life and all 
human understanding are inescapably finite and historical. Human relationships and 
communities involve complex dynamic systems: attempting to describe them on the 
basis of static models has serious limitations. We will now consider some of the more 
important implications for ethics of Gadamer's hermeneutics: the critique of abstraction 
(section 4.1.1 ), the nature of moral truth and knowledge (section 4.1.2), the nature of 
reason and its role in moral deliberation (section 4.1.3), the importance of tradition 
(section 4.1.4), the centrality of language and its metaphorical nature (section 4.1.5), 
and the e!em£nt_s of _(!ppljcation and self-presentation in the virtuous life (section 4.1.6). 
We will then briefly reconsider our scenario from Chapter One (section 4.1.7). 
TM,491. 
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4.1.1 Abstracted ethics? 
In Part One of Truth and Method, Gadamer is fiercely critical of the abstraction 
involved in 'aesthetic consciousness' and I have suggested that this critique might 
equally apply to those forms of ethical reasoning which we have seen to rely on their 
own forms of abstraction. Gadamer is clear that moral deliberation is not about applying 
universal principles in the abstract but is about judging individual concrete cases? He is 
critical of Kant's conception of the aesthetic experience as isolated and separate from 
the world and from the cultural and historical situatedness both of the work of art and of 
the experiencing subject. Gadamer suggests that in performing such abstraction the true 
nature of the work of art is distorted and so judgements about it do not relate to the 
'real' work of art at all. They relate, if at all, to an artificial construct derived from the 
work of art. In attempting to simplify moral judgements by abstracting only certain 
features from a complex context (from the situation where action is required), or by 
attempting to apply universal principles or a universal method, ethicists too unavoidably 
alter the nature of the ethical case under consideration. The real nature of the case lies in 
a complex network of agent, motivation, context, relationships, tradition, community, 
consequences and so on. Ethical judgements based on abstraction relate to an artificial 
construct consisting only of certain selected features of the case. It may well be 
impossible fully and accurately to account for all the features of a case but this should 
not prevent the attempt (and certainly we should not be deliberately excluding some of 
them). Gadamer is critical of Kant for denying any truth value to aesthetic judgements. 
He suggests that this is a direct result of the abstraction of aesthetic experience from its 
context and from the lasting significance for the observer. Kant argued for a rigid 
separation of aesthetic judgement from other forms of judgement and, in so doing, 
abstracted the aesthetic 'experience' from the context or tradition of the observer. 3 The 
aesthetic judgement becomes a judgement simply of form: all elements of context or 
purpose must be excluded. Against this, Gadamer suggests that aesthetic judgements 
(and by implication ethical judgements) can communicate truth as part of an 'event of 
meaning': that is, by virtue of the very situatedness in a context, and the lasting effects 
on an experiencing subject, that Kant denies. For Gadamer, understanding (including 
2 TM, 39. 
3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement [ 1790), trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1987), 45: §2. 
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moral understanding) can only exist as part of the 'hermeneutic continuity of human 
existence' .4 
However, after Kant and perhaps as a consequence of his rigid isolation of aesthetic 
judgements, ethical judgements increasingly come to be seen as similar to scientific 
judgements with science characterised as 'objective' and aesthetics 'merely subjective' 
(i.e. completely relative). This has required the abstraction of certain features from 
ethical contexts and from the process of deliberation in order to make them susceptible 
of a 'scientific' analysis. Theories of aesthetic consciousness abstract the experience of 
art from its context; while the hegemony of scientific method, together with 
inappropriate insistence on universality and a limited conception of reason, abstract 
ethical judgement from its context. Absolutism too is guilty of its own forms of 
abstraction. Gadamer's hermeneutics, on the other hand, imply that all understanding is 
inevitably context-bound; that we can only understand anything because we are part of a 
tradition; and that both aesthetics and ethics are part of the hermeneutical project. 
For Kant, the spectrum of judgements could be represented thus: 
Objective ... Scientific ... Ethical II Aesthetic ... Subjective 
I want to argue, with Gadamer and against Kant, that ethical judgement has a good deal 
in common with aesthetic judgement. Much traditional ethics, notably utilitarianism, 
has attempted to provide a rational basis for ethical judgements by the adoption of a 
scientific method. For Enlightenment science only the rigorous application of method 
could provide access to truth. Hermeneutics, together with late twentieth-century 
philosophy of science from Thomas Kuhn5 onwards, would suggest that science is not 
as 'objective' as the Enlightenment philosophers thought. The 'objective' approach of 
science may have brought us significant understanding of ourselves and our world but 
even here truth is ultimately perspectival. No judgements can properly be described as 
completely 'objective'. The spectrum should perhaps be represented with no rigid 
separation: 
4 TM, 96. 
5 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed, 
1970). 
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Objective .. . Scientific 
Concept .. . Ethical 
Aesthetic 
... Subjective 
... Judgement 
This opens up the possibility that ethics has as much to learn from aesthetics as it has 
from science and implies that ethics always involves judgement rather than merely the 
application of rigid rules. Kantian ethics tends to divorce ethical principles from 
empirical conditions. 6 This, together with the characterisation of human beings as 
essentially rational, has led to the exclusion of feelings, passions and, most seriously, 
imagination from the sphere of ethics. 
Dale Jamieson describes the dominant conception of moral theory: 
On the dominant conception, moral theories are abstract structures that sort 
agents, actions, or outcomes into appropriate categories. Proposed categories 
include virtuous, vicious, right, wrong, permitted, forbidden, good, bad, best, 
worst, supererogatory, and obligatory ... The job of moral theorists ... is to 
make particular moral theories explicit, to describe their universality, and to 
make vivid their coercive power. This is done through examining arguments, 
assessing evidence, and scrutinizing logical relationships. 7 
Such systems can feel cold and inflexible to those struggling with ethical judgement 
who may be able to see many specific and particular features of their situation which 
militate against the conclusions of such abstract models. As Kathleen Higgins notes, 
Kant's ethics, 'presents invulnerability to situational contingencies as an ethical ideal. 
This ideal, however, is foreign to our moral experience.' 8 Robert Song traces the 
genesis of this ideal back before Kant to Plato who, in situating moral truth in a realm of 
reality removed from time and contingency, created ethics as a form of techne. 
Immunity to change also implied, in the ideal subject, 'an impermeability to the 
distracting, unpredictable power of the passions' .9 However, real moral decisions are 
coloured by the sort of person who is making the decision; the impact of the decision on 
their networks of relationships; and the temporal location of the situation in relation to 
6 Immanuel Kant, 'Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals' [1785], in H. J. Paton (ed.), The Moral 
Law: Kant's Groundwork ofthe Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (London: Hutchinson, 1948), 
iii-v. Page references are to the second edition of Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, which 
appear as marginal notes in this edition. 
7 Dale Jamiesol),_ 'Metl}od and Moral Theory', in Peter Singer (ed.), Companion to_Ethics (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1991), 476-87, at 476, emphasis mine. 
Kathleen Marie Higgins, The Music ofOur Lives (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991). 
9 Robert Song, 'Wisdom as the End of Morality', in Stephen C. Barton (ed.), Where Shall Wisdom Be 
Found? (Edinburgh: T &T Clark, 1999), 295-306, at 300. 
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other contexts (both moral and non-moral). In abstracting the process of ethical 
judgement from the context of specific ethical decisions traditional ethical theories have 
removed much of the power of ethical thought to guide actual behaviour. Not only do 
such ethical theories not take proper account of individual circumstances but because of 
this they now have no real purchase on the actions of the moral agent. So we should not 
adopt a standpoint in relation to ethical deliberation and the good that pretends to 
immediacy (this would amount to a criticism of Joseph Fletcher's 'antinomian'). Nor 
can we attempt to escape our historical situation by appeals to absolutes and universals 
(Fletcher's 'legalist'). Instead we should adopt a standpoint that corresponds to the 
historical nature of the human condition (Fletcher's 'situationist'). Ethical deliberation 
should be characterised by constant vigilance in mediating between the norms of an 
ethical tradition and the specific features of ethical situations. 
A properly hermeneutical ethics would need to be contextual; situated within language 
and tradition, and related to concrete cases and specific situations. Moral judgements 
could not be based upon, or justified by, appeals to abstract principles. Abstraction 
could only be used as a tool of ethical analysis: principles and generalisations would 
have no weight on their own, they would need to be recontextualized and open to 
modification by particular cases. Such an ethics could regain its ability to motivate 
ethical behaviour. The insights of deontological forms of ethics need not be abandoned 
altogether but the status of moral principles would need to change. Moral principles 
might be deemed to hold 'in most cases' but they would nonetheless be recognised as 
partial and provisional, as the distilled wisdom of communal deliberation. There would 
be no room for moral absolutes: there is no objective standpoint 'outside' ethics from 
which they could be recognised. 
4.1.2 Moral knowledge & moral truth 
In Truth and Method Gadamer addresses the problem of method in the human sciences. 
This problem stems from the division between the 'exact' and the 'human' sciences. In 
the exact sciences all contingency related to the observer must be excluded and their 
-~j<:Le~l-9onsistscof_knowledge=of;.similarities.-=regularitiescand-conformities~to-law': 10- In-
the face of the dominance of the exact sciences the human sciences either had to adopt 
10 TM, 14. 
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their method in order to preserve their claims to truth; or they had to develop an 
autonomous method and so undermine (in the eyes of the exact scientists) their own 
truth claims. The choice seemed to be between scientifically verifiable truth and no truth 
at all. However it is this characterisation of the nature of truth, the denial of truth claims 
made outside the exact sciences, which Gadamer criticises so fiercely. Gadamer does 
not accept that only truth arrived at by scientific method can be valid: 
Understanding is not to be thought of so much as an action of one's subjectivity, 
but as the placing of oneself within a process of tradition, in which past and 
present are constantly fused. This is what must be expressed in hermeneutical 
theory, which is far too dominated by the idea of a process, a method. 11 
The assertion that the human sciences cannot make truth claims is dependent upon the 
widespread understanding of truth as consisting only of 'scientific truth'. On the basis 
of this assumption, the conclusion about the human sciences is correct but it is this very 
assumption that Gadamer wishes to challenge. 
Gadamer argues that scientific method is simply inappropriate for the human sciences. 
The emphasis on scientific method has simply blinded us to other kinds of truth proper 
to the human sciences. The exclusion of all factors relating to the observer and the 
detachment from tradition may allow the identification of what is 'regular' or 'typical' 
but that is all that method can properly identify. This leaves out a great deal that is 
important to our hermeneutic experience. Gadamer also criticises the understanding of 
'experience' in the natural sciences, suggesting that it simply ignores the 'inner 
historicity of experience' 12 by insisting on results that are verifiable and repeatable. I 
would argue that the search for universal norms and the application of universal method 
in ethics similarly denies the inner historicity of our moral experience. Also, the 
scientific method involves breaking down the object of study into smaller and smaller 
parts so that they can be more easily understood. Increased understanding is usually 
described using metaphors of depth. For Gadamer, understanding is also about breadth 
and synthesis as well as depth and analysis; about having more descriptions of an object 
and about seeing connections. As Richard Rorty observes, 
the more descriptions that are available, and the more integration between these 
descriptions, the better is our understanding of the object identified by any of 
h d . . 13 t ose escnptwns. 
11 TM, 290. 
12 TM, 346. 
13 Richard Rorty, 'Being That Can Be Understood Is Language: Richard Rorty on Hans-Georg 
Gadamer', London Review of Books, 16 March 2000, 23-25, at 23. 
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I suggest that ethics has followed too closely the pattern of 'scientific method' in its 
search for universals and its abstraction of ethical judgements from context and 
motivation. Can moral 'knowledge' be obtained by the methods of deductive logic or is 
there an irreducible historical and cultural element, in which proper weight must be 
given to context and motivation, which must operate by inductive methods. Is all ethical 
knowledge a priori and simply waiting to be discovered; is it simply a posteriori, 
needing to be constructed, like scientific knowledge, after the collection of appropriate 
data; or is it perhaps 'connatural', arising from the reality and experience of individual 
'special cases', but related to some primitive apprehension of moral truth in the knower? 
Connatural knowledge is a kind of knowledge by acquaintance. We know the 'natural 
law', for example, through our direct acquaintance with it in our human experience. 
Jacques Maritain was a strong defender of such a conception of ethical norms as rooted 
in human nature. 14 
Gadamer returns to the understanding of knowledge and truth found in the humanist 
tradition: moral, historical and political truths cannot be objective because our own 
being is always already involved. 15 They (and we) are always already situated within a 
context: a community and a tradition, a culture and a history. Jean Grondin suggests that 
knowledge here is not an understanding of method, rather it is 'common sense' or 
'wisdom for life'; what is formed is a 'capacity for judgement', or more simply 'taste' .16 
B. R. Tilghman suggests that beauty and goodness were closely related in Plato and that 
this fact has been hidden by the translation of 'to kalon' as 'beauty'. He suggests that it 
actually means 'goodness in general or that which is to be desired and sought after ... it 
is that which attracts the soul to finer things' .17 By the eighteenth century the idea of 
beauty had become restricted to the appearance of things. The beautiful became the 
'aesthetic' and had lost all connection with practical utility and morality. For Gadamer, 
taste is neither simply subjective (within the individual) nor strictly objective (imposed 
from without): it is formed in individuals in their interaction with a community in a 
process of education and cultural formation (Bildung). Taste is not simply about 
following fashion; rather it implies an ability to stand back and judge fashion according 
14 See e.g. Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law (New York: Gordian, 1971 ). 
15 TM, 9-42. 
16 Jean Grondin, The Philosophy of Gadamer, trans. Kathryn Plant (Chesham: Acumen Publishing, 
2003), 26. 
17 B. R. Tilghman, Wittgenstein, Ethics and Aesthetics: The View from Eternity (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1991 ), 22. 
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to its own standards, 'certain of the agreement of an ideal community' .18 The agreement 
of an ideal community is what gives taste its normative power. 
Gadamer wishes to retrieve this earlier, moral, understanding of the word 'taste' to 
replace its narrowed and impoverished sense as an exclusively aesthetic term 
understood individualistically. He uses the Aristotelian concept of phronesis to explore 
this further. Phronesis (or prudence) is distinct from both techne (practical skill) and 
episteme (theoretical knowledge). Techne is about the correct application of rules and 
knowledge, phronesis is about the development of judgement and wisdom. Phronesis is 
cultivated rather than taught and is flexible in adapting to particular contexts: it is a 
matter of' common sense'. 
There is something immediately evident about grounding philological and 
historical studies and the ways the human sciences work on this concept of the 
sensus communis. For their object, the moral and historical existence of 
humanity, as it takes shape in our words and deeds, is itself decisively 
determined by the sensus communis. Thus a conclusion based on universals, a 
reasoned proof, is not sufficient, because what is decisive is the circumstances. 19 
For Gadamer, aesthetic experience transcends 'method' and resists all attempts to 
reduce understanding to the subjectivity of either the artist or the viewer. Aesthetic 
experience is not simply subjective consciousness but is a form of ontological 
disclosure in which the 'being' of a work of art is communicated within a tradition and 
culture. The experience thus affects the life of the viewer and can communicate 'truth' 
without the use of conceptual thought: 
in art and the beautiful we encounter a significance that transcends all 
conceptual thought. 20 
It is this sort of contextual experience, rather than abstraction, that is the key to art. I 
suggest that ethics similarly transcends method: contextual experience of ethics and 
goodness as part of an unfinished process is the key. There are interesting parallels 
between virtuous lives and works of art: contemplating the life of Saint Francis or 
Mother Theresa for moral inspiration is surely more about recognising moral beauty 
than about analysing moral concepts. Like art, a virtuous life is something to 'follow' or 
'aspire to' rather than strictly to imitate. 
18 TM, 37. 
19 TM, 22-23. 
20 Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'The Relevance of the Beautiful: Art as Play, Symbol, and Festival' [1977], in 
Robert Bernasconi (ed.), The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays, trans. Nicholas Walker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 3-53, at 16. 
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Gadamer' s hermeneutics is designed to overturn the dominance of technical reason and 
to regain a social and contextual conception of wisdom and truth: 
For moral knowledge, as Aristotle describes it, is clearly not objective 
knowledge - i.e., the knower is not standing over against a situation that he 
merely observes; he is directly confronted with what he sees. It is something that 
he has to do. 21 
Wisdom is grounded in the sensus communis and truth emerges from the interactions, 
the conversations, between individuals. Song suggests that Aristotelian ethics is 
different from Platonic ethics: 
The good life is one that is good for human beings, not for those who have shed 
all distinctively human characteristics. 22 
Instead of the locus of moral truth lying beyond the everydaf world, wisdom is 
located in the accumulated experience of the virtuous person. 3 
Gadamer argues that philosophy, art and history are modes of experience in which a 
truth may be communicated that cannot be verified by the methodological means proper 
to science; truth comes into being as the result of an interaction (between subject and 
text or between subject and interlocutor). Truth emerges as text and contemporary 
consciousness combine in a 'fusion of horizons'. I suggest that ethics is a similar mode 
of experience, based on our interactions with other people: right choices depend upon an 
interaction between the individual, the tradition and the situation. Moral truth emerges 
as the morality of the 'other' (person, text or tradition) combines with our own moral 
consciousness: understanding is located in-between familiarity and strangeness (this is 
the concept of 'moral distance' which is to be overcome by a fusion of horizons). New 
experiences challenge our previous false generalisations. We must be open to new 
experiences and willing to learn: conversation, openness and risk are prerequisites for 
understanding. It is the dialectic of question and answer that gives understanding the 
character of a conversation or dialogue. Historically effected consciousness renounces 
any claim to absolute knowledge and seeks understanding through a fusion of horizons, 
which is an achievement of language (language which is both consequent upon 
understanding and also a condition of it). The hermeneutic circle is as inevitable in 
ethics as in all other understanding: We cannot escape from it; instead, we should 
concentrate our efforts on making a conscious effort to enter the circle aware of our 
21 TM, 314. 
22 Song, 'Wisdom as the End of Morality', 300. 
23 Song, 'Wisdom as the End of Morality', 301. 
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prejudices and prepared to put them at risk. We must acknowledge that, together with 
all our knowledge, our moral understanding is partial, historical and finite. The goal of 
universality is unattainable. 
A properly hermeneutical ethics would not be based upon the application of a universal 
method or on scientific criteria of validation. This would not mean that it could make no 
truth claims at all; rather, it would mean that moral truth was encountered in the 
interactions of agents and situations; that it developed connaturally. The insights of 
natural law ethics would be incorporated but again only with provisional status. 
Hermeneutical ethics would take proper account of experience and would strive for 
breadth of understanding as well as depth. It would restore an element of judgement or 
taste (considered, once again, to include moral sensibility alongside aesthetic 
sensibility) to moral deliberation. Moral wisdom would be seen as a function not just of 
the individual but also of the community. The sensus communis may have some 
similarities with Social Contract ethics although the important feature would not be 
communal agreement but communaljudgement. 
Gadamer suggests that: 
Art is only possible because the formative activity of nature leaves an open 
domain which can be filled by the productions of the human spirit.24 
I want to suggest that ethics too is only possible because the formative activity of nature 
leaves an open domain which can be filled by the productions of the human spirit 
(and/or the Holy Spirit): that ethics is a creative and artistic project rather than simply 
the keeping of rules or the application of a method. The insights of utilitarianism 
(together with proportionalism and other forms of consequentialism) would not need to 
be abandoned: the consideration of consequences would be an important component of 
moral deliberation, perhaps especially in public and political ethics. However 
utilitarianism as a complete system could not be accepted. The process of evaluating 
consequences would not simply constitute an ethical judgement: the results of such a 
process would be open to challenge and modification by other considerations. 
24 Gadamer, 'Relevance ofthe Beautiful', 13. 
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4.1.3 The nature of moral reasoning 
There are serious questions to be addressed about the abstracted rationalist basis of 
much ethical theory and also about the conceptions of reason which moral theories 
assume. 
25 In Chapter Three we saw that Gadamer characterises Kant as asking the 
question 'what are the conditions of our knowledge by virtue of which modem science 
is possible, and how far does it extend?'. In Truth and Method, Gadamer explores the 
conditions of all understanding and concludes that it is our situatedness within a 
tradition, a culture and a language that, despite constituting limitations to our 
understanding, are in fact the necessary conditions of its possibility. This must be true 
of our ethical understanding as much as our aesthetic or historical understanding. 
Gadamer argues that we are completely and inevitably context-bound, and this includes 
our reason. There is no such thing as universal reason; rather our reason is constantly 
dependent upon the context in which it operates; reason is always related to a specific 
community, tradition and language. Except, perhaps, in the limiting case of formal 
logic, 'pure reason' is simply impossible to attain. Gadamer emphasises the importance 
of the linguisticality of our experience together with the metaphorical nature of all 
language, as demonstrated in the process of concept formation. 26 Reason here works 
inductively from grasping resemblances rather than deductively from subsuming 
particulars under universals. 
Gadamer is sharply critical of the Enlightenment notions of reason and rationality upon 
which legalism and utilitarianism both seem to be based. Both seek to exclude feeling 
and emotion from moral decision-making because of a concern to satisfy the canons of 
rational validation and 'objectivity'. Mark Johnson considers the ways in which we, as 
humans, think and the mental schemes we use to organise our thoughts. He mounts a 
sustained attack on the conception of morality as an abstracted system of universal laws 
dictated by reason.27 Johnson is critical too of what he calls utilitarian reductionism: the 
reduction of reason to 'economic, means-ends, technical rationality as the sole criterion 
for moral evaluation' .28 Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner also consider the way we 
25 For further discussions see Emanuel Katongole, Beyond Universal Reason (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2000); Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
·(London: Duckworth, 1988). 
26 TM, 429. 
27 MI. 
28 Ml, 120. 
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think. They outline a theory of conceptual blending, similar to Johnson's understanding 
of metaphorical projection, as central to reason and throw similar doubts on the 
dominant conceptions.29 This view of reason as detached, abstracted and objective 
pervades much of contemporary ethics (although its significance and limitations are 
rarely recognised). Gadamer's hermeneutical insights preclude the possibility of such a 
universal reason. Johnson suggests that Kant, in particular, is guilty of a misguided 
attempt to abstract a universal reason with the result that reason comes to mean little 
more than the principles of formal logic:30 when in fact what is needed to resolve 
specific cases is moral imagination. 31 
For Gadamer, moral reasoning is a form of phronesis. Phronesis is formed through 
dialogue, through conversation. It requires openness to others and patient listening. 
There is no single authority and no monopoly of truth. Ethics is situated (as are agents) 
within tradition, culture and language. In Gadamer's ethics there could be no hard and 
fast principles, no moral absolutes. An agent may possess maxims that would militate 
against certain courses of action but can never be sure in advance of the right action. 
The right action is known by that kind of intuition which phronesis provides. Phronesis 
is formed within an agent and is closely connected to their character, their hopes and 
their priorities. A good person is one who instinctively knows what is right; who acts 
out of habit.32 Formation depends on the example of other virtuous people and on 
dialogue with them (either real, or an internal dialogue about their actions, motivations, 
character and so on). As Chris Lawn observes, one great advantage of phronesis is its 
flexibility and adaptability: 
Each situation is utterly unique: its strangeness exposes the inadequacy of 
general rules. Rules by their very nature can never be programmatically applied 
to specific cases.33 
This is true not just in the resolution of cases but also in their framing: the way we 
decide which factors are morally relevant and the descriptive language that we use. 
Phronesis allows a good deal of interpretive flexibility and even redefinition of terms in 
29 Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden 
Complexities (New York: Basic Books, 2002). 
30 Ml, 110-13. 
31 For further discussioJ1 of the ~post-_mqden] questioning of reason' see Paul D. Murray, Reason, Truth 
- cmdTheology {n Pragmatisi Perspective (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 1-21 and 131-60. 
32 Obviously, Gadamer's ethics at this point has strong links to virtue ethics. See e.g. Alasdair 
Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 2nd ed, 1985). 
33 Chris Lawn, Gadamer: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum, 2006), 134. 
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response to the situation an agent faces: the case 'co-determines, corrects and 
supplements' the principle.34 Rules which are intrinsically rigid do not easily admit of 
exceptions or of a redefinition of terms in this way. Christian ethics should be about 
judgement (and taste), not about rules and abstraction. 
Song suggests that, as Christians, our belief that this finite world is not all there is 
should prompt an 'openness to the world and a vulnerability to its unpredictability'. In 
ethics therefore: 
We are free to face particularities in their particularity. We do not have to 
impose moral rules on circumstances or force them into premeditated moulds. 
We are freed from the effort of having to elevate ourselves above the level of 
chance: Kantianism, as Bernard Williams shrewdly recognises, is a form of 
Pelagianism. 35 
This last point is important for Christian ethics. Openness to contingency is a 
constituent part of Christian faith. The attempt to rise above chance (with absolute truth 
or scientific method) may be not only misguided (and, as Gadamer would suggest, 
ultimately impossible), it may also be heretical. 
There are problems not only with our understanding of what reason is, but also with the 
insistence that it is only reason that counts in relation to moral decision-making. 
Gadamer suggests that by focussing solely on the truth that admits of scientific 
verification other truth may be missed. Ethics can be rational without being rationalistic. 
A morality of constraint, based upon 'reason' alone, ignores the human resources of 
imagination which could allow more sensitive and humane judgements to be made.36 
Gadamer rejects the oppositions which characterise the Enlightenment: between reason 
and tradition, reason and prejudice, reason and authority. Reason is inescapably situated 
in history and culture; it depends for its power upon the very fact that it is part of a 
tradition. Norm and context are not separate and competing but are connected and 
inform one another. Reason cannot be separated from other human capabilities as a 
separate objective faculty. The search for an objective ethics based on absolute norms 
controlled solely by reason is a wild goose chase. Gadamer's hermeneutics may allow us 
to move beyond absolute ethical systems and the fear of ethical relativism. 
34 TM, 39. 
· 
35 S~ng, 'Wisdom as the End of Morality', 305. He is referring to Bernard Williams, Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), 224, n20. 
36 Ml, 185-216. 
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A properly hermeneutical ethics would be rational but not rationalistic: emotions, 
passion, will and imagination would be allowed a role alongside reason in ethical 
deliberation. Reason would be recognised as contextual rather than universal and the 
importance of inductive reasoning would be emphasised. Moral wisdom would be 
recognised as a form of phronesis. The conclusions of Kantian rational ethics would be 
open to challenge. 
4.1.4 Tradition and ethics 
Gadamer asserts that there is simply no possibility of a universal objective viewpoint 
outside historical contingency. Prejudice (or prejudgement) is inevitable and is a 
necessary condition of any genuine encounter of understanding. The Enlightenment 
believed that prejudice could be overcome by the application of absolute (and universal) 
reason, but for Gadamer, all human existence, including human reason, is finite and 
historical. We stand in a particular community, within a particular tradition, and it is 
from here that we receive our prejudices. Gadamer argues that the Enlightenment's 
attempt to eliminate the historical contingency of tradition was misguided. History and 
tradition are the very basis of human existence and understanding. If this is true of 
understanding generally it must also be true of our ethical understanding. That is why, 
as Gadamer says, 'the character and virtue of the individual, far more than his 
judgements, constitute the moral reality of his being' .37 Nothing can completely 
transcend human thought and history. So, ethical knowledge is also incapable of 
transcending history, there is no objective, eternal and universal standpoint from which 
to formulate moral absolutes. Ethics exists as part of the wider tradition of human 
understanding in a hermeneutic community. Just as works of art constitute the 
'assembled achievements of the human mind' so do good (virtuous) lives. Our moral 
understanding comes from our experience of interaction (direct or indirect) with other 
moral agents. The being of a work of art consists partly in its being experienced by an 
observer within a community and a tradition of understanding: so too the being of a 
good person. Ethics is by its very nature interpersonal and communal. Paul Ricoeur 
defines ethical intentions 'as aiming at the "good life" with and for others in just 
37 TM, 277. 
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institutions' .38 Just as the abstraction inherent in the 'aesthetic consciousness' destroys 
the continuity of the work of art, so abstraction in ethics destroys the continuity of the 
agent with others and with society. As Gadamer observes: 
A person who reflects himself out of a living relationship to tradition destroys 
the true meaning of this tradition. 39 
Gadamer wishes to retrieve the 'special exemplariness of tradition for the hermeneutical 
task' .40 Ethics is not a finite and completed text but we are embedded in it as it 
develops. The whole process is an event within the movement of tradition. 
Understanding involves the interaction of subject and object, both situated within 
history and tradition. Understanding itself becomes part of that history and tradition. 
There is an inescapable temporality here (of subject, object and understanding) that 
precludes any claim to certainty or to ultimate foundations. It is this temporality which 
creates for Gadamer the paradigm for the basis of all understanding: distance. Distance 
can arise within a tradition (temporal distance or 'vertical' distance) and also between 
traditions ('horizontal distance'). The latter can also occur between different parts of the 
same tradition (e.g. the range of different moral understandings within the Christian 
tradition). In After Virtue, Alasdair Macintyre provides an insightful account of the 
distance between moral traditions and of the historical distance within moral 
traditions.41 His solution to this 'problem' is to opt for one system of ethics: the 
Aristotelian. Gadamer would not see this distance simply as a problem but also as a 
condition of the possibility of understanding. In all cases it is openness to the horizon of 
the 'other' that allows understanding and truth to emerge in dialogue. We must be open 
to new experiences; we must allow others to address us and to challenge our prejudices. 
This openness is characteristic of historically effected consciousness. Hermeneutics is 
not about methodological certainty but about readiness for experience: this is what 
distinguishes historically effected consciousness. The important thing is not to have the 
'right answers' but to keep asking questions. We must also try to understand the 
38 PauLBkoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), 172. 
39 TM, 360. 
40 TM, 178. 
41 Macintyre, After Virtue. 
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questions that others are asking; the questions to which their actions were the answer. 
Moral understanding requires the same discipline of question and answer. 42 
Understanding, interpretation and application are inseparable and legal hermeneutics is 
the paradigm case. As we have seen, a law's normative content is in large measure 
determined by how it is applied. Gadamer's conclusion that philological and legal 
hermeneutics are essentially the same proposes a unity that does not consist in historical 
or scientific method but in the fact that they all find 'their true ground in historically 
effected consciousness' .43 Moral development includes our worldview; our experience; 
the acquisition of knowledge, character, and virtue; and our telos. All of this is subject 
to the influences oftradition, culture and language. 
A person who has to make moral decisions has always already learned 
something. He has been so formed by education and custom that he knows in 
general what is right. The task of making a moral decision is that of doing the 
right thing in a particular situation.44 
The specific features and limitations of a situation constitute its 'horizon'. Individuals 
understand as part of a community and a tradition. The horizon of the present must 
continually change as we risk our prejudices in the dialogue that leads to understanding 
as horizons fuse. Ethical deliberation should be characterised rather by constant 
mediation between the norms of an ethical tradition and the specific features of ethical 
situations. As Nicholas Lash observes: 
If it is true for us, as creatures of history, that some understanding of our past is 
a necessary condition of an accurate grasp of our present predicament and our 
responsibilities for the future, it is also true that a measure of critical self-
understanding of our present predicament is a necessary condition of an accurate 
'reading' of our past. We do not first understand the past and then proceed to 
understand the present. The relationship between these two dimensions of our 
quest for meaning and truth is dialectical: they mutually inform, enable, correct, 
and enlighten each other.45 
Just as a tradition is 'an argument extended through time' , so is an ethical tradition or 
system of morality: 'fundamental agreements are defined and redefined' .46 Our ethical 
ideas, if they are truly open to the 'other' and to dialogue, are open to criticism and 
development though always limited by the course of their effects (effective history). 
42 For a discussion in relation to Scripture and ethics see Stephen E. Fowl and L. Gregory Jones, 
Reading in Communion: Scripture and Ethics in Christian Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991 ). 
Chapter 5- 'Listening to the Voices of Outsiders: Challenges to Our Interpretive Practices'. 
43 TM,-340~ . 
44 TM, 316-17. 
45 Nicholas Lash, Theology on the Way to Emmaus (London: S.C.M., 1986), 24-25. 
46 Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality.? , 12. 
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They are grounded in our historical, bodily and linguistic existence. In short, they are 
hermeneutical. 
A properly hermeneutical ethics would recognise the importance of tradition, and the 
provisionality implied by our temporal historical nature. Tradition would represent an 
important resource, though not an absolute authority. Such an ethics would be open to 
the insights and experiences of other traditions. It would have similar properties to legal 
hermeneutics: ethics would have no meaning without the possibility of its being applied. 
Ethical understanding would consist in a mediation between moral norms, the history of 
their application (historical effect), and the case at hand. Application would not be 
consequent upon a prior understanding; rather it would be an integral part of moral 
understanding; casuistry would be an important element. 
4.1.5 The developmental character of moral language 
Gadamer observes that 
objectivizing science regards the linguisticality of the natural experience of the 
world as a source ofprejudices.47 
For Enlightenment science this implies that linguisticality is the source of illegitimate 
but avoidable bias. For Gadamer language is indeed a source of prejudices, in the sense 
of prejudgements, but this is inescapable and indeed constitutes a condition of the 
possibility of understanding. All thought involves language: as Fred Lawrence puts it: 
'human beings live within language as the air they breathe' .48 Human beings cannot 
escape their dependence on language and we must be constantly aware of the limitations 
it brings but just as our historical situatedness is both a source of limitations for our 
understanding and also a condition of its possibility, the same is true of our linguistic 
situatedness. Even our understanding of tradition is verbally constituted. Part of the very 
nature of our existence, the nature of human being, is that we exist in relation to other 
things through conversation. If this linguistic 'conversation' is the basis of our existence 
and of our relationships, if as Gadamer suggests 'we are a conversation' ,49 then ethics, 
47 TM, 153. 
48 Fred Lawrence, 'Gadamer, the Hermeneutic Revolution, and Theology', in Robert J. Dostal (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Gadamer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 167-200, at 
184. 
49 This expression is taken from Holderlin's poem 'Celebration of Peace'. 
133 
which seeks to guide those relationships, must also be based on conversation and 
mediated through language. Our understanding of ethical texts (and text-analogues such 
as the lives of others and our networks of relationships) are conditioned by history and 
language: these are the two conditions that render all our understanding finite though we 
can never grasp with certainty the extent of their influence. Rorty urges that philosophy 
should abandon the scientific, problem-solving model of philosophical activity in favour 
of a conversational model and the fusion of horizons through a discipline of question 
and answer. 50 Paul Murray characterises Rorty as concerned to 
return us to the constraints and conditions of finite human existence in order to 
expunge sceptical concerns at root and prevent any group from claiming the 
exclusive right to declare on matters of truth and goodness.51 
Gadamer's understanding of language is fundamentally expressivist: words do not 
'stand for' objects; rather, they have their meaning because of the conventions of 
language use. The meanings of words, the way they are used in utterances to 
communicate and their performative character are 'sanctioned by consensus, agreement 
and convention'. 52 Language has the power to express what it is to be human. 
Correspondence theories of language often ignore or denigrate poetry and literature 
seeing them as inferior to propositional language or as simply rhetorical devices. For 
Gadamer, metaphor is not simply a figure of speech, but is at the heart of all our 
language use. It is not the power of thought and representation that allow language its 
meaning; meaning arises from the interactions of human dialogue in which metaphor, 
imagination and the sensus communis play vital roles. Language is constantly changing 
as a result of dialogue. This change occurs within a tradition and a community and is 
limited by the sensus communis; it cannot be controlled by individuals. Language is 
fundamentally social in character. As we have seen, it is language itself that allows 
humankind to be aware of a 'world' at all. 
Gadamer sees language as living and developing. He is clear that concept formation is 
an inherently metaphorical process. 53 Concept formation often takes place as a result of 
'accidents and relations';54 reflection on perception and experience can extend the 
50 Rmty, 'Being That Can Be Understood Is Language', 25. 
Murray, Reason, Truth rind Theology iii Pragma-tist Perspective, 87. 
52 Lawn, Gadamer, 78. 
53 TM, 428-38. 
54 TM, 428. 
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semantic range of a word. This is how language, including moral language, develops. 
Concepts are constantly being revised in the light of experience and dialogue. The great 
strength of language lies in its ability to express newly identified similarities in the 
world or in our interaction with it; flexibility, rather than univocity, is the key. Gadamer 
is critical of the scientific ideal of a logically ordered arrangement of concepts which 
constitutes an abstraction from their relationships of meaning and from the constant flux 
of the metaphorical life of language. This may have a place in the exact sciences but not 
in the human sciences (and not in ethics). Concept formation is a communal enterprise; 
'common usage' guides as well as limits the development of language. The sensus 
communis provides the normative framework for the development of language and 
understanding; it provides conditions and limits. The nature of moral language is crucial 
to our notions of moral understanding and moral reasoning; Stanley Hauerwas agrees 
with Fletcher that our moral notions fail to grasp (and indeed can never grasp) the full 
depth and richness of our moral experience. 55 There is always more in our moral 
experience than we can adequately describe in our moral language; it is only the 
metaphorical basis of language which allows us any hope of finding ways to reduce this 
deficit. 
A properly hermeneutical ethics would recognise the importance of our moral language 
and the metaphorical process by which our moral notions are formed. If our ethical 
understanding is to be seen in this way, then we will have to acknowledge that our 
ethical knowledge can only ever be provisional; that our ethical understanding is 
inescapably limited by history and language; and that our ethical deliberations are 
unavoidably context-bound. However we would also need to adopt that vigilance of 
thought that is required in the absence of complete understanding and which constitutes 
the essence of hermeneutics. We would also have to seek moral truth not in words or in 
absolute formulations but in dialogue. Truth exists in the interaction which language 
mediates as the world is brought into being in language: truth is encountered in 
interaction, in 'dialogue', in the mediation between familiarity and strangeness, and in 
the 'in-between'. The hermeneutic circle is inescapable: individual words acquire 
meaning in discourse; knowledge exists within networks of ideas; truth emerges in 
55 Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981 ), 12. 
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linguistic interactions. Hermeneutical ethics would be controlled by a discipline of 
question and answer, and based on the model of conversation. 
4.1.6 Application and self-presentation 
Gadamer's problem with Kantianism is its intellectualism; making right choices depend 
upon the proper understanding and subsequent application of an abstract norm. For 
Gadamer right choices depend upon an interaction between the individual, the tradition 
and the situation. We need to 'see' and frame situations as 'moral' situations that 
demand action: we need to appreciate the morally relevant factors of a situation. Moral 
knowledge includes experience and tradition; moral understanding always already 
involves application. We can never fully elucidate all the reasons for, nor all the 
influences upon, our actions. Our discernment in the moral situation is not related to 
theoretical knowledge of an 'object', rather it is the 'vigilance of ethical knowledge'. 56 
As we noted above 'hermeneutics is not the title of a philosophical project that aspires 
to complete understanding, but the name of vigilance in thought which rests on its 
absence'. 57 Gadamer' s conclusion to this section is worth quoting in full: 
To summarize, if we relate Aristotle's description of the ethical phenomenon 
and especially the virtue of moral knowledge to our own investigation, we find 
that his analysis in fact offers a kind of model of the problems of hermeneutics. 
We too determined that application is neither a subsequent nor merely an 
occasional part of the phenomenon of understanding, but codetermines it as a 
whole from the beginning. Here too application did not consist in relating some 
pre-given universal to the particular situation. The interpreter dealing with a 
traditionary text tries to apply it to himself. But this does not mean that the text 
is given for him as something universal, that he first understands it per se, and 
then afterward uses it for particular applications. Rather, the interpreter seeks no 
more than to understand this universal, the text - i.e., to understand what it says, 
what constitutes the text's meaning and significance. In order to understand that, 
he must not try to disregard himself and his particular hermeneutical situation. 
He must relate the text to this situation if he wants to understand at all. 58 
We do not learn moral knowledge as one might learn a skill or craft, but are always 
already in the situation of having to act. We do not acquire moral knowledge and then 
apply it: what is right 'cannot be fully determined independently of the situation that 
. . h . ' 59 reqmres a ng t actton . 
56 Gadamer, quoted in Grondin, Philosophy ofGadam-er, 106. 
57 Grondin, Philosophy ofGadamer, 75. 
58 TM, 324. 
59 Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics (London: S.C.M., 1966), 27. 
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A person who has to make moral decisions has always already learned 
something. He has been so formed by education and custom that he knows in 
general what is right. The task of making a moral decision is that of doing the 
right thing in a particular situation.60 
Despite some reservations, Gadamer's considerations of play in relation to ontology 
have useful insights with implications for ethics. Morality could be said to exist within a 
community or tradition but only find expression through moral agents and observers, 
through being 'played'. Is the purpose of ethics less about solving problems and more 
about 'ordering and shaping the movement of the game itself: less about actually being 
a virtuous person and more about ordering the attempt? Taylor agrees that the human 
sciences should be understood on the 'conversation' model. 61 Rorty hopes that 
philosophers will abandon the 'scientistic, problem-solving, model of philosophical 
activity with which Kant burdened [the] discipline' and substitute 'a conversational 
model, one in which philosophical success is measured by horizons fused rather than 
problems solved, or even problems dissolved'. 62 Perhaps we might hope that ethicists 
will achieve something similar. 
The idea of the virtuous life as a form of self-presentation has interesting parallels with 
the Eastern Orthodox notion of 'personhood' ,63 and with the Catholic personalist 
tradition.64 Human persons are to some extent constituted by their network of 
relationships: 'a self can never be described without reference to those who surround 
it'. 65 Human beings may be said to exist as isolated individuals but only become real 
persons as they interact with others and achieve 'self-presentation' .66 It is ethical action, 
or the observance of such action, which brings about change in moral agents. 
60 TM, 3 16-17. 
61 Charles Taylor, 'Gadamer on the Human Sciences', in Dostal (ed.), Cambridge Companion to 
Gadamer, 126-42, at 127, emphasis mine. 
62 Richard Rorty, 'Being That Can Be Understood Is Language: Richard Rorty on Hans-Georg 
Gadamer', London Review of Books, 16 March 2000, 23-25, at 25. 
63 See John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (London: 
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1985). 
64 See e.g. Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, trans. John J. Fitzgerald (Notre Dame, 
IN: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1966); Emmanuel Mounier, Personalism (London: Routledge & 
Paul, 1952). 
65 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self· The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 35. 
66 Such self-presentation, though, is historically situated. Compare Macintyre's criticisms of Erving 
Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1959).in Alasdair 
Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 2nd ed, 1985), 35, 115-17. 
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A properly hermeneutical ethics would recognise the complex, dynamic character of our 
moral lives. We find our true selves in the artistic project that is living the virtuous life: 
The observed virtuous life of another is something to follow and to interpret in one's 
own artistic project. At this point questions of motivation, character and virtue are 
clearly important and the insights of virtue ethics will be essential. Casuistry, as a form 
of artistic composition will be central to moral deliberation. Considerations based on 
feelings, emotions, taste, imagination and inspiration may not be measurable, nor easily 
incorporated into a decision-making process (artistic composition is neither easy nor 
reducible to simple propositions), but the diversity of goods requires that the effort 
should be made.67 
Hermeneutical ethics would be open to learning from the self-presentation of others, 
eager to engage in conversation and prepared to put its prejudices at risk. It would be 
happy to learn from the experiences of others and would strive to incorporate the 
practical wisdom of other traditions, including that of oppressed minorities. There are 
no easy answers here, but if Gadamer is right the challenge must be taken up. 
4.1. 7 Our example reconsidered in the light of a hermeneutical ethics 
In Chapter One we considered the scenario of a drowning child and one person's 
response: that they would jump in 'so that their child did not have to die alone'. We 
observed that this might be considered a praiseworthy and fitting response, but that 
traditional ethical theories would not be expected to reach this conclusion, nor would 
they readily provide a justification for it. Perhaps we can now offer a justification, and 
answer the questions which we raised. 68 Can this decision be justified on the basis of 
aesthetic criteria? In other words, was the decision justifiable because there was 
something 'beautiful' about it? (Though, of course, at the time the father would have 
had no opportunity to test this perception against the sensus communis.) Motivation is 
important; love for another can (and possibly should) be an overriding consideration. 
Given more time (or the luxury to consider the scenario in the abstract) rules, duties, 
consequences and virtues might all have a place in our deliberations but ultimately we 
67 See Charles Taylor, 'The Diversity of Goods', in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical 
Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 230-4 7. 
68 Chapter One, 13. 
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might still wish to find a solution that is elegant, beautiful or fitting. We might also wish 
that we were formed in such a way that an appropriate response was an instinctive 
judgement of taste. 
4.2 Criticisms of Gada mer's hermeneutics 
Gadamer stands as a key figure in the area of hermeneutics and his work is arguably the 
most important contribution to the field in the late twentieth century. His work has been 
developed and amended in a number of different directions. Inevitably it has also been 
criticised. If we are to appropriate Gadamer's hermeneutics in our approach to ethics 
then we will render ethics susceptible to the same criticisms that have been directed at 
Gadamer. It will be important to see whether any of these criticisms are fatal for 
Gadamer's theories (or for ethics as a hermeneutical endeavour) or whether they can be 
answered by adaptations and modifications. We will consider criticisms relating to the 
ambiguity of Gadamer's hermeneutics (section 4.2.1 ), the possibility of a critique of a 
tradition from within (section 4.2.2), and the recognition of prejudices (section 4.2.3). 
4.2.1 Anthony Thiselton and ambiguity 
Anthony Thiselton suggests that Gadamer is located precisely on the boundary between 
modem and post-modern thought. Prescribing a criterion in advance for a 'right 
judgement' constitutes a return to objectivity (and modernity) whilst removing all the 
'rules from the game' is no more than (post-modem) relativism.69 I suspect that 
Gadamer is really neither modem nor post-modem (nor even on the boundary) since 
both positions accept and maintain the same criteria for the establishment of objective 
truth (science and reason), modernism claiming that the criteria are adequate and 
objective truth a possibility, postmodemism denying the claims with the consequence 
that all truth must be relative. The notion of relativity is parasitic upon the notion of 
objectivity. Post-modernism is effectively a denial of the possibility of Cartesian truth: 
Gadamer does not adopt this model of truth in the first place; rather, he questions the 
criteria on which the debate about truth is based and argues that the debate is misguided. 
Gadamer, then, is neither modem nor post-modem but perhaps 'extra-modern'. He 
69 Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics (London: Harper Collins, 1992), 328. 
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attempts to move beyond both objectivism and relativism by asserting the value of truth 
claims that are independent of method. However, both Gadamer and post-modernism 
represent scepticism about the legacy of Enlightenment thought. 70 It is therefore not 
surprising that Gadamer is recruited by post-modernist authors although this is not an 
accurate characterisation of his position. The two forms of scepticism have much in 
common but originate from different directions. Both are sceptical of Cartesian dualism 
and the autonomous thinking subject. Both are sceptical of science as the dominant 
discourse. The anti-foundationalist tendencies of both Gadamer and post-modernism 
result in a deep mistrust of 'objective truth' and its replacement with contextual and 
intersubjective truth: for postmodernism this implies an inevitable relativism, but not for 
Gadamer. 
Thiselton suggests that there is a 'deep ambiguity' in Gadamer which 
allows the interpreter of his system to stress either of two aspects. He or she may 
stress, on one side, the universality of language and of effective-histories which 
transmit community-judgements of practical wisdom as tradition. Alternatively, 
the emphasis may be seen to lie on the variable and unpredictable nature of the 
historically finite actualisations of texts and traditions in context-relative events. 
If interpreters emphasise only variable finite effects, this suggests some support 
for a socio-pragmatic hermeneutic. If, however, they emphasise that these 
effects presuppose universals of language and continuities of tradition, this 
suggests that Gadamer is laying the foundations of a metacritical hermeneutic. I 
criticise those pragmatists who attend to only one side of Gadamer's system, but 
I recognise the difficulty of reconciling the two sides, and acknowledge the 
ambiguity of Gadamer's own work. 71 
It seems to me that to describe these features of Gadamer's work as an 'ambiguity' 
rather misses one of Gadamer's most important points: the embedded nature of 
'context-relative' events. For Gadamer there is an inevitable connection and tension 
between discrete 'events' and the broader 'tradition'. The mistake would be to think we 
could isolate either pole of this relationship. Context-relative events can never be 
independent of their situation in history, tradition, culture and language. To describe this 
as an ambiguity is to preserve the false dichotomy between norm and context. 'Context-
relative' should perhaps be rendered as 'context-dependent' to avoid introducing 
notions of relativity. Context-relative events may be 'variable and unpredictable' but 
they are not simply free-floating with no connection whatsoever to tradition. This 
relationship qetwe~n ey~nJs anq trqditiQn is crucial for Gadamec problems ru:ise when 
70 Lawn, Gadamer, 122. 
71 Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 25. 
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one aspect is emphasised at the expense of the other. The difficulty does not so much lie 
with Gadamer as with the interpreters who 'stress either of two aspects' and 'emphasise 
only' one half of the story. The fact that Gadamer's hermeneutics can be interpreted in 
two ways is hardly Gadamer' fault when he IS at pains to stress this necessary 
relationship. Thiselton acknowledges as much m his criticism of pragmatists; and 
Georgia Warnke, for example, argues that Rorty is too one-sided in his approach to 
Gadamer and that he ignores Gadamer's emphasis on dialogue. 72 Context-relative events 
are still part of a tradition: pragmatists need to remember this. All traditions encompass 
context-relative events and interpretation always already involves application: 
metacritical theorists cannot completely ignore practical situations. It may be 'difficult' 
to reconcile the two sides of Gadamer's hermeneutics (perhaps especially so if one is 
caught up in Enlightenment rationalism), however it may be worth the effort if we can 
develop a metacritical hermeneutic which properly incorporates socio-pragmatic 
elements. This discussion is very similar to that of Fletcher in Situation Ethics. As we 
have seen, for Fletcher the approach of the situationist is preferable to that of the legalist 
or the antinomian. The relationship between tradition and situation is to be preserved. 
Emphasising only one aspect would be a mistake. Interpreters of Gadamer and 
interpreters of Fletcher have both made this mistake and then sought to blame the 
original author for ambiguity or inconsistency. In both cases a careful reading shows 
that the authors went to great lengths to advocate the difficult path of retaining both 
aspects in tension. 
In part, then, the strength of Gadamer's hermeneutics comes from the very fact that he 
holds these two aspects in dialectic tension; the universality of language does not efface 
the specificity of particular situations but it does offer the hope of mediating between 
tradition and situation. So the ambiguity noted by Thiselton may be a strength rather 
than a weakness and his criticisms should more properly be directed at those interpreters 
of Gadamer who fail to keep the two aspects of his hermeneutics in dialectic tension. 
72 Georgia Warnke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1987), 159-61. 
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4.2.2 Jiirgen Habermas and ideology critique 
Jtirgen Habermas suggested that the gravest error in Gadamer's system was the 
assumption that consensus (or tradition) can develop without the malign influence of 
distorting forces (ideology). He suggested that in this Gadamer was na'ive, and pointed 
out that institutional authority can legitimate violence; that rhetoric can obfuscate as 
well as enlighten;73 and that in the light of Marx we need a self-critical 'depth-
hermeneutic'. The Marxist literary theorist Terry Eagleton mounts a similar criticism, 
effectively arguing that Gadamer's hermeneutics serve only to support the status quo 
and so are politically deeply conservative. 74 
Habermas is committed to the values of truth, critique and rational consensus, and his 
aim is to reformulate the project of modernity, moving it away from its heavy reliance 
on the knowing subject and to locate normative control in an 'ideal speech-situation', a 
sphere of public debate. In so doing he hopes to rescue the Enlightenment project from 
the criticisms of post-modernism. 75 Habermas is broadly positive about much of 
Gadamer's hermeneutics in Truth and Method76 but is critical of hermeneutics' claim to 
universality. 77 He engages positively with Gadamer's emphases on language, tradition 
and translation: 
Tradition [ Oberlieferung], as the medium in which languages propagate 
themselves, takes place as translation, namely as the bridging of distances 
b . 78 etween generattons. 
He agrees with Gadamer's critique of scientific method and the impossibility of a truly 
detached and objective standpoint. Habermas sees the primary task of hermeneutics as 
the prevention of miscommunication, of misunderstanding. He approves of Gadamer's 
cnttque of 'the objectivistic self-understanding of the cultural sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaften)' 79 and agrees that it is never possible to completely describe an 
action or, as he puts it, to locate it in all its stories: 
73 Jtirgen Habermas, 'On Hermeneutics' Claim to Universality' [1970], in Kurt Mueller-Vollmer (ed.), 
The Hermeneutics Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 294-319, at 297. 
74 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 73. 
75 See Nicholas Adams, Habermas and Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 23-
48. 
76 Jtirgen Habermas, 'A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method', in F. R. Dallmayr (ed.), Understanding 
- ·anaSociatlnquirJT(Notre·oame, IN:University-ofNotreDame Press,-nn-7):--335:63~ -· - - --· 
77 Habermas, 'Universality'. 
78 Habermas, 'Review', 339. 
79 Habermas, 'Review', 344. 
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The ideal of complete description cannot be consistently formulated; it ascribes 
to history a claim to contemplation that it not only cannot redeem but that is 
illegitimate as a claim. 80 
In other (more Gadamerian) words, there is no objective standpoint outside history. 
Habermas also agrees with Gadamer's emphasis on the involvement of application in 
understanding: 
I find Gadamer's real achievement in the demonstration that hermeneutic 
understanding is linked with transcendental necessity to the articulation of an 
action-orienting self-understanding. 
He also accepts the role of prejudices in understanding, especially in relation to practical 
philosophy and ethics. Even in his criticism of Gadamer, Habermas still seeks to specify 
in what sense and to what extent the fundamental theses of hermeneutics can be 
defended. 81 
Habermas argues that Gadamer goes too far in opposing hermeneutic experience to 
methodic knowledge. The critique of the absolutism of method derived from the natural 
sciences does not, for Habermas, imply an exemption from all considerations of 
method. He suggests that tradition may be profoundly altered by scientific reflection; 
though I suspect that Gadamer would not disagree. More tellingly, he criticises 
Gadamer for failing 'to appreciate the power of reflection that is developed in 
understanding'. 82 Habermas argues that when tradition is passed on through learning 
there is always the danger that the educator's illegitimate prejudices will be passed on to 
the learner because of the educator's perceived authority. What is needed is reflection: 
knowledge is raised to reflection when it makes the normative framework itself 
transparent while moving around in it.83 
He suggests that Gadamer's rehabilitation of prejudice is in danger of denying the 
power of reflection, rendering a tradition unable to critique itself and to recognise the 
'repressive character of social power relations': 84 Gadamer's reliance on tradition leaves 
him unable to criticise tradition, and he is naively optimistic about the capacity of 
language, tradition and temporal distance to filter out false prejudices. Habermas feels 
that Gadamer is uncritically dependent on tradition. Gadamer sees understanding as 
80 Habennas, 'Review', 350. 
81 Habermas, 'Universality', 302. 
82 Habennas, 'Review', 357. 
83 Habennas, 'Review', 357. 
84 Habennas, 'Review', 361. 
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placing oneself in a process of tradition85 but Habermas argues that this does not allow 
for proper reflective engagement with tradition: 
Gadamer sees living traditions and hermeneutic research fused in a single point. 
Against this stands the insight that reflective appropriation of tradition breaks 
the quasi-natural substance of tradition and alters the positions of subjects within 
it. 86 
Nicholas Adams suggests that both Gadamer and Habermas acknowledge the authority 
of tradition and also acknowledge that reflection on that tradition creates a distance 
between the tradition and the individuals who participate in it. He argues that Gadamer 
tries to close this gap by urging faithfulness to the tradition whilst Habermas tries 'to 
construct a procedural ethics in the gap that opens up' .87 Adams is critical of Gadamer 
at this point but he misrepresents him: Gadamer is no advocate of blind faith in 
tradition. Rather, Gadamer seeks to close the gap, to fuse the horizons by means of 
imaginative engagement. Recognising tradition as 'tradition' and placing it within a 
narrative context, and recognising tradition as something that requires interpretation 
(and is susceptible of critique), are hermeneutical insights. The possibility of self-
criticism that Adams advocates arises from within the tradition not from any gap 
between tradition and reflective individuals. 
This question about the influence of distorting ideologies can of course be addressed to 
Enlightenment rationalism as much as to any other tradition. Arguably it is only 
openness to other traditions and the voice of outsiders that has enabled Habermas to see 
the distorting effects of ideology and power in Western European society, standing as it 
does within the Enlightenment tradition. It required the voices of Marx, Freud and 
Nietzsche fully to uncover the distorting influences of money, sex and power within our 
own tradition and, indeed, in the Western church. 88 Habermas' critique could only carry 
real force if there were an objective viewpoint from which to judge traditions, from 
where the distortions were completely visible. As it is, however, Habermas' own 
tradition stands in need of the same depth-hermeneutic: there are no privileged 
traditions. 
85 TM, 290. 
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Habermas suggests that hermeneutics' claim to universality is invalid; that there are 
limits to hermeneutics' field of application. However, he focuses on the limit 
encountered in cases of systematically distorted communication in psychoanalysis, and 
in the critique of ideologies. In such cases, he suggests, unintelligible speech cannot be 
overcome by hermeneutic analysis. When confronting unintelligibility arising from 
historical or cultural distance we can in principle identify what extra information might 
be required to make understanding possible; we can know 'what we do not yet know'; 
this is not the case with cases of distorted communication. Such distortion can occur in 
everyday speech when the parties fail to recognise the distortion. Habermas argues that 
tradition can be the locus of falsehood and coercion as well as truth and accord. 
Following a lengthy discussion of Freud, Habermas suggests that what is required is a 
depth-hermeneutic which can eliminate obscurities arising with language itself rather 
than from within language where hermeneutical understanding is located. Gadamer 
would no doubt reply that there is no objective vantage point outside language from 
which such a depth-hermeneutic could survey language. For Habermas: 
A critically self-aware hermeneutics ... one which differentiates between insight 
and delusion, assimilates the metahermeneutical knowledge concerning the 
conditions which make systematically distorted communication possible. It links 
understanding to the principle of rational discourse. 89 
For Gadamer, such knowledge would have to be attained within hermeneutics and not 
beyond it. Matthew Foster suggests that this leads to two arguments: (1) every authentic 
critique of ideology demonstrates the hermeneutic character of language and (2) any 
critique which does not recognise its own hermeneutic character (e.g. Habermas') is 
ultimately only promoting a new ideology.90 
Habermas' criticism of hermeneutics is significant but I am not sure that it is fully 
justified. I suspect that Habermas' optimism about our ability to 'know what we do not 
yet know' is unfounded; even in cases of temporal and cultural distance there may be 
fundamental differences of which, from our own historical and cultural viewpoint, we 
cannot hope to be aware. Distorted communication is not a special case. Habermas 
observes that only a newcomer to a situation of distorted communication can recognise 
the miscommunication.91 This is precisely Gadamer's point when he stresses the 
89 Habermas, 'Universality', 314, emphasis mine. 
90 Matthew R. Foster, Gadamer and Practical Philosophy: The Hermeneutics of Moral Confidence 
(Atlanta, GA: Scholars, 1991 ), 154. 
91 Habermas, 'Universality', 302. 
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importance of openness to others, and of dialogue. For Gadamer aesthetic consciousness 
consists in a 'trained receptivity to 'otherness" and 'keeping oneself open ... to other 
more universal points of view' .92 He requires the same of hermeneutics, as Warnke has 
noted.93 It may be that within a tradition or group hermeneutics has no way to recognise 
the distorting influences of ideology, but openness between traditions allows for the 
miscommunication to be recognised. 
For understanding to be achieved Gadamer suggests that two things are required. First, 
an awareness of our prejudices; second a willingness to correct and revise prejudices in 
the light of experience. In a theological context, Stephen Fowl and Gregory Jones 
observe that 
failures of interpretation and corrupt character are mutually reinforcing. In such 
situations, communities lose the ability to read scripture over-against themselves 
in ways that challenge current ways ofthinking and acting.94 
This implies that while communities may have this ability it can be suppressed by 
ideology and corruption. They cite the Dutch Reformed Church's attitude to apartheid 
in South Africa as an example. However, they go on to say that 
such a community needs to hear the voice of a prophet ... cultivating the skills 
oftalking to outsiders can help to avoid this situation.95 
It is this sort of encounter between cultures that can open a community to interpretive 
innovation. This seems to be entirely in line with Gadamer's insistence on openness to 
others and I am not convinced that Gadamer was as na'ive about ideology as Habermas 
suggests, or that Gadamer's system is unable to allow for a critique of tradition. 
Communities are able to read texts over-against themselves especially when they can 
hear the voice of an outsider or a prophet. Indeed it is the connection between tradition 
and situation which we identified in our consideration of Thiselton's charge of 
ambiguity that allows Gadamer to mount a successful defence against the critique of 
Habermas. Blind allegiance to tradition would clearly be susceptible to the distorting 
influences of ideology but for Gadamer tradition that is open to dialogue is subject to 
critique and development arising from context-dependent events and situations. 
Constant vigilance and openness to others are the conditions of a critique of tradition 
from within hermeneutics. Habermas' criticism of Gadamer has some force and serves 
92 ~TM,~n:- - . 
93 Warnke, Gadamer. 
94 Fowl and Jones, Reading in Communion, 103. 
95 Fowl and Jones, Reading in Communion, I 04. 
146 
as a warning against complacency but I suspect that Gadamer simply failed to 
emphasise the self-critical aspects of his system rather than that they are absent. 
4.2.3 Anthony Thiselton, Richard Bernstein and critical judgement 
In the light of Habermas' critique there are questions which need to be addressed about 
the issue of 'control' or regulation of interpretations. Thiselton observes that Gadamer 
does not actually explain how we are to take our pre-judgements and apply them to 
particular cases, or how we are actually to recognise false prejudices. For Thiselton, this 
leaves the question 'what is the basis for our critical judgements?' .96 How, that is, are 
we to recognise true prejudgements? Richard Bernstein asks a similar question of 
Gadamer: 'what is and what ought to be the basis for the critical evaluation of the 
problems of modernity?'. He argues that Gadamer's own arguments require rational 
justification.97 It seems to me that Thiselton is looking for a 'method' by which we can 
apply our prejudices to cases, and discriminate between true and false prejudices. This 
is precisely what Gadamer is least likely to offer. Gadamer would no doubt argue that 
the application of prejudices requires the exercise of phronesis rather than the 
application of a method. For Gadamer the basis for critical judgements lies in the 
normativity of the sensus communis; the necessary discrimination has more in common 
with aesthetic judgement. Bernstein is seeking justification in terms of Enlightenment 
reason but the rational justification for Gadamer's arguments involves an appeal to a 
different conception of rationality than that of universal reason; forms of reason and 
argument may still be valid but the ultimate justification does not rest exclusively upon 
the canons of rationality. Bernstein also asks: 'what material, social and political 
conditions need to be concretely realised in order to encourage the flourishing of 
phronesis in all citizens?'. Bernstein suggests that Gadamer's emphasis on practical 
philosophy and the role of phronesis is not complemented by any consideration of the 
social conditions necessary for their functioning in society.98 However, Gadamer does 
set out to illuminate the essential character of the Geisteswissenschaften.99 As well as 
96 Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 315. 
97 Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivis171 and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis 
(Philadelph-ia: University o"f Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 155. 
98 Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 158. 
99 Roger A. Badham, 'The Implications of Gadamer's Hermeneutics for Contemporary Christian Ethics' 
(Ph.D. thesis, Drew University, 1997), 159. 
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developing his own hermeneutical theory in Truth and Method, Gadamer argues, at 
length, against nineteenth-century hermeneutics concluding that the humanist tradition 
is to be preferred. There are elements of Truth and Method that directly concern what 
ought to happen in society. Although Gadamer does not address Bernstein's concern 
directly, the social conditions necessary for the flourishing of phronesis would include 
the centrality of Bildung and the sensus communis. As we have seen, Gadamer sees 
Bildung as 'the properly human way of developing one's natural talents and 
capacities', 100 and the sensus communis as the sense that founds community: 
what gives the human will its direction is not the abstract universality of reason 
but the concrete universality represented by the community of a group, a people, 
a nation, or the whole human race ... this communal sense for what is true and 
right . . . is not based on argumentation but enables one to discover what is 
evident. 101 
4.3 Developments of Gadamer's hermeneutics 
Thiselton suggests that Gadamer's work can be seen as a 'crossroads' for contemporary 
hermeneutics from which theories can develop in at least four directions. 102 First, 
Gadamer's work in its rejection of 'method' represents a turn from the critical to the 
metacritical and focuses on how we make ethical decisions rather than on what 
decisions we actually make. Hence Gadamer's work has inspired others to take up and 
modify this metacritical approach. This route is followed by, for example, Pannenberg, 
Habermas, Apel and Ricoeur. Much of this work has emphasised the role of practical 
wisdom rather than theoretical reason. It has also recognised the role of tradition and 
community, tradition being seen to represent the practical judgements of communities 
developed over time. Second, Gadamer's hermeneutics has inspired socially relevant 
critical theory. Habermas' critique of Gadamer is influential here. Habermas, and 
Ricoeur are perhaps the most significant authors to develop Gadamer's hermeneutics in 
this critical direction. (We will consider the work of Ricoeur in more detail in section 
4.3.1.) Third, Gadamer's hermeneutics has inspired a pragmatic approach, looking at the 
effects of texts within given communities (effective history). This emphasises the 
variable nature of the application of texts to specific historical events, and the context-
relative nature of understanding. This socio-pragmatic hermeneutics ~ev~l()p~d ~y,_ 
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for example, Rorty. Lawn notes that Rorty explicitly turns to Gadamer's hermeneutics 
(in particular to the notions of dialogue and conversation) in his critique of orthodox 
views of language and truth. 103 Fourth, some have responded to Gadamer's 
hermeneutics by turning back to more traditional approaches, focussing more on the 
critical than the metacritical. 
4.3.1 Paul Ricoeur: retrieval and suspicion 
Perhaps the most direct and significant development of Gadamer's philosophical 
hermeneutics is the work of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. In his work we begin 
to see more developed answers to some of the criticisms outlined above. Both Gadamer 
and Ricoeur characterise understanding as a historically and culturally situated dialectic 
of question and answer in which prejudices play a crucial role. Ricoeur emphasises the 
concept of narrative as the means by which we understand and locate ourselves and our 
actions. Both see application as an integral part of understanding. 104 He describes a 
three stage approach to hermeneutics: describing, narrating, and prescribing. 105 Ricoeur 
insists on a properly critical (and self-critical) approach as an integral part of 
hermeneutics. With Gadamer, he emphasises the role of tradition but he shares 
Habermas' suspicion that an overemphasis on belonging to a tradition can make a 
critique of that tradition virtually impossible. Ricoeur accepts and incorporates 
Habermas' critique into his own hermeneutics. Ricoeur's 'critical hermeneutics' is often 
characterised as 'retrieval and suspicion' 106 and represents an attempt to incorporate 
critical concerns into interpretation theory. The retrieval of textual perspectives is an act 
of interpretation and must be subject to critical checks. Any single text can give rise to a 
number of different interpretations because of the subjective influence of prejudices. 
Ricoeur emphasises the need for suspicion and self-criticism: 
Hermeneutics seems to me to be animated by this double motivation: 
willingness to suspect, willingness to listen; vow of rigour, vow of obedience. 107 
103 Lawn, Gadamer, 126. 
104 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and 
Interpretation, trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981 ), 62. 
105 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 20 .. 
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Ricoeur insists on retaining 'explanation' (Gadamer's 'method') alongside 
'understanding'. He argues that explanation alone is reductive whilst understanding 
alone is vulnerable to self-deception and that what is needed is a dialectical relationship 
between the two. He welcomes methodological proposals as potentially helpful 
suggestions in the process of coming to an understanding though they must always be 
subject to validation or correction. Ricoeur explains the relationship between 
explanation and understanding: 
On the epistemological level, I say that there are not two methods, the 
explanatory method and the method of understanding. Strictly speaking only 
explanation is methodic. Understanding is rather the nonmethodic moment 
which, in the sciences of interpretation, comes together with the methodic 
moment of explanation. Understanding precedes, accompanies, closes and thus 
envelops exrlanation. In return, explanation develops understanding 
analytically. 10 
This emphasis on method is often characterised as a significant difference between 
Ricoeur and Gadan1er but I am not sure that this is really the case. Whilst Gadamer is 
highly critical of scientific method in the human sciences and certainly argues that 
method alone is insufficient to guarantee truth, he does stress the importance of 
openness to others and of conversation. I think Ricoeur's acceptance of all interpretative 
strategies actually represents a development of Gadamer's commitment to openness. 
Gadamer has more recently conceded that there are hermeneutical dimensions even in 
the natural sciences: 
Doubtless the image of the natural sciences that I had in mind when I conceived 
my hermeneutical ideas for Truth and Method was quite one-sided. It is now 
clear to me in this respect that a whole broad field of hermeneutical problems 
has been left out. 109 
Perhaps Gadamer could now even find a role for scientific method within a broader 
conception of hermeneutics; though never as the sole (or even a sufficient) guarantor of 
truth. 
For Gadamer and Ricoeur, the existence of multiple ethical theories and methods does 
not imply ethical relativism. If scientific method were the only guarantor of truth and 
scientific method could be shown not to apply in ethics, then all ethics would be 
108 Paul Ricoeur,-'Explanation and Understanding', in-Charles E. Reagan and- David Stewart (eds.), The 
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work, trans. Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart 
(Boston: Beacon, 1978), 149-66, at 165, emphasis original. 
109 Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'Reflections on My Philosophical Journey', in Lewis E. Hahn (ed.), The 
Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer (Chicago: Open Court, 1997), 3-63, at 40. 
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relative. For Gadamer and Ricoeur, ethical pluralism is inevitable and, if competing 
ideas are open to dialogue with others, positive. Like Gadamer, Ricoeur emphasises the 
creative possibilities of distanciation. He denies the possibility of a totally objective 
standpoint as sought by science and rejects an uncritical acceptance oftradition: 
a certain dialectic between the experience of belonging and alienating 
distanciation becomes the mainspring, the key to the inner life, of 
hermeneutics. 110 
Listening in openness to symbol and narrative allows creative events of meaning to 
occur. Despite their differences Gadamer and Ricoeur are agreed in privileging the 
'horizon' of the text rather than the author and in viewing the text as a 'well' of possible 
meanings. For Ricoeur, the autonomy of the text is a condition for this 'surplus of 
meaning'. They agree that as texts shape interpretations, so also interpretations shape 
texts. Meaning is the result of a two-way encounter between text and reader. Ricoeur 
develops this particularly in relation to metaphor. For Ricoeur, the act of understanding 
is directed towards future creative possibilities. As Kevin Vanhoozer puts it, we do not 
meet a mind behind the text; rather we encounter a possible way of looking at things, a 
possible world in front of the text. 111 Understanding a text is not about understanding 
the 'sense' of the text in terms of its original context; rather it is about grasping the 
possible worldviews opened up by its 'reference': 
To understand a text is to follow its movement from sense to reference: from 
what it says to what it talks about. 112 
Thus understanding is always about application in new communicative contexts. 
Ricoeur's moral philosophy is to be found throughout his work on critical hermeneutics 
but finds its clearest expression in Oneself as Another. Here he defines the ethical goal 
as 'aiming at the "good life" with and for others, in just institutions' .113 Thus, for 
Ricoeur, moral reflection is ultimately teleological. The good life is composed of 
various discrete goods which we discover through our inherited social practices. 
Practices, in Ricoeur's conception, are multi-layered or 'thick', consisting of many 
different dimensions: most importantly the integrating narratives that contextualise all 
110 Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 90.; see also the conclusion in Paul Ricoeur, 
Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian 
University Press, 1976). 
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the other dimensions. In this emphasis on 'institutions' and practices Ricoeur 
demonstrates that he shares the social concerns of Bernstein and Gadamer. 
Like Gadamer, Ricoeur emphasises the importance of phronesis: he describes it in terms 
of three 'moments', corresponding to his three stage hetmeneutics: description, 
narration and prescription. 114 Description involves the recognition of goods, and also the 
framing of situations, within the full thickness of our inherited social practices. It is the 
dominant narratives surrounding our goods and practices that allow us to make sense of 
our experience. Narrative also allows us imaginatively to explore possible responses to 
moral situations; to rehearse the meaning and consequences of various possible choices. 
Ricoeur divides the third moment of phronesis, prescription, into two stages: the 
'deontological test' 115 and the 'test of practical wisdom' .116 Here, as Martha Nussbaum 
observes, Ricoeur attempts to 'forge a complex relationship between deontology and 
teleology at the level of Aristotelian phronesis' 117 ; to combine Hegel's Sittlichkeit with 
Kant's Moralitd/. 118 He mediates between an Aristotelian theory of the good and a 
Kantian theory of the right: the good and the right stand in dialectic tension with one 
another. 
Ricoeur distinguishes between 'ethics' and morality': 
I reserve the term 'ethics' for the aim of an accomplished life and the term 
'morality' for the articulation ofthis aim in norms. 119 
The main aim of Ricoeur' s moral philosophy in Oneself as Another is: 
to establish: ( 1) the primacy of ethics over morality, (2) the necessity for the 
ethical aim to pass through the sieve of the norm, and (3) the legitimacy of 
recourse by the norm to the aim whenever the norm leads to impasse m 
• 120 practice. 
Norms are important but provisional conventions; the deontology of morality is 
ultimately subject to the teleology of ethics. In tragic situations, arising from the conflict 
of norms, phronesis 'has no recourse other than to return to the initial intuition of 
114 Ricoeur, Onese(f as Another, 140-68. 
115 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 203-39. 
116 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 240-96. 
117 Martha C. Nussbaum, 'Ricoeur on Tragedy: Teleology, Deontology, and Phronesis', in John Wall, 
William Schweiker and W. David Hall (eds.), Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought (New 
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ethics.' 121 (This, of course, is comparable to the approach of Fletcher's situationist.) 
Such conflicts are central to the development of practical wisdom. 
John Wall considers the greatest strength ofRicoeur's concept ofthe good to be 
that it views the good dynamically, interpretively, dialectically. The good is not 
just given to the self by external forces (like history, power, tradition, social 
relations, biology, and so forth). It is also, by definition, actively and voluntarily 
interpreted by the self into its own sense of narrative identity. 122 
The self must create a coherent structure out of all the teleological ends by which it is 
constituted in multiple contexts. This narrative identity or structure 
like a text, can be read and critiqued by others in the public domain. 123 
Ricoeur's third thesis above, the legitimacy of recourse by the norm to the aim 
whenever the norm leads to impasse in practice, is really a recognition of the possibility 
of tragic conflicts between norms and a suggestion as to how we might proceed in the 
face ofthem: 
in the conflicts to which morality gives rise, only a recourse to the ethical 
ground against which morality stands out can give rise to the wisdom of 
judgement in situation. From tragic phronein to practical phronesis: this will be 
the maxim that can shelter moral conviction from the ruinous alternatives of 
univocity or arbitrariness. 124 
Tragic conflicts reveal the shortcomings or 'one-sidedness' of the competing principles. 
Nussbaum suggests that for Ricoeur: 
To this one-sidedness, the solution is a phronesis that is contextual, situational, 
sensitive to the conflicting demands of reality, willing to choose in the full 
knowledge ofreality's conflictual character. 125 
Nussbaum argues that Ricoeur's approach to tragedy goes well beyond the two 
dominant approaches to tragic predicaments characteristic of modernity - the Kantian 
and utilitarian responses. Kant simply denies that such conflicts ever genuinely arise; 
one or other of the apparently conflicting duties will turn out not to be genuine. The 
utilitarian approach never even recognises the tragic conflict; it simply perseveres in the 
calculation of consequences. Given the failings that we have already identified in moral 
121 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 240. 
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absolutism and utilitarianism, together with the alternative approaches adopted by 
Gadamer and developed by Ricoeur, we would surely expect a more flexible and more 
adequate response. 
Song is critical of some features of Ricoeur's approach, in Oneself as Another, to the 
ethical question of the status of the human embryo. 126 However, I think Song is 
insufficiently alert to the methodological dimensions of the debate. He commends 
Ricoeur for refusing to 'cast the question in terms of the Kantian divide of person and 
thing' 127 and agrees that 'wisdom in such matters is a matter of communal phronesis' .128 
Ricoeur is consciously open to all sides in the debate: 
It is necessary to listen to the spokespersons of opposing theses in order best to 
determine the point of insertion of practical wisdom. 129 
He goes on to reject the ali-or-nothing outlook that characterises the embryo as either a 
person or a thing; instead he proposes that a narrative account of personal identity 
should ground a different understanding of the embryo which could allow 'qualitatively 
different rights to be assigned at different stages of development' .130 Song does not 
disagree with this. However, he criticises Ricoeur for insufficient attention to the role of 
the dominant technological culture and concludes that his arguments are not finally 
decisive. Ricoeur, though, is clear that 
moral judgement in situation is all the less arbitrary as the decision maker ... has 
taken the counsel of men and women reputed to be the most competent and the 
wisest. 131 
Also, he is not attempting to be 'finally decisive'; rather, he is trying to characterise the 
nature of the situation and apply the Aristotelian 'just mean'. Practical wisdom takes the 
form of 'critical solicitude': a concern for other persons, even 'potential persons', that 
has wrestled with the principles at stake in the situation and has listened to the views of 
others. 132 In short, Ricoeur's horizon is properly hermeneutical and could not be 'finally 
decisive'. It does however represent a valuable contribution to the debate. 
126 Robert Song, 'Whose Sanctity of Life? Ricoeur, Dworkin and the Human Embryo', in Stephen Barton 
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Another important area of Ricoeur's research is that of linguistics and he could well be 
said to be continuing Gadamer's (and Heidegger's) turn to language. In particular, 
Ricoeur has explored the metaphorical nature of language which, as we have seen, is an 
important Gadamerian theme. In Creativity in Language Ricoeur argues that metaphor 
is not merely an ornament of language or a stylistic decoration, but a semantic 
innovation, an emergence ofmeaning. 133 
He argues that words only really have meanings within sentences used in particular 
contexts; on their own or in a dictionary they have only potential meanings. It is the use 
of words within sentences that is the focus of creativity in language. A problem arises 
because of a phenomenon of natural languages: polysemy. By polysemy, Ricoeur means 
the ability of words to mean more than one thing. This gives rise to the potential for 
misunderstanding and confusion. He outlines three possible strategies for meeting this 
challenge of misunderstanding: ordinary language, scientific language, and poetic 
language. 134 
For ordinary language the main aim is to convey information from speaker to hearer 
about the concrete situations of everyday life; its main tactic is to reduce the effects of 
polysemy. Ordinary language relies heavily on the effects of context to limit the 
semantic fields of words that we use. The structure of the sentence and the context 
together reduce the number of possible meanings of words. In this way, ordinary 
language is able to make relatively univocal statements even while utilising polysemic 
words although the possibility of misunderstanding is never completely eradicated. 
Ordinary language also has creative potential, not just misunderstandings but new 
understandings can emerge. The variability of meaning of words and language's 
sensibility to the context confer the powers of creation and invention. 
Scientific language aims at eradicating polysemy, rather than reducing it, in an attempt 
to eliminate all ambiguity. Scientific language uses precise definitions of words and 
adopts technical terms which denote 'only quantitative entities to the exclusion of the 
qualitative aspect of our experience'. 135 This process of abstraction leads ultimately to 
the replacement of words by mathematical symbols. Science creates formal systems and 
133 Paul Ricoeur, 'Creativityin tanguage: ~Word, Polysemy, Metaphor', in Reagan andStewart (edi), The 
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 120-33, at 120. 
134 Ricoeur, 'Creativity in Language', 127. 
135 Ricoeur, 'Creativity in Language', 128. 
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rules for interpreting them. Ricoeur argues that the aim of scientific language is not 
strictly communication; rather it is 'to insure the identity of meaning from the beginning 
to the end of an argument'. 136 These features of scientific language may represent part 
of the reason that Gadamer considers scientific method inappropriate in the human 
sciences. Utilitarianism, for example, represents an attempt to describe ethics in purely 
quantitative terms to the exclusion of qualitative aspects of our experience. 
Poetic language, and especially metaphor, actually strives to preserve polysemy and to 
make use of it. Polysemy is deliberately preserved and several possible interpretations 
are held in creative tension. Metaphor 
is the general process by which we grasp kinship, break the distance between 
remote ideas, build similarities on dissimilarities . . . metaphor has the 
extraordinary power ofredescribing reality. 137 
Ricoeur concludes 
that the strategy of discourse implied in metaphorical language is neither to 
improve communication nor to insure univocity in argumentation, but to shatter 
and to increase our sense of reality by shattering and increasing our language. 
The strategy of metaphor is heuristic fiction for the sake of redescribing reality. 
With metaphor we experience the metamorphosis of both language and 
I. 138 rea 1ty. 
Ricoeur suggests that the power of imagination to allow new worlds to build our self-
understanding is conveyed by emerging meanings in our language. For Ricoeur, 
imagination is a dimension of language and there is an inescapable link between 
imagination and metaphor. 139 In the next chapter, the power of metaphor (section 5.2) 
and its connection to imagination (section 5.3) will be explored further as we consider 
the work of Mark Johnson. 
4.4 Conclusions 
Gadamer's hermeneutics appears to have the potential to address the concerns about 
recent ethical theory with which we began, especially when taken together with recent 
work in cognitive science and on the overlaps between ethics and aesthetics. In 
136 Ricoeur, 'Creativity in Language', 129. 
- -137- ~~----- ---~--~c----7~-~--M==""==--~= 
· - RiCoeur, 'Creativity in Language', 132. 
138 Ricoeur, 'Creativity in Language', 133. 
139 Paul Ricoeur, 'Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics', in Reagan and Stewart (eds.), The 
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 134-48, at 148. 
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particular Gadamer addresses the weaknesses of legalism and utilitarianism which we 
identified at the end of Chapter Two. It would seem that none of the criticisms of 
Gadamer's hermeneutics are fatal either for his undertaking or for our project of 
incorporating ethics within hermeneutics; though they may point to important 
modifications or developments. The ambiguity noted by Thiselton turns out to be a 
strength rather than a weakness. Habermas' critique carries some weight against 
hermeneutics and therefore against ethics as a hermeneutical endeavour: there is the 
same danger of ideological influence in ethical traditions, and there is the same need for 
self-criticism and criticism of one's tradition. However, Gadamer's hermeneutics can 
deflect the criticisms by retaining the link between tradition and situation and by 
emphasising the importance of openness and conversation: ethics will need to do the 
same. Also Ricoeur's work shows how a properly critical approach may be incorporated 
into hermeneutics (and ethics). We must be open to others and prepared to modify our 
pre-understandings: vow of rigour, vow of obedience. 
What might it mean for ethics to become part of a universal hermeneutical project? Like 
all understanding our ethical knowledge will be seen to depend upon and be conditioned 
by our historical and cultural situatedness. The abstraction of ethical deliberation from 
real-life situations will prove to be impossible as well as misguided and misleading. 
Ethics will be part of the essence of becoming a true 'person'. The virtuous life will be 
best understood as an artistic project. Ethical understanding will be part of an 'event of 
meaning' and will be interpersonal, contextual and not completely reducible to 
propositions. Truth and meaning will be located within the experience of the event 
itself. Our moral sense, or conscience, will have much in common with taste. Ethics will 
be based on experience and practical knowledge, and practical application will be an 
integral part of the process of moral understanding. It will no longer be possible to 
practice or understand 'ethics in itself only 'ethics as the assembled achievements of 
the human mind as it has realised itself historically in reflective human societies'. 
Whilst not offering specific content to the virtues a hermeneutical conception of ethics 
could provide concepts (aesthetics, taste) for evaluating them; and a mechanism for 
their control (the sensus communis). The goal of the good life would be located as much 
in the process, as in the outcome. Christian ethics based on Gadamer's hermeneutics 
~ ~ 
could have in common with other forms of ethics an appreciation of ethical 
understanding as partial and revisable, an emphasis on learning from others, especially 
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those outside one's own tradition, and a creative element. The distinctiveness of such a 
Christian ethics would be the place of inspiration and the work of the Holy Spirit within 
a Christian tradition and context. 
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Chapter Five 
Metaphor, Imagination and Conscience 
In Chapter Two we identified a number of failings in the ethical approaches of 
utilitarianism and legalism: especially their abstraction; their reductionism; their 
conceptions of reason, knowledge and truth; and their failure to allow for the 
significance of history and tradition. In Gadamer's hermeneutics we discovered a 
philosophical critique of these tendencies together with intimations of how we might 
better proceed by drawing ethics into the universal project of hermeneutics. In 
particular, Gadamer emphasised the need for a proper account of the historical, cultural 
and linguistic situatedness of ethics. The danger is that as human sciences become more 
scientific they become less human. The scientific method of utilitarianism strives to 
exclude all human contingency and so ethics has no room for morally relevant but 
agent-relative motivations, feelings, emotions, passions or virtue. The absolute truths of 
legalism are totally inflexible and unable to respond to morally significant features of 
differing situations. For Gadamer, language is the universal medium in which all 
understanding occurs and our ethical understanding, like all other understanding, must 
be seen on the model of a conversation. Gadamer noted the importance of metaphor and 
concept-formation, insights which have been developed further by Paul Ricoeur. Proper 
attention to our moral language may provide the beginnings of a coordinated response 
to the failings of legalism and utilitarianism within the context of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics. In this chapter I will briefly address the importance of moral notions and 
moral language (section 5.1). I will consider further the important role of metaphor in 
our language and understanding (section 5.2). In particular, I will make connections 
with the work of Mark Johnson in cognitive science: especially in relation to metaphor, 
concept-formation and imagination. Johnson is significant because his work on 
language and embodiment suggests a new and contextual conception of reason which 
may offer significant advantages over the abstract universal reason of the Enlightenment 
(section 5.3). I will explore the role of imagination in ethical deliberation, the 
imaginative character of conscience, and some parallels between taste and conscience 
(section 5.4). I will also suggest a model for the work. ofmgral theorists (section 5.5). 
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5.1 Moral notions and moral language 
As we have seen, Gadamer makes the claim that 'Being that can be understood is 
language'. 1 Language is the way we make sense of our experiences; of the world; of 
being itself. Language is the only way that we can understand being: anything that we 
understand about being comes to us through language. However, this does not mean that 
language must necessarily be able to provide access to all of being; there will always be 
truths that are beyond our ability to express, always more to understand. There is 
however no other access than through language. This is another example of Gadamer' s 
critical realism. Being is real but our understanding of it is both enabled and limited by 
our language. In his assertion that language goes all the way down, Gadamer is 
challenging the Cartesian view that thought gives rise to understanding that must then 
be expressed through language. It is not the Cartesian thinking subject that alone 
guarantees linguistic meaning: rather, meaning and understanding are products of 
human dialogical interaction. Understanding develops in linguistic communities. We 
must pay more attention to the ways that language enables and limits our moral 
understanding. Our moral notions and the way we use them in ethical deliberation will 
be particularly significant. 
Stanley Hauerwas considers the importance of moral notions m the context of a 
discussion of Fletcher's Situation Ethics. He argues that there was 'something 
essentially right about the main thrust of [Fletcher's] view' but that he was mistaken to 
characterise the debate solely in terms of a conflict between rules and situations (though 
this is arguably a caricature of Fletcher's intentions) when 'what he was really 
concerned with was the applicability of our moral notions to various kinds of 
situations. '2 He suggests that our moral notions are simply not rich enough or flexible 
enough to account for the richness and variety of our moral experience. He criticises 
Fletcher for focussing on decision as the central ethical concept and ignoring the prior 
issue of our moral notions. The way we frame a situation or decision depends on our 
historical, cultural and linguistic situatedness: our tradition and language are always 
already in play. Hauerwas criticises those ethical approaches that attempt to establish 
TM, 474. 
2 Stanley Hauerwas, 'Situation Ethics, Moral Notions, and Moral Theology', in Vision and Virtue: 
Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection (Notre Dame, IN: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1981), 11-
29, at I I. 
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objective moral judgements from the point of view of a spectator. He suggests that all 
our notions arise from historical contexts: even a supposedly concrete notion such as 
'table' arises from our social conventions and practical needs. We group empirically 
dissimilar objects (consider the great variety of tables) together on the basis of 
experience. The basic difference between moral and non-moral notions lies in the 
reason for grouping them together: moral notions are not simply means to identify and 
categorise but also to 'avoid or promote, to excuse, blame, praise, or to judge and 
command'.3 
We do not come to know the world bl perceiving it, but we come to know the 
world as we learn to use our language. 
Our moral notions are the way we group together some of the most significant and 
recurring features of our experience. Hauerwas criticises Fletcher for his narrow overly 
simple understanding of rules. He observes that 
rules are not dictated from on high, but rather are embodied in the very notions 
we use ... therefore just as in using descriptive terms we have to follow 
interpersonal rules in a public language to talk about aspects or relationships in 
the world, so in using moral terms we have to follow interpersonal rules in a 
public language to talk about some aspects or relationships of those beings who 
are regulated by interpersonal rules. 5 
Our notions only acquire meaning as we use them in real-life situations. The rules (or 
perhaps better, conventions) for the use of our moral notions have the additional 
characteristic that they are also rules for human behaviour. Our moral rules are 
embedded in our moral notions and our moral behaviour: they are understood and 
clarified as they are used. Or, in Gadamer's words, specific cases co-determine, correct 
and supplement the principles. 6 Moral notions can be transformed by developing social 
or historical contexts: 7 we are constantly in the process of testing our moral notions 
against experience and adapting them as necessary. The application of moral notions to 
new and difficult situations 
is often done by men who might be called moral virtuosos or geniuses ... more 
by intuitive insight than logical rigor. 8 
3 Hauerwas, 'Situation Ethics', 16. 
4 Hauerwas, 'Situation Ethics', 17. 
· 
5 Hauerwas, 'Situation Ethics', 18. 
6 TM, 39. 
7 Hauerwas, 'Situation Ethics', 25. 
8 Hauerwas, 'Situation Ethics', 26. 
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Hauerwas argues that there is still a role for the moral theologian in backing up such 
genius with 'good reasons' and so preventing it from being lost or perverted. He notes 
that a few of our moral notions are 'relatively complete' (his example is murder) whilst 
the majority are open and can be used in many different ways (it is this openness that, 
for Hauerwas, constitutes the rightness of Fletcher's position). Some complex situations 
can only be understood by using several moral notions together. Importantly, Hauerwas 
suggests that as a result of this openness our moral reasoning is not deductive but 
analogical: 9 
we do not find what we ought to do by having an abstract principle from which 
can be deduced the 'right act'. Rather ... by comparing cases, [we] try to find 
out what is common to the situations . . . In this sense, moral reason is more 
dependent on imagination than strict logical entailment. 10 
The metaphorical nature of language, the way our moral notions function, and the 
analogical nature of moral reasoning all imply a significant role in ethics for 
imagination. Hauerwas expounds (though not explicitly) a hermeneutical approach to 
ethics: 
the moral philosopher and the theologian cannot and do not start their thinking 
in an ethical vacuum. Rather they begin with the richness of human experience 
that is embodied in our everyday moral notions. 11 
This constitutes an ethical version of the hermeneutic circle and emphasises the 
linguisticality of our ethical understanding. Our received moral notions are inherited as 
'scattered and limited pieces of our experience': 12 the problem is that they are inherited 
together with a pretentious claim to the sort of coherent hierarchy that would make them 
sufficient to describe and control all of our moral deliberation. Problems arise when the 
radical specificity of our situations exposes the inadequacies of our ethical systems. 
Hauerwas and Gadamer would urge us to recognise this pretension for what it is and to 
recognise the partial and embedded nature of our moral understanding. 
9 Hauerwas, 'Situation-Ethics', 22. 
10 Hauerwas, 'Situation Ethics', 22, emphasis mine. 
11 Hauerwas, 'Situation Ethics', 24. 
12 Hauerwas, 'Situation Ethics', 27. 
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5.2 The nature and function of metaphor 
The nature of moral notions is further radicalised by Johnson who argues that all our 
moral language is metaphorical. Before turning to Johnson's work we need to sketch in 
some background considerations regarding the nature and function of metaphor. 13 Three 
principal types of theory of metaphor have been elaborated. 
First, the substitution theory of metaphor. This theory which sees metaphor as chief 
amongst the tropes was probably developed by students of rhetoric in the Aristotelian 
tradition. 14 According to this theory, metaphor is simply an ornamental way of saying 
something that could have been said in more literal language. In other words, the 
metaphor is dispensable (the similarity could be recognised without it) and a literal 
meaning can be substituted. Metaphor is a decorative feature of rhetoric designed to 
produce aesthetic speech but is ultimately unnecessary. 
In brief, a grace or ornament or added power of language, not its constitutive 
form. 15 
Second, the emotive theory of metaphor. This theory suggests that the impact of 
metaphor is purely affective. Like the substitution theory it tends to assume that 
metaphors are dispensable. Metaphor adds nothing to the cognitive content of the 
utterance; rather, it is suggested that the metaphor adds only emotional content (largely 
unspecified). If pushed to its limit, the emotive theory denies that metaphors have any 
cognitive content at all. This view of metaphor is often associated with logical 
positivism: the words in a metaphorical utterance may have meaning but the utterance 
itself cannot be meaningful as its applicability cannot be tested. The effect of the 
metaphor is related solely to its emotive import. 16 
Third, incremental theories of metaphor. The basic position of these theories is that the 
cognitive content expressed in a metaphor cannot be expressed adequately in any other 
way. The metaphor cannot be substituted because part of the cognitive import of the 
13 See Paul A vis, God and the Creative Imagination: Metaphor, Symbol and Myth in Religion and 
Theology (London: Routledge, 1999), 93-1 02; David E. Cooper, Metaphor (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1986); Janet Martin Soskice-, Metaphor anc{R(digfousLanguage (Oxford: Clarendon, f985). 
14 Soskice, Metaphor, 10. 
15 I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936), 90. 
16 Soskice, Metaphor, 26-31. 
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utterance is provided by the form of the metaphor. Where do these extra meanings come 
from? One possible answer is provided in the work of Richards who proposes an 
'interaction theory' ofmetaphor. 17 On this view, metaphor is not a matter of substitution 
but of the interaction between words in a sentence. Speaking of one thing (the tenor of 
the metaphor) in terms which are seen to be suggestive of another (the vehicle of the 
metaphor) results in a tension in the sentence. This tension arises because of an apparent 
error in predication which does not make literal sense and requires resolution by the 
hearer. 
The vehicle is not normally a mere embellishment of a tenor which is otherwise 
unchanged by it, but ... the vehicle and tenor in cooperation give a meaning of 
more varied powers than can be ascribed to either. 18 
Francis Bacon commented similarly on the ability of aphorisms to generate new ideas in 
contrast to the limiting influence of 'method': 
[Aphorisms] representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to enquire farther, 
whereas Methods, carrying the shew of a total, do secure men as if they were at 
furthest. 19 
Metaphors offer the same invitation, and the same superiority over method. 
In Interpretation Theory Ricoeur addresses the question of signification in works of 
literature.20 In scientific works, the (linguistic) significations are to be taken literally. 
However literature, especially poetry, contains more than simply a literal sense. He 
suggests that this 'surplus of meaning' is an integral part of their signification. Ricoeur 
argues that the tension produced by the interaction of tenor and vehicle is not strictly a 
tension between the parts of the utterance but between two possible, and opposed, 
interpretations of the utterance. In other words metaphors can only function in a context. 
They are a phenomenon not of semantics but of discourse. 21 A metaphor cannot exist 
without an interpreter who recognises the utterance as metaphorical when the literal 
meaning 'self-destructs' in contradiction.22 It is the interaction between these possible 
interpretations of the metaphor (as utterance) which gives rise to the creation of 
meaning typical of good metaphors. For example, McFague observes that 
17 Richards, Rhetoric, 93. 
18 Richards, Rhetoric, I 00. 
19 Quoted in Brian Vickers, Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1968), 92. 
-
20 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Th~~ry: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, TX: Texas 
Christian University Press, 1976). 
21 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, J-24. 
22 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 50. 
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metaphor always has the character of 'is' and 'is not' ... a metaphor does not 
assert identity between the (tenor and vehicle) ... but suggests we consider what 
we do not know how to talk about ... through the metaphor?3 
In other words, not all facets of a metaphor will be true. As Ricoeur puts it: 
redescription is guided by the interplay between differences and resemblances 
that gives rise to the tension at the level of the utterance. 24 
Thus, metaphors can offer us new insight and information; they re-describe reality.25 
Theories of metaphor locate the essence of metaphor at different levels of an utterance. 
In substitution theories, metaphor exists at the level of the individual word. Interactive 
theories locate metaphor within sentences and Ricoeur locates it within discourse. These 
explanations seem to come progressively closer to understanding how metaphor works. 
All three of these levels are required: metaphor is the result of using a particular word 
(or words) within an apparently incongruous sentence structure, as part of a discourse. 
Metaphorical meaning does not exist simply at the level of the word but neither does it 
exist at the level of the sentence. Metaphors only work in a particular context: 
utterances may be literal in one context and metaphorical in another. These observations 
place metaphor firmly in the domain of language known as parole (as opposed to 
langue), and within the scope of pragmatics (rather than semantics). Pragmatics seeks to 
specify the extra-linguistic common ground that speakers and hearers share and that 
enables them to understand each other.26 Semantically, metaphoric utterances are false, 
but hearers will attempt to re-assess the utterance in a way that is relevant, to find an 
interpretation of the metaphor which will make the utterance true, rather than assume 
that the utterance is nonsense. For metaphor to function as communication, the speaker 
and the hearer must share common perceptions of that to which the metaphor is 
alluding. Evans suggests that: 
In order for a sharing of mutual understanding between speaker and hearer to 
occur, there must be a common speech community, a common universe of 
discourse, and the recognition of a common meaning function. 27 
23 Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress, 
1987), 34. 
24 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 68. 
25 See also JUrgen Moltmann, Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms of Christian Theology, trans. 
Margaret K()hl (Londo I!: ~.CJy1., 2_00Q),_ Hi I-6(i. _ 
26 For a full discussion see S. Davis (ed.), Pragmatics: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991). 
27 R. A. Evans, Intelligible and Responsible Talk About God: A Theory of the Dimensional Structure of 
Language and Its Bearing Upon Theological Symbolism (Leiden: Brill, 1973), 217. 
165 
Metaphors are characteristically open to a variety of interpretations though the number 
of possible interpretations is not unlimited. Rather; they are restricted by the traditional 
and linguistic situatedness of the speech community: by the sensus communis. The 
value of metaphor can only be assessed within a community in terms of how well it fits 
into the language and world-view of the community, and in terms of the actions which 
may be prompted in the hearers. For Ricoeur, 'interpretation (of texts) is ... a critical 
reflective self-reconstruction of the interpreter in the act of reading' .28 Given that 
Ricoeur sees both texts and metaphor as discourse this definition will apply in some 
degree to the interpretation of metaphors too. So, the value of metaphor may lie in its 
ability to prompt such a reflective self-reconstruction within a community. 
Metaphors may prompt a whole series of related propositions. They can be extended to 
provide a system, or model, for considering a particular subject. Consideration of such 
models can allow the development of understanding and can prompt further metaphors 
and hypotheses. This use of models is basic to scientific enquiry where they give rise to 
new ways of thinking and speaking about the world. However, models are imperfect 
and may break down in the face of new discoveries. At this point models can sometimes 
be adapted to accommodate the new data. Alternatively, more than one model may be 
adopted together to provide a more complete description.29 Some models simply have 
to be discarded. Theology also depends on models to give form to its reflections. Here 
too models fail: such failure is usually related to the communal dimension of metaphor 
and often occurs when attempts are made to apply models to new situations or in new 
communities. So for example, the use by feminist theologians of the metaphor 'God is 
our Mother' instead of, or alongside, 'God is our Father' constitutes such a paradigm 
shift. 
McFague suggests that there may be no known fact or truth or feeling without 
metaphor: 'metaphor is as ultimate as speech itself.30 Recent studies in cognitive 
science also suggest that metaphor is absolutely fundamental to the way we think: in 
28 Werner G. Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics: Development and Significance (London: S.C.M., 
0 
I 991 )l 61. 
29 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to 
Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 70-71. 
30 Sallie McFague, Speaking in Parables: A Study in Metaphor and Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 
1975), 47. 
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Moral Imagination, Mark Johnson considers the implications for ethics of such 
studies. 31 
5.3 Moral Imagination: Mark Johnson and cognitive science 
Johnson considers the ways in which we, as humans, think and the mental schemes we 
use to organise our thoughts. 32 He mounts a sustained attack on the conception of 
morality as a system of universal laws dictated by reason. He also argues that we do not, 
in practice, make ethical decisions by bringing specific, concrete situations, under 
universal laws (his prime target, therefore, is Kantian ethics). Johnson argues instead 
that our ethical thought is thoroughly metaphorical and that imagination has an essential 
role in our ethical deliberations (and indeed many other kinds of deliberation). He 
argues that our traditional conceptions of morality and of moral deliberation (especially 
in their Kantian forms) are mistaken and that both moral absolutism and moral 
relativism are misguided because they assume false views of human reason and moral 
understanding. Johnson argues convincingly that 
any adequate account of meaning and rationality must give a central place to 
embodied and imaginative structures of understanding by which we grasp our 
world. 33 
In a sense, Johnson extends Gadamer's notions of our situatedness in tradition and 
culture to include our situatedness in a physical body (embodiment): both have 
implications for our understanding of language including moral language. 
5.3.1 The impact of cognitive science on our conception of reason 
Johnson considers five ways in which studies in cognitive science have a direct bearing 
on our conception of reason, including moral reasoning. 
3t MI. 
32 This section draws primarily on MI. It is in this book that Johnson's work is most clearly focussed on 
ethics. However, see also Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind : The Bodily Basis of Meaning, 
. Imagination, and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Lakoff and Johnson, 
Philosophy in the Flesh. Also relevant is Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, The Way We Think: 
Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities (New York: Basic Books, 2002). 
33 Johnson, Body in the Mind, xiii. 
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First, the theory of prototypes: the classical theory of categories and concepts involves 
the description of necessary and sufficient features that something must possess to fall 
under a certain concept or be included in a particular category. However, most 
categories actually used by people are not consciously defined in this way. Rather, we 
usually define categories (e.g. bird) by means of a typical example or prototype (e.g. 
robin), while still able to recognise other members of the category that differ, often in 
significant ways, from the prototype (e.g. ostrich, penguin).34 Categories thus have a 
radial structure with a prototype case at the centre and less typical cases further out. So, 
our concepts are not uniformly structured and our categories have 'fuzzy edges'. 
Johnson suggests that our basic moral categories - e.g. person, duty, right, law, will -
also exhibit this prototype structure. Moral principles only clearly apply to prototypical 
(clear-cut) cases whilst our moral lives require us to address unique and individual 
(precisely not prototypical) cases.35 Johnson accepts that there is a relatively stable 
'core' to most of our moral concepts, however he suggests that this is not due to the 
abstraction of objective 'rules', rather it is the result of the stability of the shared 
metaphorical systems within a given culture.36 It is the prototype structure of moral 
concepts which can account for both their stable core and their relative indeterminacy.37 
Johnson also argues that something important is missing from morality when it is seen 
as based on absolute laws: 
What is left out is any sense of the development, growth, and historical 
transformation of our experience and our moral knowledge.38 
In fact, moral rules are considered objective precisely because they are unaffected by 
historical contingencies. 
Second, Johnson discusses frame semantics: semantic frames are the idealised 
frameworks that we, communally, develop to understand the different kinds of situation 
that we encounter.39 Our terms and concepts only have meaning in relation to these 
broad schemes or frames which are not an objective part of the situation but are 
imposed by us in the light of prior understanding and experience. There can be several 
ways of framing any moral situation that we encounter (Johnson's example is 
34 The examples are Johnson's. 
35 M/, 9. 
36
-MC9I. 
37 MI, 100. 
38 M/, 79. 
39 Ml, 9. See also Johnson, Body in the Mind, 18-40. 
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understanding a foetus as either 'a person' or as 'a biological organism with no 
personality'.) Semantic frames are not static; rather, they are dynamic patterns with both 
spatial and temporal dimensions. However the number of possible ways for an 
individual to frame a situation is once more restricted by the traditional and linguistic 
conventions within which they operate though new combinations or extensions of 
frames are always a possibility. 
Third, metaphorical understanding: our understanding is largely composed of 
'metaphorical mappings' .4° Complex systems of metaphor connect our different 
experiential domains. Trevor Hart's summary of Johnson's position is helpful: 
In short, we make sense of the world by mapping meaningful order from one 
domain (generally some physical reality) onto another (generally some extra-
physical reality) in order to grant it a clearer structure.41 
Language does not provide a system of fixed concepts that can be mapped directly onto 
the reality of our experience. Rather; complex systems of overlapping metaphors 
connect different areas of our experience.42 Johnson argues that this interconnection of 
domains implies that there is no purely 'ethical' domain: rather, our moral systems have 
a vast reach into other domains of our experience.43 Brown notes the phenomenon of 
synaesthesia: 'the habit of our minds regularly to connect the same phenomena across 
different kinds of discourse' and suggests that this phenomenon may help to explain the 
effectiveness of metaphor.44 Moltmann observes that 'it is a fundamental characteristic 
of religious speech to try to make the unexperienceable divine reality comprehensible 
with the help ofmetaphors taken from the world which human beings experience'.45 
Fourth, basic-level experience: concepts derived from certain categories of experience 
are more important in determining how we function than others. This is dictated by 
features we have in common: 
the kinds of bodies we have, the way our brains work, the nature of our purposes 
and how we interact socially.46 
40 Ml, !0. 
41 Trevor Hart, 'Creative Imagination and Moral Identity', Studies in Christian Ethics 16, no. I (2003), 1-
13, at 5. 
42 See also Johnson, Body in the Mind, 65-100. 
43 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 333. 
44 David Brown, Discipleship and Imagination: Christian Tradition and Truth (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 3 77. 
45 Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 161. 
46 Ml, II. 
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Basic level experiences of pleasure and pain, as Bentham and Mill realised, will be 
important in moral deliberation and, because shared, may provide arguments against the 
extreme forms of moral relativism. They will not, however, be the only experiences or 
notions on which to base our moral judgements. 
Fifth, narrative: narrative is a fundamental mode of human understanding which plays a 
role in how we 'understand actions, evaluate moral character, and project possible 
solutions to morally problematic situations. ' 47 As we will see (section 5.3.6), it is the 
narratives surrounding our goods and practices that allow us to make sense of our 
experience and to explore imaginatively the possible responses to moral situations. 
Narrative is constitutive of our experience; any moral theory must take account of this 
narrative character of our lives. 
As we have seen, Gadamer set out to describe what happens in the process of 
understanding: 
Fundamentally I am not proposing a method; I am describing what is the case.48 
Cognitive science has the same aim. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that there is 
so much overlap between Johnson's account of the implications of cognitive studies for 
moral reasoning and our own survey of the implications of Gadamer's hermeneutics.49 
Gadamer provides a strikingly similar account of the metaphorical nature of language 
and of the process of concept formation. 50 He is also aware of the influence of our 
language on our reasoning: 
The conceptual world in which philosophising develops has already influenced 
us in the same way that the language in which we live conditions us ... we must 
become aware of these influences. 51 
Gadamer and Johnson are both critical of the claim of abstracted reason to universality 
and its pretension to univocity. Many ethical theories require literal concepts and 
objective situations, while metaphor is seen as non-rational, subjective and 
unconstrained. Semantic frames have interesting parallels with Gadamer's horizons and 
47 Ml, II. 
48 Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'Supplement I: Hermeneutics and Historicism' [ 1965], in TM, 542-49, at 512. 
49 What is surprising,_ given, Jhe~ extent oL th~ _ p!ir~!Jels between John sou_ and_ 9itd!lJ11er is tb~t )o_@s_Qn 
refers to Gadamer so little: there are only a handful of references in all of Johnson's published works. 
Perhaps this is a consequence of the lack of dialogue between continental and American philosophy. 
5° Chapter Three, 112. 
51 TM, XXV. 
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Taylor's conceptual schemes. 52 For all three, our reasoning and understanding depend 
upon our cultural and historical situatedness. In fact, the metaphorical nature of 
language requires a communal understanding. Reason is always linguistically situated 
but this is also the condition of possibility of metaphoric extension and the development 
of new concepts by a community. 
5.3.2 Johnson's criticism of abstraction 
Johnson is particularly critical of the conception of moral laws stemming from the 
essence of reason upon which morality is said to be based. He is especially critical of 
attempts to abstract moral laws from the context of our experience, arguing that such 
systems are simply too narrow and too unimaginative to capture most of what goes on 
in our moral experience.53 Johnson argues that moral norms can only have any 
relevance within the evolving moral tradition of a specific community. He summarises 
Hegel: 
ethics ought not to consist merely in [an abstracted] theory of morality ... but 
rather in a theory of the historicallJ and culturally embedded and embodied 
morality of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). 5 
In fact, Johnson's criticism goes even deeper than this. He suggests that Moral Law 
theories work with a conception of reason which is itself a dangerous abstraction: 
Reason is defined as an abstract structure that stands above and transcends any 
particular instance of reasoning in actual historical contexts . . . a fixed, 
transtemporal structure that in no way depends on the nature of our bodily 
experience nor on the social contexts, historical events, or cultural practices in 
which it is manifested. 55 
As we have seen, Gadamer's hermeneutical insights preclude the possibility of such a 
universal reason. Johnson suggests that Kant, in particular, is guilty of a misguided 
attempt to abstract a universal reason with the result that reason comes to mean little 
more than the principles of formal logic. 56 
52 Charles Taylor, 'Understanding the Other: A Gadamerian View on Conceptual Schemes', in Jeff 
Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald and Jens Kertscher (eds.), Gadamer's Century (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. 
Press, 2002). 
53 Ml, 104. 
54 M/,28. 
··ss Ml, 108. 
56 Ml, 110-13. 
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5.3.3 Reduction and the diversity of goods 
As we have seen, Johnson is also critical of 'utilitarian reductionism' through which 
'technical rationality [becomes] the sole criterion for moral evaluation'. 57 Similarly, in 
The Diversity of Goods Charles Taylor argues convincingly against the reductionism of 
both utilitarianism and formalism. He suggests that both are concerned with the 
epistemological question of validation - as understood by the natural sciences, after the 
Enlightenment. A principal concern of utilitarianism was the concern to satisfy these 
canons of rational validation. All considerations of feelings, emotion, virtue or 
obligation, were excluded: utilitarians 
could abandon all the metaphysical or theological factors ... which made ethical 
questions undecidable. Bluntly, [they] could calculate.58 
Formalism again offers the prospect of making moral decisions without the unvalidated 
consideration of feelings or emotion and without addressing issues of virtue or 
obligation by sidestepping them altogether. You can finesse all this by recourse to 
universalisable maxims and moral absolutes. 
Taylor argues that to approach ethical theory with these notions of validation and formal 
principles leads to a serious distortion of our moral thinking. An already formulated 
theory of validation distorts our observations and framing of reality: any reason at work 
in a situation that does not fit the model is either discarded or simply goes unnoticed. 
Both systems narrow our horizons: 
One of the big illusions which grows from either of these reductions is the belief 
that there is a single consistent domain of the 'moral', that there is one set of 
considerations, or mode of calculation, which determines what we ought 
'morally' to do. The unity of the moral is a question which is conceptually 
decided from the first on the grounds that moral reasoning just is equivalent to 
calculating consequences for human happiness, or determining the universal 
applicability of maxims, or something of the sort. 59 
For Taylor the boundaries of the 'moral' are an open question. Also different moral 
ideals may appear to contradict one another - for example, the universal attribution of 
moral personality and considerations of less than universal solidarity or personal 
excellence. 60 
57 Ml, 120. 
58 Charles Taylor; 'The Diversity~of Gooi:ls'; in~ Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical 
Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 230-47, at 230. 
59 Taylor, 'Diversity', 233. 
60 Taylor, 'Diversity', 233. 
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Against the quantitative deliberations of utilitarianism and the avoidance of the issue by 
formalism, Taylor argues for a consideration in moral reasoning of the qualitative 
distinctions we make between different actions, or feelings, or modes of life as being in 
some way morally admirable or contemptible. This is, in essence, Mill's point about 
higher and lower pleasures, but Taylor argues that it cannot be accommodated within 
the quantitative framework of utilitarianism. Commonly adopted moral goals illustrate 
these quantitative distinctions: for example, the goals of personal integrity, Christian 
agape, and liberation, already involve judgements about what is most important in life. 
Taylor notes that the higher goals he cites involve motivation as part of their very 
definition. To aspire to one of these goals is to aspire to be a particular kind of person, 
to be motivated in a certain way, to exhibit a particular virtue. The goals are 
significantly qualitatively different and not easily susceptible of a quantitative analysis 
or comparison. Qualitative considerations 'get short shrift in the utilitarian and formalist 
reductions' .61 Some forms of ethical thinking are unfairly privileged over others. Taylor 
suggests that the grounds for such dismissal are usually expressed in terms of self-
evidence, validation or a desire to exclude 'subject-related properties'. 62 These last are 
to be excluded in the search for a 'naturalist account of man': a description like that of 
any other object in nature. Such a programme requires that human goals and activities 
are characterised in purely physical (or even chemical) terms. Such requirements for 
absolute and objective explanations of human behaviour must exclude considerations of 
qualitative contrast. Taylor suggests that the assumption that our accounts of human 
behaviour must be naturalistic is misguided, rather we should expect to have to take 
account of 'the significances of things for agents' and that this will 'require some use of 
languages of qualitative contrast' .63 He suggests that both utilitarianism and formalism 
are, in fact, arbitrary restrictions of moral reasoning and that they have little foundation 
in our normal ethical sensibility and practice. 
Taylor concludes that 'the ethical is not a homogeneous domain' and that the moral 
goods which we do in fact recognise are diverse. Virtue, character, feelings, emotions, 
motivations and goals all play a part in everyday moral thinking. No single-factor 
theory is likely to do justice to our full range of moral considerations. Their claims of 
objective calculation and precision are illusory: 
61 Taylor, 'Diversity', 240. 
62 Taylor, 'Diversity', 241-42. 
63 Taylor, 'Diversity', 243. 
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In fact, they only have a semblance of validity through leaving out all that they 
cannot calculate. 64 
Our various goals are ultimately incommensurable. Their combination must rest on 
considerations other than direct comparison and calculation. 
5.3.4 The centrality of metaphor 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson suggest that our metaphorical talk is extraordinarily 
coordinated. A metaphor is not simply an utterance; rather it is embedded in our 
language in a way which shapes both our language and our actions. 65 Moral 
Imagination is an extended exploration ofthe consequences ofthis recognition. Johnson 
points out that we rarely stop to reflect on the nature of our moral language: the 
metaphors are now dead, and we behave as if the language we use were literal, univocal 
and unchangeable. He suggests that our moral reasoning depends on metaphor at two 
basic levels: 
(1) Our most fundamental moral concepts (e.g. will, freedom, law, right, duty, 
well-being, action) are defined metaphorically, typically by multiple metaphoric 
mappings for a single concept. (2) The way we conceptualise a particular 
situation will depend on our use of systematic conceptual metaphors that make 
up the common understanding of members of our culture. In other words, the 
way we frame and categorise a given situation will determine how we reason 
about it, and how we frame it will depend on which metaphorical concepts we 
are using. 66 
Johnson points out that because of the flexibility of metaphorical concepts, which can 
be developed and extended (or supplemented) by further metaphors, it becomes 
impossible to have determinate, univocal applications of moral rules that contain such 
concepts. However, he suggests that this is a strength and not a weakness. Metaphor 
constitutes a basis for imaginatively moving beyond 'clear' and prototypical cases. It 
allows us to explore possibilities in a flexible, though constrained, way and to develop 
our moral concepts in the light of experience. 67 
64 Taylor, 'Diversity', 245. 
65
- Lakoffand Joh-nson, Metaphors- w;ii~e By, 5. 
66 M!, 2. 
67 Ml, I 0. For a detailed discussion of 'conceptual blending' see Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We 
Think. 
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In Moral Imagination, Johnson describes in considerable detail the metaphoric character 
of much of our moral deliberation.68 He outlines event structure metaphors (the journeys 
of our lives), metaphors of social and moral 'accounting' ('can someone lend me a 
hand?', 'I owe you my life') and metaphors for moral character (uprightness and 
strength). He also considers some examples of semantic framing (for example, marriage 
is a journey, marriage is a resource, marriage is an organic unity). His conclusion is that 
metaphor has a central role in our moral deliberation: 
My claim ... is that because so much of our common moral understanding is 
structured by systems of metaphor, no account of morality can be adequate that 
fails to examine the extent to which our conceptualisation, reasoning and 
language about morality involve metaphor (and other imaginative devices).69 
This dependence on the metaphorical nature of our understanding is not, for Johnson, to 
be lamented: it is what makes abstract thought possible and allows us to make sense of 
our experience. This closely parallels Gadamer's accounts of traditional and linguistic 
situatedness as the conditions of the possibility ofunderstanding. 
5.3.5 Reason and faculty psychology: the 'Moral Law Folk Theories' 
Johnson is highly critical of what he calls the 'Moral Law Folk Theory'. It is worth 
quoting his summary in full: 
Human beings have a dual nature, part bodily and part mental. It is our capacity 
to reason and act upon rational principles that distinguishes us from brute 
animals. The free will, which humans possess but animals do not, is precisely 
this capacity to act on principles we give to ourselves to guide our actions. 
Therefore our freedom is preserved only in acting on principles our reason gives 
to us. There is a deep tension between our bodily and mental aspects, because 
our bodily passions and desires are not rational. That is why we need reason to 
tell us how we ought to act in situations where our actions may affect the well-
being of ourselves and other people. Reason guides the will by giving it moral 
laws - laws that specify which acts are morally prohibited, which are required, 
and which are permissible. Universal reason not only is the source of all moral 
laws but also tells us how to apply those principles to concrete situations. Moral 
reasoning is thus principally a matter of getting the correct description of a 
situation, determining which moral law pertains to it, and figuring out what 
action that moral law requires for the given situation.70 
Johnson argues that this theory is so pervasive in our culture that it is the shared basis of 
both religious and rationalist (Kantian) ethics. Most of us, he suggests, are not even 
68 See also Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 290-334. 
69 MI, 61-62. 
70 MI, 7. 
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aware of this basis to our morality and simply accept it, without reflection or criticism, 
as literal fact. Because the theory is so pervasive, it becomes difficult to conceive of 
alternative ways of doing ethics. Rationalist ethical systems share certain common 
features: they purport to give guidance about right and wrong; they specify moral laws; 
they treat reason as a force; and they treat morality as a system of restrictions. 71 Johnson 
criticises the dualism of such systems together with their conceptions of reason and 
freedom, and their implied disregard for the imaginative and subjective aspects of moral 
deliberation. In fact, Johnson suggests that it is morally irresponsible to 'think and act 
as though we possess a universal disembodied reason that generates absolute rules ... 
and universal laws . . . by which we can tell right from wrong in any situation we 
encounter'. 72 Moral absolutism and moral relativism are both mistaken in accepting this 
erroneous view of reason: we are expected to choose between the absolute nature of 
moral laws based on reason or accept that they are utterly relative to a specific cultural 
context. As we have seen, Gadamer argues that the absolutist/relativist split is a false 
dichotomy. Johnson adduces evidence from 'recent empirical studies in the cognitive 
sciences concerning conceptual structure, meaning and reason' 73 which suggest that we 
do not, in practice, reason or understand in the ways that the Moral Law Folk Theory 
suggests. Rather: 
A new view is emerging of concepts as grounded in structures of our bodily 
interactions and as irreducibly imaginative in character. 74 
In fact, what we are learning about the ways in which humans reason and conceptualise 
is radically at odds with our traditional theories. Johnson points out that for the Moral 
Law Folk Theory to be plausible, a number of assumptions about concepts and 
reasoning must be accepted: 
(1) There must be one and only one correct conceptualisation for any situation. 
Otherwise we could never figure out which moral rule is supposed to apply to 
the situation. (2) There must exist literal concepts with univocal meanings, in 
terms of which the moral laws are stated and which also apply to the situation 
being considered. (3) Situations must be conceptualisable by a list of features 
that uniquely describe them (which is to say that concepts must be defined by 
sets of necessary and sufficient conditions for their application). 75 
71 Ml, 27. 
n=-Ml,S~-
73 Ml, 5. 
74 Ml, 6. 
75 Ml, 8. 
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However, moral decisions are complex, they are made by people who are involved in 
intricate networks of relationships with others; people who are influenced by their 
culture both in terms of how to make moral decisions and also in terms of what sorts of 
decision actually matter. Situations can often be framed and rules interpreted in several 
ways. 
A rationalistic ethics is, I suggest, simply unattainable as it is based on the illusion of 
pure reason, totally independent of experience, and it characterises reason simply as 
logical inference (with no role for metaphor, feelings or imagination). Johnson, on the 
other hand, suggests that our actual human understanding is thoroughly metaphorical 
and is based on bodily experience: 
In short, 'pure' reason has almost nothing to do with human reason ... Views of 
reason as pure, transcendent and nonimaginative ignore the fact that moral 
theories are expressions of the moral traditions they emerge from and 
reconstruct. 
He argues that all moral theories have a metaphorical basis: even Kant's moral theory 
stemming, supposedly, from pure practical reason depends on metaphor. Johnson 
suggests, with Putnam, that Kant is not simply providing arguments for his approach; he 
is also providing an image to explain how our ideals are co-ordinated: 
Putnam is right in claiming that Kant's theory elaborates a moral image and is 
an imaginative articulation of a particular moral tradition. 76 
Kant is not working completely ex nihilo: he too is limited by his prejudices. By 
attempting to ground ethics in 'pure reason' and the 'pure will' Kant creates a huge 
problem for himself: how can moral principles based purely on a priori concepts and 
stripped of all connection to experience or feeling ever apply to real situations? Kant's 
solution is to suggest that we treat moral laws as if they were laws of nature: 
In short, the underlying metaphor that lets us afply the categorical imperative to 
concrete cases is 'moral laws are natural laws'. 
Thus, says Johnson, even Kant's supposedly pure rational ethics is based on 
metaphorical mappings and requires the use of imagination in its application to specific 
cases. 
Johnson criticises a second folk theory: the theory of 'Faculty Psychology'. According 
to this the mental realm is co_l!!:e_rised of at least four parts (the faculties): r~as()n, 
76 M/, 66. 
77 Ml, 72. 
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perception, passiOn and will. These faculties are distinct and often in conflict. 
Perception receives sense impressions and passes them on to reason and/or passion. 
Will is capable of freely making decisions to act (and is therefore thought of, 
metaphorically, as a person). Reason is calculating and makes decisions while passions 
often oppose reason, and can be unpredictable and difficult to control. Will causes the 
body to act and can be guided by reason (though it can also resist the force of reason). 
Will is prone to following passion although sometimes it can resist passion, especially if 
it is a 'strong' will. Commonly, passion and reason are in a 'struggle' for control of the 
will.78 The Moral Law Folk Theory (and its more philosophical counterparts) assumes 
this theory of Faculty Psychology and so morality is seen as a constant battle between 
the forces of reason and of passion. We are required to keep our reasoning 'pure' and 
cultivate a 'strong' will. Our moral lives are struggles to preserve these in the face of 
pressures and temptations that arise from our passions, from our bodily lives and 
involvement in the physical world. Johnson perhaps overstates his case here: Faculty 
Psychology may be defensible but only if one is clear that it is a device of philosophical 
analysis. Problems arise when it assumes the status of a description of psychological 
realities. 
5.3.6 The narrative self 
Johnson argues that moral absolutism not only distorts our understanding of human 
reason but that it also distorts our conception of the self. He criticises the objectivist 
view of the self that is presupposed by the Moral Law folk theory and suggests that it: 
cannot give an adequate account of moral personality, because it cannot account 
for the way in which the moral identity of a person is an ongoing, culturally and 
historically situated, imaginative process of thought and action ... the historical 
narrative process by which moral agents formulate and continually revise their 
moral identity is incompatible with [the objectivist self]. 79 
He describes six characteristics of this view of the self (a view which is fundamentally 
Cartesian). First, the 'essential rational' self: the moral agent has a fixed determinate 
rational nature. Second, the 'ahistorical' self: our essence as moral agents is not changed 
by our historical circumstances. Third, the 'universal' self: every moral agent possesses 
the same essential nature. Fourth, the 'bifurcated' self split into reason and desire: 
78 Mf, 14. 
79 MI, 126. 
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reason is unable to move us to action; desire is not intrinsically rational. Fifth, the 
'atomic', individual self: people are the source of their own ends and of the rationality 
and freedom to realise those ends. Sixth, the self as 'separate from its acts': the essential 
self is entirely independent of the actions it performs. Johnson denies the validity of all 
of these characteristics .. In particular, he denies the split between reason and desire, and 
asserts the unity of the self and its actions. Taylor provides an extended treatment of this 
in Sources of the Self.80 There is an essential unity between the self and its acts: the self 
is a work-in-progress. We do not have pre-established fixed identities: rather our 
identity evolves and emerges from a network of ends, relationships, and the critique of 
others: 
Human beings are not fixed quasi-objects that have an independent prior identity 
and then go about making choices from which they are distanced. We are, rather, 
beings in process whose identity emerges and is continually transformed in an 
ongoing process of reflection and action. Our actions express who we are, and they 
may also transfom1 who we are at the same time. 81 
This concept of the historically situated self finding and forming itself as part of an 
ongoing process is reminiscent of Gadamer's language of 'play' as the clue to 
ontological explanation. Both seem to accord with the language of 'being' and 
'becoming': art and the historical self only come to their true potential in the interaction 
with a viewer or with other selves. For Gadamer, play is about interaction with others, 
about self-presentation, but 'all presentation is potentially a representation for 
someone': meaning exists in the event or interaction between the work and the 
audience. 82 So the moral life is about the artistic and creative project of self-
presentation whose meaning can exist only within a community. The objective/ 
subjective split in ethics (and aesthetics) is now seen as a false dichotomy, there is 
simply no possibility of pure objectivism or pure subjectivism for historically situated 
selves. For morality, one of the key points here is that the self is at stake in moments of 
choice and deliberation. Our actions are constitutive of and constituted by our selves. 
For a self-in-process 
8° Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 1-107. 
81 Ml, 148. 
82 TM, 106. 
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moral deliberation is primarily a matter of the way in which our imaginative 
ideals inform our exploration of possibilities for acting within a morally 
problematic situation. 8 
Johnson emphasises the narrative context of self and action, arguing that narrative is a 
fundamental way in which humans seek to make sense of experience, to describe their 
own lives, and to explore possibilities for the future. In this he agrees with Macintyre: 
It is now becoming clear that we render the actions of others intelligible in this 
[narrative] way because action itself has a basically historical character. It is 
because we all live out narratives in our lives and because we understand our 
own lives in terms of the narratives that we live out that the form of narrative is 
appropriate for understanding the actions of others. Stories are lived before they 
are told - except in the case of fiction. 84 
In our moral lives we attempt to weave together our experiences and our goals into a 
narrative, a framework that helps us imaginatively to engage with problematic 
situations, and that continues our tradition while also giving us the means for criticising 
and transforming it. 85 Johnson may accept the need for moral theories and 
generalisations but he insists that we should not see them as absolute or objective but 
remember that they are formed from the bottom up, from the developing life of a moral 
tradition. We must remember that they are, in fact, potentially distorting abstractions: 
Humans are temporal, and ultimately narrative, creatures. It is this dimension 
that must be infused into moral theory. We must make use of all sorts of 
idealizations and imaginative models, though we want to keep them as fine-
textured, flexible and open to novelty as possible ... idealizations, if they are to 
be useful, must take account of the central role of narrative in the structure of 
human experience. 86 
The traditional conceptions of the moral self fail for three main reasons: first, we are 
socially constituted; second, we are historically situated; and, third, we are subject to 
change and development. What underlies all of these is a shared and developing 
language. Traditional moral theories attempt to escape the thoroughgoing contextual 
and indeterminate nature of our moral lives by adopting processes of abstraction or 
reduction. Hermeneutics shows us that such attempts are futile: ethics must be properly 
situated and demonstrates an ineliminable indeterminacy. The self, the moral agent, is 
constituted not simply by its biological nature but also, and in large measure, by its own 
imaginative ideals; the networks of relationships of which it is part; the traditions and 
'-sJ-- Ml,-149. 
84 Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 2nd ed, 1985), 212. 
85 M!, 184. 
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institutions of its culture; and its historical and linguistic situatedness as Taylor 
observes: 
What I am as a self, my identity, is essentially defined by the way things 
have significance for me. And as has been widely discussed, these things have 
significance for me, and the issue of my identity is worked out, only through a 
language of interpretation which I have come to accept as a valid 
articulation of these issues. To ask what a person is, in abstraction from his 
or her self-interpretations, is to ask a fundamentally misguided question, one 
to which there couldn't in principle be an answer. 87 
Taylor and Johnson argue persuasively that moral identity is subject to change and 
development. Traditional moral theories tend to assume a self that is fixed and 
unchanging, detached and rational, immune to situational contingencies. Ricoeur 
identifies the temporal dimension of the self as the significant lacuna in traditional 
descriptions and suggests that narrative provides the means for making sense of this 
temporal dimension of our selves and our actions. 88 Our experience is not just ordered 
by imagination but it is ordered into narrative. We construct the narrative of our lives; 
and our deliberations (including our moral deliberations) are, in turn shaped by those 
same narratives. There simply is no narrative-free way to see the world: once more we 
have encountered a hermeneutic circle. 
5.3. 7 The importance of moral imagination 
Johnson makes strong claims for imagination: that without imagination nothing could 
be meaningful, and that we could never make sense of our experience. Hart maintains 
that imagination 
is capable of breaking reality open for our consideration and transforming it and 
... manifests elements of creativity in doing each of these things ... the poetic 
and the heuristic belong together. 89 
He notes, following Warnock,90 that imagination allows us to structure our experience 
in a chaotic world; that it operates in a subconscious way; and that it is capable of 
transforming our apprehension of reality. Hart is critical of modern objectivist science 
in its attempts to 'eliminate the "distortions" of human perspective from its accounts of 
87 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 34. 
88 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narr_ative (~l}icago: Univers_ity of Chicago Pxess, 1984), 52. Also: Paul 
Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blarney (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
113-68. 
89 Hart, 'Imagination', 2. 
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the material cosmos' and observes that 'emotional, moral, aesthetic and spiritual 
realities and values fall even further beyond the boundary of "reality'". 91 Yet these are 
the things that we cherish most and which allow us to construe our lives as coherent and 
worthwhile. Hart concedes the basic, Gadamerian, point 
that our experience and knowledge is mediated by both sense and sensibility, our 
embodiedness and our embeddedness in historically located symbolic worlds.92 
The only reality with which we can engage is the world mediated through our 
perception and experience, which will necessarily include the realities excluded by 
objectivist science. The view of imagination as 'unconstrained, subjective play of 
images or representations' fundamentally misunderstands the nature of human 
cognition. Instead, imagination should be placed at the core of moral judgement.93 
Johnson argues that moral imagination does not necessarily entail moral relativism 
because our imaginative forays are constrained by our shared language and communal 
systematic metaphors. Also, basic-level experiences are the common ground for our 
moral reasoning. Hart agrees: 
creative imagination, far from being the unruly and gratuitously disruptive force 
of popular report, is a responsible (and according to Johnson's account rule-
governed) extension of our selves into the world, which intuits its contours and 
generates meaningful patterns which provide the best 'fit' available, and thereby 
enables us to indwell the world in ways befitting our nature as human beings.94 
There are interesting resonances here with the notions of natural law, connaturality, 
moral sense, and conscience: something inherent in our human nature allows us to 
recognise the good and to act upon it. 
I suggest that there is an unavoidable 'moral distance' between cultures and, to a lesser 
extent, between individuals within a culture. Overcoming this distance by a fusion of 
horizons can be productive if we are open to a conversation with the other and prepared 
to put our prejudices at risk. 'Metaphorical imagination is a crucial skill in creating 
rapport and in communicating the nature of unshared experience. ' 95 For Taylor, it is our 
indwelling of a set of overlapping imaginative frameworks that structures our moral 
91 Hart, 'Imagination', 3. 
92 Hart, 'Imagination', 4. 
93 Ml, 208. 
94 Hart, 'Imagination', 7. 
95 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 231. For an example in relation to missionary work 
among the Masai see Vincent J. Donovan, Christianity Rediscovered: An Epistle from the Masai 
[1978] (London: S.C.M., 2001). 
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experience and grants us our sense of the good.96 We learn by example rather than by 
learning rules: 
We are inspired by the lives of people ... who seem to us to be caring, sensitive, 
intelligent, courageous and wise. We get a sense of what we might become and 
how we might live by observing how they live and by trying to act as they 
would.97 
A mature moral imagination depends upon 
experience that is broad enough, rich enough and subtle enough to allow 
[human beings] to understand who they are, to imagine who they might become, 
to explore the possibilities for meaningful action, and to harmonise their lives 
with those of others. 98 
Such moral imagination is formed in a community by Bildung and limited by the sensus 
communis. Artistic taste requires the exercise of imagination. I want to suggest that 
conscience too is fundamentally imaginative. We are the artists of our lives.99 
5.4 Moral imagination, conscience and taste 
The classical definition of conscience was given by Thomas Aquinas: the mind of man 
making moral judgements. Human beings have an innate awareness of basic moral 
principles (which he called synderesis), and conscience (conscientia) is the judgement 
of the practical reason as it brings these to bear on particular questions of right and 
wrong. 100 Moral judgements are thus often seen as the application of universals (rules, 
principles) to particulars (cases, situations). As we have seen, this characterisation can 
be called into question and in this section I want to explore the consequences for our 
notion of conscience. The word 'conscience' has been used inconsistently to describe 
various different components of the human ability to make moral judgements and we 
need to be careful about definitions when referring to it. However, there seems to be 
almost universal agreement that human beings have some sort of faculty or ability for 
recognising good and evil and for making distinctions between right and wrong. I intend 
96 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 78. 
97 Ml, 258. 
98 Ml;Ts:r 
99 Ml, 183. 
100 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican province (London: 
Bums, Oates & Washbourne, 2nd revised ed, 1920-25), 1.79.12. 
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to adopt a broad definition of consctence as the human ability to make moral 
judgements ('the seat of moral agency in the soul.IOI as Oliver O'Donovan describes it). 
Whilst the content of moral judgements and the definitions of good and evil may vary 
from time to time, place to place, or culture to culture, the ability to make moral 
decisions seems to be constant. Many of the differences can be explained by different 
understandings of the facts relevant to the case (rather than faulty logic or judgements). 
Perhaps surprisingly, people often agree on moral principles even when they do not 
share much in the way of ethical theory. Eric D' Arcy quotes Jacques Maritain regarding 
the UN declaration of human rights: 
it is an example of the fact that men can come to agree to a number of practical 
truths regarding their lives in common which are derived from extremely 
different, or even basically opposed, theoretical conceptions. He tells of a 
meeting of the French National Committee of UNESCO which was discussing 
the Rights of Man, at which someone expressed surprise that people of mutually 
antagonistic ideologies could yet agree on a proposed statement of the rights: 
'Yes,' they replied, 'we agree on these rights, providing we are not asked 
h , 102 w y. 
Beauchamp and Childress make the same point in relation to medical ethics 103 as do 
Jansen and Toulmin in their history of casuistry. 104 
Confusion anses when one considers what conscience actually does and how it 
operates: different understandings of the nature of conscience inevitably lead to 
different understandings of its function and operation. Conscience has variously been 
seen as a witness regarding past actions; as a lawgiver; as prompting human beings to 
obey laws; as calling us to a virtuous life; and as forming character. Many authors see 
conscience as an element of reason; making judgements in a rational and strictly logical 
way or acting as 'a superior principle'. This is perhaps supremely the case for Kant with 
his strict emphasis on duty and the categorical imperative. C. A. Pierce suggests that 
this complete range of meaning of 'conscience' is present in the New Testament and 
that no single word is applicable to translate syneidesis on all occasions. However, it is 
always retrospective, passing moral judgement after an action is performed. The 
101 Oliver O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Leicester: 
lnter.Varsity, 1986), 115. 
102 Eric D'Arcy, Conscience and Its JJjghJ_i2_f!_eedom (!..,o!Ldon: _Shet<q_& _Ward,l26J),c_n2., -_- c- ~~~ - -
103-"T~mL:-B-~uchmnp and -Ja~es F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 5th ed, 2001). 
104 Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1988). 
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prospective conscience seems to be a Christian innovation emerging in the Patristic 
period. 105 D' Arcy observes that both understandings of conscience are subsequently 
used together: 106 conscience is henceforth a faculty of moral direction as well as moral 
judgement. It seems that the key concept which could enable us to unify our 
understandings of conscience is imagination. One needs imagination to identify the 
relevant features of a moral dilemma and to consider the consequences of any proposed 
action. Empathy is a fundamentally imaginative capacity: it is our imagination that 
allows us to make sense of the motives, feelings and choices of other people. We need 
to build up a 'mental picture' of the situation, of what has happened and of what might 
happen if a particular course of action is followed. It is imagination which allows the 
retrospective function of conscience to be transformed into its prospective function by 
imagining the judgement that conscience would pass if an action were performed, by 
imagining how one might feel after any proposed action, and by imagining what the 
new situation would actually be: in other words, by considering possible narratives. 
Narrative is not something that we impose on a completed experience, rather it is 
inherent in the imaginative synthesis that constitutes and is constituted by our 
experience itself. Narrative allows us to make sense of the historical dimension of our 
existence: we are able to orientate ourselves in moral space. 107 Also it allows us to make 
sense of the imaginative projections by which we explore the plans and goals that 
motivate our lives. Johnson observes: 
There is no other cognitive-ex~eriential structure that blends these two basic 
dimensions of human existence. 08 
It is rare that real-life moral decisions can be reduced to single simple questions ofright 
and wrong action. More often, the situation will involve a number of people who will be 
affected by any decision, a number of possible courses of action and a number of 
morally 'grey areas'. Imagination seems a better tool for dealing with such complexity 
than logic or the application of rational syllogisms. 
D' Arcy suggests that it was St Jerome's comments on synderesis, picked up by Peter 
Lombard which set the tone for much of the scholastic debate on conscience. For the 
105 C. A. Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament: A Study of Syneidesis in the New Testament; in the 
Light of Its Sources, and with Particular Reference to St. Paul: With Some Observations Regarding Its 
Pastoral Relevance toaay ("Conaon:'S.tJv[, l95-5), 104.:-ro, arid 14. - - -
106 D'Arcy, Conscience, 13. 
107 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 25-52. 
108 MI, 171. 
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Scholastics, synderesis was primarily seen as a cognitive faculty which applied only to 
general principles: some authors equated this with conscience, others like Aquinas 
maintained a distinction. Not all of the Scholastics saw synderesis as purely cognitive: a 
notable exception was the voluntarism of the Franciscans. Bonaventure concluded that 
for a human being to be moral both reason and will need to be directed and that 
conscience directs reason and synderesis directs the will. There are serious questions to 
be asked about whether it is legitimate to attempt to separate reason and will in this way 
and whether moral judgements can always be reduced to bringing particulars under 
universals. Johnson argues that such a separation is illegitimate and that we very rarely 
think and reason in terms of universals and particulars. As we have seen, he suggests 
that reason, desire and imagination are inextricably connected and that we usually think 
in terms of prototypical definitions and radial categories. Such ideas are not completely 
new. Joseph Butler (in 1726) speaks of 
conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or Divine reason; whether considered as 
a sentiment of the understanding or as a perception ofthe heart; or, which seems 
the truth, as including both. 109 
The phrases 'sentiment of the understanding' and 'perception of the heart' are 
particularly fascinating and are echoed by T S Eliot who described conscience as 'the 
power to feel our thoughts and think our feelings'. 110 Arguably it is the Scholastic 
debates about conscience, framed as they are in terms of philosophical analysis, which 
colour subsequent treatment of the concept and have a negative impact on the ability of 
moral theology to guide decision-making: there is a gap between moral philosophy and 
phenomenology, between theory and practice. 
Is conscience a universal human capacity? Generally, the answer to this question has 
been in the affirmative and certainly was for both Aquinas and Kant. However, there is 
an extreme Protestant position which claims that conscience is only present in human 
beings by the grace of God. In a similar vein, Thielicke suggests that there is no real 
continuity between the conscience in an unbeliever, where it functions as a defence 
against the claims of God, and the conscience in a believer, where it functions as the 
voice of God. 111 Conscience, he argues, is totally transformed at conversion. Ramsey 
109 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel and a Dissertation of the Nature of 
~ _ --=-:-~=~irtue!:'[J,126]~(London::;S.R.C.K.,=t9~10~),7t48,--emphasis-mine.-- - - - -·--- ----
110 Quoted in: Ronald Preston, 'Conscience', in John Macquarrie and James Childress (eds.), A New 
Dictionary of Christian Ethics (London: S.C.M., 1986), 116-18. 
111 Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics [ 1958], 3 vols., vol. I: Foundations (translated from 2nd 
German edition) (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1968), 318. 
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admits that conscience is universal, 'a natural ground for morality in all men', but urges 
that it is 'transcended' by Christ: the promptings of conscience can act only as 
boundaries and are unable themselves to motivate action. Whether conscience is indeed 
universal depends again on how one defines it. If taken as the whole ability to make 
moral decisions then it seems to be a universal feature of human nature. Our moral 
deliberation, our ability to recognise the good, seems to be similar to our ability to 
recognise beauty; an ability with many facets, some cognitive some affective, which 
requires a 'fit' between the characteristics of an object and our perceptive abilities. 
Judgements in both will have a subjective (though not arbitrary) element. Even if 
conscience is a universal human ability, it is generally held to require education and 
practice for it to develop fully. In this, of course, it would be no different to other innate 
abilities such as language. Indeed, as we have seen our moral judgement develops as we 
learn to use our moral language. It seems reasonable then to suggest that there is an 
essential communal element to conscience. Again, dangers arise if one attempts to 
abstract the individual moral agent from their context, community, tradition and history: 
it is the sensus communis which provides much of the content and control of 
conscience. There are of course parts of conscience, parts of our ability to make moral 
judgements, that are essentially individual and interior. However, they are not the whole 
story: there are other elements that are communal and exterior which have an inevitable 
effect on the individual and interior components. 
Ethics, though, is not just about principles; it must also be about application to 
individual cases. Principles are no more than markers for the outer limits of communal 
self-understanding. Conscience could perhaps be defined as our ability to 'do' casuistry. 
Indeed casuistry is not just an essential complement to moral theory; rather it is itself 
the very essence of communal moral deliberation from which moral theory develops. As 
we have seen, Gadamer argues that situations in which we are required to act are, by 
definition, special cases and 
from this it ultimately follows that all moral decisions require taste - which 
does not mean that this most individual balancing of decision is the only thing 
that governs them, but it is an indispensable element. 112 
It would seem that casuistry is an essential part of a properly hermeneutical ethics. 
Reliance_ on abstra~t~()n an9 ratio_qal _al!a.lysis (!D_a narrowly defined formal_ sense of 
'rational') ignores too much that is significant in particular cases when real people have 
112 TM, 39, emphasis mine. 
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to make moral choices. Moral knowledge is a matter not of theoretical knowledge, or 
episteme, but of practical wisdom, or phronesis. 
There are, of course, a number of problems with the notion of conscience, some of them 
notorious. However, many of them look rather different if conscience is redefined as the 
whole ability to make moral decisions and if the agent is properly situated. Preston 
observes that: 
Conscience can err because our judgements can be corrupted by personal, social 
and economic interests; it can err because it makes errors of factual judgement, 
and because of ignorance; it can err by not being sensitive enough to the 
personal and social factors involved in the issue at stake; and it can err by 
wrongly estimating the consequences of possible actions. 113 
These errors can be reduced (though probably never avoided completely) by paying 
proper attention to the sensus communis, and by employing an adequately trained moral 
imagination. Conscience can indeed be corrupted by personal, social and economic 
interests, but these should not be simply ignored in making moral judgements; rather, 
we need to educate our conscience to take proper account of them. Ignorance can be 
addressed by education. The moral community and Scripture provide ways of educating 
our conscience: 
As Christians we are to allow the mind of Christ to be formed in us ( 1 Cor 2.16) 
so that we grow in sensitivity, in the art of moral discernment. 114 
Sensitivity and accurate estimation of consequences require the use of imagination. The 
erring conscience cannot be identified 'objectively' but can be identified communally. 
The traditional problems with the notion of conscience (the erring conscience, the 
doubting conscience, the merely probable conscience, the over-scrupulous conscience 
and the sleeping conscience) apply particularly to conceptions of conscience as isolated 
and individual. Deficiencies in one's individual knowledge, ability, sensitivity or 
imagination may be addressed by recourse to the communal education of conscience. 
Can conscience be 'lost' or, abnormally, absent m some individuals? St Jerome 
describes synderesis as: 
That spark of conscience which was not quenched even in the heart of Cain, 
when he was driven out or paradise . . . And yet in some men we see this 
113 Preston, 'Conscience'. 
114 Preston, 'Conscience', 117, emphasis mine. 
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conscience overthrown and displaced; they have no sense of shame for their 
sins. 115 
The absence of conscience is usually included as part of the definition of a psychopath. 
(There is a parallel situation concerning the absence of taste as part of the definition of a 
philistine.) This may presumably be an absence of Aquinas' synderesis or a failure at 
any level of the ability to make moral judgements (in our terms, conscience). This 
seems to be sufficiently rare to warrant description as a pathology and presumably 
cannot be addressed simply by education. Whether psychopaths are born with no 
conscience or whether they lose their conscience or whether their conscience is absent 
only in certain isolated areas of their lives is unclear. Whether conscience is overthrown 
and displaced or simply ignored raises the question of conscience's ability to motivate 
moral action. Absence of shame may be due to lack of conscience, but it would also 
seem that repeated sinful activity can dull one's response to the promptings of 
conscience: shame is still present but one's sensitivity to it is reduced. 
The question of motivation is an important one. Kant would argue that love of duty, as 
seen in a 'good will' is the only thing that can motivate good actions. Even if we have 
an effective and educated conscience, capable of making sound moral judgements, we 
still have to obey its dictates. This, of course, implies a different understanding of 
conscience from those who would argue that conscience itself enforces rules 116 but is 
consistent with our definition of conscience as the ability to make moral judgements. 
Whether we obey the dictates of conscience must depend either upon the degree of 
authority that we attribute to conscience and hence its ability to compel us; or upon the 
ability of conscience or of 'right' moral choices to attract us (rather like the ability of 
some objects to produce 'sensations', or subjective judgements, ofbeauty). 
There are a number of striking parallels between conscience and taste: the ability to 
make ethical judgements and the ability to make aesthetic judgements both seem to be 
innate and universal (or to constitute an abnormality if absent); both require education; 
both have an inescapably communal dimension; both have an inescapably subjective 
dimension; both involve both judgements and feelings; both involve judgements of past 
actions and creative possibilities for the future; both can err; both can paralyse 
115 Quoted in: D'Arcy, Conscience, 16-17. 
116 R. A. Shiner, 'Butler's Theory of Moral Judgement', in S. C. Brown (ed.), Philosophers of the 
Enlightenment (Brighton: Harvester, 1979), 199-225. 
189 
(scrupulosity or perfectionism); individuals can settle for second-best (conformity or 
kitsch); both need to distance themselves from self-interest. 117 
Can we now construct a model of conscience that is consistent with both Gadamer's 
hermeneutics and Johnson's accounts of the findings of modern cognitive science? Is 
such a model consistent with the observed phenomenology of ethical decision-making 
and is it helpful in considering ethical theory? I suggest we can. We will need to 
overcome the 'Great Divide between Reason and Sentiment' to produce a notion of 
conscience that involves both rational elements and subjective feelings and experience 
(we will need to adopt a new notion of reason). Indeed, we will need to overcome a 
number of dualisms in the characterisation of conscience which we can now see as false 
distinctions: conscience concerns both past and future actions (i.e. both retrospective 
and prospective functions); it is both individual and communal; both a voice (accusing) 
and a 'call' (to virtue) 118; it is both about guilt and about moral ideals; it is about feeling 
and judgement, imagination and reason. As the ability to make moral judgements 
conscience is crucial for the art of casuistry in the light of Gadamer's hermeneutics. The 
communal aspect of conscience is crucially important in the education of individual 
consciences; in legislation and prohibition of certain behaviours; and in the avoidance 
of moral relativism. However, the sensus communis is not incontrovertible. Individuals 
may challenge the public conscience on the grounds of new facts, or of new 
experiences. Such challenges may result in significant shifts in the sensus communis. 
The situation is very similar to Kuhn's notions of 'normal science' and 'paradigm 
shifts'. 119 The sensus communis will continue unchanged for long periods, accepted by 
all the members of the community until there is sufficient pressure to produce a 
significant change. Changes in the secular communal understandings of sexual morality 
seem to have undergone a paradigm shift during the latter half of the twentieth century, 
for example. 
117 For a discussion of beauty, bad taste and sin, see John W. de Gruchy, Christianity, Art and 
Transformation: Theological Aesthetics in the Struggle for Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,2001),74-81. ----~ -_o·· 
·· 
118 John-·Macquarrie, In Search of Humanity: A Theological and Philosophical Approach (London: 
S.C.M., 1982), 130. 
119 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure ofScient(fic Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed, 
1970). 
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Moral judgements are more similar to aesthetic judgements than has generally been 
allowed and we may have much to learn from considerations of aesthetics. One function 
of conscience is to assemble and attempt to resolve a number of different views and 
opinions: a form of composition or bricolage. The moral life should be seen as an 
artistic project which requires all the gifts and skills (inspiration, imagination, creativity, 
composition, bricolage, proportion ... etc.) of a trained artist. Moral judgement will 
render conclusions that are relative and contextual (though not arbitrary) and we should 
not require the sort of precision and certainty that we require of science (though, as 
paradigm shifts demonstrate, the conclusions of science are more context-bound than is 
generally acknowledged). Apparently similar situations may have different 'right 
answers' for different people. Rather than 'scientific precision', what we should require 
of moral judgements is 'artistic merit' and above all a proper exercise of moral 
imagination. 
5.5 The moral theorist as art-critic 
We have seen that our moral language is thoroughly metaphorical and that our moral 
reasoning is irreducibly imaginative. Also, we have seen that metaphors, especially as 
they become objectified and die, can dominate the way we think. How should we 
respond? What kind of moral theories do we require? What is the best way for a 
community to retain some sort of control in the face of the unpredictable creativity of 
metaphors? 120 McFague observes that theological reflection relies on metaphorical 
language in the Bible and in the Christian literary tradition. This language is not a 
secondary embellishment to doctrine and systematic theology; rather it is its foundation: 
If one accepts that metaphor is basic ... to all human thought. .. then there is no 
way for theological reflection to avoid a return to its metaphorical base in 
parable, story, poem and confession. 121 
By extension, the same will be true of theological ethics. We need to remember that our 
understanding can only ever be partial and that we cannot even be sure which elements 
of our understanding are correct: moral norms must be constantly recontextualisable. 
McFague observes that 
120 Rachel Reesor, 'Atonement: Mystery and Metaphorical Language', The Mennonite Quarterly Review 
68, no. 2 (1994), 209-18, at 212. 
121 McFague, Parables, 64. 
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metaphorical 'knowledge' is a highly risky, uncertain and open-ended 
enterprise... The risk and open-endedness means that many metaphors are 
necessary, metaphors which will support, balance, and illuminate each other. 122 
Rather than progressively refining our norms to a core of absolutes we should attempt to 
hold multiple metaphors in creative tension. The metaphors will be able to correct and 
limit each other and can be re-orientated, or supplemented, when required. A collection 
of live metaphors, although 'fuzzy', may contain more of the truth and be more flexible 
than abstract systems. As we have seen the traditional Enlightenment emphases have 
been called into question: even the claims of scientific inquiry to detachment and 
objectivity have been shown to be false. Ricoeur suggests that the scientific search for 
univocity is an unrealistic demand of the Enlightenment dependence on reason. Even 
science proceeds by means of metaphor (scientific models) and the use of heuristic 
fictions. Ethical and scientific language are both aiming to describe something (the good 
or the true) which is (currently) beyond a complete literal understanding. Ricoeur is 
concerned that theological language (and, we might add, ethical language) should open 
up possibilities rather than close them down. Vanhoozer characterises his position: 
scientific and literal language fail to serve humanity because they are unable to 
express the possible. 123 
Cooper observes that metaphor may have the ability to convey extra cognitive content 
above and beyond the propositions to which the metaphor may lead us. He suggests that 
this extra truth and understanding are in a certain sense ineffable: that is they cannot be 
reduced to propositions and are subject to a different grammar. 124 Thus metaphor may 
be particularly appropriate for expressing religious truth: it may also be particularly 
appropriate for expressing Christian truth. To adapt an argument from John of 
Damascus and the eighth-century iconodules, the fact that Christ was incarnate as a 
human being, using ineradicably metaphorical human language and preaching in 
parables, may mean that metaphors (like icons) should be venerated as providing a 
specialised epistemic access to spiritual truths. 125 
122 McFague, Parables, 44. 
123 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: A Study in Hermeneutics 
and Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 61. 
124 Cooper, Metaphor. 
125 McFague, Parables, 62. 
192 
Johnson briefly discusses the model of morality as art. He suggests 
that we are likely to learn a great deal more about morality by examining how 
far it is like aesthetic discrimination and artistic creation than by studying 
traditional Moral Law accounts. 126 
Johnson argues that we must rely, not on Moral Law but on moral imagination. Moral 
theory is not abstract and universal but must be grounded in the metaphorical and 
narrative understanding of our situations: 
[Moral] theory would not be based primarily on discovering and applying moral 
laws, but rather on developing knowledge of the imaginative constitution of our 
moral understanding and what this means for moral reasoning. 127 
De Gruchy (following Kierkegaard) suggests that 'our capacity for aesthetic experience 
[is] an essential part of what it means to be human'. 128 I suggest that our capacity for 
moral judgement and moral outrage (our conscience) is similarly an essential part of 
what it means to be human and that both aesthetics and ethics depend upon the basic 
human capacity for imagination. Plato, in Protagoras, identifies the 'divine spark' 
kindled in humanity by Prometheus as 'skill in the arts' which Hart renders as 'capacity 
for culture': 129 could this just be our 'imagination'? 
The criteria for judging 'good' metaphors, and hence 'good' moral theories, are similar 
to those for judging good art and good exhibitions. Expounding moral theory should be 
like staging an exhibition rather than focussing on one aspect of one painting. The moral 
theorist could now be described as an art-critic rather than the policeman of an ideology. 
The art-critic (who will also be an artist in their own right), is responsible for 
commenting on each of the works of art, pointing out their strengths and weaknesses, 
and for producing a reliable exhibition guide which includes reference to context and 
history, and the history of interpretation and that will enable the viewer to relate to the 
exhibition. This, though, is very definitely guidance not prescription: a good deal of 
control must be relinquished so that ethics can develop and be recontextualised through 
dialogue. 
126 M/,210. 
127 Ml, 77. 
128
-de-Gfiichy, Christi;;;iiy, Art-~nd Transformation, 81. 
129 Trevor Hart, 'Through the Arts: Hearing, Seeing and Touching the Truth', in Jeremy Begbie (ed.), 
Beholding the Glory: Incarnation through the Arts (Grand Rapids, MJ: Baker Books, 2001), 1-26, at 
4. 
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In all of this, we must remember that language and art are both only partially successful 
attempts to express the ineffable. As James Dunn observes: 
At [Christianity's] heart is the conviction that God revealed himself most fully 
not just in human word but in human person, not just in rational or even inspired 
propositions but in the human relationships which can never be confined within 
words and formulae alone. 130 
5.6 Conclusions 
It seems that Gadamer's hermeneutics, together with Johnson's moral imagination, and 
an emphasis on the normative control of a community may be able to provide a coherent 
ethical framework or horizon. This framework offers a co-ordinated response to our 
concerns about abstraction, reduction, absolute truth, universal reason, history, tradition, 
language and metaphor. Moral theories arise from developing moral traditions and are 
grounded in their historical and cultural context which allows real people to reach 
meaningful conclusions about concrete situations. This framework reflects what 
cognitive science has shown us about how we actually think. It is humane and creative 
rather than callous and proscriptive; and yet avoids the dangers of moral relativism. 
130 James D. G. Dunn, The Partings of the Ways: Between Christianity and Judaism and Their 
Sign{ficance for the Character of Christianity (London: S.C.M., 1991 ), 259. 
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Chapter Six 
Truth and Imagination in Christian Ethics 
In the last chapter we noted, with Mark Johnson, that the descriptions of our reasoning 
(including our ethical reasoning) provided by cognitive science do not accord with the 
traditional Enlightenment view. I suggested that Johnson's description of moral 
imagination drew together many of these observations and could provide a coherent 
approach to ethical reflection. The importance of the imagination is a theme which has 
recently begun to be developed in relation both to theology and to ethics. 1 
In this chapter I want to explore further the implications of imagination for ethics and, 
specifically, its possible place in Christian ethics? I will briefly outline Gadamer' s 
critical realism (section 6.1 ); some of the relationships between ethics and aesthetics 
(section 6.2); and the imaginative structure of revelation (section 6.3). I will then 
consider creativity and will attempt to draw out links with the Christian doctrines of 
creation and incarnation (section 6.4). I will explore the role of improvisation in 
Christian ethics and endorse it as a way of doing justice to Gadamer's insights (section 
6.5). I will then address the question of the normative 'control' of ethical deliberation 
and the importance of the community in the light of the doctrine of the Trinity and the 
role of the Holy Spirit in inspiration (section 6.6). The chapter concludes with a 
consideration of two practical consequences: the recovery of rhetoric; and the adoption 
of casuistry (section 6. 7). These themes are complex and, as I hope to show, the 
possible connections are abundant: we can barely begin to do them justice. In several 
1 In relation to theology see David Brown, Tradition and Imagination: Revelation and Change (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999); David Brown, Discipleship and Imagination: Christian Tradition and 
Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Garrett Green, Imagining God: Theology and the 
Religious Imagination (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989); Sallie McFague, Metaphorical 
Theology: Models of God in Religious Language (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982). 
In relation to ethics see Ml; Kathleen Marie Higgins, T~e Music of Ow Lives {Philadelphia; Temple 
University Press, I99f); Samuel Wells, Improvisation: The Drama a/Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, 
~Ml:~flL'!:ZP~·~79Jl.tl);~,Ch!lfh~.~"~Ti!Y_lQr,=Sour;ces ... o/-the-.Self:-. -'the- Making···of-the Modern--Identity· 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
2 As a priest in the Church of England I am part of the Christian tradition and much of the following 
discussion concerns the nature of ethics for the Christian community. I have not made any attempt to 
reflect on the implications for other traditions. 
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places this chapter draws on the 'ecclesial ethics' and 'ethics of character' developed by 
Stanley Hauerwas. 3 
6.1 'Invention' in both senses: critical realism 
Trevor Hart considers the claim that our 'knowing' of the world is imaginatively 
constructed from the outset and concludes that it is indeed imagination which allows us 
to structure our experience of the world. It is simply not possible to attain a truly 
objective standpoint; we are always limited by our perceptions ofthe world: 
Reality is always mediated to us through some perspective or other, and the 
scientific attempt to escape this fact is itself, ironically, a highly imaginative 
achievement in so far as it succeeds . . . It is the world as we perceive and 
experience it that concerns us, and should concern us, in any study of the nature 
and meaning of human existence.4 
This experience is structured by imagination, it IS 'moral, emotional, spiritual and 
aesthetic' as well as physical, and it allows us to find meaning and value in our 
existence. 5 
Hart refers to Johnson's study The Body in the Mind and suggests that imagination 'is at 
root a matter of meaningful pattern, and our capacity to recognise and construct and 
reconstruct it'. 6 He notes the two important functions ascribed to imagination by 
Johnson in relation to our tacit knowledge and experience. First: the structuring of 
experience by image schemata or semantic frames. (Johnson's 'semantic frames' are 
similar to Charles Taylor's 'inescapable frameworks' 7 or 'conceptual schemes',8 and to 
Gadamer's 'horizons'.) Second: metaphoric projection, making sense of the world by 
3 See e.g. Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Ethic (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981 ); Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue: Essays in 
Christian Ethical Reflection (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Stanley 
Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (London: S.C.M., 1983); Stanley 
Hauerwas, In Good Company: The Church as Polis (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1995); Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Christian 
Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). 
4 Trevor Hart, 'Creative Imagination and Moral Identity', Studies in Christian Ethics 16, no. I (2003), 1-
13, at 3-4 
5 Hart, 'Imagination', 4 
6 Hart, 'Imagination', 5 
7 Taylor, Sources ofthe Self, 3-24. 
8 Charles Taylor, 'Understanding the Other: A Gadamerian View on Conceptual Schemes', in Jeff 
Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald and Jens Kertscher (eds.), Gadamer's Century (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. 
Press, 2002). 
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extending meanings from one domain of our experience to another.9 Hart makes the 
important observation that such projection is essential in our language about abstract 
concepts whose reality is 'discarnate and elusive'. If we are to converse about mental, 
spiritual, emotional, or moral realities then we have to use language from the domain of 
another more basic (generally physical) reality. In short, we must use metaphor: 
There is, we might say, a poetic aspect to our most basic perceptual 
engagements with the world, and to the language in which we articulate them ... 
creative imagination is constantly at work rendering experience into symbolic 
form. 10 
There Is a hermeneutic circle at work here: our metaphors are constituted by our 
experience while our experience is constituted by metaphors: experience and 
imagination are inextricably linked. 
Imagination is not only important in our ability to create meaningful order but also in 
our capacity to reorder our experience. We have already seen that metaphor can allow 
us to extend our language, especially to non-prototypical cases, and to develop our 
concepts imaginatively. Sometimes we deliberately 'play' with the symbols and 
schemes that interpret our experience. As Mary Warnock puts it: 
If, below the level of consciousness, our imagination is at work tidying up the 
chaos of sense experience, at a different level it may, as it were, untidy it again. 
It may suggest that there are vast unexplored areas . . . questions raised by 
experience about whose answers we can only with hesitation speculate. 11 
In this way poets and artists (and Stanley Hauerwas' moral virtuosos) can reorganise 
our perceptions of the world, and challenge our understanding of reality, through their 
imaginative re-descriptions. Paul Ricoeur observes that language 'invents' in both 
senses of the word (to encounter and to create): 'reality brought to language unites 
manifestation and creation'. 12 Sallie McFague argues that 'discovery' and 'creation' are 
involved in scientific and theological models and that all knowledge depends on models 
(i.e. extended metaphors) to some extent. She suggests that there is always a tension 
between the 'is' and 'is not' of the correspondence of models to reality and that this 
'metaphorical thinking' should be at the heart of both science and theology. 13 
9 See Chapter Five, 169. 
10 Taylor, 'Understanding the Other', 6. 
11 Mary Warnock, Imagination (London: Fabe!,_l9_7_7),~0_8.,_ __ 
·---------·-~ ------,o-~-·--···-------------::--·------- --·-- -- - - - ·-
12 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multidisciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in 
Language, trans. Robert Czerny, Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1977), 239. 
13 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, I 0 I. 
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In his Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty develops the concept of incarnate 
subjectivity. 14 The world is real, not simply a Cartesian extension of our own minds. 
However, consciousness, the world, and the perceptions of the human body are 
intricately intertwined. The things we experience are not the unchanging 'objects' ofthe 
natural sciences; rather, they are interactions between the object and the human body, 
with its sensory functions. As our perspective changes, incarnate subjectivity 
reconstructs 'things' through use of its prior understanding of the world's make-up. The 
ability to reconstruct in this way is a function of our connaturality with the world's 
things. 15 We do not comprehend only by means of concepts. Our intellect can reflect on 
our memories, emotions, instincts and volitions. It can illuminate our inner inclinations 
and orientations of spirit; not to articulate them in concepts, but nonetheless to attain 
invaluable knowledge. Merleau-Ponty agrees with Husser! that 'transcendental 
subjectivity is intersubjectivity and argues that there is 'no coherent conception of the 
self which is not regulated by the consciousness that others have of us'. 16 Understanding 
arises in interactions and identity inheres in relationships. 
Hart observes that our attempts to describe the world are "'heuristic fictions" which in 
an important sense create what they discover and invent what they find'. Heuristic 
fictions are not simply a necessary evil in our processes of understanding, something to 
which we have only occasional recourse when other methods fail: rather, they are 
simply all we have. We have to create meaning imaginatively if we are to understand or 
explain anything. There is a reality 'out there' to be discovered or found; but, if we are 
to make any sense of it we cannot avoid the need to 'create' and 'invent' for ourselves 
meaningful coherent unities. There is a constant dialectic between discovery and 
creation. This brings us to the important question of reference in Christian ethics. 
14 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception [ 1945], trans. Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962). 
15 See also R.J. Snell, 'Connaturality in Aquinas: The Ground of Wisdom', Quodlibet 5, no. 4 (2003) 
(http://www.Quodlibet.net). 
16 Thomas Baldwin, 'Introduction', in Maurice Merleau-Ponty (ed.), The World of Perception, trans. 
Oliver Davis (London: Routledge, 2004), 1-36. 
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6.1.1 Critical realism in Christian ethics? 
Janet Soskice discusses reference and realism in relation to scientific models and 
religious metaphor. 17 She argues for a critical realism which regards scientific models 
and religious metaphors (and, I suggest, ethical theories) as genuinely referring to real 
'things' or relations and their properties rather than, as the positivists would assert, 
being 'convenient fictions for the ordering of observables' .18 This conviction becomes 
the foundation for a critical realist philosophy which regards science and religion (and 
ethics) as genuinely, though only inaccurately and provisionally, depicting a reality 
whilst conceding that this reality may never be directly observed or fully understood by 
human beings. 
For the idealists, the structure of human knowledge is entirely dependent upon human 
thought. 'Reality', such as it is, is no more than a construction of the human 
consciousness and intellect. The question of reference is irrelevant as no external 
reference is claimed or sought. Theories and language possess truth and are consistent 
within their own human-constructed realm. Here again, theoretical models (and ethical 
theory systems) are no more than ideas. Soskice argues convincingly that positivist and 
idealist accounts of scientific practice fail to account for the explanatory and predictive 
knowledge of the world which science provides. 19 Instead she proposes a critical 
realism: 
The [critical realist] is committed not to any one particular account of the world 
or even to the possibility that a perfect account could be provided, but to the 
intelligibility of what is essentially an ontological question, 'What must the 
world be like for science to be possible?' ... The scientific realist's argument is 
that the success of science means that its practitioners must assume not only that 
the world, its structures, and relations exist independently of our theorising but 
also that our theorizing provides us with access to these structures, limited and 
revisable as that access may be at any given time?0 
For us, the relevant questions become, 'What must the world be like for ethics to be 
possible?' and, 'Can we claim a similar 'success' for ethics which would enable us to 
assume that 'the good' exists independently from our theorising and that we can have 
genuine access to such a reality?' 
- - - - _l] -Janet-MartiwSoskice;-Metaphor andReligio!iirLanifiiage (Oxford: ClareriOon, 1985),- 1IS-41. 
18 Soskice, Metaphor, 120. 
19 Soskice, Metaphor, 120-22. 
20 Soskice, Metaphor, 122. 
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Soskice's realism has a strong 'social and context-relative nature'. 21 Scientific theories 
are relative to the context of the enquiry. Knowledge is structured according to 
humankind's thought and concepts; however the way we classify the world (or the 
good) may not be the only appropriate way of doing so. The realist is not committed to 
the identification of only one way of approaching the subject matter, but rather to the 
possibility that all such schemes allow access to the transcendent reality 'behind' them. 
Hence, Soskice's critical realism is not vulnerable to objections along idealist lines that 
all knowledge is humanly constructed. The truth of that charge would be allowed but 
not as the final word. Soskice advocates a cautious realism, which nonetheless meets the 
conditions that Mary Hesse says 
ought to be satisfied by an account of science that claims to be realistic in 
anything like the traditional sense. These are: (l) Theoretical statements have 
truth value. (2) It is presupposed that the natural world does not change at the 
behest of our theories. (3) The realistic character of scientific knowledge 
consists in some sense in the permanent and cumulative capture of true 
propositions corresponding to the world.22 
We can construct similar conditions for 'realist' accounts of ethics. These would be: (l) 
Statements in ethical theory have truth value. (2) The nature of 'the good' does not 
change at the behest of our theories. (3) The realistic character of moral knowledge 
consists in some sense in the permanent and cumulative capture of true propositions 
concerning 'the good'. The last condition is perhaps the most distinctive of the realist 
approach and requires us to claim a form of 'success' for ethics as envisaged above. 
Ethical theories, developed in relation to particular sets of circumstances, can also be 
applied in new and radically different circumstances to provide answers to problems 
that are generally regarded as 'good': as conducive to human flourishing. Part of the 
problem here is that it is difficult to 'test' the 'explanatory and predictive powers' or 
outcomes of ethical theories although the ability to 'confront successive challenges' 
adduced by Macintyre in support of Aristotelian ethics is pertinent. Soskice emphasises 
the importance of membership of a linguistic community in her theories of reference. 
She quotes Hilary Putnam: 
The realist explanation, in a nutshell, is not that language mirrors the world but 
that speakers mirror the world; i.e. their environment - in the sense of 
constructing a symbolic representation ofthat environment.23 
Then later observes: 
21 Soskice, Metaphor, 131. 
22 Mary Hesse, The Structure of Scientific Inference (London: Macmillan, 1974), 290. 
23 Hilary Putnam, 'Realism and Reason', in Hilary Putnam (ed.), Meaning and the Moral Sciences 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 123-38, at 123. 
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The descriptive vocabulary which any individual uses is, in tum, dependent on 
the community of interest and investigation in which he finds himself, and the 
descriptive vocabulary which a community has at its disposal is embedded in 
particular traditions of investigation and conviction. 24 · 
Sallie McFague suggests that science also proceeds on the basis of critical realism. 
Scientists imaginatively construct models to explain the way the world works in the 
light of observed data. The evidence for the models 'need not be conclusive and is never 
absolute'. The models do not function as literal descriptions with epistemic certainty: 
they are retained because they have explanatory power, because they generate new 
discoveries and because they link to other theories and models: 
Such an epistemological position on models may be called critical or modified 
realism and it owes its success, as Mary Hesse says, 'both to fidelity to nature as 
revealed in experiments, and to the fertile imagination which selects appropriate 
analogies from familiar experiences and from familiar types of language, and 
thus exhibits relations between one aspect of experience and another' Both 
experimentation and imagination are ingredients of this perspective?5 
If such critical realism can be applied to ethics and can incorporate fidelity to human 
nature and to our imagination thereby exhibiting relations between one aspect of 
experience and another, there may yet be room for 'scientific method' in ethics. 
The form of critical realism put forward by Soskice and McFague, then, may be able to 
accommodate the suggestions that ethical theories are necessarily the product of human 
thought without descending into the nihilism and moral relativism to which these 
suggestions alone inevitably lead. This then allows that questions such as 'What must 
the world be like for ethics to be possible?' and 'What must humankind be like for 
ethics to be possible?' are intelligible; and are susceptible of partial answers even by 
context-bound human beings. Paul A vis urges the acceptance of a 'qualified realism' 26 
but argues that 'the term symbolic realism brings out the vital imaginative and creative 
factor in our significant knowledge, both of the world and of God ... ' better than 
'critical realism'. 27 Imagination and self-criticism are both important components of 
qualified realism. The acceptance of critical realism by Soskice in relation to metaphor 
and science is not, alone, a sufficient reason for adopting critical realism in ethics but 
24 Soskice, Mf!taphor, 1.~9. 
25 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, I 0 I. She is qu~!il1g:__~ry_J:I~-~~·- §_qj~!l_f!"-lll!4J&~-Hi!'!JPP­
~-Jmaginatiofi.'~lfspeCts ofih(!HisTOryl(uidlogic of Physicat'SCience (London: S.C.M., 1954), 13. 
26 Paul A vis, God and the Creative Imagination: Metaphor, Symbol and Myth in Religion and Theology 
(London: Routledge, 1999), 13 7-51. 
27 Avis, Creative Imagination, 152. 
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Scientists imaginatively construct models to explain the way the world works in the 
light of observed data. The evidence for the models 'need not be conclusive and is never 
absolute'. The models do not function as literal descriptions with epistemic certainty: 
they are retained because they have explanatory power, because they generate new 
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revealed in experiments, and to the fertile imagination which selects appropriate 
analogies from familiar experiences and from familiar types of language, and 
thus exhibits relations between one aspect of experience and another' Both 
experimentation and imagination are ingredients ofthis perspective. 25 
If such critical realism can be applied to ethics and can incorporate fidelity to human 
nature and to our imagination thereby exhibiting relations between one aspect of 
experience and another, there may yet be room for 'scientific method' in ethics. 
The form of critical realism put forward by Soskice and McFague, then, may be able to 
accommodate the suggestions that ethical theories are necessarily the product of human 
thought without descending into the nihilism and moral relativism to which these 
suggestions alone inevitably lead. This then allows that questions such as 'What must 
the world be like for ethics to be possible?' and 'What must humankind be like for 
ethics to be possible?' are intelligible; and are susceptible of partial answers even by 
context-bound human beings. Paul Avis urges the acceptance of a 'qualified realism'26 
but argues that 'the term symbolic realism brings out the vital imaginative and creative 
factor in our significant knowledge, both of the world and of God ... ' better than 
'critical realism' .27 Imagination and self-criticism are both important components of 
qualified realism. The acceptance of critical realism by Soskice in relation to metaphor 
and science is not, alone, a sufficient reason for adopting critical realism in ethics but 
24 Soskice, Metaphor, 149. 
25 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, I 0 I. She is quoting: Mary Hesse, Science and the Human 
Imagination: Aspects of the History and Logic of Physical Science (London: S.C.M., 1954), 13. 
26 Paul A vis, God and the Creative Imagination: Metaphor, Symbol and Myth in Religion and Theology 
(London: Routledge, 1999), 137-51. 
27 Avis, Creative Imagination, 152. 
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her demonstration that language can depict reality even in the absence of certain 
knowledge may be helpful in the search for an account of ethical theory. It allows the 
possibilities, for instance, that we can give real content to virtue theory; that the 
individual moral experience (conscience) is important but not ultimate; and that the 
communal dimension of ethics is essential. The concerns here are not about proof but 
rather about conceptual possibility. 
6.1.2 Gadamer and critical realism 
This critical realism seems to be close to Gadamer's position concerning truth in Truth 
and Method. Brice Wachterhauser considers at some length Gadamer's approach to 
realism and truth.28 He characterises hermeneutical philosophers as falling into two 
broad camps: those who believe that the hermeneutic circle is vicious and those who do 
not. In other words, those who, in a postmodernist frame of mind, believe that the finite 
nature of human knowledge renders useless such normative terms as truth, reason, 
reality, fact, value and good and that all that remains is thoroughgoing relativism; and 
those who see hermeneutics as a necessary corrective in philosophy but who are still, in 
some sense, realists. For Gadamer, the fact that we can never attain certain knowledge 
does not entail that we can attain no knowledge at all: certainty is only applicable to 
certain domains such as logic or mathematics. 29 Non-cognitivist theories of ethics deny 
ethics any claim to 'real knowledge' as this would require the same kind of 
subject/object dichotomy that pertains in the traditional view of scientific knowledge: 
without this, moral knowledge is simply devoid of truth value.3° For Gadamer, all real 
knowledge involves the abolition of this false dichotomy: we cannot escape the 
hermeneutic circle. For Gadamer, history and language are the conditions of possibility 
of knowledge but also its limitations. We can know that our knowledge is so 
conditioned but can never fully assess the impact of our prejudices. As Wachterhauser 
points out, this finitude in our knowledge and understanding means that scepticism can 
never be completely silenced: 
28 Brice Wachterhauser, 'Getting It Right: Relativism, Realism and Truth', in Robert J. Dostal (ed.), The 
o. cambiidge companion lalJaaame~~ccarntirTcrge:': -caiTibridge-u~iversi~fY Pi-es'S'; :2062), ·s:r78~ -- · -----'- -
29 So also: Taylor, Sources of the Self, 59-62. 
3° For a discussion see Sabina Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 
1-5. 
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Neither the knower, as such, nor the conditions of her knowledge can be 
completely known. 31 
All inquiry presupposes a tradition but we can never completely elucidate the nature or 
history of that tradition. There is no absolute knowledge that can successfully refute 
scepticism: scepticism and suspicion must remain permanent features of our 
understanding. It is just not possible, following Gadamer, to 'carry through any version 
of foundationalism and thereby defeat the sceptic by the rules of her own game' .32 In 
Gadamer' s hermeneutics tradition functions by setting the normative context of inquiry: 
it determines the important questions and also determines what constitutes a good 
answer. Reflection takes place in a community (through language) and across time (in 
history). We are formed by traditions but we can also contribute to their development. 
Gadamer is opposed to the Cartesian view of freedom that requires us to be able to 
judge the full nature and extent of any norms that govern our knowledge. This model of 
rational autonomy is clear in Descartes' insistence on his intellect as the only 
justification for knowledge and in Kant's categorical imperative as the only justification 
for moral norms. All contingent factors are irrelevant: 'History is suddenly transcended 
in reason'. 33 Wachterhauser suggests that Gadamer' s view of freedom is freedom within 
a tradition: freedom and tradition co-exist in another unavoidable hermeneutic circle. 
Gadamer's account of 'finitude' insists that there will always be a certain level 
of contingent opacity and inescapable inarticulacy in our reliance on tradition. 
Nevertheless, such factors do not preclude freedom, but instead situate it within 
an ongoing dialogue, which is the driving force of any historical tradition.34 
Attempts to escape the limitations of our knowledge, to attain some universal objective 
viewpoint, also constitute escapes from the possibility of knowledge. Gadamer's 
antifoundationalism suggests that knowledge need not be grounded in epistemological 
certainty. Truly universal knowledge would also be truly irrelevant. Our finitude is 
linguistic as well as historical. Our language itself has a history: it develops through the 
use of metaphor and imagination: whilst we must acknowledge the 'authority' of a 
linguistic tradition we also have the freedom to extend that tradition through our 
imagination and linguistic creativity. Language is both a condition and a limitation of 
our knowledge. 
31 Wachterhauser, 'Getting It Right', 58. 
32 Wachterhauser, 'Getting It Right', 69. 
33 Wachterhauser, 'Getting It Right', 62. 
34 Wachterhauser, 'Getting It Right', 63. 
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We are always already biased in our thinking and our knowing by our linguistic 
interpretation of the world. To grow into this linguistic interpretation means to 
grow up in the world. To this extent, language is the real mark of our finitude. It 
is always out beyond us. 35 
Nonetheless, Gadamer is an uncompromising realist. Wachterhauser points out that it is 
not the case, for Gadamer, that our words create our reality in an idealist sense: rather 
there is a real world to be known (in an inescapably finite way); it is the world in which 
we grow up.36 
All our knowledge must be ultimately proviSiOnal and we must be constantly vigilant in 
our thought: the denial of foundationalism and the implicit acceptance of fallibilism 
mean that we must always be prepared to abandon a belief (or set of beliefs) if a weight 
of evidence to the contrary arises within the dialogue that constitutes our tradition. This 
is not relativism as it is usually understood: our judgements, though fallible, are not 
arbitrary. Our knowledge still describes something real even though it must change and 
develop. Relativism, on the other hand, is the flip-side of absolutism: both require the 
same criteria of knowledge. Once absolute certainty is abandoned as the standard for 
knowledge then the simple fact that all knowledge is relative to historical and linguistic 
context (i.e. all knowledge is situated and all understanding is hermeneutical) ceases to 
undermine the value of such knowledge. Indeed, such situatedness becomes an essential 
condition of knowledge. For Gadamer, our language can genuinely reflect reality. Our 
language and the world are both intelligible: 
'Being that can be understood is language.' This is not the vision of a skeptical 
relativist who sees us as trapped inside language, but it is the vision of a 
metaphysical realist, who has incorporated Hegel's insight into the historically 
mediated nature of human knowinf with Hegel's (and Plato's) conviction that 
the world is inherently intelligible.3 
Our interpretations correspond, more or less, to the way things are in the world and are 
'true' to the extent that they correspond. However our judgements about such 
correspondence, our evaluation of interpretations, occur within the 'common intelligible 
space that penetrates the world, our experience, and our languages'. 38 I suggest that such 
judgements and such evaluations are fundamentally imaginative endeavours and that the 
imagination can be reliable as an organ oftruth. 
35 Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'Man and Language' [ 1966], in David E. Linge ( ed.), Philosophical 
____ ,._,,;,...;:.:__~-~--z::~HermenetiiiCS=-cserkeley:~uni\~'ersit)i- -or·calif6ri1if{Press: ~1976)~ s9::6s;-~ar-64;:,__ -~-- ._,),·~·-----~-~,_:~~=~. 
36 Wachterhauser, 'Getting It Right', 66. 
37 Wachterhauser, 'Getting It Right', 77. 
38 Wachterhauser, 'Getting It Right', 77. 
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6.2 Goodness, Truth and Beauty: the transcendentals reunited? 
Hans Urs von Balthasar addresses the relationship between goodness, truth and beauty 
and attempts to put aesthetics (back) at the centre of theology: 
We here attempt to develop a Christian theology in the light of the third 
transcendental, that is to say: to complement the vision of the true and the good 
with that of the beautiful (pulchrum). The introduction will show how 
impoverished Christian thinking has been by the growing loss of this perspective 
which once so strongly informed theology ... the transcendentals are inseparable 
and ... neglecting one can only have a devastating effect on the others.39 
I suggest that in the light of Gadamer's hermeneutics and the centrality of imagination 
to ethical thought we might conclude that Christian ethics has been similarly 
impoverished by the neglect of the third transcendental and that there is a link between 
the Enlightenment project to locate all authority in reason and the failure of ethics 
observed by Alasdair Macintyre (the result of attempts to provide objective ethical 
theories which abstracted actions from their contexts and excluded desire from the 
moral calculus). It seems that theology and ethics may both have been led down blind 
alleys by Enlightenment insistence on the rational and objective, to the exclusion of 
subjectivity, emotion, and aesthetics. Perhaps von Balthasar's restoration of the 
aesthetic perspective in Christian theology can offer some hope of providing a way 
forward for theological ethics, out of the impasse that Macintyre describes. Jerrold 
Levinson notes that in recent Anglo-American philosophy, aesthetics and ethics have 
been pursued in relative isolation but suggests that there is growing interest in the 
intersection or overlap of aesthetics and ethics and that this may offer some hope of 
ending 'this rather artificial isolation'. 4° For example, Marcia Muelder Eaton argues 
against Kant's rigid separation of ethics and aesthetics.41 For her, the separation of 
moral and aesthetic value is a mistake because our experiences do not come 'in separate 
packets': considerations of one sort can, and do, affect considerations of the other. 
Aesthetic and moral sensitivity are often both called for in decisions/judgements about 
both art and morality. She suggests that in order to understand morality and thus 
become a mature moral person, one's action must have both appropriate style and 
39 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics [I 96 I], 7 vols., vol. I, trans. 
Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (Edinburgh: T &T Clark, 1982), Foreword. See also John Milbank, Graham 
Ward and Catherine Pickstock (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy (London: Routledge, 1999), 1-20. 
40 Jerrold Levinson, 'Introduction: Aesthetics and Ethics', in Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Aesthetics and 
Ethics: Essays at the Intersection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1-25, at I. 
41 Marcia Muelder Eaton, 'Integrating the Aesthetic and the Moral', Philosophical Studies 67 (I 992), 
219-40; Marcia Muelder Eaton, 'Aesthetics: The Mother of Ethics?' The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 55 (1997), 355-64 
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content, and this requires aesthetic skills:42 art can be an important source in the moral 
formation for an individual or community. She concludes that ethics ultimately rests on 
aesthetics because acceptance of a telos is based on aesthetic judgement.43 She observes 
that moral considerations usually look to extrinsic features (consequences, principles 
etc.) whilst aesthetic considerations tend to consider intrinsic features (form, colour etc.) 
but neither can or should be exclusive. Intrinsic features such as creativity and 
autonomy can be sources of value in moral judgement and questions of purpose and 
context should not be excluded from aesthetic judgements. In this she agrees with 
Gadamer's criticisms of 'aesthetic experience' .44 She suggests that our aesthetic 
responses are the results of aggregate rather than separate perceptions.45 The assessment 
of a 'meaningful' or 'virtuous' life demands an understanding of the holistic nature of 
human experience and no single source of value can be allowed to override others. 
Lives are only admirable if all relevant considerations are given due attention, 
and decisions about particular actions to be performed reflect this.46 
Colin McGinn suggests that vi11ue can be characterised as 'beauty of the soul'. Just as 
beauty is the property that delights our aesthetic faculties so the virtuous person is an 
occasion of aesthetic pleasure.47 He notes that our language of moral evaluation is 
'thoroughly saturated with aesthetic notions (fine, pure, flawless, lovely, delightful, 
rotten, bestial, stinking, vile, grotesque etc.). 48 In Johnson's terms, there is considerable 
metaphoric projection from the domain of the aesthetic to the domain of the moral. 
McGinn suggests that the moral life is an artistic life because it requires skill and has 
aesthetic qualities: he urges that artistic techniques (composition, detail, form, 
construction, inner integrity) should be employed in moral formation. 49 He is convinced 
that aesthetic notions have wide application: 
the aesthetic pem1eates almost every experience a human being has, and at many 
levels. We are aesthetic beings though and through; we apprehend the world 
through aesthetic eyes ... I have argued that the domain of the aesthetic includes 
42 Eaton, 'Aesthetics: The Mother of Ethics?' 361 
43 Eaton, 'Aesthetics: The Mother of Ethics?' 357 
44 So also: Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 379. 
45 Eaton, 'Integrating the Aesthetic and the Moral', 231 
. _ ~6 _ Eaton, 'Integrating the Aesthetic'and·the'Moral', 237 
47 Colin McGinn, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 93. 
48 McGinn, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction, 98. 
49 McGinn, Ethics, Evil. and Fiction, 118. 
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people's inner lives- that characters can be beautiful or ugly. Perhaps this idea 
will seem all but inevitable once the full extent of the aesthetic is recognized.50 
He suggests that virtually everything we ever understand we evaluate in aesthetic terms: 
once we recognise this 'panaestheticism' the connection with ethics is a natural step. 
I suggested earlier that beauty might be a feature or property of the interaction between 
subject and object. 51 (This would be in accord with Merleau-Ponty's existential 
phenomenology.) Because of the type of beings that humans are, there are certain 
properties of objects that are more likely to evoke a positive aesthetic response. Paul 
Tillich suggests that 
[a] work of art is authentic if it expresses the encounter of mind and world in 
which an otherwise hidden quality of a piece of the universe (and implicitly of 
the universe itself) is united with an otherwise hidden receptive power of the 
mind (and implicitly ofthe person as a whole). 52 
If ethics and aesthetics are indeed closely related, we can now perhaps suggest that 
goodness, like beauty, is intersubjective: goodness is a feature of the interaction 
between human beings (or between human beings and the world, human beings and 
God etc.) and this interaction can be judged in a similar way using aesthetic criteria. The 
way our nature is constituted means that we will be attracted to certain things as 
beautiful or good. This may be analogous to the way in which 'metaphorical truth' 
emerges in the interaction between speaker and hearer that we noted earlier. This may 
offer the possibility of a version of natural law based not on reason as the defining 
human characteristic but on imagination, and on the hermeneutic and aesthetic nature of 
human experience and the connaturality of moral knowledge. Along these lines, Kevin 
Vanhoozer offers a characterisation of wisdom which seems to agree with the 
understanding ofphronesis that we have developed: 
Wisdom - the virtue that orders all other virtues - is intrinsically linked to the 
imagination, and to beauty, via the theme of fittingness. The wise person 
perceives and participates fittingly in the ordered beauty of creation. Wisdom 
thus integrates the true, the good and the beautiful.53 
Beauty, Goodness and Truth subsist not in subject or object but come to being in the 
interaction of subject and object in a particular context within a tradition. So, beauty is 
50 MeG inn, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction, 121. 
51 Chapter Four, 125. 
52 Quoted in Richard Viladesau, Theological Aesthetics: God in Imagination, Beauty, and Art (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 212. 
53 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 'Praising in Song: Beauty and the Arts', in Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells 
(eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 110-22, at 115. 
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not a property of an object nor simply a subjective 'feeling', rather it comes into being 
in the interaction between subjects (with particular characteristics) and objects (certain 
features of objects may make this kind of interaction more likely for subjects of a 
particular constitution). So, for example, a human judgement of beauty in relation to 
colour depends on the human ability to register certain wavelengths of light. Also, 
Goodness is not simply a property of an action or an agent, again goodness comes into 
being in the interaction of action and agent in a particular context within a tradition: it is 
a secondary quality. 54 Truth is not simply 'out there' independently of human beings 
(naive realism) nor simply a human construct (idealism) but rather it comes into being 
in the interaction of human beings with the world, with themselves and with others in 
particular contexts within a tradition. The motivation for us to be moral now becomes 
the attraction of the good and the desire to see more beauty in the world. Richard 
Viladesau observes that: 
The good, in order to be morally effective, must also appear good; that is, its 
connection with our final end, with our deepest desire, must be perceivable. The 
good must be seen as joyful and fulfilling. 55 
It is our imagination, not our will, that can motivate us to change.56 As Vanhoozer 
comments: 
Human beings are created for fellowship with God, the one in whom the true, 
the good, and the beautiful are ultimately grounded and find their unity. To 
discern the fittingness of the new order of things 'in Christ' requires a robust 
imagination, nurtured on compelling and intelligible forms. 57 
He considers the ethical life as a work of beautiful art: not the self made beauty of 
Nietzsche's creative genius, but 'the Spirit-made beauty ofthe faithful disciple'. 58 
6.3 Revelation, Christian truth and imagination 
In the first volume of his magisterial two-volume work on theology and imagination 
David Brown considers the changes in Christian doctrine and self-understanding that 
are brought about by his reappraisal of tradition as 'the motor that sustains revelation 
54 See John McDowell, 'Values and Secondary Qualities', in Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and 
Objectivity: A Tribute to J. L. Mackie (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985). 
55 Viladesau, Theological Aesthetics, 212. 
56
. _l_l}t~restif!g!yJhis)s ~als<?.the S:.()nciusion ofmu.~l!.R9P1Jhtr psycholggy a119 111~ny ~elf=ht:!P. IJp"o~~.J~{q!,e 
. "tfW.~importfince~of'·'~i~uallsatiOn'>and- see'e.g: Paul· McKenna, Change four- Li]e-ii/sf:;inDays 
(London: Bantam, 2004). 
57 Vanhoozer, 'Praising in Song', 117. 
58 Vanhoozer, 'Praising in Song', 120. 
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both within Scripture and beyond'. 59 Biblical revelation and later tradition are 
encompassed by a single process: we need to pay as much attention to developments in 
tradition as to the original revelation. Brown's thought here seems to owe a good deal to 
Gadamer' s hermeneutical insight that tradition is the condition of all understanding and 
to the concept of effective history (Wirkungsgeschichte). He also sees imagination as 
central to his argument: it is 'stories and images that give religious belief its shape and 
vitality' .60 In the second volume he considers the implications of his arguments for 
discipleship: the difference that being 'an involved reader' makes, and the impact of the 
fact that 'such discipleship is necessarily constituted by membership of a particular 
community' .61 He suggests that truth can attach to the non-historical or fictional; that 
they 'can sometimes embody the greater and more profound truth': 
It is thus the imagination that best preserves the continuing tradition's grasf on 
divine reality and our subjective appropriation of it in our own discipleship.6 
Brown concludes his second volume with a consideration of the nature of truth.63 He 
notes the continuing suspicion of the imagination and its association with images and 
appearance rather than reality. 64 He notes that postmodemists, whose rejection of any 
dominant form of truth might have been expected to make them sympathetic to the 
imagination, actually rebel against the dominance of images as much as the dominance 
of narratives. In this, they acknowledge the power of images; though, as Vanhoozer 
notes, it is ironic that ideology critique ultimately undermines the imagination on which 
it may well be founded. 65 Brown traces a different, more positive, assessment of the role 
of the imagination back to Kant. Kant argues that imagination is central to the 
possibility of understanding our world. Brown sees this as mediating between the 
rationalist and the empiricist: 
both mental concepts and perceptual data are needed, but they are brought into 
intelligible relation with one another only through the work of the imagination 
59 Brown, Tradition & Imagination, l. 
60 Brown, Tradition & Imagination, 2. 
61 Brown, Tradition & Imagination, 2. 
62 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 3. 
63 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 343-406. 
64 See also A vis, Creative Imagination, 18f; Trevor Hart, 'Through the Arts: Hearing, Seeing and 
Touching the Truth', in Begbie (ed.), Beholding the Glory: Incarnation through the Arts (Grand 
Rapids, Ml: Baker Books, 2001), 1-26, at 2. 
65 Vanhoozer, 'Praising in Song', 113. 
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... and it is the imagination that unifies such activity into the sense of a united 
consciousness. 66 
Johnson also examines Kant's view ofimagination67 and summarises: 
Imagination generates much of the connecting structure by which we have 
coherent, significant experience, cognition and language. 68 
Imagination, rather than being a mere flight of fancy, becomes the basis for all our 
understanding of the world. Brown traces a complex picture in relation to the 
understanding of imagination in Kant and Plato concluding that 'there can therefore be 
no insuperable objection to thinking of the imagination as itself one form of access to 
the truth'. 69 Imagination has the advantage of being able to 'see' new combinations and 
to 'think laterally'. Brown suggests that once imagination is seen as central to the 
process of revelation 'it becomes possible to think of growth in knowledge through a 
deepening understanding within tradition of the possible range of reference of images 
and stories'. 70 This is precisely the process we have identified as metaphoric projection 
and reordering of conceptual fields; and the narrative ordering of experience. 
Brown argues that the narrative of Jesus rarely works alone and works best when 
supplemented by other stories which test its appropriate application to the context of the 
believer: narrative and imagination sustain the life of the tradition. He also argues that 
truth can arise from conflict, indeed he argues that conflict is integral to the proper 
development of a community's self-understanding: 'Heresy is ... indispensable to the 
growth of orthodoxy'. 71 He cautions that while the ultimate aim should be a common 
mind, all religious truth is provisional and that we should never see any issue as 
definitively resolved. He notes that the provisional nature of religious truth is mirrored 
in the nature of scientific and historical truth. Brown suggests that the pattern of truth 
arising from conflict should come as no surprise 'since disagreement is one of the most 
powerful pressures towards more careful formulation of one's own ideas'. 72 We need to 
be constantly open to other traditions and prepared to reformulate our own beliefs, 
66 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 350. Brown cites Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Al38, B 177, 
A123-124 
67 Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind : The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason 
(Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1987), 147-66. 
68 Johnson, Body in the Mind, 165. 
69 -Brown~'Discipleship"& 1magination;":352~· 
70 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 353. 
71 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 3. 
72 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 317. 
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indeed such encounters may force upon us dramatic paradigm shifts. 73 We must take 
proper account of our tradition and hear the voices from the past, but we must also be 
open to 'the further transformations in Christian understanding that are undoubtedly yet 
to come' .74 
McGinn notes that there are two traditional paradigms of moral texts exemplified in the 
Bible. First: the list of moral directives as typified by the Ten Commandments. Second: 
the parable. He suggests that 'philosophers have been too influenced by the 
commandment paradigm and not enough by the parable paradigm.' 75 The parable is a 
narrative with characters to whom we can relate, with believable motivations and 
personalities, 
the parable is a small work of art that invites aesthetic as well as moral attention. 
It exploits the power of the story form in order to teach a moral lesson. 
Accordingly, it needs to be interpreted ... 76 
Metaphor is widely employed, indeed parables can be characterised as extended 
metaphors, 77 and the narrative often involves the hearers by ending with a question. 
Brown notes that 
existential truths cannot of themselves adequately engage the heart and the 
imagination. The point has been well taken by ... narrative theology. 78 
The story form includes not just the parable but also the play, the short story, the novel, 
the film and the television soap. Ethical themes are dramatically enacted and characters 
are developed: 'art is used to serve morality in many different ways.' 79 Brown agrees 
that truth can be conveyed imaginatively through fictional narrative, poetry, and the 
visual arts. 80 
A novel can instil an entirely new ethical perspective in the reader. It is as if we 
ourselves live through the events of the story and are thereby influenced to come 
to a new moral vision. (The mysteriousness ofthis process is part of its power.)81 
73 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 330. 
74 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 342. 
75 McGinn, Ethics. Evil, and Fiction, 172. 
76 McGinn, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction, 172, emphasis original. See also John R. Donahue, The Gospel in 
Parable: Metaphor, Narrative and Theology in the Synoptic Gospels (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988). 
77 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 15. 
78 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 290. 
79 McGinn, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction, 173. 
80 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 344. 
81 McGinn, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction, 177. 
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Hauerwas structures the moral life around the categories of character, vtswn and 
narrative. Emanuel Katongole summarises Hauerwas' central contention 
that given the very nature of a contingent and historical existence, all modes of 
human existence and activity are historical and thereby marked with an 
irredeemable particularity. 82 
In fact we are so thoroughly historical that no human project, and especially not the 
quest for moral truth, stands outside the realm of narrative: everything is contingent. 
Hauerwas argues that such a narrative conception of moral reason is, effectively, 
Aristotelian phronesis. 83 Reason is related to praxis and the whole endeavour has the 
nature of a craft or an art. 84 Correct descriptions of actions and correct framing of 
situations involve narrative contexts; virtue and character can only be assessed relative 
to narrative context; and moral deliberation involves the imaginative exploration, 
guided by our imaginative ideals, of different ways in which the web of narratives that 
constitutes a moral 'situation' might be continued. 
6.4 Christian imagination: creativity and incarnation 
The Christian doctrine of God as creator has its foundation in the book of Genesis.85 
The first account of creation in Genesis states that human beings are created 'in the 
image of God' (Gen. I :27). This was interpreted by the Fathers and by Augustine in 
particular as being the human rational faculty mirroring the wisdom of God. We have 
been concerned in this study to reappraise our traditional notion of reason and to replace 
it with a notion of reason as fundamentally imaginative. Coleridge describes the 
imagination as 'a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite 
I AM'. 86 The imago Dei then might perhaps not be reason in its traditional sense but, 
rather, imagination: if we are fundamentally imaginative beings it is because God is so 
too. Garrett Green suggests that the traditional interpretation of the imago Dei can 
indeed be reformulated as relating to human imagination: 
82 Emanuel Katongole, Beyond Universal Reason (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2000), 136-37. 
83 Stanley Hauerwas, Richard Bondi and David Burrell, Truthfulness and Tragedy: Further 
Investigations in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 27 and 
35 . 
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Katongo1e, Beyond Universal Reason, 124-31. 
85 There is however, some debate about the origin of the doctrine of creation presented in Genesis. 
86 Quoted in Patrick Sherry, Spirit and Beauty: An Introduction to Theological Aesthetics (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1992), 122. 
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The point of contact for divine revelation is, materially, the paradigmatic image 
of God embodied in Jesus Christ; formally, it is the human imagination ... 87 
The imago Dei is seen most fully in, the fully human, Jesus Christ and in his 
imaginative and creative engagement with the cultural, historical and linguistic 
situatedness of the incarnation. It is our creative imagination that allows us 'to perceive 
and commend what is good and true in Christ'. 88 Imagination is a communal enterprise; 
the imago Dei does not reside in individuals but in human beings collectively. God has 
created us as social beings, designed for relationship with him and with one ariother. It 
is our moral imagination that allows us to negotiate these networks of relationships, to 
evaluate our experience and contribute to the developing creation. As George Eliot put 
it: 
powerful imagination is not false outward visiOn, but intense inward 
representation, and a creative energy constantly fed by susceptibility to the 
veriest minutiae of experience, which it reproduces and constructs in fresh and 
full wholes. 89 
If we are to avoid complacency, we must be prepared constantly to reorder our basic 
symbols and metaphors. All of this is achieved through the creative, and communal, use 
of language and imagination: 
the work of imagination is social work, and for Christians that means ecclesial 
work. The formation, discovery, and interpretation of normative patterns 
requires a communal context, even when it appears to be the fruit of one 
individual's insight. As Wittgenstein reminded us that the very idea of a private 
language is incoherent, so the notion of individual imagination is unthinkable. 
We are formed by the ongoing interaction of character and circumstance . . . in 
the matrix of our mutual relations ... with others.90 
Brian Horne suggests that if creativity is part of the very nature of God then it cannot be 
optional for creatures made in God's image: 'We may not choose not to create if we are 
to be human. ' 91 However, Hart draws attention to an apparent theological cost of 
ascribing a creative role to human imagination. He notes Johnson's strong claim for 
imagination: 
If imagination were not always at work we could never have any coherent and 
unified experience or understanding.92 
87 Green, Imagining God, I 04. 
88 Vanhoozer, 'Praising in Song', Ill. 
89 George Eliot, Impressions ofTheophrastus Such [ 1879] (London: Pickering, 1994), Ch 13. 
90 Green, Imagining God, x. 
91 Brian L. Home, 'Art: A Trinitarian Imperative', in Christoph Schwobel (ed.), Trinitarian Theology 
Today (Edinburgh: T &T Clark, 1995), 80-91, at 91. 
92 Johnson, Body in the Mind, 162. 
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Hart agrees that imagination creates the world we inhabit. The problem arises when we 
attempt to reconcile this insight with our understanding of God's creation: that God 
created a good world out of chaos. What creative role remains for human imagination 
when God has already declared his creation to be good? Hart outlines one possible 
direction of an answer to this objection: 
God created 'the world' with a view to its being a suitable habitation for his 
human creatures (among others), and in due course for his own indwelling of it 
as Jesus Christ. God also created us with capacities, organs of response 
(physical, imaginative, spiritual, moral, aesthetic) such that we would perceive 
this world in certain ways. He created us not to be purely passive in this 
relationship, but actually to 'make sense' of the world, to respond to it in 
appropriate and responsible ways through intellection, interpretation, artistry and 
the like.93 
In other words, God only declares creation to be good because it already contains the 
potential for creative human imagination to continue the creation begun and sustained 
by God. 94 Part of the problem seems to be that, in discussing the relationship between 
God as creator and humankind as fundamentally imaginative beings, we have redefined 
our notion of one pole (the human) of the relationship, but we retain (unconsciously 
perhaps) at the other a static model of God as creator: God as a 'master builder' whose 
project is complete. If, as the imago Dei might suggest, the human creative imagination 
reflects the divine creative imagination then perhaps alternative models are more 
appropriate. An alternative Christian understanding of God as creator speaks of creation 
as an artistic expression, beautiful in itself and expressive of God's character. John 
Mcintyre sees the glories of creation as manifestations of God's creative imagination.95 
Our creation of the world by our creative imagination is a natural response to God's 
imaginative artistic project in creation, and indeed an integral part of that project. 
Creation continues or, at least, it appears to historically situated creatures to 'continue'. 
Of course, from God's eternal vantage point it may be complete, containing 'already' all 
the imaginative responses we have ever made or ever will make. 
Johnson's account of human beings as fundamentally imaginative creatures is 
compelling and there seems to be no reason to believe that creative imagination could 
not occupy a central role in relation to theology and morality. As well as tracing the full 
implications of such an emphasis on imagination there-is much work remaining to be 
93 Hart, 'Imagination', 8 See also Hart, 'Through the Arts'. 
94 See also Hart, 'Through the Arts', 16-18. 
95 John Mcintyre, Faith, Theology and Imagination (Edinburgh: Handsel, 1987), 51. 
214 
done in characterising the nature of imagination and its operation. It does not seem to be 
simply a faculty of the human mind; or at least it seems to involve the use of all the 
other faculties: we can see and hear in the imagination (even taste and smell in the 
imagination), feel in the imagination, and make judgements about imaginary states of 
affairs. We have already had cause to question the notion of faculty psychology and its 
separation of reason from the rest of the human mind: the same arguments would hold 
true in relation to imagination. Imagination is perhaps best thought of as a disposition, 
or mode of operation, of the mind which allows the creative ordering of experience and 
the exploration of possible futures. In relation to moral issues this mode of operation 
may perhaps constitute 'conscience'. 96 
Gadamer describes the process of coming to an understanding as a fusion of horizons 
(Horizonverschmelzung) which is a work of language. This bridging of distance 
between horizons in language may be another role of imagination; indeed we have seen 
that it performs a similar function in relation to empathy. Brown outlines the historical 
and metaphysical distance between the modern believer and Christ: the particularity of 
the incarnation can render the universal significance of Christ difficult to appreciate. He 
argues that it is not a simple retelling of the story of Christ that is required; rather, the 
story must be retold to describe what a 'Christ-like life might be like in flawed 
situations. ' 97 He concludes that this retelling is an imaginative enterprise that may be 
best addressed by novelists98 and which he calls 'bridging distance'. 99 
Visual and literary imagination [is] an indispensable constituent of the living and 
developing dynamic of religious belief. 100 
Kant defined imagination as 'the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not 
itself present'. 101 To say that something is not present is effectively to say that there is a 
distance to be bridged. Green categorises the main types of distance as temporal and 
spatial. 102 Temporal distance includes our relation to past reality: personal memory and 
the recollection of communal history both involve the use of the imagination. There is 
96 See discussion of conscience, and its relation to imagination, Chapter Five, 183-91. 
97 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 97. 
98 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 99-100. 
99 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 79. 
100 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 3. 
101 Quoted in Green, Imagining God, 62. 
102 Green, Imagining God, 62-66. 
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also a creative or anticipatory role for imagination in relation to future reality. The 
second type of distance is spatial: this relates to geographical separation (imagining real 
objects in a different location) but also to cases where the scale of objects (e.g. 
subatomic particles or the whole cosmos) means that they cannot be directly observed 
because of our physiological limitations. The final type of distance Green considers is 
'logical distance': this relates to objects which are believed to be real but cannot be 
subject to direct observation. In all these cases it is the work of imagination to overcome 
distance. Green's observation of the spatial distance involved in relation to microcosmic 
and macrocosmic realities is related to Johnson's suggestion that we tend to make sense 
of unknown domains by transferring images from a better understood domain: the 
experience of embodiment and of 'meso-cosmic' (as opposed to micro-cosmic or 
macro-cosmic) reality. 103 Objects of imagination may be real or illusory: we can 
imagine what really happened (or at least what may have happened) in the past (the 
greater the temporal distance the more imagination is required); we can imagine what 
may happen in the future; we can imagine real people or objects in other places; we can 
construct illusory objects or states of affairs which may be related to, or completely 
separate from experienced reality (we can imagine political change, or a world of sheer 
fantasy). In all of these instances we involve ourselves: we imagine ourselves looking, 
feeling, hearing, experiencing the objects in question. Moral imagination focuses this 
ability on to the issues that arise from our relationships with God and with other people. 
Our memory, empathy and ability to generate new possibilities may all be involved in 
ethical reflection. In relation to faith, Brown notes the strength of tradition but suggests 
that traditional views may also become a 'prison' unless some of the faithful possess 'an 
open imagination that insists on the exploration of alternative possibilities' .104 The 
cumulative insights of a community will be greater than those of any individual but 
individuals with imagination are necessary if the whole community is to move in fresh 
directions. The central role of creative imagination implies not only that artistic 
enterprises have a role in moral formation but also that the processes of artistic 
creativity may serve as a model for ethical reflection: morality and the arts are both 
historically and culturally situated communal enterprises. 
103 Green, Imagining God, 66. Johnson, Body in the Mind, xix. 
104 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 292. 
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Traditionally the Christian justification of artistic creativity has been the incarnation, 105 
as in the iconoclastic controversy of the seventh and eighth centuries when the 
veneration of icons was justified on the grounds that the incarnation itself constituted an 
act of creative representation. In the incarnation 'God chose an unexpected and 
stunningly imaginative way of making his love and forgiveness unmistakably real' .106 
The incarnation is a dynamic and creative act: the Word, the divine logos, is spoken to 
humankind. In the incarnation the Son embraces the radical particularity of a human life 
and God provides both an 'image' and a narrative to communicate his love and 
forgiveness: the Word was not just 'made flesh' but also made icon and story. John de 
Gruchy suggests that social change requires a revolution of the imagination: 
artistic creativity is not only God-given but one of the main ways whereby the 
power of God is unleashed, awakening both a thirst for justice and a hunger for 
beauty. 107 
In Jesus, God embraced human creativity: Jesus himself used imaginative ways of 
communicating as he negotiated the tension between tradition and innovation guided by 
the Holy Spirit. He needed imaginatively to overcome historical and interpersonal 
distance just as much as we do when we try to re-appropriate his story for our situation 
through imaginative reconstruction. In incarnation, God chose to become historically, 
culturally and linguistically situated: he embraced the limitations and possibilities of a 
particular culture at a particular point in history. Jesus lived his life in a specific context 
and in relation to a particular community. As Oliver O'Donovan puts it: 
the foundation of Christian ethics [is] in the incarnation. Since the Word became 
flesh and dwelt among us, transcendent divine authority has presented itself as 
worldly moral authority ... The meaning of Jesus' life and teaching must be a 
worldly meaning, a reality of human existence which can command our lives in 
the world and reorder them in the restored creation. 108 
The incarnation suggests that God's way is not the way of abstraction (nor indeed the 
way of classical theism) but rather the way of identification with humankind. That 
identification continues in the work of the Holy Spirit. Creating narrative order and co-
authoring our own particular narrative is an exercise in composition that requires 
imagination and inspiration. We must now tum to consider how creativity is to be 
105 See e.g. Hart, 'Through the Arts', 15-25. 
106 Sherry, Spirit and Beauty, 122. 
107 John W. de Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation: Theological Aesthetics in the Struggle for 
Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200 I), 241. 
108 Oliver O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Leicester: 
Inter-Varsity, 1986), 143. See also de Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 244. 
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expressed within Christian ethics (section 6.5), and to consider the normative role of 
community and context (section 6.6). 
6.5 Improvisation as a model for Christian ethics 
Samuel Wells identifies three strands in contemporary Christian ethics: the universal, 
the subversive, and the ecclesial. 109 The universal strand, he suggests, is concerned to 
find the common ground with all people of good will, is usually content with 
deontological and consequentialist approaches, and seeks to make Christianity 
'reasonable'. The subversive strand challenges existing power relationships and the 
church's involvement in them, either by seeking to establish a society where all voices 
are heard or by creating a church which adopts the values of the marginalised. It is the 
ecclesial strand (where Wells locates his own work) that seeks to articulate a 
distinctively Christian ethic. Ecclesial ethics seeks dialogue with others but also seeks to 
respect the particularity of the Christian tradition. Wells suggests that true liberation 
does not lie in overcoming (subversive strand) or ignoring (universal strand) the 
tradition but in being faithful to its particularity. The emphasis on tradition in 
Gadamer's hermeneutics suggests this may be the best approach for a hermeneutical 
ethics although it must be accompanied by openness to other traditions and the 
possibility of ideology critique and liberation. For Wells, the focus of God's 
involvement with the world, and the focus for ethical deliberation is the sacred 
community of the church. The church has its own narrative identity centred on practices 
through which it is formed, extended and restored. Imaginative engagement with 
narratives and practices forms disciples and this includes their moral formation. 110 
We have noted the communal nature of imagination and its inherent linguisticality. The 
implication of the communal context of moral deliberation is that it is in fact constituted 
by the overlap and interaction of many narratives. The context is not that of a single 
story unfolding but of many stories interacting. Wells suggests that the notion of drama 
is a more appropriate model than simple narrative: 'Christians find their character by 
becoming a character in God's story' .111 Ethics becomes a matter of performance. 112 
109 Wells, Improvisation, 33. 
110 Wells, Improvisation, 41. 
111 Wells, Improvisation, 57. 
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Nicholas Lash introduced the notion of performance in relation to the interpretation of 
Scripture: 
Christian practice, as interpretative action, consists in the performance of 
texts which are construed as 'rendering,' bearing witness to, one whose 
words and deeds, discourse and suffering, 'rendered' the truth of God m 
human history. 113 
In ethics we cannot simply imitate the story of Jesus: new contexts reqmre us to 
interpret the narrative in order to relate it to our own situation. We need to engage our 
imagination and as we do that together, as a church community, we perform a drama. 
The concept of 'performance', whilst allowing for a good deal of interpretation is still, 
for Wells, too closely controlled by the original 'script'. He suggests that even the 
concept of drama is too static: 
there is a dimension of Christian life that requires more than repetition, 
more even than interpretation - but not so much as origination, or 
creation de novo. That dimension, the key to abiding faithfulness, is 
improvisation. 114 
He suggests that the model of dramatic improvisation is appropriate for Christian ethics. 
He characterises theatrical improvisation as 'a practice through which actors seek to 
develop trust in themselves and one another in order that they may conduct unscripted 
dramas without fear' .115 Christian ethics is a faithful improvisation on the Christian 
tradition so that Christians can face novel situations without fear. Theatrical 
improvisation requires thorough training: actors form habits and practices, they 
learn to act instinctively and to respond to the changing situation. This is a good 
description of the goal of moral formation. The Duke of Wellington's assertion 
that 'The battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton' emphasizes 
the importance of character in times of crisis; Wells's ethics is a form of virtue 
ethics: 'the heart of ethics lies in the formation of character ... In every moral 
"situation" the real decisions are ones that have been taken some time before.' 116 
Jeremy Begbie argues that theology has much to learn from the models and methods of 
music, again especially improvisation. 117 Kathleen Higgins suggests that ethics has 
112 Wells, Improvisation, 59. 
113 Nicholas Lash, Theology on the Way to Emmaus (London: S.C.M., 1986), 42. 
114 Wells, Improvisation, 65. 
115 Wells, Improvisation, II. 
116 Wells, Improvisation, 74. 
117 Jeremy Begbie, Theology, Music and Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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much to learn as well. 118 The temporality of narrative; cultural situatedness; and the 
importance of interrelationships; are mirrored in musical tradition. Here the physicality 
of the experience is obvious: the physical nature of instruments and the physiological 
constitution of human beings combine to allow the experience we call music. Music is a 
dynamic temporal process involving the possible combination of different notes at any 
one time and the creation and resolution of tension on multiple levels. Music is a 
communal practice that involves, at its most basic, two processes: music-making and 
. h . 119 I . 
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we are dealing with practices, interactions with sounds, concrete encounters with 
the physical world, drawing on many facets of our human make-up ... music is 
'performative' through and through. 120 
Performance and appreciation in music are paralleled by creativity and evaluation in 
ethics: we create our own moral life and we evaluate the moral lives of ourselves and 
others. The traditional approach of ethics is to seek the resolution of tension although, 
as we have seen, the hermeneutical nature of understanding and the inevitability of the 
hermeneutic circle imply that we cannot always dissipate the tension (in fact we can 
rarely do so): what we need to do is to see the tension as constructive and learn to live 
with it. In music it is tension that contributes a sense of flow to a piece although the 
situation is dynamic and complex. Tensions on one level can contribute to resolutions 
on other levels. Well-handled maintenance of tension may similarly be ethically 
desirable: 'a good life involves creative appropriation, even cultivation, of tension ... ' 121 
The traditional focus on ethical choices can obscure the fact that ethical decisions are 
almost always part of a similarly dynamic and complex process: each decision is part of 
a narrative (several, in fact) and having made a decision does not absolve us from the 
continued effort of monitoring the effects of our actions and of making further choices. 
The situation and the agent are constituted by, and help to constitute, a complex web of 
relationship. We need to recognise 'the fragmented texture of experience in which the 
majority of our ethical choices take place.' 122 Using static models to handle complex 
and dynamic ethical 'situations' is inappropriate leading to undue pessimism (with no 
apparent resolution, the situation is hopeless) or undue optimism (this static model can 
provide all the answers). The model of music can help to overcome such limitations: 
118 For an exploration of music in relation to ethics see Higgins, The Music of Our Lives. 
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It gives us practice in an alternative method, engaging us in thought that is 
temporally extended and tolerant of the currents of tension. And music presents 
tensions, not as obstructions, but as themselves vehicles to the achievement of 
resolution. 123 
Music calls for divided attention: it calls for the grasp of numerous different elements in 
continually changing relationships. The fragmented texture of moral experience noted 
by Higgins implies that here too our attention will be divided. Higgins suggests four 
kinds of thinking that are involved in the appreciation of music. First: the 'imaginative 
grasp of similarities and nuances of difference'. Second: 'appreciation of the conditions 
of balance' in an unstable context. Third: an awareness of the focus produced at any 
given time 'by the mental assertion of a foreground/background framework of 
interpretation'. Fourth: continuous reappraisal of one's 'structural understanding' to 
date. In ethics, similar approaches allow us to make sense of our moral lives situated 
within multiple narratives. 124 
The tensions between the limitations imposed by tradition and language, and the 
possibilities they offer (the tensions between constraint and freedom), are exemplified in 
both dramatic and musical improvisation. There is a good deal of freedom in musical 
improvisation but also a great deal is 'given': the physical constraints of the nature of 
performers and instruments; a tradition of previous work; expectations and so on. 
Improvisation is not without its 'rules': without constraints there could be no intelligible 
outcome, only chaos. 
What is typical of much improvisation, and arguably a key to the pleasure it 
affords, is, first a strong contrast between the contingent and the non-negotiable 
'given' constraints . . . second, an interplay between them; and, third, a mutual 
enhancement as they interact - they not only engage with, but also highlight and 
magnify, each other. 125 
Improvisation (dramatic or musical) is not about perfection, about the precise rendering 
of a score or script; rather there is a relaxed freedom ('close enough for jazz') and also 
the possibility that 'mistakes' can be taken up, or 'reincorporated', in the whole 
process. 126 Such mistakes can be illuminating and productive: Sharon Welch is prepared 
to wager that 
the innovation, creativity, power, precision, beauty, and responsiveness that 
heals and affects people's lives, our lives in positive ways, may emerge as 
123 Higgins, The Music ofOur Lives, 167. 
124 Higgins, The Music of Our Lives, 196-97. 
125 Begbie, Theology, Music and Time, 185, emphasis original. 
126 Wells, Improvisation, I 43. 
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readily from our acknowledgement and check to each others' constitutive 
weaknesses as from building on each others' strengths. There is a story, possibly 
apocryphal, that one jazz musician, asked where he came up with the ideas for 
such original improvizations said that it came from having to do something with 
the other musicians' mistakes. 127 
Many of the rules and constraints which govern responsible improvisation grow out of 
the communal practice of music or drama: they are a priori givens for a particular 
performance but develop connaturally through the experience of performance and 
accommodate the a posteriori reflections of a community on previous performances. 
Norm and context (and agents) interact and co-determine one another: tradition evolves. 
Our response to these tensions should not be to try and overcome them (in any case 
Gadamer's hermeneutics suggest that we cannot) but to operate within them. The 
constraints exert a 'normative' influence on the performers. Begbie characterises the 
work of composers such as Boulez and Cage as attempts to overcome the constraints of 
tradition, physicality and temporality which they see as problematic. In attempting to 
escape from tradition they abandon 'corporate musical memory' and the conventions, 
strategies and devices of previous composers. Their approach is one of abstraction; the 
result is music that has been described as chaotic or sterile or indeed deemed not to be 
music at all. It may be that their compositions will be incorporated into a new tradition 
of music, but the dangers of attempted abstraction seem to mirror those in ethics. True 
freedom, as opposed to chaos, is dependent upon constraint: 
Theologically speaking, to be free is not to enjoy some supposedly unbounded 
contingency, it is to be at home in the world, at peace with each other and with 
God.t28 
The ethical ideal is to move freely and gracefully in harmony with the world. 129 
Our human nature and temporality already imply constraints; we cannot choose to be 
other than we are, and therein lies the beginning of our situatedness, and the 
impossibility of overcoming it. 
the order of sound is intrinsic to the being and meaning of music and [is 
grounded] in physical features of the non-human world as well as in universal 
characteristics of our own constitution. 130 
127 Sharon Welch, 'Communitarian Ethics after Hauerwas', Studies in Christian Ethics I 0, no. I (1997), 
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Perhaps goodness is similarly intrinsic to the being and meanmg of ethics and is 
similarly grounded in physicality (temporality) and in our constitution: goodness always 
implies goodness 'for someone' in a particular context. All of this is modelled by 
improvisation. Improvisation does justice to the notions of process, particularity and 
contingency which are so basic to a theology of tradition. The processes of 
improvisation (gathering, passing on, improvising, andre-improvising) remind us ofthe 
development of tradition. Attempts to escape from tradition are futile and potentially 
damaging. Appropriation of a tradition entails the creative production of a novel and 
fruitful future. The constraints of tradition are not a threat to freedom; rather they are a 
condition of its possibility. 131 Improvisation can help us to understand the dynamics of 
this process, and is relevant to ethical theory as well as to Christian doctrine more 
generally. 
6.6 The art of control: community and inspiration 
The central focus, and perhaps the main attraction, of the traditional rationalist 
approaches to ethics is the possibility that practical reason can guide our will and 
control our passions, thus promising moral order and control. Ethics, like science, is to 
be univocal: dilemmas have one 'right answer'; universality removes cultural variables; 
and the exclusion of agent-relative features such as emotion avoids the spectre of 
subjectivity. The process of moral deliberation becomes ordered, rational and 
predictable, even pedantic. Arthur Schopenhauer characterises such 'moral pedantry' as 
a 'form of folly' that 
arises from a man's having little confidence in his own understanding, and 
therefore not liking to leave things to its discretion, to recognise what is right 
directly in the particular case. Accordingly, he puts his understanding entirely 
under the guardianship of his reason, and makes use thereof on all occasions; in 
other words, he wants always to start from general concepts, rules and maxims, 
and to stick strictly to these in life, in art and even in ethical good conduct. 132 
Higgins suggests that our experience with music should alert us to the danger here: too 
much analysis can impoverish our listening experience; we should attend to the 'whole 
musical matrix' and not just disconnected musical elements. We need to appreciate the 
flow and beauty of the music and not simply identify its component parts. Higgins 
131 Begbie, Theology, Music and Time, 216-21. 
132 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 2 vols., vol. I, trans. E. F. J. Payne 
(New York: Dover, 1966), 60-61. 
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suggests that in ethics as much as in music we should recognise the value of intuition 
and emotion. 133 
Compared to the traditional approaches, ethics that involves character and imagination 
and which seeks to learn from our experiences of art and music can appear to some to 
be 'woolly' and arbitrary. Creative imagination and responsible improvisation might be 
seen to represent a certain 'loss of control'; as effectively no more than relativism or 
emotivism. As we have seen, the hermeneutical approach to ethics, and the process of 
improvisation, arise within a tradition and are subject to numerous constraints. The 
concerns about relativism arise as part of the postmodemist critique of authority when 
claims to objectivity and absolute truth are undermined. However Gadamer's 
hermeneutics stand, to a large extent, outside this debate: reason and scientific method 
were never granted the status of providing the sole access to truth. Gadamer's critical 
realism and his emphasis on the provisional nature of all knowledge do not even allow 
the distinction between 'absolute' and 'relative' to be drawn. The constraints of 
tradition, culture and language, together with the sensus communis, militate against a 
charge of relativism. However, as with dramatic and musical improvisation there is still 
a good deal of freedom within the constraints and the results of improvisation are open 
to aesthetic evaluation: some will be judged 'good' others 'bad'; some will be 
celebrated and passed on, others will be ignored and passed by. If ethics is to become 
part of the hermeneutical project then we will need to address these questions of 
evaluation and the charge of loss of control. How are we to evaluate the results of 
hermeneutical approaches to ethics? How are we to adjudicate differences of opinion? 
We have already suggested that it may be possible to make a case for evaluating 
judgements of the good in a similar way to evaluating judgements of the beautiful. The 
achievements of ethics which we will need to evaluate are not simply decisions; rather 
they are decisions made by agents (with a history and motivation) in particular 
situations. Neither the decision alone, nor the consequences alone, will enable us to 
judge the balance and composition of the whole. Judgements will be complex and will 
necessarily be partial and provisional. Higgins reminds us of the 'commonplace that 
music is never the same twice': no two performances of a particular work are ever 
identical in every respect. Sometimes the differences are aesthetically crucial; 
133 Higgins, The Music of Our Lives, 199. 
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sometimes trivial and barely detectable. Two performers working from the same score 
(or the same performer on different occasions) can produce radically different 
'interpretations' of a piece. 
Each musical experience is unique. In this respect it parallels our ethical 
situation. The universal character of most traditional moral ideals ignores the 
importance and potential value of the uniqueness of the particular situation. 
Realism in ethics dictates that we take this character into account. The 
complications and confusions of 'learning from experience' arise in large part 
from our recognition in practice that the present situation is unique, no mere 
repetition of a previous or recurrent situation. 134 
As well as providing normative control, the communal nature of traditions allows for 
the possibility of critique: new communities reconfigure old assumptions. Alternative 
sets of narratives and practices from different traditions are brought to bear on concepts 
and assumptions. Human beings are almost always members of multiple traditions 
which will require reconciliation. All traditions will be committed to a diversity of 
goods. Also, it is possible for a tradition to 'retrace its steps' to examine the origin and 
development of its understanding and commitments: it can examine the effective history 
(Wirkungsgeschichte) of its canonical texts (or text-analogues). It is in negotiating this 
plurality of goods and traditions, and in constant vigilance, that the possibility of 
effective critique lies. Brown urges openness to 'plural voices' (especially, in relation to 
Scripture, the Jewish voice) and awareness of effective history as a corrective against 
too simplistic a view of tradition: 
Neither religion [Judaism or Christianity] will do adequate justice to the history 
of its developing tradition, so long as its own trajectories are seen as simrle and 
obvious, and the creativity of other alternatives not fully acknowledged. 13 
This is in accord with Gadamer's emphasis on dialogue and on openness to others as the 
defence against ideology in hermeneutics. Alasdair Macintyre recognises that 'moral 
philosophies ... always ... articulate the morality of some particular social and cultural 
standpoint', 136 but argues that this does not entail an inability to criticise those 
traditions. In After Virtue and in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 137 he makes a 
sustained case for the possibility of progress in moral theory. Johnson makes 'the 
somewhat weaker claim that we can learn from our collective experience' .138 Learning 
134 Higgins, The Music of Our Lives, 200. 
135 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 302. 
136 Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 2nd ed, I 985), 268. 
137 Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988). 
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from experience (and openness to dialogue with others) requires us to put our prejudices 
at risk, to relinquish the 'control' of rational certainty. 139 
If all our understanding is perspectival and inherently provisional then the search for 
objective criteria by which to evaluate ethical decisions and moral lives is futile. 
However, this does not mean that there is no possibility at all for judging between 
different actions and interpretations; rather they must be judged according to criteria 
that are internal to the tradition (or by comparison with other traditions); criteria that are 
aesthetic rather than scientific, and are inherently communal. Brown suggests criteria 
for evaluating new formulations of Scriptural truth, some of which may be helpful 
here. 14° First, they should take account of the effective history of the 'text' and address 
key historical questions. Second, they should be compatible with empirical facts and 
scientific discoveries. Third, they should be coherent and intelligible. Fourth, they 
should demonstrate continuity with the tradition as it has developed so far. Fifth, they 
should recognise that the person and teachings of Christ lie at the heart of the Christian 
faith. Sixth, they should engage the imagination. Seventh, they should make use of 
effective analogies. Eighth, they should be acceptable to the Church. McFague adduces 
other criteria in relation to the evaluation of theological models: 
One reason the great theologians are great - in addition to their faithfulness to 
the root-metaphor of the classic text of Christianity is that they offer total, well-
integrated, aesthetically satisfying systems derived from expanding the 
implications ofthat root-metaphor. 141 
She identifies criteria of consistency and comprehensiveness, as well as the ability to 
cope with anomalies, to fit with empirical data and to fit with our experience of God. 
Also she urges that they should be intrinsically open to other perspectives. 142 Hauerwas 
suggests four criteria for 'true stories'. First: they should have power to release us from 
destructive alternatives. Second: they should offer ways of seeing through current 
distortions. Third: they should leave room to keep us from having to resort to violence. 
Fourth: they should have a sense for the tragic. Macintyre suggests that ethical theories 
should be able to confront successive challenges. 
139 SeeChapterFive, 193. 
140 Brown, Discipleship and Imagination, 389-405. 
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Similar criteria to these may help us to evaluate ethical decisions and moral lives but it 
seems unlikely that we will be able to elucidate adequate criteria for particular 
judgements without reference to context and agent. Rather, these criteria may function 
more like a list of 'artistic techniques': approaches which, experience has determined, 
are often employed by artists whose works are frequently deemed 'good' or 'beautiful', 
even though the techniques alone do not justify such a judgement and the direct 
contravention of one or more techniques might not preclude such a judgement. 
Ultimately it may be impossible to completely characterise the criteria upon which 
moral evaluations are based; rather they will depend upon taste, an overall 'aesthetic' 
assessment of composition, balance and so on; or they will depend upon a similar sort 
of response to that engendered by particularly effective (beautiful or 'fitting') pieces of 
art. As art-critic the moral theologian is our guide: the control of Christian ethics is no 
longer purely rational but becomes a communal responsibility within the life of a 
worshipping community that is guided by the Holy Spirit. It may be that the doctrines of 
creation and incarnation, and the parables of The Good Samaritan and The Last 
Judgement, will tum out to be more effective 'criteria'. 
At the end of Chapter Four143 we noted that Christian ethics based on Gadamer's 
hermeneutics could have in common with other forms of ethics an appreciation of 
ethical understanding as partial and revisable, an emphasis on learning from others, 
especially those outside one's own tradition, and a creative element. The distinctiveness 
of such a Christian ethics would be the place of inspiration and the work of the Holy 
Spirit within a Christian tradition and context. It seems that what is required is a form of 
'inspired improvisation' as the Holy Spirit prompts and guides the Church in its creative 
re-appropriation of tradition and of the foundation narratives of Christ's life and 
ministry. Such improvisation is to be judged by 'aesthetic' criteria and controlled by the 
sensus communis. The moral life is not simply about an individual imitating the life of 
Christ but about a faithful community exploring how the moral authority ofthat life can 
be expressed within their particular culture and language: ethics is not a monologue but 
a collection of dialogues; it is not about reproduction but about performance and 
improvisation. The ultimate authority for Christian ethics is to be found in Jesus Christ. 
The Scriptures have authority because 'they render Christ, the image of God, fully and 
143 Chapter Four, I 57- I 58. 
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coherently to the imagination': 144 the Bible represents a normative paradigm for 
Christian moral imagination. The Christian faith, including Christian ethics, is 
characterised by the exercise of a faithful imagination attempting to shape our lives, 
individually and communally, according to the pattern of Jesus. It is the Holy Spirit who 
sanctifies life and opens up the possibility of a future in the eternal Kingdom. The Holy 
Spirit enables us imaginatively to grasp and respond to the image of God the Father in 
Jesus Christ. 
David Cunningham notes that the modern understanding of human persons as 
individuals makes it 'extraordinarily difficult to imagine how anything could be 
exhaustively described by the category of relation'. However, he argues that this is 
precisely the case with God: the Trinity is not a collection of three independent beings 
who just happen to relate to one another; rather God is 'relation without remainder' .145 
Begbie and Cunningham 146 both suggest that the polyphony of music can offer a helpful 
model. Cunningham characterises the Christian understanding of God as polyphonic: 
Attention to any one of the Three does not imply a diminished role for the 
others; all three have their distinctive melodies, and all are 'played' and 'heard' 
simultaneously without damage to God's unity. 147 
Begbie suggests that the appropriate musical model might be the fugue. He also 
suggests that the true goal of salvation is not the 'rescue of solitary individuals'; rather, 
it is the creation of 'a community sustained by the Spirit' .148 Cunningham uses the term 
'participation' to signify this interrelationship and suggests that this virtue of 
participation can be characteristic of our lives too: we can begin imaginatively to 
explore what it means to dwell in, and be indwelt by, both the life of God and the lives 
of others. This emphasis on participation runs counter to any emphasis on the 
individual, and is entirely consonant with the model of ethics as hermeneutics that we 
have been exploring: Tradition, culture and language, and so ethics, are all essentially 
communal enterprises. Cunningham sees the individualism of the Enlightenment, like 
its rationalism, as an illegitimate abstraction. He also notes the challenge of modern 
individualism to Christian faith: 
144 Green, Imagining God, 125. 
145 David S. Cunningham, These Three Are One: The Practice of Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: 
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calling into question the ideal of mutual participation both within the believing 
community and within God. Christians have understood themselves as called 
into communion with each other because they bear the image of the triune God; 
consequently, to raise doubts about the indispensabilit~ of the common life is to 
raise doubts about the Trinitarian conception of God. 14 
In Spirit and Beauty Patrick Sherry develops three claims: 
that the Spirit of God communicates God's beauty to the world, both through 
Creation, in the case of natural beauty, and through inspiration, in the case of 
artistic beauty; that earthly beauty is thus a reflection of divine glory, and a sign 
of the way in which the Spirit is perfecting creation; and that beauty has an 
eschatological significance, in that it is an anticipation of the restored and 
transfigured world which will be the fullness of God's kingdom. 150 
If, as we have suggested, goodness and beauty are closely related, and if ethical 
creativity can be seen as parallel to artistic creativity then claims similar to those above 
could be made for the Spirit's work in the moral lives of individuals: the Spirit 
communicates God's goodness to the world through inspiration in relation to 'moral 
beauty'; that holy lives are a reflection of divine glory, and a sign of the Spirit's role in 
the continuing creation; and that the 'beauty of holiness' has a similar eschatological 
significance. This speculation really represents no more than an interim reflection on the 
metaphorical projection from the aesthetic to the moral which we noted earlier. 
ShetTy suggests that the concept of inspiration is really part of the doctrine of Creation: 
inspiration is the way that God through the Spirit allows us to participate in the 
continuing creation. 151 He refers to biblical inspiration and to artistic or scientific 
originality; I would want to add 'moral creativity'. In relation to biblical inspiration, 
Sherry recommends widening the concept of inspiration to include not just the original 
creation of a text but also the subsequent selection and reworking of the material. 152 
Brown would add that inspiration can also guide our appropriation of; imaginative 
engagement with; and development of; tradition and revelation. 153 Imagination, 
inspiration and creativity can be expressed as much by the use of metaphorical 
projection and the reorientation of semantic fields into new patterns as by novel acts of 
creative genius: indeed, even these 'paradigm shifts' are born out of historical, cultural 
149 Cunningham, These Three Are One, 171. 
150 Sherry, Spirit and Beauty; 2. 
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and linguistic situatedness. God may create ex nihilo but hermeneutics suggests that 
human beings never do. In both art and ethics, imagination and inspiration seem to be 
closely linked. Having restored the central role of imagination in understanding and in 
reason, we may well conclude that inspiration always involves imagination and that, in 
Christian terms, inspiration represents the work of the Holy Spirit in continuing God's 
creation through human beings by engaging with their imaginations. 154 Such 
considerations seem to apply equally well to the notion of ethics as hermeneutics. As 
Brown argues, the truth that is revealed through inspiration does not constitute a 
permanently 'fixed' deposit: it is not universal in its scope and application but needs to 
be interpreted and applied in new contexts. Revelation, or inspiration, is intersubjective: 
God and human beings interact; truth emerges in that interaction and is constantly 
reformulated and developed in the life of a tradition. In this, our conception of ethics 
would be no different from our conception of revelation, or of theology more generally. 
The terms 'inspired' and 'uninspired' generally connote positive and negative 
judgements respectively. Often such judgements are made retrospectively and usually 
they are made by others in the community rather than by the individuals themselves. It 
is Hume' s 'true judges' or the sensus communis or the 'artworld' 155 that pronounce on 
the beautiful and inspired in art. It is the Church (or Christian community) that 
pronounces on the holy and inspired in Christian ethics. Our understanding of art and 
our understanding of the good are subject to change in the light of works by geniuses or 
virtuosos. A new style in art (or in ethics) may require a modified definition of beauty 
(or goodness). 
For Hauerwas, Wells and Vanhoozer, worship is central to the formation of Christian 
moral imagination. 156 Worship 'forms our imaginations and hence our sensibilities as to 
what is fitting in the created (and redeemed) order': 157 it forms our habits and character 
and is thus central to the formation of disciples. Discipleship is inescapably social and 
154 For another account of improvisation and inspiration see Frances Young, The Art of Performance: 
Towards a Theology of Holy Scripture (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1990), 160-92. 
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the Church's authority rests upon shared values and common worship. 158 Worship helps 
us to attend to the world; 'to see the world under the mode of the divine' .159 The lives of 
others in the communion of saints (historical or contemporary) can provoke our 
imagination and inspire our moral lives. The stories of the Saints function in a similar 
way to the parables: they function as models of hermeneutical engagement with 
tradition and experience. We need to approach the lives of others as 'text-analogues' to 
be interpreted and understood as part of the hermeneutical engagement which 
constitutes ethics. In this, once more, narrative is central: 'from a sense of what we have 
become, among a range of present possibilities, we project our future being'. 160 This 
narrative engagement is constituted by the community at worship, and in turn is 
constitutive of that community. Catherine Wallace suggests that the two great 
commandments are actually one. Each presupposes and elicits the other: 
The storytelling that grounds our relationship with one another also grounds our 
relationship with God ... Our creative storytelling sustains us as living members 
of the network of relationships and histories that theologians call 'the risen body 
of the living Christ' .161 
These conclusions regarding 'moral inspiration' seem to be in accord with our intuition; 
they appear to be theologically coherent. In the same way that modern Trinitarian 
theology can offer some answers to the criticisms of modern atheism and a corrective to 
classical theism 162, ethics as hermeneutics offers answers to post-modern deconstruction 
(and charges of emotivism and relativism) and a corrective to modernist absolutism: 
Persons can only be persons in community; the community can only be free in 
its personal members. The equilibrium between personal freedom and a just 
society should be possible in the light of the triune God and his resonance in the 
church, provided that the ecumenically united church can understand and present 
itself as the avant garde of a redeemed humanity, freed from its division and 
enmities. 163 
158 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination, 340. 
159 Brown, Discipleship & Imagination; Stanley Hauerwas, 'The Significance of Vision: Towards an 
Aesthetic Ethic', in Vision and Virtue, 30-4 7, at 46. 
160 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 47. Taylor is summarising Heidegger's insight into the temporal structure 
of being in the world. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time [ 1926), trans. John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962). 
161 Catherine M. Wallace, 'Storytelling, Doctrine and Spiritual Formation', Anglican Theological Review 
81, no. I (1999), 39-59, at 59 
162 See e.g. Robert W. Jenson, 'What Is the Point of Trinitarian Theology?' in Schwabe! (ed.), Trinitarian 
Theology Today, l-30. 
163 Jilrgen Moltmann, Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms ofChristian Theology, trans. Margaret 
Kohl (London: S.C.M., 2000), 332. 
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Not everyone will be part of the same community. So, what happens when different 
communities meet? We must now consider the nature of inter-community public debate 
in ethics and the role of narrative within it. 
6.7 From personal narrative to public ethics: rhetoric and casuistry 
Nicholas Adams identifies as a theological problem the relationship between narrative 
and argument. He notes that Habermas draws a distinction between philosophical 
argument, as the application of techniques to solving problems, and poetry, as 
disclosing the world through the making of associations. He relegates philosophy and 
aesthetics to separate autonomous spheres. Adams is critical of Habermas for drawing 
this distinction too sharply and suggests that theologians should refuse this 'choice'. 
Narrative and argument are not separate practices but represent only different aspects of 
language use. Adams notes that philosophical arguments can be constructed in narrative 
form and that what Christian communities need when debating vital issues is not 
isolated proof-texting but biblical stories. These stories are not just preliminaries to 
more formal philosophical debate: 
These stories ... can be used as focal points for interpretation while participants 
reason through the problems set before the community. 164 
Telling stories within traditions or communities is not problematic; the problem which 
Adams identifies is the relationship between narrative and public argument: what 
happens when different groups, telling different stories, meet. Habermas fears that they 
will simply be unable to interact: they might listen to each other's narratives but no 
'argument' would be possible. He attempts to resolve this difficulty by appealing to a 
notion of reason that transcends tradition and a universal ethics that similarly transcends 
commitment to a particular community: communities should suspend their narratives in 
favour of formal procedure or method. Of course, Gadamer' s hermeneutics renders both 
the appeal to transcendent reason and the adoption of method illegitimate. As Adams 
notes, John Milbank suggests a different approach: we cannot 'argue' against another 
tradition, only 'out-narrate' it in a process of redescription and renarration. We need, for 
example, to 'persuade people- for reasons of 'literary taste'- that Christianity offers a 
much better story' .165 For Milbank, narratives and rules are historically situated: we 
164 Nicholas Adams, Habermas and Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 218. 
165 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 
330. 
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need both but we also need to remember their status. We can perhaps characterise these 
positions in terms of the modernist/postmodernist divide that we have already 
encountered. Habermas' position is the 'modern' one; communication and persuasion 
depend on reason and argument. What he fears is the total relativism of postmodernity: 
without reason and argument there can be no communication or interaction. Milbank's 
position (and Gadamer's, and mine) is extra-modern: communication and interaction 
never depended solely on reason and argument in the first place: it is imagination that 
allows a fusion of horizons. Narrative and argument combine to form 'argumentative 
narrative' or rhetoric. 
Albert Jonsen & Stephen Toulmin note the importance of rhetoric in ethics: 
Practical moral reasoning today still fits the patterns of topical (or rhetorical) 
argumentation better than it does those of formal (or geometrical) 
demonstration. 166 
Theology and ethics are about persuasion not proof: 
The task of such a [socio-linguistic] theology is not apologetic, nor even 
argument, rather it is to tell again the Christian mythos, pronounce again the 
Christian logos, and call a~ain for Christian praxis in a manner that restores their 
freshness and originality. 1 7 
Adams suggests that both Habermas and Milbank have given up on metaphysical truth 
claims, arguing that such universal claims cannot be made from within particular 
traditions. Gadamer's critical realist position would allow us to argue that such claims 
can be made but that they can only ever be provisional. Hermeneutics and rhetoric allow 
for understanding and persuasion whilst excluding absolute truth and universal method. 
We must maintain an openness to others and a readiness to listen: true rhetoric is not 
simply about dominance. Rhetoric is not simply a matter of repeating the narratives in a 
louder tone. 168 Nor is it about 'each side [hoping] to win a monopoly for the categories 
in which they themselves frame the question' .169 The goal of interaction and rhetoric 
may not be for one group to out-narrate another; it may rather be to find a broader 
narrative into which both can be accommodated or to preserve both narratives together 
as contributions to our understanding (Rorty's metaphor of understanding as breadth 
166 Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), 326. 
167 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 381. 
168 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 383. 
169 Oliver O'Donovan, 'Homosexuality in the Church: Can There Be a Fruitful Theological Debate?' in 
Eugene F. Rogers Jr. (ed.), Theology and Sexuality: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2002), 373-86, at 374. 
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rather than depth). The connection between traditions is the fundamentally imaginative 
character of human beings and it is here that the beginning of understanding and 
communication lies. Such imaginative engagement between traditions can be a 
necessary corrective to distortions within traditions. There is no certainty in this 
approach and, in principle, everything is open to question: ethics is an art not a science. 
The traditional approach of philosophical argument and problem-solving utilises only 
reason, seeks universal application and gives rise to deontology; the narrative rhetorical 
approach engages the imagination, addresses itself to particular situations and inevitably 
issues in some form of casuistry. 
Casuistry has a bad name. Since Blaise Pascal's excoriating critique of the Jesuits in Les 
Lettres Provinciales casuistry has been thought of as a form of sophistry, or a way of 
avoiding one's moral duty. 170 While this criticism may have been true of the Jesuits at 
the seventeenth-century French court, who were being unreasonably accommodating 
towards rich or high-born penitents, it need not be true of all casuistry. I suggest that in 
its rejection of casuistry, much modern ethical theory has deprived itself of a useful 
ethical tool. It may be that the reaction against casuistry has contributed to a distorted 
understanding of the nature of ethics and an unjustified emphasis on rational a priori 
principles. Jonsen and Toulmin are critical ofthe 'tyranny ofprinciples'. They note that 
once we accept rules and principles as the heart and soul of ethics, no middle 
way can be found between absolutism and relativism. 171 
At the most basic level, all ethics requires some form of casuistry. G. E. Moore argues 
that 'casuistry is the goal of ethical investigation': that all ethical theories must 
eventually get to grips with cases. 172 However, casuistry has traditionally been about 
mitigating circumstances and possible exceptions. As we have seen, for Gadamer, 
situations in which we are required to act are, by definition, special cases. Ethical 
judgement can never be simply about applying universal principles; rather the case 'co-
determines, corrects and supplements' the principle. 173 Circumstances always alter 
cases; so a properly hermeneutical form of ethics will inevitably involve casuistry. 
170 Blaise Pascal, The Provincial Letters [ 1656-7], trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (Harmondsworth_: P(:nguin, 
~ 19671. "- - - -- ~ . - -- ·-
171 Jonsen and Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry, 6. 
172 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), 5. 
173 TM, 39. 
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The traditional understanding of casuistry works on the assumption of a top-down 
application of principles. Jonsen & Toulmin make a stronger claim for casuistry which 
actually challenges the understanding of the nature of principles and rules together with 
the assumption that ethics is a top-down affair. They argue that moral knowledge is 
essentially particular and that moral theory requires an understanding of cases and 
circumstances. Casuistry is not simply about fitting rules to cases (as in statute law): 
rather, morality develops from case to case, or from the bottom up (as in case law). 
Casuistry is not simply 'applied ethics'; it is also, at the same time, an account of the 
derivation of moral principles. On this view, moral principles are the distilled wisdom 
of a community's bottom-up deliberations. This distilled wisdom may then be re-applied 
in a top-down fashion to future cases. Intuitively this does seem to be the way in which 
we actually 'do' ethics but we are regularly prone to losing sight of this origin of our 
moral principles. Principles are invested with a universal, a priori, status that can allow 
for no exceptions when we forget that the principles have emerged from a culture's 
reflection on moral experience. 174 If their origin is kept in mind principles can be 
recognised as a posteriori and as open to development and modification. Nigel Biggar 
argues that there should be a 'dynamic, dialectical relationship' between casuistry and 
history so that rules allow cases to be brought within our rational scope while cases are 
able to modify rules. 175 In other words, there should be scope for responsible 
improvisation. 
In relation to casuistry, Nigel Biggar observes that: 
One of the most common objections [to casuistry] ... is that its rational procedure 
is so logically mechanical as to lack the flexibility necessary to do justice to the 
uniqueness and novelty of an historical situation ... casuistry abstracts the process 
of making moral decisions from the theological historicity of the moral agent. 176 
This criticism seems unjustified: certainly casuistry sets out to do the exact opposite by 
paying particular attention to the historical situatedness of the agent and the particularity 
of the situation. Such criticisms are perhaps more properly directed at inappropriately 
rigid forms of casuistry, or at ethics which is conducted within a framework of a priori 
principles and deductive logic. As we have seen Mark Johnson constructs an ethics 
based on inductive logic; on prototypical concepts and radial categories; and on the 
creative imagination. This allows us to modify our concepts in the light of experience 
174 There are parallels here with 'literal truth' arising from the death of a metaphor. 
175 Nigel Biggar, 'A Case for Casuistry in the Church', Modern Theology 6, no. I (1989), 29-51, 42 
176 Biggar, 'Casuistry', 36 
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whilst still preserving the core of our concepts unchanged. 177 Our understanding of an 
immoral notion, e.g. 'theft', depends upon a prototype or paradigm case. Other cases 
may be included in the definition if they are sufficiently close to the paradigm case. 
Certainty of judgement decreases as the 'radial' distance increases. Categories may 
overlap or conflict. Judgement is required to determine which is the most appropriate 
conclusion in a particular case. 
This process is far closer to Jonsen and Toulmin's description of the casuistical process 
than to any formal deductive model of ethical reasoning. They suggest that the heart of 
moral experience is located in the wisdom that comes from seeing how the ideas behind 
rules work out in the course of people's lives; 'in particular, seeing more exactly what is 
involved in insisting on (or waiving) this or that rule in one or another set of 
circumstances' .178 Moral knowledge, then, is more about 'affective sensibility' than 
about the cognitive ability to make ethical deductions. Hauerwas says: 
Casuistry therefore cannot be limited simply to consideration of 'cases' or 
situations, but also requires the imaginative testing of our habits of life against 
the well-lived and virtuous lives of others ... [though] we cannot do exactly what 
they did. Rather we must let their lives imaginatively challenge our own, so that 
we may learn how to embody the virtues which determined not only what they 
did, but how they did it. 179 
Casuistry is an artistic enterprise, involving creativity, imagination, inspiration and the 
testing of moral judgements against a 'canon' of traditional judgements within a 
community and a tradition. For Hauerwas the church must be such a community of 
discourse and he stresses the intuitive character of some judgements: a natural 'feeling 
for the good': 
Often some of the community's best 'casuists' may not even be those who 
manifest the strongest rational skills. Those with intuitive gifts may simply 
'know' better than they can say what the gospel requires of us. The church must 
be a community of moral discourse so that the moral significance of those 
people is not lost because we fear the prophet. 180 
Casuistry is not just a necessary complement to moral theory which guides our conduct 
in specific cases: rather, it is a central part of ethical deliberation: theory and cases 
codetermine one another; principles inform cases but are derived from cases in the first 
xn,M/;9;· 
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place (another hermeneutic circle). Principles are no more than markers for the outer 
limits of communal self-understanding. Moral principles, though useful, are provisional 
and revisable. Casuistry however need not lead to moral relativism; history, tradition 
and the sensus communis provide adequate control. What is required is a form of 
casuistry that is more artistic than scientific and whose judgements have more in 
common with aesthetic judgements than with traditional ethical judgements. The moral 
life is an artistic project which requires all the gifts and skills (inspiration, imagination, 
creativity, composition, bricolage, proportion ... etc.) of a trained artist. Casuistry will 
be an indispensable tool for a properly hermeneutical ethics. Abstracted ethics is really 
no ethics at all unless it gets to grips with cases. Charles Pinches' comments on action 
theory are pertinent here: 
action theory has been guided by a pressing interest to extract particular actions 
from the rich mix of narratives that characterise human life ... since [the] 
procedure began with the extraction, sooner or later the reinsertion will prove 
difficult. The difficulty is with the governing idea that the true identity of an 
action can be found out by removing it . . . from its various homes in human 
life. I&! 
Similarly, the true nature of moral deliberation depends on its situation in its various 
homes in human life. As far as possible, we must hear 'the full story' before we frame 
situations, let alone before we dare to offer a judgement. This is quite a challenge: as 
Julius Kovesi observes, we may 'need a whole novel to state all the facts' .182 However, 
it is a challenge that we simply cannot avoid. Again we must recognise that, even at its 
best, our ethical deliberation is partial and provisional. Adams urges that we should test 
the claims of moral norms in as many ways as possible, remembering 'that forms of 
testing are just as culturally specific as the norms they test' .183 His bottom line is a 
thoroughly tradition-bound commitment to the "Summary of the Law". 
6.8 Conclusions 
Gadamer's hermeneutics support Jansen and Toulmin's strong case for casuistry: moral 
knowledge is essentially particular and the resolution of moral problems requires an 
understanding of cases and circumstances. Moral principles can only ever be provisional 
181 Charles R. Pinches, Theology and Action: After Theory in Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2002), 27. 
182 Julius Kovesi, Moral Notions (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), 112. 
183 Adams, Habermas and Theology, 229. 
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and must constantly be open to change: moral choices must be made on the basis of 
probability, not certainty. 
In this brief, and inevitably cursory, exploration of the implications of the notion of 
moral imagination for Christian ethics we have begun to see a coherent approach to 
ethics that is consistent with Gadamer's hermeneutics and is consonant with recent 
developments in theology. 
We have characterised Gadamer's approach as a form of critical realism and this seems 
to be an appropriate stance in relation to ethical knowledge. Indeed we have suggested 
that it is an equally appropriate approach in science and in art: all three can convey truth 
but our understanding is inevitably limited. In this sense the transcendentals are 
reunited: ethics, aesthetics and scientific inference all represent branches of Gadamer's 
universal hermeneutics. 
The imagination resonates with the doctrines of Creation, Incarnation and Trinity. The 
recovery of the role of imagination in ethics perhaps represents a paradigm shift, away 
from the 'normal' ethics of the Enlightenment and of postmodemity: it is, at the very 
least, an important corrective to the dominant rationalistic, abstracted and reductive 
models of ethics. Imagination, whilst not quite a 'theory of everything', does seem to be 
relevant and productive in many areas of theology and it certainly seems to provide a 
better account of the phenomenology of moral deliberation. A proper understanding of 
the central role of moral imagination may allow us to survey the ethical landscape 
afresh, offering new ways of interpreting moral notions (of reorganising semantic 
frames and exploring areas of overlap) such as Natural Law, Moral Sense, conscience 
and reason. The lessons from improvisation, and especially music, offer the hope of an 
ethical approach more suited to complex, dynamic and temporal moral situations than 
the traditional static, univocal and universal models. 
As well as the centrality of imagination to moral reasoning we have also observed the 
fundamental role of narrative, and the significance of parables and the lives of the 
Saints. Such stories engage with real people in real life situations. Ethics is no longer 
simply either a priori or a posteriori: rather, it develops connaturally and is subject to 
the limitation and potential of a hermeneutic circle. The hermeneutic circle is 
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unavoidable and the attempts by moral absolutism and utilitarianism to step outside it 
by means of abstraction or reduction are futile: there can be no absolute truth and no 
universal method. The importance of tradition has been restated and the normative 
control offered by the sensus communis has been described: the result of these 
considerations has been to align a hermeneutical model of ethics with narrative ethics 
(and narrative theology more generally) and ecclesial ethics, although the latter is not to 
be seen as in any way exclusive but rather as constantly vigilant, constantly engaged in 
conversation, and constantly open to others. 
We have noted the pervasiveness of aesthetic language in our moral deliberation and the 
concept of virtue as beauty of the soul. The good life has become an artistic project, 
involving artistic techniques and aesthetic evaluation. Higgins argues that this can 
provide a more positive, open-minded and imaginative ethical orientation as we seek to 
live our lives with harmony and grace. 184 We have seen the importance of vision and a 
notion of the good in offering moral 'attraction' rather than moral obligation; love of the 
good is what empowers us to be good. 185 Aesthetics and ethics should not be conflated 
but there is more overlap than the traditional approaches to ethics have been prepared to 
allow. Living well has an aesthetic character; art and literature have a place in ethics; 
and moral formation is about training the moral imagination. The distinctiveness of 
Christian ethics lies in its tradition and context, together with the inspiration of the Holy 
Spirit. 
Gadamer requires us to adopt a hermeneutical approach to the whole of our ethical 
deliberation: imagination will be needed to understand scripture, the gospel, tradition, 
history, ethical texts, art, literature, culture, the narratives of moral lives (our own and 
others), and our moral experience. The 'situation' must retain its significance but be 
orientated within its historical, cultural and linguistic contexts (once more like 
Fletcher's situationist). We should acknowledge that negotiating this hermeneutic circle 
is an artistic endeavour, and that, while we may not wish to adopt Fletcher's crude and 
simplistic 'agapeic calculus', the ability to promote that love enjoined by the summary 
of the law may be amongst the aesthetic criteria for its evaluation. 
184 Higgins, The Music of Our Lives, 204. 
185 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 93. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
In the introduction I proposed two major theses. First, that ethics (including Christian 
ethics) should adopt a stance that is properly hermeneutical: that ethics is part of the 
universal project of hermeneutics. Second, that human beings are fundamentally 
imaginative moral beings: imagination is central to ethics because it is central to 
language and reason. If, as I have argued, these suggestions are correct then we will 
need to explore the changes in the ethical landscape brought about by their adoption; 
and reflect upon their implications for future ethical deliberation. In this chapter I will 
review the arguments up to this point (section 7.1 ). I will then briefly consider a 
hermeneutical approach to our understanding of 'experience' (section 7.2) before 
reflecting, as an example, on the current debate in the Anglican Communion concerning 
homosexuality (section 7.3). Finally, I will draw some conclusions and make some 
closing comments (section 7.4). 
7.1 Summary 
In Chapter Two I considered Finnis's account of moral absolutes together with the 
method of utilitarianism. We identified a number of problems with these approaches 
which stemmed from their failure to appreciate the complexity, and significance for 
moral deliberation, of the context of our actions and choices (the twin failings of 
abstraction and reduction). We also noted their reliance on Enlightenment reason and 
their attempts to escape from the limitations of tradition and language in their search for 
a universal standpoint. We expressed concerns about Finnis' understanding of absolute 
truth, and about the reductive approach of utilitarianism and its adoption of scientific 
method. 
In Chapter Three I set out an overvtew of Gadamer's hermeneutics in Truth and 
Method, paying particular attention to those elements which may have the most direct 
and immediate bearing on ethics although, ih truth, all of Gadamer's philosophical 
hermeneutics, clarifying as it does the processes of understanding in all fields, will be 
relevant to ethics. In our extended thought experiment we observed that all our 
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understanding is thoroughly situated: it is simply not possible to escape the limitations 
(and possibilities) of tradition, culture and language. We saw that Gadamer addressed 
similar problems in the 'human sciences' to those which we had identified in ethics. We 
also noted Gadamer's denial of the possibility of absolute truth and his thoroughgoing 
criticism of scientific method in the human sciences, which I have explicitly taken to 
include ethics. We noted Gadamer's inclusion of aesthetics within the hermeneutical 
project and I suggested that ethics too should be incorporated into hermeneutics: ethics 
should be properly 'situated', taking full account of tradition, culture, language and the 
particularity of context. Perhaps the most important observations concerned the 
historically conditioned nature of reason and the centrality of language to all our 
considerations. 
In Chapter Four I considered the significance of Gadamer's hermeneutics for ethical 
reflection. We concluded that the attempt to achieve abstraction was a fault common to 
both moral absolutism and utilitarianism; and that proper attention to Gadamer's 
hermeneutics may be able to address some of the shortcomings we identified in Chapter 
Two. We also considered criticisms and developments of Gadamer's hermeneutics, 
concluding that the criticisms were not fatal and that, with some modifications, 
hermeneutics, particularly as it has been developed by Ricoeur, could provide a fruitful 
approach to ethical theory. 
In Chapter Five I considered the importance of moral notions and of the moral language 
in which we conceive and express them. We recognised that language is central to all 
understanding and that it allows us to interpret and communicate our experience. We 
considered the nature and function of metaphor. Taking up Gadamer's observations on 
metaphor and concept formation, we have examined Johnson's claim that our language 
is ineradicably metaphorical and that metaphor is particularly important in our use of 
abstract language. We characterised Gadamer's 'fusion of horizons' as a work of 
imagination and noted the importance of conversation within a community of discourse. 
We examined in some detail the implications of cognitive science for ethics; in 
particular, Mark Johnson's conception of reason and his model of moral imagination. 
We saw that imagination is essential to language and to reason, and so is essential to 
knowledge, to theology and to ethics. We considered the importance of narrative in self-
identity and in moral deliberation. We considered the role of imagination in conscience 
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and noted parallels between conscience and taste. We noted, with Johnson, that the 
descriptions of our reasoning (including our ethical reasoning) provided by cognitive 
science do not accord with the traditional Enlightenment view. I suggested that 
Johnson's description of moral imagination could provide a coherent approach to ethical 
reflection and proposed the model of an art-critic as appropriate to the moral theorist. 
In Chapter Six I explored the significance of Gadamer's hermeneutics specifically for 
Christian ethics. We characterised Gadamer's position in relation to truth as a form of 
critical realism and noted the implications of this: that truth can only ever be provisional 
and that we must adopt an open listening stance towards others. We briefly considered 
the nature of goodness, truth and beauty, and the relationship of ethics to aesthetics. We 
noted the involvement of imagination in our apprehension of revelation, and its 
importance in a developing tradition. We noted the connections between imagination 
and creativity, and explored briefly the connections with the Christian doctrines of 
Creation and Incarnation. We explored the model of improvisation as an approach to 
Christian ethics; noting the normative control of tradition and the sensus communis, and 
the significance of inspiration by the Holy Spirit. I suggested that Christian ethics, 
conceived as a hermeneutical endeavour would need to adopt the approach of rhetoric 
rather than simple logical argument, and that casuistry would be an important element. I 
suggested that ethical deliberation should be considered as an art and that its judgements 
might best be evaluated by aesthetic criteria. Whilst not adopting Fletcher's agapeistic 
calculus, we noted that ethical deliberation would have to take proper account of the 
'situation' and that love would be an important criterion in the evaluation of ethical 
judgements. 
7.2 The hermeneutics of experience 
In Truth and Method Gadamer strives to do justice to the truth of aesthetic experience 
and overcome the radical subjectivisation of the aesthetic that began with Kant. 
Aesthetic experience cannot be abstracted from real life and it should not be denied as a 
mode of knowledge which conveys truth. I have argued that the same considerations are 
"'"- ---<true"- Of ·our-·,moral·experience ···(our~experience·'·Ofthe oegood' ·and' of relationship"'with-
others). Gadamer argues against the notion of experience in the natural sciences, 
suggesting that its meaning has become severely restricted: the 'inner historicity of 
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experience' is simply ignored. He also argues that 'language is already present in any 
acquisition of experience' 1 and that 'pure reason' is simply a fantasy as we are 
completely unable to free ourselves from the prejudices and predispositions of our 
language. How then should we approach 'experience' as a theological source? 
Christian theology has recognised four main sources: Scripture, reason, tradition and 
experience. 'Experience' in this context refers primarily to the subjective inner life of 
individuals, their feelings and emotions, in contrast to the 'objective' outward world. 
Experience has been seen either as a privileged source of divine revelation; or as 
standing in need of interpretation within a theological framework. As a source of divine 
revelation, appeals have often been made to a core religious experience common to all 
humankind. George Lindbeck concludes that there is little evidence for such universal 
experience and dismisses the theory as hopelessly vague and incapable of verification.2 
At the other extreme, rather than unwarranted confidence in experience there has been 
unwarranted scepticism: experience by itself has been regarded as unable to offer any 
reliable theological data: rather, it must always be interpreted and corrected by theology. 
Ludwig Feuerbach, for example, provided a devastating critique of theologies based on 
experience in his account of projection: what we interpret as experience of God may in 
truth be no more than experience of ourselves.3 A similar dichotomy in relation to the 
role and authority of experience exists in moral theory: it has been well characterised by 
Sabina Lovibond.4 
It seems to me that Gadamer's hermeneutics may offer a middle road: a more 
reasonable approach to the place of experience in theology generally, and more 
specifically in ethics. If we adopt a hermeneutical approach to understanding experience 
then we may be able to chart a safe course between the Scylla of naive realism and the 
Charybdis of projection and total relativism. Critical realism allows us to assert the 
reality encountered in experience whilst accepting that our understanding of it is 
necessarily limited by our historical, cultural and linguistic situation. Experience is 
constituted by, and constitutive of, language and concepts, and is mediated by 
TM, 348. 
2 George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 1984), 31. 
3 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity [1841), trans. George Eliot (Buffalo: Prometheus 
Books, 1989). 
4 Sabina Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). 
243 
imagination: Lovibond makes the case for imagination as the mediator between 
emotivist and realist ethical theories. We have encountered another hermeneutic circle: 
tradition and theology are interpreted by experience, and experience is interpreted by 
tradition and theology. Experience can no longer be simply accepted as authoritative, 
nor can it be summarily dismissed. We will now consider some of the implications of 
such a hermeneutical approach for the current debate in the Anglican Communion 
concerning homosexuality. 
7.3 The Anglican debate about homosexuality 
Andrew Goddard is rightly critical of 
those who ... manage to combine a remarkably naive hermeneutic in relation to 
experience (especially when the interpretation of their own experience offered 
by those who present as marginalised or victims is granted an almost sacred 
quality which puts it beyond critique) while emphasising the complexities of 
interpreting biblical texts and employing a hermeneutic of suspicion in relation 
to them. 5 
It seems to me that what is required is a thoroughly hermeneutical approach to 
experience, as well as to Scripture, and indeed to tradition, culture, ethical texts, art, 
literature, culture, and the narratives of moral lives (our own and others). Such an 
approach will find places for imaginative engagement, for listening to others, and for a 
hermeneutic of suspicion and self-criticism. Space will not allow a thorough exploration 
of the implications of a hermeneutical approach to all aspects of this complex debate.6 
However, I hope to identify some areas where such an approach may have useful 
insights to offer, particularly in terms of how the debate is conducted rather than in 
terms of the conclusions it should reach. 
5 Andrew Goddard, 'Listening to Learn, Learning to Listen', 2006, Fulcrum (http://www.fulcrum-
anglican.org.uk!news/2006/newsletterl O.cfm?doc= 149), 8. 
6 See Christina Sumners, Reconsider: A Response to Issues in Human Sexuality and a Plea to the 
Church to Deal Boldly with Sexual Ethics (London: Lesbian & Gay Christian Movement, 1995); 
Andrew Linzey and Richard Kirker (eds.), Gays and the Future of Anglicanism: Responses to the 
Windsor Report (Winchester: 0 Books, 2005); Andrew Linzey, Has Anglicanism a Future? A 
Response to the Windsor Report (London: LGCM, 2005); The House of Bishops, Some Issues in 
Human Sexuality: A Guide to the Debate (London: Church House Publishing, 2003); The House of 
Bishops, Issues in Human Sexuality (London: Church House Publishing, 1991 ); The Lambeth 
Commission on Communion, The Windsor Report (London: Anglican Consultative Council, 2004); 
Mark Bonnington and Bob Fyall, Homosexuality and the Bible (Cambridge: Grove Books, 1996); 
Anglican Mainstream UK and The Church of England Evangelical Council, Repair the Tear. The 
Windsor Report: An Assessment and Call for Action (London: 2004); Oliver O'Donovan, 
'Homosexuality in the Church: Can There Be a Fruitful Theological Debate?' in Eugene F. Rogers Jr. 
(ed.), Theology and Sexuality: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 373-
86. 
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Michael Vasey suggests that much of the debate on homosexuality suffers from a failure 
to address the presuppositions and interpretive frameworks that people bring to it.7 
Admittedly the situation is complex and there are many contextual factors operating: for 
example, the different secular understandings of homosexuality in different parts of the 
world and among different groups of people; the missionary situation of the church 
(directed primarily against secularism in the West and against Islam in many parts of 
Africa); the inherited faith of African and South American churches and a backlash 
against European imperialism; different approaches to biblical hermeneutics; Western 
postmodernism and African and South American premodernism mixed with colonially 
imposed modernism;8 and no doubt many others. 9 The debate should not be too readily 
reduced to a matter of disagreement about the interpretation of Scripture or to a contest 
between the Northern and Southern hemispheres. 10 A hermeneutical approach would 
require us to pay more attention to contextual factors and might allow us to conclude 
that the issues under debate are not actually the same on all occasions; that there is not 
simply one debate about homosexuality in the Anglican Communion but several. While 
all parties tend to frame 'homosexuality' according to their own understanding, it may 
be that even the nature of the 'homosexuality' in question is not the same in all cases. 
As Oliver O'Donovan notes: 
If there is anything more disconcerting than the hesitation and uncertainty with 
which theologians propose their answers on this subject, it is the dogmatic 
certainty with which they frame their questions. 11 
It may be that there will be more than one 'right answer' and that the church will need 
to adopt different approaches in different contexts. Contributions to the debate are 
sometimes based on a particular conception of homosexuality and may be phrased in 
inflammatory language, like the following from the Archbishop of Nigeria, Peter 
Akinola: 
Homosexuality or lesbianism or bestiality is to us a form of slavery, and 
redemption from it is readily available through repentance and faith in the 
saving grace of our Lord, Jesus the Christ. 12 
7 Michael Vasey, Strangers and Friends: A New Exploration of Homosexuality and the Bible 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1995), 23-67. 
8 See e.g. Anglican Mainstream UK and The Church of England Evangelical Council, Repair the Tear. 
The Windsor Report: An Assessment and Call for Action. Anglican Mainstream criticise ECUSA for 
their 'apparently uncritical embrace of post-modem and relativist understandings oftruth'. 
9 See Ruth Gledhill, 'For God's Sake: An Interview with Peter Akin()la', The Times (London), July 5 
2007. 
10 The Anglican Communion, 'The Listening Process Website: An Overview of the Summaries', 2007 
(http://www.aco.org/listening/reports/). 
11 O'Donovan, 'Homosexuality in the Church', 377. 
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Obviously it Is an important question whether homosexuality is a transcultural 
psychological condition (the essentialist view) or a series of diverse, historically 
conditioned stances more akin to ethnic or national character (the constructionist view). 
Certainly, we need to be aware that the moral notions and moral language that we use in 
this debate are contemporary constructions. K. Rudy offers a properly hermeneutical 
insight: 
It is only because we live in a culture that bifurcates straight from gay \and uses 
one to define the other) that we see certain historical practices as 'gay'. 1 
Certainly, the prevailing secular views on sexuality have changed. Vasey comments: 
the twentieth century ... perspective sees sexual activity as essentially good and 
associates it primarily with relationship rather than procreation. 14 
Once the Church accepts this position and agrees that the unitive purposes of sexual 
behaviour alone are an adequate basis for a moral relationship the issue becomes simply 
the gender of the partners. It is worth remembering that the full range of sexual practices 
available to homosexual couples is also indulged in by many heterosexual couples. 
Consequently, judgements as to the morality of certain abstracted 'acts' do not help to 
distinguish between homosexuality and heterosexuality but apply equally to both. As M. 
J. Hartwig observes: 
the fundamental question about the morality of homosexual activity remains that 
of whether the homosexual relationship is a context within which individuals 
can grow in their love for God and for others. 15 
The Church has to deal imaginatively with new data arising from the experience of 
homosexual people; 'from the particular stories of those who live integrated, virtuous, 
and flourishing lives as covenanted homosexuals' 16 and from those who believe that 
homosexuality does constitute a 'parallel and alternative form of human sexuality as 
complete within the terms of the created order as the heterosexual'? 17 The Episcopal 
Church of the USA, for example, sees itself at the end of a forty year 'listening process' 
with its own momentum in which they have already heard the voices of lesbian and gay 
12 Simon Sarmiento, 'What Archbishop Akinola Said (or Not)', 2005, Thinking Anglicans 
(http://www.thinkinganglicans.org.uklarchives/000985.html). 
13 K. Rudy, 'The Social Construction of Sexual Identity and the Ordination of Practicing 
Homosexuals', Journal of Religious Ethics 25, no. I (1997), 133-38, at I 37. 
14 Vasey, Strangers and Friends, 46. 
15 M. J. Hartwig, 'Galileo, Gene Researchers and the Ethics of Homosexuality', Theology & 
Sexuality 1 (1994 ), 1 06-1 1, at 1 09. 
16 S. J. Pope, 'Scientific and Natural Law Analyses of Homosexuality: A Methodological Study', 
Journal of Religious Ethics 25, no. I (1997), I27-46, at 112. 
17 The House of Bishops, Issues in Human Sexuality, 40. 
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Christians; pastoral sensitivity now demands their full inclusion. 18 They have no wish to 
impose such an answer on the whole of the Communion; they simply want the 
autonomy to proceed as they feel called by the Holy Spirit. 
The Anglican Communion has been encouraged since at least 1978 to listen to the 
experience of gay and lesbian people: 
The Church, recognising the need for pastoral concern for those who are 
homosexual, encourages dialogue with them. 19 
This was reaffirmed in 198820 and in 199821 but the whole process has, as Andrew 
Goddard has shrewdly noted, been hindered by an impaired understanding (on both 
sides of the debate) of the nature of such a listening process. Goddard writes from an 
evangelical position and is conservative on this issue ('the proper context for sexual 
expression is the union of a man and a woman in marriage') but he engages creatively 
and imaginatively with those of different views and, unlike some of those he criticises, 
refuses to close down the debate before it has even begun. He quotes an Anglican 
Mainstream article 'What is meant by listening?' which outlines their understanding in 
relation to Lambeth Resolution 1.10: 
It is clear that the comment on listening is subservient to the fact that such 
relationships are wrong in Scripture ... the reason we have to listen to [those 
who live in same-sex relationships] is so that they can be transformed and not 
continue in relationships which are unscriptural.22 
Goddard argues that such an understanding does no justice to the concept of 'dialogue' 
as set out in the original resolution. The emphasis in the Lambeth resolution was on 
overcoming homophobia through true dialogue and not simply on restating the 
traditional position on homosexuality. As Goddard suggests, what is needed is real 
listening, a properly hermeneutical openness to the voices and traditions of others as we 
attempt to interpret secular culture guided by the Holy Spirit. It is vitally important that 
the Church listens to the experience of all people and acknowledges that she has much 
to learn about the experiences of homosexual people and the contexts and situations in 
18 See The Episcopal Church of the USA, To Set Our Hope on Christ: A Response to the Invitation of 
Windsor Report Paragraph 135 (New York: ECUSA, 2005), 40-43, also foreword and appendix. 
19 The Lambeth Conference, 'Resolutions from 1978' 
(http://www.lambethconference.org/resolutions/1978/). Resolution I 0. 
20 The Lambeth Conference, 'Resolutions from 1988' 
(http://www.lambethconference.org/resolutions/1988/). Resolution 64. 
21 The Lambeth Conference, 'Resolutions rrom 1998, 
(http://www.lambethconference.org/resolutions/1998/). Resolution 1.1 0. 
22 Anglican Mainstream, 'What Is Meant by Listening?' 2006 
(http://www.anglican-mainstream.net/?p=298). 
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which they live. Listening must be more 'open, humble and fluid than the rather precise, 
controlling and limiting definition offered by Anglican Mainstream'. 23 In such a 
hermeneutical listening process both sides must be open to the possibility that they may 
be transformed by the encounter; both sides must be prepared to put their own 
prejudices at risk. It is simply not possible to define the nature of any such 
transformation in advance.24 
The Anglican Communion characterises its 'Listening Process' in this way: 
A listening process is an open commitment to engage actively in the world and 
thought of the person or people to whom you are listening and a corresponding 
commitment on the part of the other person or people to enter into yours. It does 
not presume agreement or disagreement; it presumes a striving for empathy.25 
This seems to be an entirely appropriate and properly hermeneutical way of approaching 
this particular ethical debate. However, it requires that people approach the debate with 
humility (acknowledging the provisional status of knowledge and revelation) and 
openness to transformation. Goddard concludes that it is perfectly possible to 
understand 'listening' in ways that allow for new insights and the development of 
understanding without either undermining the authority of Scripture or ascribing 
unwarranted privileged status to 'experience'. However, such listening may lead to 
changes in the teaching of the Church. Evangelicals may well have 
a firm conviction that . . . listening to experience should never lead a faithful 
Christian to the conclusion that the Bible is wrong and an unreliable guide to 
God's will for us. 26 
Some gay and lesbian Christians will have an equally firm conviction that listening to 
experience or Scripture should not lead them to deny the reality of their understanding 
of their sexual identity. All involved 'must not be so selective in [their] listening that we 
filter out unwelcome voices' .27 Indeed, as David Brown notes, perceived 'conflict' may 
be integral to the development of the church's understanding. 28 
23 Goddard, 'Listening to Learn, Learning to Listen', 5. 
24 Goddard, 'Listening to Learn, Learning to Listen', II. 
25 The Anglican Communion, 'The Listening Process Website: What Is the Listening Process?' 2007 
(http://www.aco.org/listening/whatis.cfm). 
26 Goddard, 'Listening to Learn, Learning to Listen', I 0. 
27 Goddard, 'Listening to Learn, Learning to Listen', I I. 
28 David Brown, Discipleship and Imagination: Christian Tradition and Truth (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 293-342. 
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Unfortunately, this is often not the approach that is adopted. African (and other 
evangelical) churches committed to literal interpretations of Scripture see any 
accommodation with homosexuality as sinful and as undermining the gospel, a position 
they would impose on the whole of the Anglican Communion.29 Anglican Mainstream, 
for example, see themselves as 
committed to promote, teach and maintain the Scriptural truths on which the 
Anglican Church was founded.30 
For them, these truths are fixed and unchanging. A hermeneutical approach to ethics 
and to Scripture offers a different understanding. In a discussion of interpretation in 
relation to the authority of Scripture, Trevor Hart is critical of those who believe they 
can uncover a final fixed meaning in biblical texts as well as those who believe that the 
meaning of a text is wholly created by its readers. His suggested solution is a form of 
critical realism: 
A properly Christian approach to Scripture ... will be one that seeks to submit to 
the text, presuming on the presence of communicative intent mediated through 
the text, seeking to be constrained in its initial approaches and subsequent 
responses by a discipline of hearing what the text is saying, so far as it is 
possible, and recognizing the partial and provisional nature of all its readings, 
thereby being open and committed to a continuing process of disciplined 
listening and hearing.31 
This approach is thoroughly hermeneutical and in full accord with the approach to 
ethics that I have outlined. If we replace 'Scripture' with 'ethics', 'readings' with 
'understanding', and 'text' with 'ethical text' or 'other' or 'art' or 'literature' or 
'narrative of a moral life' the passage outlines a properly hermeneutical approach to 
ethics, and the openness and commitment to listening are what hermeneutical vigilance 
demands .. 
There are no easy answers to the problems facing the Anglican Communion: many 
involved believe they have nothing to learn from listening. However, a more 
hermeneutical and imaginative approach might lead to a different understanding of the 
questions and to a generous and tolerant debate more fitting to the traditions of 
Anglicanism: imagination may serve us better than reason, and metaphor better than 
29 Gledhill, 'Times Article'. Maurice Sinclair, 'Response to a Catechesis on Homosexuality', 1996 
(http://www.episcopalian.org/cclec/paper-cathomo-sinclair.htm). 
30 Anglican Mainstream, 'Who We Are', 2007 (http://www.anglican-mainstream.net/?page _id=216). 
31 Trevor Hart, 'Tradition, Authority and a Christian Approach to the Bible as Scripture', in Joel B. 
Green and Max Turner (eds.), Between Two Horizons: Spanning New Testament Studies and 
Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, Ml: Eerdmans, 2000), 194-95. 
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rigidly defined concepts. In his introductory notes to O'Donovan's 'Homosexuality in 
the Church', Eugene Rogers writes: 
This piece shows so much change from earlier, more abstract accounts of 
homosexuality [by O'Donovan] . .. that I found myself moved. I asked 
O'Donovan how he mustered the tremendous effort of moral imagination it must 
have taken. He replied that he had written it by reading paragraphs over the 
phone to a friend dying of AIDS. 32 
So, abstraction can indeed be countered by moral imagination and openness to others 
once ethics becomes situated and personal (and hermeneutical).33 
7.4 Conclusions 
In this thesis I have attempted to answer the question: if Hans-Georg Gadamer's 
hermeneutics can govern an interpretation of what ethics is, and how it works, and how 
it can be justified, then what would ethics look like? This has been as a response to 
concerns about abstraction in ethical theory and about the separation of reason from the 
passions, the emotions and the imagination. We have seen that Gadamer's hermeneutics 
can indeed provide a horizon from which to approach ethics. I have suggested that 
ethics should be included in the universal project of hermeneutics, not just because it 
makes good theoretical sense and could help to address some of the shortcomings in 
contemporary ethical theory, but also because it may result in ethical judgements that 
make good practical sense. 
The horizon offered by hermeneutics is one which seems to be already taken for 
granted, at least in part. We have already noted, for example, that the work of Alasdair 
Macintyre and Mark Johnson seems to be entirely consistent with Gadamer's 
hermeneutics, though without any explicit reference to his work. If this indebtedness 
were to be recognised then hermeneutics could be applied to ethics in a more rigorous 
and consistent way. Hermeneutics consistently argues against legalism (absolute truth) 
and utilitarianism (scientific method) and addresses directly the concerns which we 
raised in Chapter Two. In a properly hermeneutical ethics, norms and maxims cannot be 
absolute: the hermeneutic circle demands that we recognise them (together with all 
32 Eugene F Rogers Jr. (ed.), Theology and Sexuality: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2002), 373. 
33 For a further example of the possible impact of moral imagination (this time on international 
peacemaking) see John Paul Lederach, The Mora/Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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understanding) as provisional. We must talk in terms of provisionality, incompleteness 
and probability. Similarly, ethical judgement cannot depend on a universal method. A 
properly situated ethics, which takes account of tradition, history, culture and language 
simply cannot resort to legalism or to universal method. A hermeneutical ethics would 
also recognise Joseph Fletcher's basic position that the situation is decisively important 
in ethical deliberation: neither legalism nor antinomianism is adequate to the task. 
Ethics is no longer a competition between rival theories to provide 'deep' understanding 
of ethical judgements; rather, all ethical theories can cooperate to provide a 'broad' 
understanding. Norms and judgements are to be tested in as many ways as possible. So, 
moral sense, conscience, natural law, virtue and consequences can all be accommodated 
together with traditional moral principles: none is decisive alone. Critical self-
understanding can be included within the hermeneutical and ethical project as Ricoeur's 
principles of recovery and suspicion. A properly hermeneutical ethics would adopt a 
critical realist stance in relation to truth. It would recognise ethical truth as real, but our 
understanding as partial. In this it would distance itself from non-cognitive ( emotivist) 
ethics and from naive realism while still acknowledging the role of emotion in ethics 
and insisting on the truth value of ethical norms and principles, even though they are 
ultimately revisable. Such an ethics would insist on openness to others and on the 
importance of conversation both within and between traditions. A properly 
hermeneutical ethics could not be characterised as either modern or postmodern: the 
scientific criteria of validation as a basis for truth claims (accepted by both) are denied. 
Such an ethics cannot therefore be considered as a form of relativism: as we have seen, 
such a charge is dependent upon the same criteria of validation together with a denial of 
their possibility. Normative control is provided both by tradition and by the sensus 
communis. Ethics is a communal enterprise as much as an individual one. 
The importance of language in relation to understanding and its fundamental 
metaphorical character imply a central role for the imagination in ethical deliberation. 
Fusion of horizons is a work of the imagination. Gadamer' s hermeneutics together with 
Johnson's account of moral imagination provide a better account ofthe phenomenology 
of ethical deliberation than do the traditional accounts. Johnson's account of the nature 
of reason, in the light of recent studies in cognitive science corrects the distorted 
Enlightenment view of abstract and universal reason and denies the separation of reason 
from will and emotion. Reason is properly situated and proceeds inductively utilising 
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prototype definitions and radial categories. The imaginative and creative elements of 
ethics can be illuminated by borrowing terms and ideas from aesthetics. 'The art of 
ethics' and 'moral imagination' are grounded in metaphoric projection from aesthetics 
to ethics; aesthetic criteria may be appropriate in evaluating moral judgements; 
conscience and taste have much in common. Further attention to these parallels may 
provide useful insights into the nature of ethics. 
For Christian ethics, a hermeneutical approach could have great strength, insisting on a 
careful hermeneutical approach to Scripture, tradition, and experience within a 
framework of imaginative reasoning. It could also have significant connections with the 
doctrines of Creation, Incarnation and Trinity. There are also links with narrative ethics 
and with understandings of Christian life as 'performance'. The aesthetic rather than 
scientific approach allows room for the importance of improvisation and inspiration. 
Hermeneutics can help to clarify and justify an ecclesial ethics although it insists that 
any conclusions are provisional. Such an approach to ethics can combine considerations 
of virtue and character with those concerning actions and context. The notion of moral 
formation as training the imagination, together with the importance of listening to others 
brings ethics in line with contemplative prayer and spiritual formation: Christian 
discipleship is all of one piece. 
Unfortunately, the book Faithful Performances: Enacting Christian Tradition came to 
my attention too late for any detailed consideration here.34 However, many of the 
contributions (which concern performance, tradition, identity, worship, ethics and the 
arts) will be directly relevant. Also relevant will be Douglas Hedley's Living Forms of 
the Imagination, due to be published in 2008. 
Much of this depends on a critical realist approach to truth and a developmental 
understanding of revelation. Christian ethics should be the ethics of a particular tradition 
that is constantly open to conversation with others. This openness is equally important 
within the church; particularly at a time when western hegemony is being challenged by 
the rise of the world church. Ethics and the gospel must be worked out in new contexts; 
new traditions must overlap. Gospel and ethics must be contextualised; and the process 
34 Trevor A. Hart and Steven R. Guthrie (eds.), Faithful Performances: Enacting Christian Tradition 
(Aidershot: Ashgate, 2007). 
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will be easter if the western church recognises the contextual nature of its own 
understanding of the gospel and of ethics.35 A hermeneutical ethics properly combines 
what David Brown identifies as the four main principles of what he calls the 'Catholic 
and Anglican' approach to ethics: natural law and conscience, formation and growth in 
holiness, love and the sacredness of the person, justice and the divine society.36 It offers 
a rationale for the importance of such combination together with a unifying thread (the 
imagination) and guidance (aesthetic criteria) for the process without resorting to 
legalism or the application of universal method. 
Ethical deliberation that is properly hermeneutical will adopt the insights of multiple 
theories and be always open to the voices of others. The ethical theorist or moral 
theologian might best be thought of as an art-critic staging an exhibition and writing the 
guidebook in order to develop a theme. Jeffrey Stout describes the process as 
'bricolage': 
Calling attention to the processes of inclusion, exclusion and reconfiguration at 
work in creative moral thought should help us to avoid thinking of ethical 
reasoning merely as a procedure for determining the truth value of moral 
propositions ... The moral bricoleur needs to declare some propositions true, 
some false. But there is more to the process than that. Bricolage can put new 
candidates for truth and falsehood to work, recover old candidates from 
retirement, and alter the current division of conceptual labor. It can give some 
truths pride of ~lace while making others seem trivial or irrelevant, though 
nonetheless true. 7 
Macintyre considers the interminable disagreements that are the 'most striking feature 
of contemporary moral utterance'. 38 He argues that: 
What we possess are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now 
lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess indeed 
simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions. But we 
have- very largely, if not entirely, lost our comprehension, both theoretical and 
practical, ofmorality. 39 
I think Macintyre overstates his case: we may have lost the original understanding of 
the conceptual scheme; but it seems to me that, as our language and tradition have 
developed, we have created new ones. Macintyre focuses on the disagreements between 
35 See Vincent J. Donovan, Christianity Rediscovered: An Epistle from the Masai [1978] (London: 
S.C.M., 2001). 
36 David Brown, Choices: Ethics and the Christian (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 25-55. 
37 Jeffrey Stout, Ethics after Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents (Cambridge: James 
Clarke & Co., 1988), 77. 
38 Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 2nd ed, 1985), 4. 
39 Macintyre, After Virtue, 2. 
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the remnants of competing rival systems and concludes that they simply cannot 
understand one another. Stout, on the other hand, argues that there must be considerable 
basic level agreement between rival traditions for an argument even to develop: if there 
were no agreement or understanding at all, the parties would not recognise the issues as 
of sufficient importance to argue about. 40 It is the very fragments which Macintyre 
identifies (and dismisses) that the moral bricoleur seeks to include, exclude or 
reconfigure. Macintyre's strategy however is to attempt to retrieve the tradition of 
Aristotelian ethics. Gadamer's hermeneutics suggest that the historical distance 
involved can never be completely overcome; we can never retrieve Aristotle's ethics 
completely. We can only work with our partial and situated understandings. We should 
not be thinning out our moral theories; rather we should be considering their effective 
histories (Wirkungsgeschichtes) and encouraging conversation. 
The form of hermeneutical ethics which I have proposed following our explorations of 
Gadamer and Johnson has, in my opinion, the potential to draw on the insights of other 
moral theories and perhaps to unite them into a coherent horizon. Hermeneutical ethics 
would have much in common with the contemporary retrieval of ethics from Aristotle41 
and Aquinas,42 or developments in Natural Law ethics.43 However, the emphases on the 
centrality of the imagination, the creative potential of moral language, and the 
conception of 'embodied reason' would set it apart. Hermeneutic ethics would allow 
new assessments, and perhaps even the overcoming, of several dichotomies in ethics: 
norm-context, cognitivist-noncognitivist, reason-passion, a priori - a posteriori, 
objective-subjective. The conclusions of such an ethics would represent a form of 
casuistry; they would be partial and provisional; they would be rational but not 
rationalistic; and they would be guided by judgements with many similarities to 
aesthetic judgements. 
40 Stout, Ethics after Babel, 13-32. 
41 E.g. Macintyre, After Virtue. 
42 E.g. Jean Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2005). 
43 
.E.g."RufusB1ack, Christian Mora/Realism>Natura/Law, Narrative, Virtue;' and the Gospel (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000); Jean Porter, Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for 
Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, M1: Eerdmans, 1999); Eberhard Schockenhoff, Natural Law and 
Human Dignity: Universal Ethics in an Historical World, trans. Brian McNeil (Washington DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2003). 
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This study differs from prevwus accounts of the ethical dimension of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics in its detailed engagement with Truth and Method; its identification of 
problems with, and common ground between, legalism and utilitarianism; its 
exploration of aesthetics and the parallels between taste and conscience; its 
development of the central role of imagination; its adoption of a form of critical realism; 
and its application to Christian ethics. 
I believe that this study of Gadamer's Truth and Method and its implications lends 
considerable weight to my two major theses: that ethics (including Christian ethics) 
should adopt a stance that is properly hermeneutical; and that human beings are 
fundamentally imaginative moral beings. Hermeneutical ethics could allow a greater 
role for the imagination in moral deliberation and provide a system which is flexible, 
creative and humane; and which properly reflects the goodness and beauty of God. 
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